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et iudicabit gentes et arguet populos multos et conflabunt gladios 
suos in vomeres et lanceas suas in falces non levabit gens contra 
gentem gladium nec exercebuntur ultra ad proelium 
– Isaiah Chapter 2 Verse 4 – Latin Vulgate  
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Abstract 
The subject of this research is “South Africa’s Voluntary Relinquishment of 
its Nuclear Arsenal and Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons in Terms of International Law”. The research found that 
international law considerations did indeed play an important role in 
guiding South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal, and in 
accession to the NPT.  
 
The dissertation was conducted by interviewing an expert sample of the 
key persons who were actually involved with, and led, South Africa’s 
relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The decision to interview the 
expert respondents was followed in order to understand the respondents’ 
animus or state of mind, and the logos of the decision to relinquish the 
nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT.  
 
The study sample included:  
 
• Mr FW de Klerk, former President of South Africa, who instructed 
that the nuclear arsenal should be relinquished, and that South 
Africa should accede to the NPT;  
 
• Professor Wynand Mouton, whom Mr de Klerk appointed as the 
Oversight Auditor of South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and its 
accession to the NPT;  
 
• Professor Waldo Stumpf, who successfully project-managed the 
nuclear relinquishment process, and brought accession to the NPT 
into reality;  
 
• Mr Pik Botha, who was South Africa’s longest-serving Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and who later held the portfolio of Minister of 
Energy. Mr Botha was personally involved in leading many 
important international negotiations that pertained to South Africa’s 
nuclear status over some decades; and 
 
• Dr Neil Barnard, who was Director of South Africa’s National 
Intelligence Service at the time. 
 
An important and new research finding was that all of the respondents 
indicated that the reason the nuclear weapons were relinquished and 
South Africa acceded to the NPT was that the relinquishment of these 
weapons and the accession to the NPT were symbiotically interconnected 
with the constitutional settlement in South Africa. For the respondents, it 
was a causa sine qua non of the international acceptance and recognition 
of South Africa’s non-racial constitutional settlement. The respondents 
were ad idem that it would have been well-nigh impossible to have 
achieved a peaceful constitutional settlement which was internationally 
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legitimate without relinquishing these weapons and acceding to the NPT 
prior to the conclusion of the constitutional negotiations.  
 
Had South Africa held onto this nuclear arsenal, it would have created 
international mistrust, because it would have begged the question (petitio 
principii): “What is the purpose of their retention?” The perpetuation of the 
nuclear weapons programme would have created international doubt as to 
the sincerity of the constitutional transition and contributed to the 
continued recognition of South Africa as a pariah state.  
 
This finding has not been reported in the literature and is therefore a new 
contribution to knowledge about South Africa’s constitutional transition. 
Although not publicly visible, the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and 
South Africa’s accession to the NPT were purposively linked, and indeed 
synchronised, with the constantly changing status of the constitutional 
negotiations – ratione temporis. 
 
The link between the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and the 
accession to the NPT was purposefully kept secret. This was because it 
was reasoned that the matter of South Africa’s design of a nuclear 
arsenal, its possession of these weapons, its dismantlement of these 
weapons, and its accession to the NPT formed such a potentially 
contentious matter, both nationally and internationally, that it could easily 
have thrust the entire constitutional transition into jeopardy. For this 
reason it was decided (wisely, in the researcher’s view) to address the 
matter of relinquishment and accession to the NPT in camera. It was 
conducted in camera because the security of the state was at stake. The 
testimony of the respondents made it clear that this subject was 
sufficiently incendiary to have derailed the constitutional negotiations and 
settlement, and plunged the country into chaos. 
 
The research discovered that the reason the decision was reached to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT was to ensure that 
South Africa was recognised as a constitutional democracy and a 
respected member of the international community of nations. The mission 
was conducted in order to achieve state succession in a stable framework 
of constitutional continuity.  
 
The research also discovered that a number of the countries that have 
relinquished their nuclear weapons and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons did so because of the imperative to 
create a positive state recognition status amongst the international 
community. Had South Africa retained the nuclear arsenal during the 
constitutional negotiations, and afterwards, it would have tainted and 
jeopardised the state succession and the constitutional continuity of the 
country. It would have endowed the government-in-waiting with a 
poisoned chalice and undermined Mr Mandela’s stature as a leader. The 
decision was made by Mr de Klerk and conducted in good faith insofar as 
all stakeholders were concerned.  
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Comity was displayed by the National Party towards the African National 
Congress – the regime-in-waiting – in order to endow it with the 
opportunity of becoming a successful government. The research found 
that Mr de Klerk, together with his team, carefully reconciled and 
harmonised South African municipal law with international law in order to 
obviate a conflict of laws. This harmonisation of law was important in 
establishing respectful relationships and comity with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, which is an organ imbued with international legal 
personality under the United Nations Charter, and with the international 
inspectors, including those from inter alia the United States, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, China and France.   
 
The expert respondents were all in consensus that South Africa could 
never have lawfully deployed the nuclear weapons in any conceivable 
military conflict, including in the case where the very existence of the 
South African State might have been at risk. They unanimously expressed 
the opinion that such usage would have constituted a mala in se and been 
contrary to natural law and peremptory norms of humanity. The principles 
of jus cogens and erga omnes permeated their assessment of the legality 
of any usage of nuclear weapons. 
 
The respondents were also in agreement that any actual use of these 
weapons would be disproportionate, indiscriminate, escalatory, and would 
not be able to discern friend from foe, and therefore would be contrary to 
international humanitarian law. The usage of a nuclear bomb would have 
been a threat to world peace in terms of the United Nations Charter, which 
might have justified a United Nations-sanctioned military invasion of South 
Africa to counteract such a threat to world peace, as was the case when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
 
The interviewees were in consensus that if the nuclear weapons had been 
deployed, they would have escalated conflict, and created an international 
reprisal risk with potentially disastrous consequences for South Africa, the 
region, and indeed for the world at large. The research sample further 
indicated that any operational use of these nuclear weapons would have 
created disproportional consequences, which would, by deduction, have 
contravened inter alia: the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations 
Conventions, the Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928), the Martens Clause, and 
therefore international humanitarian law. 
 
It would have raised the question of state responsibility for wrongful 
actions, which would also have included contraventions of international 
environmental law caused by trans-boundary nuclear pollution. Individuals 
committing wrongful actions could not have pleaded immunity from such 
wrongfulness by claiming immunity under South African municipal law.  
 
The respondents subscribed to a positive law interpretation of the legality 
of nuclear deterrence, which is the position that the Nuclear Weapons 
States have assumed. In its essence, this positive law view subscribes to 
the principle contained in the Lotus case, that what is not prohibited is 
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permitted. Natural law and positive law have oppositional reasoning as 
regards the legality of nuclear weapons, and this logical tension was 
evident in the research. The respondents revealed a difference of opinion 
as far as their understanding of the legality of the development, 
possession, testing and deterrence versus actual usage of nuclear 
weapons is concerned. They were of the view that any military usage or 
nuclear test would be illegal, but regarded the development, possession 
and deterrent usage of nuclear weapons as being lawful.  
 
The relinquishment process and accession to the NPT was conducted as 
a secret set of negotiations contiguous with the constitutional negotiations. 
It is a fact that the African National Congress was not informed about 
these negotiations until Mr de Klerk issued his formal announcement 
about the relinquishment and accession to the NPT on 23 March 1993. Mr 
Mandela was therefore presented with the reality of relinquishment and 
accession as a fait accompli. 
 
South Africa’s rollback is compared with the relinquishment process in Iraq 
in an attempt to discover whether insight and knowledge from the South 
African case might be transferred and applied to other countries that are 
contemplating the same actions. The provisional answer to this question is 
that partial aspects of the knowledge that was created in South Africa 
might possibly constitute elements of precedent. 
 
The application and transference of this knowledge would always need to 
be tailored to the unique context, facts and circumstances that might 
prevail in the transferee state in question. Most certainly all nuclear 
relinquishment and accession processes need to be conducted as 
extremely serious projects and in good faith. 
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Dedication 
This Masters Degree in Law is dedicated to the respondents to this 
research. They consist of a remarkable and small group of men who acted 
wisely, and for the greater good.  
 
They quietly, with humility and without self-aggrandisement, set about 
performing an important and intricate duty concomitantly with the 
constitutional negotiations in South Africa. 
 
They ensured that South Africa was the first country in the world to 
relinquish its nuclear arsenal voluntarily and accede to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
This duty was performed to ensure that the constitutional negotiations 
were concluded successfully so as to set the new, non-racial and 
democratic constitutional order securely in place. 
 
Had this duty not been performed expertly and quietly, as it was, the path 
towards a peacefully-negotiated Constitution, which was a very 
complicated matter in its own right, would have been ever more complex.  
It was also conducted by Mr de Klerk in compliance with peremptory 
norms, in fulfilment of perceived legal obligations to the community of 
nations erga omnes.  
 
At the time when this process was conducted, South Africa oscillated on 
the edge of an incipient civil war. 
 
The respondents assisted in steering South Africa away from this tortured 
fate. 
 
There was wisdom in the spirit and the means which these men devised to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal voluntarily and accede to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
They have created an exemplar.  
 
I am deeply grateful that these respondents shared their wisdom, 
experience and knowledge with me. 
 
I dedicate this research to: 
 
Mr FW de Klerk, who had the foresight, bravery and wisdom to instruct 
that this task should be performed two weeks after he assumed the office 
of President of South Africa in September 1989. He regarded this duty as 
a personal priority. No one apart from the relinquishment team was aware 
that this duty was being conducted, in accordance with an excellently-
structured implementation plan. 
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The researcher’s view is that Mr de Klerk, on the merits of this case alone, 
should probably have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his 
decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal voluntarily and ensure that South 
Africa acceded to the NPT. It was a very important and virtually-unnoticed 
gesture of international peace. 
 
Professor Waldo Stumpf, who practically project-managed the 
relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT in all its 
intricacy. Professor Stumpf was extraordinarily generous with his time and 
energy with the researcher. Professor Stumpf is a brilliant and practical 
man who is owed a great debt by South Africa. 
 
Professor Wynand Mouton, who was appointed by Mr de Klerk as the 
‘Oversight Auditor’ of the task of relinquishing the nuclear arsenal and 
acceding to the NPT. It was absolutely imperative that this task should 
have been overseen by a man of personal and international credibility. Mr 
de Klerk was insistent that the researcher should meet with Professor 
Mouton, and he referred to him as a ‘scientist of note’. The researcher 
discovered that this praise was true. 
 
Mr Pik Botha, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Minister 
of Energy in South Africa, was on the cutting edge of the negotiations 
about South Africa’s nuclear capabilities for decades. He had to address 
the fears of the United States and other countries about South Africa’s 
nuclear proclivity in an appropriate manner, and also dampen the internal 
ardour for nuclear testing amongst the local militarists, who had 
proliferation ambitions. He shared his valuable time and views with 
generosity. 
 
Dr Neil Barnard, who was Director of the National Intelligence Service, for 
his independent, creative, honest and thoughtful view. Dr Barnard 
understood full well the contradiction between the Nuclear-Weapons-
States’ and the Non-Nuclear-Weapons-States‘ differential rights and duties 
in terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. His 
viewpoint is that this inconsistency is a potentially dangerous international 
fault line and needs to be urgently reconciled by treaty. 
 
Mr Mike Louw, who succeeded Dr Neil Barnard as Director of the 
National Intelligence Service and who was a respondent in my doctoral 
research entitled ‘Learning Amongst Enemies – Phenomenological Study 
of South Africa’s Constitutional Negotiations from 1985–1998’. Mr Louw 
displayed a wisdom and thoughtfulness which I respect. 
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Acronyms and Terminology 
AEB Atomic Energy Board 
AEC Atomic Energy Corporation 
ANC African National Congress 
ARMSCOR Armaments Corporation of South Africa 
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
CDA Combined Development Agency 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
DOE Department of Energy – fell under United States’ State 
Department 
DU Depleted Uranium 
First Iraq War Term used by the respondents to describe the Gulf 
War 
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ILC International Law Commission 
Initial Report of 
the International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency 
Termed the ‘Opening Inventory’ in South Africa 
LOSC Law of Sea Convention 
LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NIS National Intelligence Service   
NNWS Non-Nuclear-Weapons-State 
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
also referred to as Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NWS Nuclear-Weapons-State 
NWFZ Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone  
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice (The 
predecessor of the International Court of Justice)  
PIV Physical Inventory Verification 
PNET Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
RENAMO Resistencia Naçional Moçambicana (Mozambique 
National Resistance Movement) 
SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation  
SADF South African Defence Force 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
Second Iraq War Term used by the respondents to describe the 2003 
invasion of Iraq by the United States and Great Britain  
SGA Safeguarding Agreement 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
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Threshold States States that are presumed to have developed a nuclear 
weapons capability but have chosen not to accede to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. They include: India, Israel, North Korea and 
Pakistan 
TBVC States Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei – 
apartheid states that were recognised only by South 
Africa      
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission, responsible only 
for chemical and biological weapons, and long-range 
missiles 
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission 
Vastrap The English translation of this Afrikaans name of the 
location of the nuclear test silos in the Kalahari Desert 
means ‘trap’; ‘snared’; ‘ensnared’; ‘trapped’; 
‘entrapment’; ‘beguiled’  or ‘entrapped’, depending 
upon the context of usage  
Y Plant Produced Highly Enriched Uranium, an integral 
element of South Africa’s nuclear bomb 
 
 21 
Chapter One  
Research Questions, Aims and Methodology  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to take a single case study of the South African 
negotiations relating to voluntary relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and 
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(‘NPT’) in terms of international law, and by using phenomenology, to build 
theory about this process where no such theory exists. To date there is no 
comprehensive primary research with a participant sample of the decision-
makers who relinquished the South African nuclear arsenal and acceded 
to the NPT in terms of international law. It is intended that the new 
knowledge uncovered by the research will be applicable to, and of 
assistance to, legal advisors and decision-makers who are involved in 
seeking nuclear rollback in other countries around the world. 
 
This chapter is divided into three broad sections. It offers an historical 
background as to how South Africa came to develop and acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability, and then it provides an introduction as to what 
circumstances and factors led to the decision to relinquish these weapons 
and presents the rationale as to why South Africa acceded to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons in terms of international law. 
The research established that Mr de Klerk instructed that these nuclear 
weapons should be relinquished in order to ensure that the carefully-
crafted, democratically-established constitutional settlement would be 
internationally recognised. Had South Africa’s nuclear arsenal not been 
relinquished in compliance with standards set by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s safeguard inspectorate, and had these nuclear bombs 
and manufacturing facilities been discovered in the midst of the 
negotiations to establish a new non-racial democratic constitution, trust in 
the good faith of the political transition would have been destroyed. One 
can only speculate about the ramifications that such a disclosure would 
have had upon South Africa’s already then pariah status international 
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relations. The retention of these nuclear weapons and the maintenance of 
a nuclear weapons-making capability would have been an impediment to 
South Africa’s gaining international recognition, as it would have 
undermined national and international trust in the bona fides of the 
constitutional transition and its substance. 
 
Secondly, this chapter offers an introduction to the relevant law and its 
context as it pertains to the possession and relinquishment of nuclear 
weapons.  
 
Thirdly, it sets out the research method and theory. The reader will notice 
that the research method and theory are presented in more depth and 
more extensively than is usually the case in a legal thesis. This is because 
a distinguishing feature of this thesis is that much of the research is 
primary and sourced from the persons who actually led the relinquishment 
process and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. The research is addressed to a small set of respondents who 
were intrinsically involved in the various phases of the nuclear programme, 
from its development to its relinquishment. A set of questions was posed 
to each of these respondents, and these questions are outlined in this 
chapter under the section that addresses the research method and theory. 
 
The list of respondents included Mr FW de Klerk, who was President of 
the Republic of South Africa and issued the instruction to relinquish these 
weapons, and set the task of South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Professor Wynand Mouton, a 
nuclear physicist, was placed in charge of the ‘oversight auditing’ of South 
Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear weapons and capabilities in 
accordance with the standards set by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and its inspectorate, which is the international nuclear 
watchdog of the United Nations. Mr de Klerk appointed Professor Mouton 
into this role of ‘oversight auditor’. 
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Professor Waldo Stumpf was delegated by Mr de Klerk to ‘project manage’ 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear weapons capability in 
accordance with the standards set by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. This also required compliance with relevant municipal and 
international laws. The ‘oversight auditor’ and the ‘project management’ of 
the nuclear weapons and accession process were conducted in harmony 
with both international law and South African municipal law, so as to 
forestall a possible conflict of laws.  
 
Dr Neil Barnard, who headed the National Intelligence Service at the time 
of the development of South Africa’s nuclear deterrent capability, was 
another respondent. Dr Barnard possessed a specialised knowledge of 
nuclear deterrence, having conducted his doctorate on this subject. He 
was involved in the inception aspect of the programme under the 
leadership of President PW Botha. Dr Barnard attended and participated 
in many crucial meetings relating to South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
policy. The National Intelligence Service was South Africa’s official 
intelligence agency. 
 
Mr Pik Botha was South Africa’s longest-serving Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. His career spanned all the phases of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons programme, from its inception to its relinquishment. Mr Botha 
addressed the international relations political edge of the nuclear weapons 
programme. He was appointed as the Minister of Mining and Energy after 
the nuclear weapons had been relinquished and South Africa had acceded 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
Mr Mike Louw, who succeeded Dr Neil Barnard as the leader of the 
National Intelligence Service, was technically not part of the research 
sample. He was a primary respondent in the doctoral research conducted 
by the researcher.1 Mr Louw’s submission during the doctoral research 
                                                
1 Heald, Geoffrey Ronald. 2006. ‘Learning Amongst Enemies: A Phenomenological Study of the 
South African Constitutional Negotiations from 1985 to 1998’. PHD submitted to University of 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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provided the lead that made it clear that the relinquishment of the nuclear 
arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons had a fundamental bearing on the international support and 
state recognition that South Africa was able to achieve for its constitutional 
transition. It is for this reason that certain testimony from Mr Louw is 
included in this research. 
 
The reader should note that the historical background, the relevant law 
and context, and the research method and theory are not perfectly 
discrete entities. These themes do overlap and intersect with each other 
from time to time, and this categorisation is not always as perfect and 
conceptually neat as one might wish. 
 
It was initially envisioned that this research would explore “South Africa’s 
Voluntary Relinquishment of its Nuclear Arsenal and Accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Terms of 
International Humanitarian Law”. The focus on international humanitarian 
law would have been particularly appropriate had South Africa been at war 
during the relinquishment and accession period. However, South Africa 
was not at war during this time; rather, it existed in a rather fragile peace. 
International humanitarian law is concerned with the norms, obligations 
and rules which are incumbent upon the conduct of states during times of 
war. It is the law of war. 
 
International law, on the other hand, has a broader ambit and relates to 
the rights, duties, and norms that govern the conduct and intercourse 
between states during times of peace. International private law, otherwise 
known as the conflict of law, concerns the interrelationship between a 
country’s municipal law and international law.  It was found in this research 
that the harmonisation and alignment between South African municipal 
law and international law was a matter of vital importance to 
understanding both why and how the nuclear arsenal was relinquished 
and South Africa acceded to the NPT. International environmental law, 
which is an increasingly important branch of international law, provided a 
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growing insight into the legality of nuclear testing and the consequential 
matter of trans-boundary pollution that arises from such tests. International 
customary law was also important to this research, as all the respondents 
indicated that the deployment of a nuclear bomb in war would have been 
contrary to peremptory norms of international law and jus cogens, and that 
there was therefore an obligation – erga omnes – to relinquish these 
weapons in order that South Africa should not come to be regarded as a 
threat to world peace. 
 
The prohibition on aggression and the use of force is viewed as a 
cornerstone of the United Nations system and was found by the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case in 1986 to be a rule of 
customary law.2 3 4  The Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928) – ‘The Great Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War’ – was concluded in an attempt to counteract 
the horror and slaughter that occurred in the trenches of France during 
World War I. The NPT was similarly conceived after the catastrophic 
implications of the humanitarian horror of the detonation of the atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki started to dawn on international 
opinion. It was likewise codified into international law. The omnipresence 
of the United Nations Charter Article 2(4) would guide the legality of the 
design, possession, deterrent usage, putative military usage, and 
relinquishment of nuclear weapons in South Africa.  
 
Maritime law and the law of the sea, together with airspace law, also 
played a role in understanding the legal status of nuclear weapons5 in 
South Africa. International humanitarian law is in itself a branch of 
international law. All of these branches of law fell under the core mantle of 
international law and it was for this reason that it was decided to conduct 
                                                
2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) Merits, 1986 
ICJ Reports 14 at 98–100. 
3 Dugard, John. 2007. International Law: A South African Perspective (with contributions by 
Bethlehem, Daniel, du Plessis, Max & Katz, Anton). Third Edition. Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd. 
501–502.  
4 Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928) – ‘The Great Treaty for the Renunciation of War’. 
5 Multilateral Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water (Moscow Test Ban Treaty), done 5 August 1963 [1963] 2 UST 1313, T.IA.S. No 
5433, 480 UNTS 43 at 889. 
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this research into the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession 
to the NPT6 in terms of international law, rather than strictly under 
international humanitarian law. It widened the terms of reference of this 
research, which might otherwise have been unnecessarily restrictive. Ian 
Brownlie notes that international law consists of that body of rules and 
principles that are binding on states and is comprised of specific and 
general rules.7  
 
An example of a specific rule of international law is that genocide is 
forbidden. The respondents contended that the wars that were being 
fought in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique, as well as the insurrection in 
South Africa against apartheid, were entirely the wrong type of conflict for 
the use of nuclear weapons, and that any such usage would probably 
have constituted a crime against humanity and been considered 
genocidal. 
 
Another specific rule of international law is that dum-dum bullets, which 
cause cruel forms of suffering, are expressly prohibited.8 The matter of the 
cruelty of nuclear weapons is raised frequently in the literature on the law 
                                                
6 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (usually referred to as the “NPT”) is 
the singular most important codification of international law as it pertains to a country’s 
development and possession of a nuclear weapons capability in international law. The NPT is 
supportive of peaceful civilian developments of nuclear capability, for example, in the fields of 
inter alia energy creation and nuclear medicine. The NPT is effectively implemented by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its inspectorate, who are comprised from nuclear 
physicists and experts from all over the world. The IAEA is a United Nations agency which has its 
head office in Vienna.    
7 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 12–13.  
8 The Hague Convention of 1899 Declaration III prohibits the use in international warfare that 
easily expand or flatten in the body. This was adopted at the First Peace Conference of 29 July, 
1899. It states: “The Undersigned, Plenipotentaries of the Powers represented at the International 
Peace Conference at the Hague, duly authorized to that effect by their governments, inspired by 
the sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St Petersburg of the 29th November 
(11th December), 1868, Declare as follows: ‘The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use 
of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, 
which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.’ The present Declaration is 
binding on the Contracting Powers in the case of war between two or more of them. It shall cease 
to be binding from the time, when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the 
belligerents is joined by a non-contracting power.” (This prohibition expanded upon the 
Declaration of St Petersburg of 1868, which banned exploding projectiles of a mass less than 
400 grams.)  
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as it pertains to nuclear weapons, but was not specifically alluded to by the 
respondents. 
 
General rules of war include the requirement that the use of force should 
be proportionate to the military objectives. It is a law of war that the use of 
force should discriminate civilians from combatants, and friend from foe. 
This distinction is of vital importance to the conduct of war, which has only 
one legal objective: to defeat the enemy. The respondents unanimously 
contended that any usage in South Africa would have contravened the 
general rules of war, inasmuch as they would have been indiscriminate 
and disproportionate. International law can be distinguished from 
municipal law by the fact that it does not possess a constitutional 
mechanism to create law. The sources of international law are codified in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.9 The law of 
treaties and the sources of international law together contribute towards 
the regime for international humanitarian law, which can be understood as 
the law of conduct between enemies in war. It is necessary that the term 
‘treaty’ should be defined at the outset, because this research addresses 
South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, which is regarded as a pre-eminent instrument of international 
law. 
 
The International Law Commission defined a treaty as: 
 
“... any international agreement in written form, whether embodied in a single instrument, 
or in two or more related instruments, and, whatever its particular designation (treaty, 
convention, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchanges of 
notes, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi or any other 
appellation), concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international 
law”.10 11 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a law-making 
treaty that has led to the creation of norms regulating the conduct between 
                                                
9 United Nations Charter Articles 92–96 . 
10 Yearbook, International Law Commission (1962), ii at 161. 
11 United Nations Charter Article 93(1). 
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states. Resolutions reached at the General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency are binding upon members. The NPT specifies 
uniform terms and conditions for the parties that have acceded to this 
treaty. These terms and conditions are subject to constant modification 
and adaptation in accordance with the development of nuclear innovation. 
The NPT has created general norms for future conduct between parties in 
terms of legal propositions. 
 
1.2 Historical Background – The Evolution of South Africa’s 
Nuclear Weapons Capability 
The chronology of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme is not 
controversial, and a detailed explication of it has been presented by Zondi 
Masiza.12 There are four time-lines that underpin this research. The first 
pertained to the beginning phase, when South Africa developed its nuclear 
arsenal. This period was from 1977 to 1989. It was the time of the wars in 
Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and turmoil among the Frontline 
States, where international humanitarian law obtained. 
 
The second time-line was the relinquishment period from September 1989 
to 23 March 1993, when the final announcement of South Africa’s 
accession to the NPT was made. This time period was characterised by 
growing peace in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and the Frontline States, 
and international law still obtained. The third time-line is from 23 March 
1993 to 8 July 1996, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
rendered its seminal Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and 
Use of Nuclear Weapons. The focus on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict will 
be used throughout the research to provide a perspective of South Africa’s 
status in terms of international law. 
 
                                                
12 Masiza, Zondi. 1993. ‘A Chronology of South Africa’s Nuclear Program’. The Nonproliferation 
Review, 35–55, Fall.  
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The fourth time-line is from 1996 to 2003. 2003 witnessed the Second 
Iraqi War start with the allied invasion of that country. The following 
discussion will be devoted to placing the overall timelines into the context 
of the research as certain phases of the nuclear weapons programme are 
more relevant to this research than others. 
 
1.2.1 The Development of  the Vastrap Nuclear Test Site in the 
Kalahari Desert until the Decision to Relinquish the Nuclear 
Arsenal in September 1989 
In the beginning phase of the research, Mr Pik Botha was the primary 
original source of information and authority. The literature review 
substantiates the entire thrust of his oral feedback. The period leading up 
to the core focus of the research can be regarded as starting in 1977, 
when construction commenced on the Koeberg nuclear power station in 
Melkbosstrand, about twenty kilometres outside Cape Town, and when the 
Soviet Union located two hitherto unknown South African nuclear test silos 
situated at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert.13 
 
In 1977 a Soviet satellite identified and photographed South Africa’s 
nuclear test site at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert. The Russians informed 
the United States of America about this development in terms of their 
obligations arising from the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and handed 
over the photographs of this military nuclear installation to the USA. The 
USSR requested the US to follow up on this matter because, inter alia, the 
Soviet Union and South Africa were in a state of war in Angola. This 
period coincided with the administration of President Jimmy Carter, in the 
USA. It was also in 1977 that South Africa was denied its seat on the 
board of the International Atomic Energy Association, and Egypt took its 
place. 
 
                                                
13 Confirmed during interview with Mr Pik Botha in Pretoria North on 18 February 2008. 
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1.2.2 The Core Phase of Relinquishment and its Legitimising 
Function with respect to the Constitutional Negotiations  
The core relinquishment phase began in September 1989 and ended on 
23 March 1993. It was in September 1989, approximately two weeks after 
Mr FW de Klerk had assumed the Presidency of South Africa, that he 
called for a meeting at the Union Buildings in Pretoria. Professors Waldo 
Stumpf and Wynand Mouton were in attendance, as were Mr Pik Botha, 
Dr Neil Barnard and others. 
 
Mr de Klerk informed this meeting that he would turn South Africa into a 
constitutional democracy. He instructed those present that South Africa’s 
nuclear arsenal should be relinquished, and that the country should 
accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. South 
Africa’s ‘point of accession’ to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was 10 July 
1991. Professor Waldo Stumpf revealed that Mr de Klerk withheld the 
public announcement of accession to the NPT for almost two years 
(20 months) after the point of accession until 23 March 1993, because he 
needed to manage two crucial issues. The first was the danger of being 
sucked into the Iraqi conflict by association and perceptions. Both South 
Africa and Iraq were regarded as pariah States, but for entirely different 
reasons. Although South Africa had never breached the NPT as such, the 
premature announcement of its nuclear capability and intentions could 
have induced a proliferation panic.14 It could also have led to the non-
recognition of the at that time putative constitutional settlement. 
 
The second issue was that Mr de Klerk needed to manage the equally 
volatile internal perceptions within South Africa in order to ensure the 
smooth conclusion of the constitutional transition. There was sufficient 
                                                
14 It is the researcher’s view that South Africa, although it had not signed the NPT, was probably a 
party to the NPT by virtue of its conduct. Ian Brownlie op cit (2003) at 13 asserts that treaties like 
the NPT “are in principle only binding on parties, but the number of parties, the explicit 
acceptance of rules of law, and, in some cases the declaratory nature of the provisions produce a 
strong law-creating effect at least as great as the general practice considered sufficient to support a 
customary rule. By their conduct non-parties may accept the provisions of a multilateral 
convention as representing general international law: this has been the case with the Hague 
Convention IV of 1907 and the rules annexed relating to land warfare. Even an unratified treaty 
may be regarded as evidence of generally accepted rules, at least in the short run”. 
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potential alienation within his own party, the political parties on the far 
right, the liberal opposition, the African National Congress, the Communist 
Party, the United Democratic Front and the Pan African Congress to 
scupper the constitutional negotiations, which would have raised the very 
real risk of South Africa veering off into a vicious racial civil war. 
 
The reason for Mr de Klerk’s instructing the delegates at that September 
1989 meeting that South Africa should accede to the NPT was that this 
was crucial to affording legitimacy and credibility to the constitutional 
transition that was being negotiated at that time. In short, it was to assist in 
securing international recognition for the new constitution. South Africa 
would in so doing regain inter alia its seat on the IAEA. The 
announcement of South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and 
accession to the NPT would have the full authority of the Security Council 
and the General Assembly of the United Nations.15 The South African 
expert sample contained in this research was cognisant and respectful of 
the IAEA’s legal personality.16 17 South Africa’s relinquishment of its 
nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT would therefore also receive 
the support of the five Nuclear-Weapons-States (NWS), which are the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation 
(previously the Soviet Union), China and France. The relinquishment 
process could be understood as a necessary baptismal ritual of comity 
that would afford credibility and recognition to the birth of the new 
constitutional democracy that was being negotiated at the same time as 
the events contained in this research were unfolding.  
 
It is important to note that Mr Nelson Mandela was informed on 23 March 
1993 for the first time as a fait accompli that South Africa had developed a 
                                                
15 Dugard op cit (2007) at 1 confirms that the ICJ stated: “That is not the same thing as saying that 
it is a state, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same 
as those of a state. Still less is it the same thing as saying that it is a ‘super-state’ … what it does 
mean is that it is subject to international law and capable of possessing international rights and 
duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bring international claims.”  
16 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Report 174 at 
179. 
17 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (29 July 1957). [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iaea.org/about/statute.html  
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nuclear arsenal, relinquished it and acceded to the NPT. This was nearly 
two years after South Africa had reached the point of accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 10 July 1991. 
 
Mr Mandela was entirely excluded from all aspects of the relinquishment 
and accession process up to the time of the announcement, as it was 
considered that his involvement in this process might have intruded upon 
South Africa’s process of achieving international constitutional recognition. 
This confirms that the relinquishment process and accession to the NPT 
were conducted quietly by a unilateral decision. The African National 
Congress, which was effectively the regime-in-waiting, was excluded from 
this decision from alpha to omega.  
 
1.2.3 The Concluding Phase: Accession to the Treaty of Pelindaba 
in 1994  
In 1994 the Treaty of Pelindaba was signed. This Treaty made the entire 
African continent a nuclear-weapons-free zone.18 It articulated the opinion, 
expressed by the International Court of Justice two years later on 8 July 
1996 when it presented its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use or 
Threat of Nuclear Weapons, that there was a great imperative to turn the 
entire world into a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The Advisory Opinion of 
the ICJ is the most authoritative assessment presented to date of the law 
as it pertains to nuclear weapons. 
 
1.2.4 The Failed Mission to Iraq to Offer Advice on a Possible 
Methodology to Relinquish their Weapons   
The final phase of this research is devoted to a comparative assessment 
of how South Africa and Iraq set about relinquishing their respective 
nuclear arsenals and addressed these accession processes. Mr Thabo 
Mbeki, the then President of South Africa, called a meeting in 2003, about 
two weeks before the United States of America and Great Britain invaded 
Iraq. He instructed that a South African team which was expert in the 
                                                
18 Op cit Goldblat at 18.   
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relinquishment of weapons of mass destruction, and which had led the 
accession to the NPT, should visit Iraq and inform the Iraqis about the 
methodologies that had been applied in South Africa to relinquish its 
weapons of mass destruction and accede to the NPT. The purpose of this 
meeting was to forestall the allied invasion of Iraq.  
 
This attempt at providing a knowledge transfer from South Africa to Iraq 
failed. A comparative analysis of the relinquishment and accession 
processes of these two countries was subsequently conducted in order to 
derive a clearer indication of why this knowledge transfer failed, with the 
objective of overcoming these weaknesses in approach in possible future 
instances of a similar nature.19   
 
1.2.5 Contextualisation of Historical Background 
It is a little known fact that South Africa designed and developed six-and-
a-half Hiroshima-strength “nuclear devices that were suitable for testing”.20 
These were in a state of ‘testing readiness’ in the late 1980s, but were not 
operationally ready.21 According to Wynand de Villiers, Roger Jardine and 
Mitchell Reiss: “South Africa is the world’s first instance of nuclear 
rollback, a state which has unilaterally and voluntarily relinquished nuclear 
weapons.”22  
 
South Africa did not ever stand in contravention of the NPT because it was 
not party to this Treaty prior to acceding to it.23 De Villiers, Jardine and 
Reiss asserted that South Africa’s nuclear programme germinated from 
                                                
19 Chapter Seven is dedicated to conducting a comparison of how South Africa and Iraq 
relinquished their nuclear weapons in terms of their relative compliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions. The research intention here is to try to discover whether the 
knowledge developed in one context could be transferred to another context. 
20 Professor Waldo Stumpf offered a comprehensive critique of the researcher’s research proposal 
on 13 December 2007. This statement was contained in that critique. 
21 Op cit Stumpf. 
22 de Villiers, Wynand, Jardine, Roger & Reiss, Mitchell. 1993. ‘Why South Africa Gave Up the 
Bomb’. Foreign Affairs, 99–100, November/December. 
23 Shelton, Garth. 2000. ‘South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Bridging the 
North-South Divide on Nuclear Weapons’. Conference Proceedings on Nuclear Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation: The Role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Jan Smuts House, 
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. 29 March. 
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the local availability of large uranium deposits which were coveted by the 
United States and Britain for use in the Manhattan Project during World 
War II and in the subsequent Cold War period. South African uranium was 
sold to the Combined Development Agency, which was essentially a 
uranium procurement agency established co-operatively between 
Washington and London with the goal of securing uranium supplies for, 
inter alia, their nuclear weapons programs. 
 
South Africa established its own indigenous nuclear research and 
development programme during the 1950s as a result of an informal, and 
perhaps unintended, knowledge exchange acquired from transacting with 
the Combined Development Agency in securing uranium supplies for the 
USA and the UK. The development of an indigenous nuclear and 
technological capability and competence inspired the South African 
government to construct a pilot uranium-enrichment plant. It was opened 
in 1969 and named the Y Plant. It was situated at Valindaba, which is 
approximately 20 kilometres from Pretoria. After the Y Plant had been 
constructed, the peaceful industrial remit of South Africa’s nuclear 
programme was supplemented to design nuclear weapons and source, 
design and construct the associated materials required by such 
programmes.24 
 
The beginnings of the South African nuclear programme were inspired by 
a peaceful industrial and commercial intention, with an initial focus on 
potential mining applications. After the peaceful nuclear programme had 
reached its apex, the scope of the nuclear project gradually crept outwards 
to include a military and nuclear weapons remit as well. The development 
of South Africa’s military nuclear capability coincided with South Africa’s 
growing involvement in the wars in Angola and Mozambique, the 
independence struggle in Namibia, the bush war in Rhodesia, and the 
growing civil unrest in South Africa itself, in protest against apartheid. 
 
                                                
24 Op cit De Villiers et al. 
 35 
“Two approximately 200-metre-deep test shafts were eventually drilled at Vastrap in the 
Kalahari Desert. These facilities were prepared for a cold test – that is, one without HEU 
– carried out in order to check the device’s non-nuclear components, logistics and 
instrumentation. A Soviet satellite’s discovery of the Kalahari site in August 1977, with 
later confirmation from US reconnaissance, aroused vehement international protest.”25  
 
The tenor of these protests was extremely serious. The Soviet Union and 
the United States were in consensus that South Africa’s nuclear 
programme could evolve to become a threat to world peace.  
 
Mr Pik Botha, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, 
received the US’s formal protest about South Africa having developed this 
nuclear test site. This vehement international protest against South 
Africa’s nuclear weapons programme came with the full backing of the 
Soviet Union26 and occurred concomitantly with the increasingly strident 
ANZAC protests against the French for conducting nuclear tests in the 
South Pacific Ocean. Pretoria abandoned the notion of conducting a 
nuclear test, but they did persist with developing six-and-a-half nuclear 
bombs. There remained a residue of senior personnel within ARMSCOR 
and the South African Defence Force (SADF) who maintained the dream 
of conducting a nuclear test explosion, in spite of the international protests 
and the negative political consequences that would almost inevitably have 
ensued. 
 
The reality of mandatory sanctions, intense international protest, 
approbation, and opposition did not retard the development of the nuclear 
arsenal in South Africa.  It may have even encouraged its development by 
creating a siege mentality among the South African militarists. The nuclear 
weapons programme quietly continued in spite of international 
condemnation. 
 
It is noted that parastatal corporations like ARMSCOR have a form of 
international legal personality and are in fact able to make arms 
                                                
25 Loc cit. 
26 Interview with Mr Pik Botha in Pretoria North on 18 February 2008. 
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agreements with foreign governments. ARMSCOR sold G5, G6 and other 
military artillery and hardware to Iraq in the 1980s. These weapons had 
been battle-tested and were very sophisticated, in their time. The 
armaments transactions with Iraq did little to engender trust in the integrity 
of the South African regime. It begged the question – petitio principii: If 
South Africa could transact with Saddam Hussein and sell G5 and G6 
artillery to Iraq, surely they could also proliferate nuclear weapons and 
technology to Iraq, or any other nation, should they so choose? 
 
Although the theory is not generally accepted, some jurists have 
contended that state corporations such as ARMSCOR should be treated 
on the international plane. This is because municipal law is often silent on 
matters of international law, such as weapons transactions. Brownlie 
makes the point, though, that “[i]n principle, corporations of municipal law 
do not have international legal personality. Thus a concession or contract 
between a state and a foreign corporation is not governed by the law of 
treaties”.27 
 
In the report on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations,28 it was found that the United Nations and its organs did 
have international legal personality. Hence the IAEA had international 
legal personality, which authorised its weapons inspections in South 
Africa. 
 
De Villiers, Jardine and Reiss confirmed: 
 
“The Y plant yielded its first HEU in January 1978, and the first fully assembled nuclear 
device was completed the following year. In July 1979 an Action Committee appointed by 
President PW Botha recommended the manufacture of six additional nuclear devices, for 
a total of seven, the first of which was designed for a fully instrumented underground test. 
It also advised that the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons be transferred 
to ARMSCOR, the South African arms manufacturing corporation. The atomic energy 
programme would supply the HEU and conduct the necessary nuclear research. It has 
been estimated that each nuclear device used 50 to 60 kilograms of HEU and had a yield 
                                                
27 Op cit Brownlie at 65.  
28 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174. 
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of 10 to 18 kilotons. They were never stockpiled in assembled form; the nuclear and non-
nuclear components were stored separately in concrete and steel vaults. The assembly 
and testing of each device required four codes. Three senior officials each held one code 
and only the head of government knew the fourth code. Consequently, no single person 
could activate the devices. Some sources have suggested that the explosives could have 
been dropped from modified Buccaneer bombers by the South African Defence Force.”29  
 
Dr Neil Barnard, the Director of the National Intelligence Service at that 
time, confirmed this assertion. He contended that:  
 
“Two Buccaneer bombers were converted to have the capacity to carry nuclear bombs. 
They were painted underneath with a special paint to protect the crew from fall-out from 
the bomb once it was dropped. 
 
The same precaution was actually taken with the B29 bombers that carried nuclear 
bombs during World War II in order to protect the US planes and their crews. There was 
a plan in the military to develop a viable delivery system. A Buccaneer bomber had paint 
modifications conducted on its under-belly to cope with an explosion of a nuclear 
bomb.”30  
 
Adolf von Baeckmann, Garry Dillon and Demetrius Perricos had expert 
knowledge about South Africa’s nuclear programme because of their 
involvement in the IAEA’s inspection regime in this country.31 They 
articulated the contractual responsibilities that existed between 
ARMSCOR, the AEC and the South African Defence Force under South 
African municipal law: 
 
“It was in 1979 that the responsibility for the nuclear weapons programme was 
transferred to ARMSCOR, while the AEC was made responsible for the production and 
supply of HEU and for the theoretical studies and some development work in nuclear 
weapons technology. ARMSCOR’s principal nuclear weapons activities were carried out 
in the so-called Circle facilities, located some 15 kilometres away from the AEC’s 
establishment at Pelindaba. The Circle facilities were constructed during 1980, on the 
basis of designs provided by the AEC and was commissioned in May 1981. The nuclear 
programme thus established involved: 
                                                
29 Op cit De Villiers et al at 100.  
30 Interview with Dr Neil Barnard at the Chameleon Restaurant in Plattekloof, Cape Town on 
29 October 2007. 
31 Adolph von Baeckmann was the former Director of Safeguards at the IAEA. Garry Dillon was a 
senior staff member and later served as a leader of the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team, and Demetrius 
Perricos served as a director of the IAEA on the South African project. 
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• The development and production of a number of deliverable gun-assembled 
devices; 
• Lithium-6 separation for the production of tritium for possible future use in 
boosted devices; 
• Studies of implosion and thermonuclear technology; 
• Research and development for the production and recovery of plutonium and 
tritium. 
 
In September 1985, the South African Government decided to limit the scope of the 
programme to the production of seven gun-assembled devices, to stop all work related to 
possible plutonium devices and to limit the production of  lithium-6; however, it allowed 
further development work on implosion technology and theoretical work on more 
advanced devices.”32 
 
The testing device was intended for usage at the facility at Vastrap in the 
Kalahari Desert, where its contemplated purpose was for deployment in an 
underground test. The nuclear weapons programme reached its technical 
apex in 1987. At this time South Africa was subjected to mandatory 
sanctions by the United Nations and accorded a pariah international 
recognition status. The decision to relinquish the nuclear weapons 
programme and accede to the NPT was driven by Mr de Klerk’s need to 
re-frame this pariah recognition status into a positive status by invoking an 
internationally-credible constitutional transition in South Africa. Mr de Klerk 
used the opportunity to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as part of his ‘legal 
methodology’ for achieving constitutional legitimacy. 
 
“The first prototype deliverable device had been completed in December 1982, but it was 
not until August 1987 that the first qualified production model was completed. The delay 
was largely due to the implementation of a rigorous engineering qualification programme 
directed towards safety and security under a wide range of postulated storage, delivery, 
and accident scenarios. When, in November 1989, the decision was taken by the 
Government to stop the production of nuclear weapons, four further qualified deliverable 
gun-assembled devices had been completed and the HEU core and some non-nuclear 
components for a seventh device had been fabricated. On 26 February 1990, the State 
President issued a written instruction that, inter alia, all existing nuclear devices were to 
                                                
32 von Baeckmann, Adolph, Dillon, Garry & Perricos, Demetrius. 1995. ‘Nuclear Verification in 
South Africa’. IAEA Bulletin, 1:47.  
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be dismantled and the nuclear weapons were to be melted down and returned to the AEC 
in preparation for South Africa’s accession to the NPT.”33  
 
South Africa’s policy of nuclear deterrence provided the reason for 
justifying the development and construction of six-and-a-half nuclear 
weapons. The policy of deterrence was rationalised by South Africa’s 
ever-intensifying involvement in the war in Angola, which was regarded as 
a proxy war with the Soviet Union.34 35 For this reason, South Africa’s 
conventional approach to armaments escalated into a nuclear deterrent 
approach. It coincided with a deteriorating regional military scenario and a 
consequent increase in insecurity. 
 
The United States of America withdrew all ‘formal military support’ to 
South Africa after the Clark Amendment (US 1975, 1976) was passed.36 
South Africa discovered that it was fighting a war with massive 
asymmetries in weapons capability. It was pitted against the military might 
of the Soviet Union, which was a military superpower.37 38 A deep sense of 
insecurity inspired the creation of the indigenous nuclear weapons 
programme.39 The programme was also pursued because it was 
associated with international scientific prestige.40 
 
                                                
33 Op cit Von Baeckmann.  
34 This type of rationalisation is explored in York, Herbert. 1987. Does Strategic Defence Breed 
Offence? Centre for Science and International Affairs. Lanham: Harvard University, University 
Press of America. 
35 Shubin, Vladimir. 2008. The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa. London: Pluto 
Press. 
36 Richard (Dick) Clark authored the Clark Amendment. This was actually an amendment to the 
US Arms Control Act of 1976. This Act affords the President of the United States the authority to 
control the import and export of defence articles and services. It requires governments that receive 
weapons from the United States to use them for legitimate self-defence. The Clark Amendment 
barred aid to groups engaged in military or paramilitary operations in Angola.  
37 Pabian, Frank. 1995. ‘South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons for U.S. 
Nonproliferation Policy’. The Nonproliferation Review, Fall. 
38 Reiss, Mitchell. 1996. ‘Nuclear Rollback Decisions: Future Lessons?’ Proquest International 
Academic Research Library. Arms Control Today, 25(6):10–16, July. 
39 Liberman, Peter. 2001. ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’. International Security, 
26(2), Autumn. 
40 The matter of scientific prestige in inspiring the development of  South Africa’s military 
capability is explored by Seegers, Annette. 1996. The Military in the Making of Modern South 
Africa. London: I.B. Taurus. 
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General Magnus Malan’s autobiography shows that protocols were set in 
place by the Witvlei Ministers Committee, for the operational deployment 
of nuclear weapons as well. This is at variance with the testimony of the 
respondents. The Witvlei Ministers Committee consisted of a security 
committee whose Ministerial members were vested with oversight 
responsibility for the nuclear programme.41 
 
General Malan maintained that: 
 
“In order to co-operate in the matter of responsibility for and management of the nuclear 
weapons question and the NPT, the so-called Witvlei Committee was created in 1978 
under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister at the time, PW Botha. 
 
The committee officially approved the continued development of a nuclear bomb, and 
indicated that its use as a weapon should be avoided. However, if it had to be used in 
exceptional circumstances, the Head of State, together with his most senior ministers, 
would have the final say in the matter [researcher’s italics]. The committee was, however, 
unanimous that this technological and scientific feat should be used mainly to place 
South Africa in a position of power and authority, particularly in any future political or 
other major international negotiations.”42 
 
A careful reading of Malan’s language is that ’exceptional circumstances‘ 
may possibly have justified military usage, that is, if it was deemed by this 
committee that the very existence of the South African state was at risk. It 
should be evident from General Malan’s reasoning contained in the above 
citation that although the Witvlei Ministerial Committee viewed deterrence 
as the most desirable option to be pursued, they also put into place an 
operational nuclear option which could escalate into action should the 
political deterrent scenario fail. The Witvlei Committee developed the 
official government nuclear weapons strategy. 
 
Waldo Stumpf confirmed that the three-phase nuclear weapons strategy 
stated: 
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• “Step 1: Policy of uncertainty – not inform anyone that we had a nuclear 
capability. 
• Step 2: If the world did not help get the Cubans out of Southern Africa when they 
amassed in Angola, we would inform selected friendly countries, for example, the 
US and UK, about our nuclear capability. 
• Step 3: If that did not work, then we would conduct an underground test to 
demonstrate this capability to the world.43 44 
 
There was no fourth step.45 People have often said to me: ‘Surely there was a fourth 
step?’ 
 
You should also understand that these nuclear devices were very crude. They were 
large. They were not designed as deliverable weapons. Although there were some 
people in ARMSCOR who were starting to make designs on these crude weapons to 
make them deliverable.  
 
They were really crude devices. They were meant for underground testing. If you wanted 
to use them, you would have literally had to kick them out of the door of an aircraft.” 46 
 
Step 1 was the only phase that was ever enacted. Steps 2 and 3 remained 
latent. The three-phase nuclear weapons strategy should be understood 
as official policy, and falling under the ambit of South African municipal 
law. 
 
1.3 Mr FW de Klerk’s Instruction to Relinquish the Nuclear 
Arsenal 
Professor Waldo Stumpf was requested to attend the crucial September 
1989 meeting in the Union Buildings in Pretoria only two weeks after 
Mr FW de Klerk had assumed the office of the President of South Africa. 
Stumpf confirmed that Mr de Klerk’s actual instruction at the meeting was 
to:  
 
                                                
43 The matter of nuclear testing scenarios is explored by Ball, Desmond & Richelson, Jeffrey 
(eds.). 1986. Strategic Nuclear Targeting. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
44 The logic underlying the strategic and tactical use of conflict is explored by the Nobel Prize 
Laureate in Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University.  
45 This commentary by Stumpf was collaborated by the feedback from Mr Pik Botha.  
46 Interview with Professor Waldo Stumpf at the University of Pretoria, Minerals Science 
Building, Pretoria on 18 October 2007. 
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“... [d]ismantle the six devices, re-melt the HEU and return it to the AEC, and advise 
Government on the timing of accession to the NPT as a full Non-Nuclear-Weapon State 
(NNWS). On 26 February 1990 President de Klerk issued a written directive instructing 
that the nuclear weapons should be dismantled and that the programme should be 
terminated. The devices had been fully dismantled and the HEU re-molten into small 
ingots about two weeks before I advised the Government that accession to the NPT could 
then occur, as South Africa was now fully an NNWS. During the entire exercise, our brief 
from Mr de Klerk had been to follow the legal principles of the NPT to the letter and to not 
put a foot wrong. This was my brief and I followed it to the letter. The last HEU was only 
transported from ADVENA to the AEC on 5 and 6 September 1991. The location where 
the re-molten HEU was stored at the time of accession to the NPT on 10 July 1991 had 
no bearing on the NPT. What mattered was that the devices had been fully dismantled. 
The Safe-Guarding Agreement (SGA) is the instrument that the IAEA uses to ascertain 
and ensure compliance with the NPT. Signing an SGA does not in itself mean that 
compliance has been achieved. That only comes later, in our case in September 1993 at 
the General Conference of the IAEA and in November 1993 at the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, where South Africa was declared fully compliant with all the terms 
and conditions of the NPT”.47  
 
The relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal was conducted over a very 
short period of time. The essential task was performed over approximately 
18 very important and little-appreciated months.  
 
This process of nuclear roll-back was conducted in relative secrecy and 
most certainly by unilateral decision. The unilateral decision to disarm the 
nuclear programme was reached by President de Klerk at the same time 
that he reached the decision and enacted the multi-party and multilateral 
constitutional negotiation process by consensus.  
 
Stumpf recollected: 
 
“At his first meeting in September 1989 where I was asked to be present (only two weeks 
after he had taken office), Mr de Klerk stated that his Government would do two major 
things to make South Africa a respected member of the international community again. 
Firstly, the political process would be reversed to a full democracy and secondly, the 
                                                
47 Op cit Stumpf. 
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nuclear weapons programme would be reversed so that South Africa could accede to the 
NPT as an NNWS.’”48  
 
Mr de Klerk succeeded in achieving these goals. The relinquishment 
process was initiated in dangerous and fragile times. It was just over two 
years later, on 24 March 1993, that President FW de Klerk, for the first 
time, publicly confirmed that South Africa had possessed a self-created 
nuclear capability, which he had instructed should be relinquished. He 
stated that this nuclear programme was intended to be of a limited 
deterrent capability.   
 
1.3.1 South Africa’s Recognition Crisis 
The essential motive underlying Mr de Klerk’s decision to relinquish the 
nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT was to secure international 
recognition of South Africa’s constitutional transition, and to reverse its 
pariah status. At this juncture the reader needs to be presented with a 
brief exposition on the doctrine of non-recognition of states. South Africa 
had a recognition problem that existed at at least four levels. The first 
three were explicit recognition problems. The fourth was an implicit and 
potential recognition problem that might have arisen from the nuclear 
weapons and their capability. This exposition is predicated on the notion 
that a wrongdoer cannot derive legal rights from acts conducted in 
contravention of international law. South Africa’s recognition crisis 
stemmed from certain acts which were invalid and therefore contrary to 
international law, and in contravention of the United Nation’s four 
peremptory norms that permit for the non-recognition of a state.  
 
John Dugard offered a useful exposition which clarifies these four 
peremptory norms alluded to above and offers coherence to the argument 
presented here:  
 
“It is accepted that there are certain basic norms upon which the international order is 
founded and that these are peremptory and may not be derogated from under any 
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circumstances. The modern law on non-recognition takes cognisance of this 
development. An act in violation of a norm having the character of jus cogens is illegal, 
and is therefore null and void. This applies to the creation of states and to the acquisition 
of territory. States are under a duty not to recognise such acts under customary 
international law, and in accordance with the general principles of law. Resolutions of the 
Security Council are, from a jurisprudential perspective, declaratory in the sense that they 
confirm an already existing duty on states not to recognise such situations. In practical 
terms such resolutions are essential as they provide certainty by substituting for the 
decision of an individual state a collective determination of illegality and nullity.”49 
 
• Firstly, the TBVC or Bantustan states were not recognised by any 
other states in the world other than South Africa. The TBVC states 
were established to deprive black South Africans of their South 
African citizenship. The justification for non-recognition of a state 
had its genesis in the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese in 
1932, which saw the Japanese establish a puppet state called 
Manchukuo in China. The United States declined to recognise this 
puppet state under the justification that it was achieved in violation 
of the Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928) (‘The Great Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War’}. The League of Nations called upon all its 
members not to recognise this puppet state. The TBVC states were 
in an analogous position as regards international law. Because the 
TBVC states were established to deny black South Africans self-
determination and their citizenship, they contravened two of the 
United Nations peremptory norms which have been accepted by 
the United Nations for the purposes of non-recognition, in Clauses 
(c) and (d): “[t]he prohibition of systematic racial discrimination and 
the suppression of human rights” as well as “[t]he prohibition of the 
denial of self-determination”.50 Dugard noted that “[j]urisprudentially, 
the doctrine of non-recognition is founded on the principle of ex-
injuria non oritur jus – the principle that no benefit can be derived 
from an illegal act”.51  
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50 Loc cit. 
51 Ibid. 
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• Secondly, as a corollary to the above, the policy of apartheid that 
rendered the black citizens alien in the land of their birth afforded it 
a pariah status. The benefit of positive recognition would not be 
afforded to this illegal act. John Dugard pointed out that:  
 
“In 1977, the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South 
Africa as punishment for its discrimination and repressive laws and practices and 
its acts of aggression against neighbouring states. Repeated recommendations 
of the General Assembly in support of wider economic sanctions52 prompted 
states, individually and collectively, to isolate South Africa in the fields of trade, 
finance, sport, and culture. Although the effects of sanctions were not immediate, 
they undoubtedly contributed to State President FW de Klerk’s decision to 
abandon apartheid in February 1990.”53  
 
• Dugard’s paragraph cited above provides a distilled code or 
formulaic, for understanding why the matter of achieving 
international recognition for the constitutional settlement was so 
important to Mr de Klerk.   
• Thirdly, South Africa’s mandate to administer Namibia was not 
internationally recognised. 
• Fourthly, its nuclear weapons status rendered it a threshold nuclear 
power. Had this nuclear status been generally known among the 
international public at the time of South Africa’s transition to a 
constitutional democracy, this would have significantly complicated 
its pariah international recognition status. More specifically, had 
South Africa proceeded to enact Step 3 of its nuclear strategy and 
conducted an underground nuclear explosion, to both test and 
demonstrate to the world that it had a nuclear weapons capability, 
such a test and demonstration would probably have been construed 
to be contrary to Clause (a) of the peremptory norms recognised by 
the United Nations for the purpose of non-recognition namely; “(a) 
The [t]he prohibition of aggression”.54 One could furthermore 
contend that the use of territory to conduct nuclear tests which 
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renders such territory toxic, blighted and unusable for human 
habitation and agriculture for thousands of years into the future 
could be construed as contravening Clause (b) of the United 
Nation’s peremptory norms pertaining to the non-recognition of 
states as the nuclear test would arguably have been in 
contravention of “[t]he prohibition of the acquisition of territory by 
means of force”55 This argument would probably not have been 
valid had such tests been conducted in South African territory, but 
might have been applicable had they been conducted in the Namib 
Desert or another part of Namibia, or on the high seas, for example.  
 
These four matters interacted to create a serious pariah recognition status 
dilemma for South Africa. If South Africa had retained its nuclear arsenal, 
it is conceivable that the doctrine of non-recognition with respect to the 
newly-negotiated Constitution might have come into effect. 
 
With respect to the question of the Responsibilities of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, John Dugard asserts: 
 
“The above doctrine of non-recognition is indorsed by the International Law 
Commission’s 2001 draft articles on the Responsibilities of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. Articles 40 and 41 provide that no state shall recognise as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of 
international law.”56 
 
Dugard pointed out South Africa’s international recognition status during 
the apartheid years was also signified by a wide range of economic 
sanctions about this racial policy. Dugard’s assertion is collaborated by the 
testimony of the respondents, and is cited in the relevant chapters of this 
research. 
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1.4 South Africa’s Purposeful Delay of Accession to the NPT 
Mr de Klerk was cognisant of the need for meticulous timing and 
synchronising of South Africa’s accession to the NPT harmoniously with 
world events, and particularly the events that were associated with the 
position of Iraq in the Gulf War. During the course of 1991 to 1993, the 
Gulf War in Iraq created a very serious problem that could have impeded 
or even perhaps negated South Africa’s pursuit of international 
recognition, which would have legitimated the constitutional transition. The 
Security Council’s authorisation of the allied invasion of Iraq was 
legitimated by the fact that Saddam Hussein had used weapons of mass 
destruction against the Kurds in the Iran–Iraq war and that he did have a 
nuclear weapons programme at that time.57 Both Iraq and South Africa 
had pariah international recognition status.  
 
South Africa did possess weapons of mass destruction and specifically 
held a nuclear arsenal and nuclear bomb-making facility. These were not 
widely known. Mr de Klerk’s deep fear was that the fact of nuclear 
possession could be conveyed to the international media in a manner that 
would create a chaotic situation along the lines of that which played itself 
out in Iraq.58 With this disclosure, South Africa could easily have been 
perceived in the media as a threat to world peace. Apartheid and the racial 
conflict were internal affairs, but if it became known that South Africa 
possessed nuclear weapons in those fragile times, it could conceivably 
have become a very public international affair. South Africa had confirmed 
violations of international law relating to apartheid and restricting the right 
to self-determination. Disclosure of this nuclear weapons status would 
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have provided the media with a plausible but incorrect case that South 
Africa was acting in breach of the NPT. It would have placed the country in 
a ’gallery of rogues‘. In addition, Mr de Klerk was at that time in a tenuous 
situation with respect to his own political party. Members of the far right 
were deeply opposed to these constitutional negotiations, as they sought 
the retention of apartheid and political power. Had the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT been prematurely or 
inappropriately disclosed, the right wing might have used this as ‘grist to 
the mill’ and might have subverted the constitutional transition. The 
situation was so precarious that Mr de Klerk called for the last whites only 
general election to gain a mandate from his constituency to proceed with 
the constitutional negotiations. There was no assurance that he would 
receive this mandate from his party. The delays in acceding to the NPT 
therefore arose from international events and the internal status of South 
African politics. It was for this reason that Mr de Klerk purposefully delayed 
South Africa’s accession to the NPT on various occasions, because his 
judgment was that the timing was not correct. 
 
Stumpf clarified that: 
 
“The reason for the delay between acceding to the NPT in July 1991 and the public 
announcement of the relinquishment of the nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT 
until 23 March 1993 resided in two serious concerns: 
 
• It was at that time that the First Iraqi War (the Gulf War) was raging. The South 
Africans were concerned that the international news media would tar them with 
the same brush as Iraq because both were pariah states. The South Africans 
feared that they would unfairly be portrayed as having broken the NPT in spite of 
the fact that they had not acceded to it at that stage and were thus not party to it. 
The worry was that the ‘international public’ would not have understood this legal 
difference and would have branded South Africa as ‘another Iraq’;  
• The internal political transformation process was at a very delicate stage (it was 
before Mr de Klerk got the overwhelming mandate from the white electorate in a 
referendum to proceed with his political reforms) and he was uncertain about how 
the news would be accepted.”59 
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The United Nations Security Council had authorised the Gulf War under 
international law because of Iraq’s illegal invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait.60 It was reasoned that if South Africa had retained the nuclear 
weapons and the associated capabilities, in the context of deteriorating 
internal stability and international proliferation fears, South Africa might 
have been deemed by the Security Council to constitute a threat to world 
peace. It is clear that a quite compelling argument and a credible scenario 
could be composed from this, legitimating a United Nations Security 
Council authorised military intervention in South Africa. 
 
An important concern was that the factual issues that pertained to the 
negative case of Iraq would be incorrectly imputed to South Africa in the 
world media. South Africa might in this way have been severely 
compromised by this incorrect understanding of international law. 
 
1.5 The Broader Historical Context of Nuclear Relinquishment 
and Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons – Nuclear Rollback in Argentina, Brazil, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Libya, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine – A Brief Exposition on Similarities and Differences 
In this analysis it will be shown that the nuclear relinquishment process 
and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
processes in South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Libya, 
Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine converged around the general 
themes of state recognition, constitutional continuity of states, deterrence, 
and seeking of both material and intangible concessions as quid pro quo 
for relinquishment and accession to the NPT from the Nuclear-Weapons-
States. The relinquishment and accession processes and the subsequent 
formation of nuclear-weapon-free zones can all be regarded as part of a 
consensus focused multilateral international law making process. 
                                                
60 United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorised Member States of the United 
Nations to use all necessary means after 15 January 1991 to uphold and implement all relevant 
Security Council Resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. 
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Individual sovereignty was sublimated to the good of a greater 
international globalised statehood. Old laws were abrogated and new 
international law was codified by various and complex consensus-seeking 
methods.  
 
Arjun Makhijan and Nicole Deller asserted that: 
 
“One of the most extraordinary accomplishments of the NPT has been its role as the legal 
instrument through which several states’ announced the rollback and termination of their 
nuclear programmes. Once they had done that, they acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-
weapons states. The NPT is also the only legal instrument which requires its parties, 
including nuclear weapons parties, to act to achieve complete disarmament.”61 
 
Makhijan and Deller’s praise for the accomplishments of the NPT in 
achieving nuclear rollback and accession is generally confirmed in this 
analysis. The motives underpinning the decision to relinquish these 
nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT was that these states benefited 
far more from relinquishment and accession to the NPT than they would 
have from retaining these weapons. This discussion alludes to some of 
those costs and benefits. 
 
This comparative international analysis of nuclear relinquishment and 
accession reveals that there is a ‘pattern’ between nuclear weapons 
acquisition, relinquishment and accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and constitutional recognition. The 
change from competitive and conflictive interaction in the sphere of 
nuclear weapons research into co-operation and collaboration was one of 
the symptoms of this ‘pattern’, manifested in the painful transition to 
constitutional democracy in the countries alluded to here. 
 
In the cases cited in respect of each country, one can generally, but not 
always, equate competitive and conflictive interaction in the realm of 
                                                
61 Mahijana, Arjun & Deller, Nicole. 2003. ‘NATO and Nuclear Disarmament: An Analysis of the 
Obligations of NATO Allies of the United States Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Band Treaty’. Institute for Energy and Environmental 
Research (IEER) Report/NATO and Nuclear Disarmament. 1–2. October. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ieer.org/reports/nato/ch1.html 
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nuclear weapons with high levels of militarism and the suspension of civil 
liberties. South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, and Libya seem to 
have fallen prey to this trend at the time that they attempted to develop 
their nuclear weapons capabilities. 
 
Co-operative and collaborative interaction in the realm of nuclear 
weapons, particularly as they pertain to their relinquishment and accession 
to the NPT, can generally, but not always, be equated with an affirmation 
of constitutional recognition and endorsement of human rights. The motion 
of a state towards constituting democracy via nuclear relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT is almost always (if not always) a unique case, 
usually the motion is irregular, and the entire process may be understood 
under a broader ambit of transitional justice. There would appear to be an 
incremental and pendular pattern around the discovery of the theme of 
constituting democracy, via nuclear relinquishment and accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A significant finding 
was that the theme of ‘constituting democracy’ was a clear motif 
associated with relinquishment and accession to the NPT in all of these 
countries. South Africa’s constitutional rationale for acceding to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons shared some parallels with 
the other states mentioned above.62 
 
1.5.1 The Comparative Cases of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil  
South Africa itself was a unique case in the development and 
relinquishment of nuclear weapons, as it is the only country in the world to 
have developed an indigenous capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons, 
and then to have rid itself of them in their entirety. South Africa went 
further than a research scenario of latently developing a nuclear weapons 
capability, as was the case with Argentina and Brazil. It developed and 
manufactured six-and-a-half nuclear bombs. 
 
                                                
62 Sung-Juo, Cho. 2005. ‘Giving-Up to Survive: Domestic Conditions Under Which States 
Renounce Nuclear Weapons’. Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Washington DC. 1–4 September. 
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South Africa is also the only state in the world which, having achieved this 
nuclear arsenal and capability, then unilaterally set about totally 
relinquishing this capability and concomitantly acceding to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The nuclear weapons 
themselves, and all ancillary matters (including all the intellectual property) 
related thereto, together with the entire relinquishment process itself, was 
scrupulously verified and audited by the inspectorate of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. All this material was relinquished. This verification 
procedure was undertaken by the IAEA in strict compliance with 
international law.  
 
In substantiation, David Albright observed that: 
 
“South Africa is the only country to voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons. Many other 
states, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil, abandoned their nuclear 
programmes before they developed a weapons capability. However, South Africa’s 
abandonment of its twenty-to thirty-year-old nuclear weapons programme remains 
unique.”63 
 
This discussion about the nuclear rollback in these countries is intended to 
provide the reader with an overview of the international pattern of nuclear 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT. This will assist in placing South 
Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT into an 
international context. The countries that have rolled back their nuclear 
weapons programmes are: Australia, Argentina, Byelorussia, Brazil, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Libya, Norway, Ukraine, Romania, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and Yugoslavia.64 
 
The cases of Brazil and Argentina differed from that of South Africa 
because these countries did not develop any nuclear weapons, but they 
                                                
63 Albright, David. 2001. ‘South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme’. Institute for Science and 
International Security, Washington DC. 14 March. [Online]. Available: 
http://web.mit.edu/sspseminars/wed_archives-01spring/albright.htm 
64 Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 2008. ‘Chain Reaction: 
Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East’. One Hundred and Tenth Congress, Second 
Session, Washington DC. 18. February. 
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did conduct research into the development of nuclear weapons.65 During 
the 1970s Brazil and Argentina were both engaged in a Dirty War. South 
Africa, too, was engaged in a Dirty War at approximately the same time. In 
all of these countries (South Africa, Brazil and Argentina) the military 
complex had an extremely powerful hold on the government. While Brazil 
and Argentina were run by military juntas, South Africa was run by a 
highly-circumscribed and limited democracy where parliament was 
regularly bypassed by the State Security Council. Brazil and Argentina 
were similarly estranged regimes engaged in complex transitions from 
military ascendancy to civilian constitutionalism. They all shared the 
common theme of groping for an internally and internationally legitimate 
constitutional solution to their problems. South Africa, Argentina and Brazil 
were developing countries which were all ex-colonies struggling with 
serious Cold War ideological conflicts. 
 
Although these countries were endowed with considerable natural wealth, 
their economies had been ruined by the subscription of their leadership to 
failed ideological formulae, ruinous economic policies and undermining of 
the judiciary by the executive. International relations were complicated by 
the fact that relationships between Argentina and Brazil were very 
mistrustful and competitive during this period as each competed for South 
American continental hegemony. This competition for dominance resulted 
in both Argentina and Brazil developing nuclear weapons research 
programmes, in a regional arms race. South Africa, by way of contrast, 
was not involved in an African arms race. It was, however, involved in a 
very real proxy war with the Soviet Union in Angola. This war was seen to 
be escalating, and the arms embargo encouraged an internal process of 
self-sufficiency with regard to weapons. This process of weaponisation 
became increasingly sophisticated in all branches of the military. One of 
the little-known areas where it reached very high levels of advancement 
was in the nuclear weapons programme, which was intended to act as a 
                                                
65 Doyle, James. 1999. ‘Nuclear Rapprochement in Argentina and Brazil’. Workshop Summary, 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. October.  
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deterrent to Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa and as a negotiation 
tool. 
 
Both Brazil and Argentina were situated in a pre-weaponisation phase of 
nuclear development. They abandoned their respective nuclear weapons 
programme as their relations with one another gradually began to thaw in 
the 1980s. The thaw in the relationships between Argentina and Brazil 
occurred simultaneously with the waning of the power of the military 
regimes, and the return to civilian constitutional rule. On the basis of this 
initial very limited sample of what happened in these three countries, it 
would seem reasonable to conclude that militarily-inclined regimes would 
be more supportive of nuclear weapons programmes than civilian regimes 
would be. Perhaps this is because a military junta ultimately derives its 
‘legitimacy‘ from the threat of military force. It is the state defining itself as 
state. A civilian constitutional formulation typically seeks a more 
complicated and subtle source of legitimacy and authority- from the 
people. This authority also derives from the reciprocal goodwill and 
understanding of other states. In contrast to South Africa, Brazil and 
Argentina’s nuclear weapons programmes were very elementary and not 
nearly as advanced as South Africa’s. 
 
The change of political leadership in all three countries (to De Klerk in 
South Africa, Neves in Argentina and Alfonsin in Brazil) saw the nuclear 
programmes in all of these countries being rolled back. One may therefore 
deduce that the decision to engage in developing a nuclear weapons 
programme and, alternatively, the decision to roll back and relinquish an 
already established nuclear weapons programme is largely a leadership 
decision based on support of the military or support of the civilians in a 
society. 
 
Kevin Kieran offers a supportive synopsis of the reasoning contained in 
the argument developed above: 
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“The key factor in the two countries’ (Brazil and Argentina) decisions to abandon their 
nuclear-weapons programmes was their eventual political rapprochement with one 
another. As in the South Africa case, leadership played a key role. In the mid-1980s, both 
countries elected civilian leaders for whom reconciliation was a priority. At the first 
meeting of the Argentine president-elect Neves and Brazilian president Alfonsin in 1983, 
the two agreed that nuclear co-operation would be given special priority. These visits 
enabled the governments to see that both nuclear programmes were in 
shambles … Bolstered by this new knowledge, the governments’ pursuit of militarised 
nuclear technology was replaced by genuine co-operation. Mutual economic engagement 
further spurred the improvement of relations. In 1990, both countries announced they 
would implement full-scope IAEA safeguards, followed by the signing of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco and subsequent accession to the NPT.”66  
 
Both Argentina and Brazil had been run by military juntas at the time of the 
development of their nuclear weapons programmes. These juntas became 
engaged in a competitive and potentially conflictive nuclear arms race with 
one another. 
 
1.5.2 The Comparative Cases of South Africa, South Korea and 
Taiwan 
South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process and accession to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons bears comparison with 
South Korea’s. South Korea was very concerned about United States 
‘disengagement’ from the region and was insecure in its relationship with 
the People’s Republic of China, not to mention North Korea. It was for this 
reason that South Korea embarked upon its nuclear weapons programme. 
Their reason for embarking upon a nuclear weapons programme was 
therefore analogous to South Africa’s. The United States through inter alia 
the Clark Amendment made it clear that they would not officially support 
South Africa in conflict with the Soviet Union in Angola. Both South Africa 
and South Korea embarked upon this programme because of the United 
State’s recalibration of their importance. For South Korea, it was both the 
People’s Republic of China and North Korea that posed a threat and might 
                                                
66 Kiernan, Kevin. 2008. ‘Why Do Some States Give up Nuclear Arsenals? Proliferation as 
Economic Bargaining’. Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs, 11, Spring. [Online]. 
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fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US interests in the region. For 
South Africa, the fear was that the Soviet Union would fill this vacuum. 
This resulted in the logic underpinning the development of South Africa’s 
nuclear capabilities. 
 
The case of the accession to the NPT of South Korea and Taiwan is much 
more complicated than the case of Brazil and Argentina. While there was 
never any dispute about recognition between Brazil and Argentina, the 
People’s Republic of China did not recognise the constitutional 
independence of Taiwan and regarded it as a renegade province of China 
itself. Taiwan constituted a clear case of nuclear weapons being used as a 
trade-off for state recognition. The recognition issue that pertained to 
Taiwan was similar to, but also very different from, that which pertained to 
South Africa. The common point is that both South Africa and Taiwan 
endured a recognition crisis. The history and reasoning underpinning 
these crises were totally different, but the symptoms were present in both. 
 
In addition, South Korea and North Korea are constitutionally divided as a 
product of the Cold War, with significant yearnings for reintegration as a 
single state. South Korea itself is constitutionally stable and can be seen 
as having a similar economic power to that West Germany had in relation 
to East Germany prior to their reunification. The impoverishment of North 
Korea lends itself to comparisons with East Germany. The matter of the 
putative constitutional integration of South Korea and North Korea 
therefore pivoted on the question of nuclear weapons held by North Korea. 
It is military regime with a very weak economic base. Free association is 
not a feature of this state, which is bound by military force. North Korea 
represents a case of a military junta with a proven nuclear capability. The 
split between South and North Korea represents a geographically 
analogous, but politically and legally dissimilar, schism to the tensions that 
existed between Argentina and Brazil, which were subsequently dissipated 
by the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and later reinforced by the 
establishment of the MERCOSUR (Argentina)/MERCOSUL (Brazil) 
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regional trade agreement in Latin America.67 Argentina and Brazil did not 
ever develop nuclear weapons, while North Korea has apparently done so. 
It is noted that Argentina and Brazil, North Korea, South Korea and the 
People’s Republic of China are all in close regional proximity to one 
another, and it is asserted that this geographical proximity increased the 
tension associated with the development of nuclear weapons 
programmes. 
 
Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters conducted a comparative analysis 
of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear relinquishment processes. 
These authors contended: 
 
“The decisions to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Taiwan 
represent two of the most important cases of nuclear rollback during the Cold War. The 
cases differ in significant ways: While Taiwan’s rollback emphasised capability 
reductions, South Korea’s nuclear rollback mainly reflected changes in intent. One 
similarity was that despite their precarious security environments, both reversed their 
nuclear programs in the face of tremendous US pressure. The United States is likely to 
remain central to these states’ future nuclear narratives to ensure that they do not restart 
their programs.”68 
 
It will be shown in the testimony of Mr Pik Botha, Professor Stumpf and Dr 
Neil Barnard that South Africa, too, was placed under extreme pressure by 
the United States to reverse its nuclear weapons programme.   
 
Taiwan and South Korea developed their nuclear weapons capability 
because of the brooding omnipresence of China, which detonated its first 
nuclear weapon in 1964. South Korea’s programme was developed 
competitively in conjunction with the mutually conflictive relations with 
North Korea. South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and South Africa’s 
nuclear programme can all be regarded as being rooted in a Cold War 
context. South Africa’s insecurity arose from the military presence and 
capability of the USSR in the Angolan war. South Africa’s relinquishment 
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did not consist only of a capability reduction, as was the case with Taiwan; 
it involved the total dismantlement and destruction of the nuclear weapons 
capability. South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process was somewhat 
similar to South Korea’s. South Africa sought United States support with 
respect to its involvement in the Angolan war, which pitted it against the 
military prowess of the Soviet Union, and South Korea, too, sought United 
States support against perceived threats arising from the People’s 
Republic of China and a potential military involvement in North Korea. 
 
South Africa and South Korea both displayed a fundamental 
reassessment in the calculation of the strategic value and costs 
associated with pursuing their respective nuclear weapons programme. 
The changed intention was signified in the pursuit of a non-racial and 
inclusive constitutional settlement and the termination of the regional war 
in Angola. Internal security concerns within South Africa did not justify a 
nuclear weapons capability. For South Korea, the economic growth and 
industrialisation within the People’s Republic of China itself created 
opportunities for co-operation and collaboration between the two and 
diminished the perception of threat. 
 
South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan all developed their nuclear 
programmes over similar time-spans, which coincided with Cold War 
tensions. One could assert that these nuclear weapons capabilities 
developed as mimicry of the superpower tensions that prevailed during the 
Cold War. Interestingly, all three countries intensified the development of 
their nuclear programmes in response to the perception and experience of 
the withdrawal of the umbrella of US military support. 
 
The withdrawal of US support to South Africa via the Clark Amendment, 
which banned military aid during the Angolan war, created a sense of 
crisis with the political and military leadership of the country. The local line 
of thought that prevailed at the time was that this crisis could best be 
overcome by developing nuclear weapons as a major strategic deterrent, 
together with a high level of conventional military capability. The National 
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Party leadership decided to develop a nuclear deterrent capability with 
respect to the USSR. Taiwan reached a similar conclusion when it was 
marginalised by the United States of America’s rapprochement with the 
People’s Republic of China. Similar reasoning underpinned the 
development of South Korea’s nuclear weapons policy, but in this case the 
driving force arose from North Korea’s development of a nuclear arsenal. 
 
Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters asserted: 
 
“In 1970, the United States began negotiating with the authoritarian South Korean 
government for the withdrawal of some US forces from Korean soil. Over the next few 
years, the United States withdrew 24 000 American troops from South Korea. This 
reduction, followed by the 1972 US rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China 
cemented Seoul’s view that it would soon be responsible for its own security and fueled 
support for a covert nuclear weapons program.”69 
 
The United States of America initially encouraged South Africa’s peaceful 
nuclear programme and assured it of its support in the war in Angola, 
where the Soviet Union were the most important and powerful 
counterparts. South Africa’s deteriorating internal circumstances which 
arose from the growing revolt against apartheid made it politically 
untenable for the US to continue supporting South Africa in the war in 
Angola. South Africa, like South Korea and Taiwan, felt abandoned, and 
hence developed an internal nuclear capability. 
 
Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters observed: 
 
“The rollback of Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program unfolded during a time of dramatic 
change in US relations with China – Taiwan’s principle security concern. Despite its long-
standing commitment to the island state, initially made manifest in a formal security 
guarantee, the United States regarded Taiwan’s potential nuclear program as a major 
threat to regional security and US interests”.70 
 
                                                
69 Op cit Hersman & Peters at 3. 
70 Op cit Hersman & Peters at 9–10. 
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There was a parallel change, and improvement in, the US–Soviet Union 
relationship with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which rendered the South 
African nuclear weapons programme obsolete. 
 
Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters posed the questions: 
 
“Why specifically did leaders in Seoul and Taipei forgo weapons programs? How 
important was Washington’s role in fomenting rollback? Not surprisingly, the experts 
identified US security guarantees and foreign pressure as overwhelmingly important 
factors influencing rollback decision making in both Taiwan and South Korea; with the 
latter, the US guarantee was overwhelming important. Notably, with Taiwan, foreign 
pressure was the overwhelming factor, the US security guarantee taking second place. 
This outcome probably reflects the changing status of the US security guarantee for 
Taiwan during the rollback experience. Three other factors – impediment to development, 
net loss of security and international standing – were either influential or very influential in 
both cases. Most of the other factors were of limited or negligible importance. These 
outcomes drive home the importance of the United States in both Taiwan’s and South 
Korea’s rollback decision making”.71   
 
Mr Pik Botha concurred with the argument offered by Rebecca Hersman 
and Robert Peters. He asserted that Washington was very important in 
South Africa’s relinquishment process, as were, to a lesser extent, Great 
Britain and Russia (the Soviet Union). The imperative to improve South 
Africa’s international standing dramatically was in the researcher’s view 
the most important single reason that underscored the relinquishment and 
accession process, as this improvement could encourage economic 
development, political stability, and international constitutional recognition.   
 
1.5.3 The Cases of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
The cases of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are very different from 
South Africa and a comparison is therefore tendentious. This section will 
therefore be devoted to assessing these cases which arise from their 
unique historical and constitutional circumstances. They do share one 
common theme with South Africa and the previous comparative 
international cases that have been cited. They too suffered from deep 
                                                
71 Op cit Hersman & Peters at 10–11. 
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concerns about their international recognition status in the aftermath of the 
break-up of the Soviet Union and their reconstitution as states in their own 
right.    
 
The nuclear weapons in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were 
returned to Russia when these countries acceded to the NPT. The break-
up of the former Soviet Union created a major nuclear proliferation threat 
which was obviated by the co-ordinated efforts of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency with the active support of the United Nations Security 
Council. These countries inherited nuclear weapons at the point of their 
birth as independent constitutional states. Hence, they are sometimes 
referred to as ‘born-nuclear states’. It was reasoned that the inheritance of 
these nuclear weapons from the former USSR would intrude on and 
perhaps obviate their quest for constitutional sovereignty and international 
recognition as newly-independent states. The theme of constitutional 
recognition was a significant reason for accession to the NPT by South 
Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The 
researcher could not establish whether the matter of state recognition 
played any role in the case of Brazil and Argentina’s accession to the 
NPT.72 
 
Unlike in the case of South Africa, material economic incentives were 
offered to Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear 
weapons inherited from the Soviet Union and accede to the NPT.73 74    
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There was also a natural humanitarian law aspect to the accession 
process in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Kazakhstan relinquished 
its nuclear arsenal because it had been used by the Soviet Union as a 
nuclear test ground. It is known that thousands of Kazakhs developed 
radiation illness, various cancers and dread-diseases and died as a result 
of these tests. The extent of these casualties is not yet clearly understood. 
Kazakhstan therefore relinquished its nuclear arsenal because it had 
brought misery and illness on its people. 
 
In closing this discussion, it is noted that India, Israel and Pakistan have 
never acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
Iraq and Libya have similarly tried to remain outside the scope of the NPT 
but have been unsuccessful in their attempt. 
 
The point that needs to be made here is that the accession to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and exclusion from 
accession have not been addressed uniformly by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and the Nuclear-Weapons-States. There are important 
contradictions that need to be noted. Why are Pakistan, India, Israel and 
North Korea entitled to develop nuclear weapons capabilities outside of 
the framework of the NPT? It is obvious that international politics influence 
this process of accession and exclusion. It is foreseen that this 
inconsistency in the rules could undermine the integrity of the NPT and 
potentially lead to very serious nuclear weapons proliferation threats. 
Pakistan, for example, is at the time of writing undergoing a period of 
severe instability with Taliban and Al Qaeda terror attacks being regular 
occurrences. The researcher’s view is that the nuclear tensions between 
India and Pakistan are sublimated constitutional tensions arising from the 
partition of the countries, and are therefore comparable to the cases of 
North Korea, South Korea, Argentina and Brazil, and Taiwan and China. It 
is submitted further that Israel has an international recognition crisis and 
                                                                                                                                 
foreign aid and investment, not captured in the above analysis, would have been considerably 
lower.”  
74 Op cit Kiernan at 6–7. 
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its nuclear programme can be regarded as a military manifestation of its 
constitutional dilemma.  
 
In 2003, Libya succeeded in gaining recognition from the United States of 
America and Great Britain as a trade-off for relinquishing its nuclear 
weapons programme and acceding to the NPT.75 Libya’s development of 
nuclear weapons capabilities and subsequent relinquishment resulted in a 
material and intangible benefit for that country. 
 
1.6 The Legal Status of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons  
The corpus of international law pertained to the discrete phases 
associated with: 
 
• South Africa’s creation of a nuclear arsenal;  
• possession of nuclear weapons; 
• contemplation of conducting nuclear tests; 
• its deterrent policy; 
• the hypothetical scenario of its having elected to deploy these 
weapons in the Angolan war or elsewhere; 
• its decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT; 
• its accession to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which converted the 
continent of Africa into a nuclear-weapon-free zone; and 
• South Africa’s failed relinquishment knowledge exchange attempt, 
on the eve of the Second Iraqi War in 2003. 
 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme was classified as a top secret 
project. It was always kept under the strict control of the President of the 
country, and subject to South African municipal law. This authority was 
never delegated, or allowed to become defused or opaque. It was carefully 
managed and controlled both at an inter- and intra-ministerial level. The 
transition of the strategic intention of the nuclear programme from peaceful 
civilian energy usage to military intent synchronised closely with South 
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Africa’s deteriorating security situation in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
deterioration was manifested internally as a constitutional crisis of internal 
state legitimacy and international recognition, and an escalating 
involvement in the Southern African regional conflicts.  
 
1.7 The Evolving Legal Clarity on the Status of Nuclear Weapons  
The relinquishment of the nuclear weapons signified the transition from 
war to peace. International humanitarian law regulates a state’s conduct in 
times of war while international law regulates its conduct in times of peace. 
Charles Moxley puts it thus: 
 
“The rules of international humanitarian law are not concerned with the regulating of the 
conduct of States in time of peace. They specifically relate to warfare and times of armed 
conflict, and are designed to regulate the conduct of belligerents, against one another or 
against some neutral State.”76        
 
Marco Sassòli offers further clarity on the interrelationship between 
international law and international humanitarian law: 
 
“Public international law can be described as being composed of two layers: the first is 
the traditional layer consisting of the law regulating coexistence and co-operation 
between members of international society, essentially the States; and the second is a 
new layer consisting of the community of six billion human beings. Although international 
humanitarian law came into being as part of the traditional layer i.e. as a law regulating 
belligerent inter-state relations, it has today become nearly irrelevant unless understood 
as a law protecting war against states and all others, who wage war. The implementation 
of international humanitarian law may therefore be understood from the viewpoint of both 
layers. For a branch of law that applies to a fundamentally anarchic, illegal and often 
lawless situation such as armed conflicts, the focus of implementing mechanisms must 
always be on prevention.”77   
 
In 1996, the seminal advisory judicial opinion on the Legality of the Use by 
a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict was delivered by the 
                                                
76 Moxley, Charles. 2001. ‘Unlawfulness of the United Kingdom’s Policy of Nuclear Deterrence – 
Invalidity of the Scots High Court’s Decision in Zelter’. Disarmament Diplomacy, 58:3, June. 
(Moxley is citing Ronald King Murray, former Lord Advocate of Scotland.)  
77 Sassòli, Marco. 2002. ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Law’. International 
Review of the Red Cross, 8(846):401, June. 
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International Court of Justice.78 This opinion clarified and updated the 
accumulated post-World War II legal status of nuclear weapons.79 
 
Dugard indicated that the ICJ found that: 
 
“The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law. 
 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstances of self-defence, in which 
the very survival of a State is at stake ... There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith 
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects 
under strict and effective international control.”80 
 
This research explores why and how South Africa pursued good faith 
negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (and other 
parties) to disarm itself of its nuclear capability and to bring its nuclear 
programme under strict international control.   
 
The formal legal conclusions contained in what is known as the Dispositif 
are cited in full because of their relevance to the study: 
 
“A. Unanimously: 
 
There is in neither customary nor conventional law any specific authorisation of the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons; 
 
B. By eleven votes to three: 
 
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and 
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such; 
                                                
78 Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 ICJ 
Reports 66. 
79 Loc cit Dugard at 5. (In this regard, John Dugard confirmed that the International Court of 
Justice is “competent to offer advisory opinions to the United Nations at the request of the United 
Nations. These opinions carry considerable weight as statements of law … However significant 
such opinions might be ... they remain advisory”.) 
80 International Court of Justice Case Summaries. ‘Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict’. The International Court of Justice. The Hague. Advisory Opinion of 
8 July 1996. [Online]. Available: http://www.icj-cij.org at 2. 
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In favour: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; 
Against: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma. 
 
C. Unanimously: 
 
A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of 
Article 51, is unlawful; 
 
D. Unanimously: 
 
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of 
the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and 
rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties 
and their undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons; 
 
E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote: 
 
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; 
 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake; 
 
In Favour: President Bedjaoui, Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, 
Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo; 
Against: Vice President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, 
Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins. 
 
F. Unanimously: 
 
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international 
control.”81 82  
 
                                                
81 Op cit ICJ Case Summaries at 2–3. Also corroborated by Burroughs, John. 1997. The (Il)legality 
of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice. Munster, Amsterdam: Die Deutsche Bilbliothek. 
82 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para 105(2). 
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Francis Boyle asserts that they constitute peremptory norms of law and 
are therefore part of a jus cogens. 
 
The Court agreed with the submission: 
 
”In general, international humanitarian law bears on the threat of nuclear weapons as it 
does of other weapons. International humanitarian law has evolved to meet contemporary 
circumstances, and is not limited in its application to weaponry of an earlier time. The 
fundamental principles of this law endure; to mitigate and circumscribe the cruelty of war 
for humanitarian reason.” 83 
 
This research focuses in particular on the issues covered by the ICJ in 
Paragraphs C, D, E, and F of the formal legal Dispositif. The remainder of 
this section will present a detailed discussion of each of these four 
paragraphs. 
 
Paragraph C pertains to the fact that the United Nations Charter was the 
final authority on the lawfulness of South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
programme. South Africa refrained from threatening to use nuclear 
weapons, although there were elements within the South African Defence 
Force and ARMSCOR who strongly advocated that a nuclear test 
explosion should be conducted.84 Had such a test explosion been 
conducted, it might well have been conducted contrary to Paragraph C of 
the United Nation’s Charter. In addition, it would almost certainly have 
been conducted contrary to international environmental law.85   
 
Paragraph D read together with Paragraph E confirms the correctness of 
this research being conducted in terms of international law. In this regard 
the respondents were in consensus that there were no conceivable 
circumstances in which South Africa could have threatened or used 
                                                
83 Boyle, Francis. 1996. ‘The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence’. Humanitarian Law and War 
Tribunals, College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 30–31, 17 October. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.derechos.org/koaga/v/boyle.html (see also Boyle, Francis. 1989. 
The Future of International Law and American Foreign Policy. New York: Transnational 
Publishers Inc.). 
84 Confirmed during interview with Mr Pik Botha in Pretoria North on 18 February 2008.  
85 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 391. 
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nuclear weapons that would have been compliant with international law, 
even in the case when South Africa’s very survival as a state was at risk.  
 
Paragraph E justifies an exploration and interrogation of the legality of 
South Africa’s development and use of nuclear weapons as a political 
deterrent capability. The respondents were in consensus that the deterrent 
threat of nuclear weapons was permitted under positive law. In this regard 
their reasoning was compliant with the reasoning and authority of the 
Lotus case, which averred that that which is not expressly prohibited its 
permitted.86  
 
South Africa represented an extreme circumstance, possibly envisaged in 
Paragraph E, where its very survival as a state was indeed threatened 
owing to the Angolan war and its own insurrection crisis. It was pitted 
against the military might of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Cuba and 
the MPLA. The respondents could offer no justification for the military use 
of nuclear weapons even though the survival of the South African State 
was threatened by an escalation of the Angolan war. 
 
Paragraph F provided the authority for the research exploring how and 
why the nuclear relinquishment process in South Africa was conducted in 
terms of its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. South Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons by entering into good faith negotiations with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, which itself falls under the Charter of 
the United Nations, and the remit of the Security Council, which is the 
highest body governing international law in the world. Paragraph F is also 
clearly linked to the research question: ”Why was the decision reached to 
roll back the nuclear arsenal in South Africa?” 
 
                                                
86 Lotus Case, 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A, No 10. 
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1.8 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
The NPT is by far the most important treaty in the world concerning 
nuclear weapons. It has already been noted that the membership of the 
NPT consists of five Nuclear-Weapons-States (NWS) and 182 countries 
which are non-NWS (NNWS) members of the NPT. The NWS possess 
nuclear weapons, while the non-NWS do not. The non-NWS are obligated 
not to proliferate nuclear weapons under international law. The non-NWS 
have abided by this obligation. The NWS are permitted to possess nuclear 
weapons under international law, but are obliged under international law to 
negotiate with other NWS to reduce these weapons. The NPT therefore 
represents a Faustian bargain between the NWS and non-NWS. The 
formula which covers this bargain is contained in Article VI of the NPT, 
which is its key element. Article VI of the NPT is a crucial and much-
debated clause. The Article obligation states that: 
 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to disarmament under strict and effective international control.”87 
 
Datan expounds on this as follows: 
 
“ ‘Each of the parties’ suggests that this obligation goes beyond the bilateral START 
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties) process and requires multilateral negotiations. This 
obligation is backed up by numerous resolutions of the UN General Assembly, dating 
back to the very first resolution.”88 
 
Article VI reads as a rather strange, inconsistent and asymmetrical 
agreement between those countries that possess nuclear weapons and 
those countries that deemed it wise and in the interests of international 
peace not to possess these weapons of mass destruction. Article VI would 
appear to be predicated on an unbalanced reciprocity of the NWS selfishly 
possessing and retaining possession of nuclear weapons and the non-
NWS selflessly relinquishing possession of weapons of mass destruction. 
                                                
87 Article VI of the NPT. 
88 Datan, Merav. 2003. ‘Nuclear Weapons and International Law’; IEER: Science for Democratic 
Action, 9(3)/Energy and Security Law 17 of 2003, 1–2. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_9/9-3/law.html 
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It is inconsistent in the sense that one set of rules and norms applies to 
those NWS that possess nuclear weapons, while another set of rules 
pertain to those countries that are NWS. Although the logic that binds the 
NPT together and makes it work is opaque, the practical and fortunate 
reality is that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has 
actually, despite its inelegance, worked well since it opened for signature 
in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Its operation begs many questions 
including: Why should the NWS be accorded the privilege of being NWS in 
the first place? Why should they be permitted to breach the NPT itself by 
engaging in nuclear proliferation, while the NNWS are not permitted to do 
so? Why should the NNWS subject themselves passively to the 
beneficence of the NWS? 
 
There are many more questions that can be posed criticising the NPT, but 
the researcher’s view is that these questions are not helpful at this stage. 
The reason for that is that there are profound humanitarian dangers 
associated with winning a consistency- and reciprocity-based argument on 
this matter. 
 
The NPT should be read together with Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter because it provides the framework for international 
law. Article 2(4) has already been alluded to in a previous section of this 
research and states: “All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the 
purpose of the United Nations.”89 Article 51 reads: 
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” 90 
 
Datan continues his argument: 
 
                                                
89 United Nations Charter, Article 2(4). 
90 United Nations Charter, Article 51. 
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“The combination of these two provisions means that a State may engage in the threat or 
use of force only in collective or individual self-defence, if an armed attack occurs, and 
only when the Security Council has not exerted control. 
 
Of course, the result has been, in part, that States claim their own threat or use of force 
as an act of self-defence, and see aggression on the part of others who act and speak 
similarly in the name of self-defence. Nuclear weapons raise this irony to the level of 
absurdity. 
 
But implicit in these principles of law is the aspiration for a just and effective international 
legal order. That it does not function smoothly, is due largely to the psychological mindset 
of human mistrust, and the ways that fear, greed, and the drive for power have been 
infused into political structures. At the same time, these structures are being challenged 
today in ways that do not necessarily promise, but do allow for the possibility of a 
transition to a more just world order based on the force of law rather than the law of 
force.”91  
 
South Africa prepared and presented its case for accession to the NPT in 
terms of the Safeguards system. Charles Ferguson defines safeguards as 
comprising “a set of nuclear material accountancy and surveillance tools 
and techniques that are supposed to help that a country’s civilian nuclear 
programme remains peaceful”.92 
 
According to James Lovett: 
 
“Safeguards is a collective term that comprises those measures designed to guard 
against the diversion of material such as source and special nuclear material from uses 
permitted by law or treaty and to give timely indication of possible diversion or credible 
assurances that no diversion has occurred. The measures designed refer to: 
 
• Containment measures, which means lock it in a safe or vault; 
• Surveillance measures, which means using a camera or using a guard to watch 
over it; 
• Nuclear material accounting – this entails data capturing, recording, reporting and 
verification activities. 
 
                                                
91 Op cit.Datan. 
92 Ferguson, Charles. 2007. ‘Nuclear Safeguards for a New Nuclear Age’. Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientist, 1, 18 December. 
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The security is also associated with safeguards and not only the safety of the people 
working with the material.”93 
 
South Africa needed to meet all the terms and conditions specified by that 
system. All variances had to be perfectly reconciled, and no unjustified 
exceptions were acceptable. These inspections are authorised by the 
IAEA, with the sanction of the United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council. Nuclear inspections of all relevant facilities are 
sanctioned by the IAEA. The inspectors carefully investigate all the data, 
intellectual knowledge, and physical facilities and synthesise this 
knowledge into a coherent diagnosis and prognosis of the nuclear integrity 
of a country. These assessments have to be justified by the presentation 
of all records of the entire programme, both written and oral. 
 
Thomas Cochran presented an insight into the precision and exactitude of 
the applied nuclear physics methodologies that are used by the inspectors 
to conduct nuclear audits in terms of safeguards agreements. The 
inspections are subjected to: 
 
• exacting and scientifically precise nuclear physics calculations;  
• rigorous physical visual inspection on site, with state of the art 
technology and measurement instruments; and 
• cross-examination of all persons associated with or connected to 
the programme in any way.  
 
These calculations are effectively peer-reviewed by the inspectors, who 
are themselves expert nuclear physicists.94 The Safeguards system 
provides a verifiable auditing system of a State’s nuclear programme and 
ensures that all materials, installations and facilities are used for peaceful 
purposes. These rights are contained in the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapons and the Statute of the IAEA. It was the 
credible application of the Safeguards system by the IAEA that conferred 
                                                
93 Lovett, James, E. 1974. Nuclear Materials: Accountability. Hindsdale, Illinois: American 
Nuclear Society. 
94 Cochran, Thomas. 1994. ‘Highly Enriched Uranium Production for South Africa’s Nuclear 
Weapons’. Science and Global Security, 4:161–176.  
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trust in the integrity of South Africa’s relinquishment and accession 
process and by extension, the credibility of the constitutional transition. 
South Africa’s compliance with the IAEA’s Safeguards system was an 
imperative step that needed to be taken and complied with in order for the 
country to accede to the NPT. 
 
The Safeguards system is therefore a vitally important nuclear audit, 
which, as has been outlined above, leads to international trust building. A 
clearance from the Safeguards system effectively means that a country 
will not suddenly use nuclear weapons for military purposes, and create a 
threat to world peace. The nuclear inspectors are pivotally important to 
achieving this audit. 
 
It is of particular relevance to this study that the NPT is pre-eminently a 
trust-creating treaty. Mr de Klerk appreciated this fact fully. As this 
dissertation will show, he used the relinquishment and accession process 
as a platform to create international trust in the new constitution and non-
racial political dispensation. This dissolved the recognition of South Africa 
as a pariah apartheid state. The trust which is implicit in the NPT as part of 
international governance was therefore linked to reversing South Africa’s 
international recognition status.  
 
Hans Blix argued that this treaty has imperfectly but significantly 
contributed towards the globalisation of law. He acknowledged that the 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT has been uneven.95 Dr Blix 
asserted: 
 
“Even though growing détente is generally reducing the relevance of nuclear weapons, 
there is still a justifiable concern about the threat that they pose, and there is a difficult 
distance to go before nuclear disarmament is accomplished and non-proliferation 
commitments universal. There is also increased concern about the reliability of certain 
commitments, about the possible clandestine development, or retention of a nuclear 
weapons capacity. Just as a reliable renunciation of nuclear weapons is mutually 
reinforcing between neighbours and within regions, doubts about the genuineness of 
                                                
95 Op cit Blix (2007) at 2.  
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such renunciations will mutually undermine such commitments. Continued international 
vigilance and efforts to maintain and expand détente globally, and regionally, 
strengthened international co-operation and effective international verification are 
required to ensure reliability and confidence”.96  
 
Nonetheless, it is his view that this globalisation of the law contributed to 
the decision by some states to relinquish their nuclear weapons and to 
accede to the NPT, by virtue of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations in 
terms of peremptory norms of international law. 
 
1.9 The Legal Status of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the Issue of South African Membership 
The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world’s premier nuclear 
agency and was responsible for conducting the inspection regime on 
South Africa’s nuclear programme. The legal obligations of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are contained in its Statute,97 
and these obligations should be read together with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The IAEA’s Statute, when read together 
with the Charter of the United Nations, provides it with its authority in 
terms of international law. This authority is quite often derived from 
Resolutions of the Security Council, which jurisprudentially confirm an 
obligation on members of the IAEA to enact these Resolutions. The 
Resolutions arising inter alia from the General Conference of the IAEA are 
in turn conveyed (where and when relevant) to the Security Council, who 
convert these into United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
 
The IAEA is therefore both an administrative organ and (by delegation 
from the Security Council) an instrument of international law. It has an 
international law-making function and this is achieved by means of inter 
alia its General Conference. An example of how the IAEA General 
Conference makes international law is illustrated by the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety, which opened for signature simultaneously with the 38th 
                                                
96 Blix, Hans. 1995a. ‘Statement by Dr Hans Blix: Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’. Summary Records, Document No. NPT/conf.1995/SR.1. New York, 17 April. 
97 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. [Online]. Available: http://www.iaea.org 
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regular session of the IAEA on 20 September 1994. Odette Jankowitsch-
Prevor pointed out that this Convention was adopted without a vote and 
therefore by consensus on 17 June 1994 by the emissaries of 84 countries 
at the Diplomatic Conference convened at the head office of the IAEA in 
Vienna from 14 to 17 June 1994. 
 
“This Convention entered into force after the deposit with the Director General of the 
IAEA of the 22nd instrument of ratification, including the instruments of 17 states ‘each 
having at least one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core’. 
The large number of countries involved in this treaty-making process reflects the intense 
international interest for all matters regarding nuclear safety and the willingness of 
countries both with and without nuclear power programmes to actively contribute to the 
safety of nuclear power plants wherever they might be situated.”98  
 
Ms. Jankowitsch- Prevor makes the point that there are complex and 
variable quorums that are required to convert a Resolution of the IAEA into 
a Convention in international law. 
 
It has been found in the case of the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations99 that the United Nations and its organs did 
have international legal personality. This case provides a legal authority 
for adducing that the IAEA had international legal personality which 
authorised its weapons inspections in South Africa. Dr Blix maintained 
that: 
 
 “Acceptance of IAEA Safeguards by non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT is 
required under the Treaty because there is a need for credible assurances that nuclear 
material and installations are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In order to provide 
such assurances, Safeguards must be effective. Ineffective Safeguards may be worse 
than none, because they might inspire misplaced confidence – with serious 
consequences. However, we must recognise that while States want the Safeguards 
system to give a high degree of assurance, they often want a minimum degree of 
intrusion when they themselves are subject to the Safeguards. States are no different 
                                                
98 Jankowitsch-Prevor, Odette. 1994. ‘International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period: 
The Convention on Nuclear Safety’. Nuclear Law Bulletin, 54:155. Ms Jankowitsch-Prevor was 
the Secretary to the Group of Experts on the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
99 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174. 
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from individuals in this regard: we want maximum protection but we don’t want to give the 
authorities unrestricted access to our homes”.100    
 
Dr Blix added: 
 
“The International Atomic Energy Agency, which I represent, is given an important role in 
the implementation and fulfillment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. First, it is responsible 
under Article III of the Treaty to verify that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the 
Treaty are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other 
explosive devices. 
 
Second, under Article IV of the Treaty, the Agency provides the main multilateral channel 
for expanding the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Further, it is 
providing the verification systems for nuclear-weapon-free zones envisaged in Article VII 
and is contributing also to the verification of activities relevant to Article VI.”101 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency does have legal personality. It 
has rights and it possesses the legal personality to maintain those rights 
by bringing claims against a State (and in the case of the research, South 
Africa), if need be.  
 
Article II of the IAEA Statute sets out its objectives: 
 
“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able that 
assistance provided by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in 
such a way as to further any military usage.”102    
 
The IAEA’s functions are laid out in Article III, A.5 of the Statute. These 
include, inter alia: 
 
“To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and 
other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the 
Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as 
to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to 
                                                
100 Blix, Hans. 1991. ‘Inspections in Iraq’. Statement to the US Senate Foreign Relations 
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any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that 
State’s activities in the filed of atomic energy.”103  
 
The Agency Safeguards are presented in Article XII of the Statute. Clause 
7 of this Article is particularly relevant to the case of South Africa. It reads: 
 
“In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to take 
requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance 
and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or a member in 
furtherance of the project; ... 
 
C. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-
compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to 
al members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”104   
 
These are some of the more important Articles which give the IAEA its 
authority. The latter clause gives the IAEA authority under international 
law, which may be applied to sanction a military intervention and war. 105 
The Statute of the IAEA is therefore designed to fulfil its obligations to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
John Dugard provides further insight into the legal personality of United 
Nations organs: 
 
“Since 1949, it has been accepted that international organisations, such as the United 
Nations and its specialised agencies enjoy international legal personality. The recognition 
of the legal personality of international organisations was as a result of an advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice in response to the question whether the 
United Nations could sue Israel for the death of Count Bernadotte of Sweden, a UN 
mediator assassinated while on duty in Palestine. The International Court held that the 
United Nations had the necessary legal personality to bring action against a state in such 
circumstances. The Court stated ‘That is not the same thing as saying that it is a state, 
which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as 
a state. Still less is it the same thing as saying that it is a super-state … what it does 
mean is that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international 
                                                
103 Op cit Statute of the IAEA at 2.   
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Verification Challenge – Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Verification. 
In co-operation with the Centre for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University: 
Birkhauser, Boston, Basel, Stuttgart. 
 78 
rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims’106.”107 
 
The IAEA’s legal personality and enforcements were illustrated in its 
denial in 1977 of South Africa’s seat to participate in the General 
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.108 This sanction 
prohibited South Africa from participating in the creation of international 
law on nuclear weapons which arises from the ratification of United 
Nations conference resolutions. 
 
Dugard offered insight into the implications of these United Nations 
enforcement mechanisms. The sanctions which were imposed against 
South Africa were comprehensive and mandatory, and were reflected in 
South Africa’s pariah recognition status. He contended that: 
 
“Exclusion from membership in international organisations is another sanction that was 
effectively employed against South Africa for violating its obligations under the UN 
Charter. In the 1960s, South Africa was excluded from membership of a number of 
specialised agencies of the United Nations – such as the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) – and in 1974 the General 
Assembly of the United Nations excluded South Africa from participation in the debates 
and work of the General Assembly. In 1994 South Africa resumed its membership of 
these bodies.”109  
 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability, together with its capability of 
proliferating these weapons and its apartheid policy, afforded it pariah 
status. It is highly unlikely that the Members would have permitted it to 
resume its participation in the work of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations had it retained possession of these weapons. 
 
Part of South Africa’s recognition crisis was encapsulated in its struggle to 
regain its membership of the international organisations after having being 
excluded from them, and sanctioned by them. Recognition of its reformed 
                                                
106 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Report 174 at 
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107 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 1. 
108 Corroborated in interviews with Mr Pik Botha and Professor Waldo Stumpf.  
109 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 8. 
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status was both a legal and a political process. It will be shown in 
subsequent chapters that this recognition crisis was one of the most 
important incentives informing the decision to relinquish the nuclear 
weapons and to accede to the NPT. 
 
Mr de Klerk resolved this crisis. His solution was to develop an 
internationally-recognised non-racial constitution that dissolved the 
imperative for the imposition of UN Security Council and General 
Assembly sanctions of all types. 
 
The legality of possession of nuclear weapons has not in the researcher’s 
view advanced as significantly as has the development of legal clarity on 
usage, testing and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the 
law as it pertains to the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the policy of 
nuclear deterrence remains unclear. 
 
1.10 Research Method and Theory 
1.10.1 Overview of Analysis 
This discussion will provide the reader with a brief holistic overview of the 
analysis of the research method and theory so as to enable a clear 
understanding of this third contribution to the introduction.  
 
When research is conducted using a critical literature review, the 
researcher is required to access a wide and deep cross-section of  
relevant, credible legal cases and literature on the matters pertinent to the 
research. The researcher is then required to synthesise this reading into 
high-quality coherence, appropriate argumentation, discovery of principles, 
and findings.   
 
Primary research involving an expert sample requires a deeper 
justification than research conducted on a secondary basis using a 
literature review only. Primary research obviously does require a literature 
review and study of relevant cases as outlined above. But it also requires 
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an integrated and coherent justification of the research methodology and 
theory employed. This necessitates conducting a second literature review 
to justify the research methodology and a third literature review to 
authorise the selection of the theoretical base. In addition, the primary 
research data that emerges from the inquiry needs to be carefully 
deconstructed into meaningful findings. The literature review and 
synthesis of relevant cases will require an additional methodological and 
theoretical justification. For example, there needs to be a uniform thrust to 
the questions that are posed to the respondents. The questions that are 
proffered need to be wisely considered and posed. They should be 
derived from the appropriate literature and consistent with the research 
objectives. 
 
For this reason, each respondent was furnished with a copy of the 
research proposal that was submitted to Wits Law School, and approved 
by the School before interviewing was commenced. The interviews were 
conducted using the research proposal as a basic agenda for discussion 
with the respondents. The respondents were all senior and very 
experienced men, having held among others the highest office in the land. 
Each addressed the topic according to his unique perspective and 
understanding of the nuclear relinquishment and accession process, and 
often disregarded the research proposal. 
 
The approved research proposal was later subjected to a far-reaching 
criticism by Professor Waldo Stumpf, who was interviewed first. Professor 
Stumpf kindly identified various weaknesses in the original research 
proposal and offered wise guidance as to how these weaknesses might 
best be obviated and rectified so as not to detract from the research.110 On 
that basis, the research proposal was largely re-written after it had been 
approved by the Law School. It was Professor Stumpf’s critique of the 
researcher’s proposal that was used as the ‘base document’ for 
                                                
110 It should be noted that Professor Stumpf’s critique of the research proposal was brought to the 
attention of Professor Jonathan Klaaren and it was agreed that this expert knowledge needed to be 
practically incorporated into the research methodology and theory component of this research as 
well as to the practical knowledge creation aspects of the thesis. 
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interviewing the primary respondents. This base research proposal was 
then distributed to each of the respondents. Some of the respondents 
chose to follow the base document and others simply responded as they 
deemed appropriate.  
 
This third section of the chapter explores various themes of the research. 
It contends that this thesis is compliant with the fundamental requirement 
that research should offer a substantial and original contribution to 
knowledge. It presents this pursuit for an original contribution to 
knowledge to the reader as a research commitment. The time period and 
schedule of events relative to this research is also discussed, and was 
derived from the earlier discussions on that matter contained in the 
historical background. This provided the cut-off dates for the various 
phases of the research.  
 
The research questions which are presented are founded in the contextual 
reality and historical background to the study. These questions and their 
rationale are offered to the reader in a separate exposition that forms part 
of this section of the chapter. 
 
The delimitations and limitations of this research are then presented to the 
reader in order to ensure that the expectations with regard to this research 
are circumscribed and remain grounded in reality. In essence, the 
research was delimited to nuclear weapons and excluded other weapons 
of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. A key 
limitation of the research is that a comparative analysis of South Africa 
and Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process was offered in order to 
ascertain whether a guideline or generalised methodology might be 
derived for other countries to relinquish their nuclear arsenals and accede 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is uncertain 
whether this knowledge is transferable and, if indeed it is transferable, the 
degree to which it is transferable, and the limitations of that transferability.    
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This research was conducted as a single case study, and a brief 
exposition is presented on the authority for using a single case study 
method. The phenomenological method was applied in order to identify 
convergences and divergences in the respondents’ viewpoints. A detailed 
rationale is offered as to the justification of the small expert sample of 
respondents. Finally, a brief exposition is offered as to how the research 
themes that are discovered relate to the question of constituting 
democracy. 
 
1.10.2  Why was the Decision Reached to Roll Back the Nuclear 
Arsenal in South Africa?   
As explained below, this question as presented in the heading above was 
posed to the set of respondents. Charles Moxley posed five questions that 
are strongly supported by international humanitarian law and underpin the 
“why” question contained above. 
 
1. “Rule of proportionality; 
2. Rule of neutrality; 
3. Rule of necessity; 
4. Rule of discrimination; (and)  
5. The role of deterrence.”111 
 
The researcher needed to keep an open mind and to listen carefully to the 
respondents in order to discover the important reasons that informed the 
decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It will be shown that the key 
concerns of international humanitarian law, as depicted by Charles Moxley 
above, and the terms and conditions associated with accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, permeated all the 
interviewees’ responses. This result was not surprising. However, there 
was another central legal consideration that influenced the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal. This was a new finding and it was the 
                                                
111 Moxley, Charles J. 2000. Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World. 
Lanham, MD: Austin & Winfield. 
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theme of achieving international recognition for the new constitution. The 
expert respondents reported this as being a prime motive behind why the 
decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal was taken. This response was 
communicated in various ways, and with different nuances, by all of the 
respondents.112  
 
1.10.3 What Impact, if any, did International Law have on the 
Decision to Relinquish the Nuclear Arsenal? 
This ‘what’ question was connected to the ‘why’ question posed above. It 
was intended to offer the respondents the opportunity of affirming that the 
decision was pursued because of the need to comply with the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and international law, or to 
disaffirm this. 
 
All of the respondents had a deep sense of the natural law associated with 
the questionable legality and utility of nuclear weapons.113 Although none 
of the respondents claimed to be expert in the area of international law, 
their analyses often spontaneously gravitated around Moxley’s criteria 
mentioned above. The respondents also could have chosen to repudiate 
the role of international law in their decision to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, but did not do so.  
 
It was expected that the respondents would outline how they had 
addressed the nuclear inspection regimens instituted by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency with respect to accession to the NPT. Accession to 
the NPT and relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal can be viewed as a 
search for compliance with international law. 
                                                
112 Professor Klaaren posed the question of whether this view might have been a post hoc 
rationalisation imputed by the researcher to the respondents’ testimony. This is a really good 
question, requiring serious moral reflection. The researcher’s view is that the feedback from the 
expert respondents speaks for itself, and the reader should decide on the interpretation on the basis 
of the primary data. The researcher holds the view that this surprising finding is a new contribution 
to knowledge. To the best of his knowledge, this notion has never yet been formally proffered as a 
contributing feature towards South Africa’s constitutional transition towards democracy. 
113 These themes are raised by Roberts, Adam & Guelff, Richard (eds.). 1982. Documents on the 
Laws of War. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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Mr de Klerk reiterated that he had placed great store on this process being 
conducted in private, accompanied by the most careful human and 
political discretion. The relinquishment and accession also necessitated 
that it should be conducted according to the precise standards specified 
by the inspectorate of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Professor 
Mouton was acutely aware of his responsibilities in performing his role 
required as the ‘oversight auditor’. He regarded his appointment in this 
role by Mr de Klerk as a personal honour. Professor Stumpf had a similar 
focus to Professor Mouton, but was involved in ‘project managing’ the 
detail of the relinquishment and accession process to the letter. 
 
Mr Botha’s response was generally inclined more towards addressing the 
political dimension of the relinquishment and accession than the detail. 
He focused on the ‘bigger picture’ issues. 
 
Dr Barnard’s exposition was inclined towards deriving the maximum 
possible quid pro quo that South Africa might obtain in exchange for the 
relinquishment and accession. He expressed the view that South Africa 
could have obtained a significantly better quid pro quo for this. The reader 
should note that Dr Barnard’s apex of involvement in the nuclear project 
was during the development of the nuclear arsenal and that he worked 
very closely with President PW Botha in this regard.  
 
Dr Barnard explained during his interview that Mr de Klerk had appointed 
Professor Mouton above him into the role of ’oversight auditor‘. Dr 
Barnard’s involvement in the nuclear relinquishment and accession 
process was not as significant as his involvement in the development of 
the policy of nuclear deterrence under President PW Botha.  
 
 85 
1.10.4 How Did South Africa Set About Acceding to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Relinquish its 
Nuclear Weapons? 
The respondents’ explanation of ‘how’ the nuclear arsenal was 
relinquished, and how South Africa acceded to the NPT, provided the 
opportunity to  indicate the perspective in which the respondents regarded 
accession to the NPT and as a corollary, the implicit import or lack thereof 
of international law in this process. The ‘how’ question was very important, 
because South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process was conducted 
successfully, inasmuch as it was achieved in a manner that was compliant 
with the standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations, and the 
inspection standards of the five Nuclear-Weapons-States. 
 
The matter of how compliance was achieved with international inspection 
standards was regarded from two perspectives. The first perspective was 
that of a narrow technical compliance of how this was achieved with the 
international law standards set by the above bodies in terms of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That was compliance per 
se. The second perspective on how compliance was achieved was a 
broader and less clearly defined matter. It related to how compliance was 
achieved, and used politically, in order to enhance South Africa’s 
international political recognition status. This had been severely curtailed 
by its human rights abuses under the policy of apartheid, which led to its 
pariah international recognition status, and included inter alia mandatory 
United Nations sanctions. In other words, there was cognisance of the 
question of whether and to what extent the relinquishment of the nuclear 
arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons could be used to assist in reversing the mandatory international 
sanctions that had been enacted against South Africa, and in enhancing 
South Africa’s international recognition status.114  
                                                
114 It will be contended that the ‘how’ question in Iraq was not satisfactorily answered and led 
directly to the Second Iraqi War. This reader is referred to Chapter Seven of this thesis, entitled “A 
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There is a further matter that needs to be briefly alluded to relating to the 
matter of compliance. The first matter of compliance was achieved with 
the IAEA inspectorate and did not include the acknowledgement that 
South Africa had developed a nuclear weapons capability. Had South 
Africa admitted this, they would have immediately been in breach of the 
NPT because of the manner in which it was formulated at that time. (This 
formulation has since been corrected.) The second matter of compliance 
related to the creation of an extended and enlarged committee which 
included the IAEA inspectors as well as ad hoc nuclear inspectors from 
the United States, Russia, Germany, Great Britain and France.  
 
1.10.5 Is the Knowledge Experience of South Africa’s 
Relinquishment of its Nuclear Arsenal and Accession to the 
NPT Transferable? 
This question is a general integrative question that was intended to assist 
in ‘binding’ the research into coherent themes as well as exploring 
perceptions of the value of the historical event of a relinquishment. A 
comparison of South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process with that 
which was conducted in Iraq is presented in pursuance of this research. 
The criteria for the comparison are contained in the notion developed by 
the Harvard Negotiation Project and expanded by the researcher that 
negotiations need to take place in four domains if they are to be 
successful.115  
 
These four domains are:  
 
1. The substantive legal domain;  
2. Legal process and procedure matters; 
                                                                                                                                 
Comparison of How South Africa and Iraq Relinquished their Nuclear Weapons in terms of 
International Law”, where the matter is addressed. 
115 The researcher visited the Harvard Negotiation Project in 2006 at the invitation of the Director 
Professor Roger Fisher. While the researcher was in Boston, Professor Robert Bordonne kindly 
presented the construct of substance, process and relationship which is used in Chapter Seven to 
assist in structuring the comparison between the South African and Iraqi relinquishment and 
accession processes. 
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3. The legal relationship matters; 
4. The time-line.116 
 
These four domains were valuable to the study because they provided an 
holistic and quite simple framework for understanding and presenting very 
complex information about the reality of the relinquishment of nuclear 
weapons and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons in two divergent cases; one case being successful and the other 
being a failure. The framework allowed for meaningful, systematic, 
logically congruent and pin-pointing comparisons, which might easily be 
improved with further expert involvement. It therefore served both a 
diagnostic and prognostic purpose. The reader should note that this 
comparison counterposed the primary research data from the South 
African case with a literature review of the Iraq case. 
 
1.10.6 Delimitations  
The main body of this research was delimited to investigating South 
Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal in terms of international law. 
This delimitation was extended to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
South African and Iraq’s relinquishment processes in terms of the 
knowledge transference comparability. As mentioned previously, the terms 
of reference of this research specifically do not pertain to other weapons of 
mass destruction, including those of a chemical and biological kind. 
 
The second delimitation was contained in the research sample, which 
consisted of a small expert group delimited to include only President FW 
de Klerk, Professor Wynand Mouton, Professor Waldo Stumpf, Mr Pik 
Botha, and Dr Neil Barnard. These respondents were the core decision-
makers associated with South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment programme. 
There were, of course, many other persons who were involved in the 
relinquishment and accession process who were not interviewed, because 
they were not privy to the core reasoning behind this decision. It was 
                                                
116 The Harvard Negotiation Project refers only to the matters of substance, relationship and 
process. The researcher regarded “time” as an important exclusion from their useful framework. 
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decided to restrict the sample to South African subjects because it was 
they who reached, and implemented, the decision to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear 
Weapons. It was further decided that the South African research sample 
should be afforded primacy. 
 
The dependence of this research upon a literature review to derive and 
present the Iraqi case in terms of the substance, relationship, process and 
time framework is most certainly a delimitation of the study. The South 
African component of this comparison can be expected to be more robust 
and have higher research integrity than the Iraqi component of this 
comparison. The researcher was unable to access an expert Iraqi 
research sample. The inclusion of a sample of Iraqi nuclear experts would 
have assured that the information provided for Iraq was first-hand and 
would also have assured greater research elegance, but was unfortunately 
not possible.  
 
Ian Brownlie offered a caution that is relevant to this discussion. He makes 
the point that “at this stage it is perhaps necessary to stress that over-
simplification of the problems, and too much reliance on general 
propositions about objective responsibility, culpa, and intention, can result 
in a lack of finesse in approaching particular issues”.117 Brownlie’s caution 
can be regarded as a critique of the researcher’s interpretation of the 
veracity of the questions at hand. 
 
1.10.7 Limitations 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
NPT was a unique process, driven and determined by a set of highly 
specific legal, technical and political concerns. One of the consequential 
challenges of this research was to assess whether, and to what extent, the 
insight of the knowledge and experience that arose from this research 
might be generalised to other countries that might intend following an 
                                                
117 Op cit Brownlie at 427. 
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analogous route of relinquishing their nuclear weapons and acceding to 
the NPT. An analysis has been conducted of the comparability of the 
South African and Iraqi relinquishment and accession processes, and it is 
uncertain whether these findings may be plausibly transferred. This is a 
limitation of the research. The researcher’s view is that it may be difficult to 
transfer this knowledge to a country that is placed under extreme pressure 
to relinquish its nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. The reason for 
this assertion is that nuclear relinquishment and accession can be very 
complicated matters. The more complicated the political circumstances 
within a society, the more difficult this task will be. The researcher is also 
not sure as to how easily and appropriately this research would translate 
into other languages and be acceptable to other cultures. Nevertheless, 
the framework offered here is rational and could be applicable. 
 
A second limitation of the research is contained in the selection of the 
research sample itself. This study would have been enhanced and its 
scope increased if the researcher had been able to secure an international 
expert sample, which included inter alia the inspectors from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the Americans and the British 
experts, and others who were party to the relinquishment and accession 
process.  
 
The researcher was not able to interview Dr Hans Blix, who played pivotal 
roles in both the South African and Iraqi cases. This failure to access Dr 
Blix should be regarded as a limitation on the research. This limitation was 
partially offset by conducting an appropriate review of Dr Blix’s statements 
to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and other 
authoritative documents, which are contained in the extensive literature 
that is available on this matter.  While the South African data was derived 
from the respondents who conducted the relinquishment process and 
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acceded to the NPT, the Iraqi research was conducted via a literature 
review only.118 
 
1.10.8 Justification for the Use of the Single Case Study Method 
The decision to carry out this research as a single case study was 
informed by the fact that the South African decision to relinquish its 
nuclear arsenal was without precedent. It was therefore a unique process, 
informed by specific legal and political considerations. It was a singular 
case requiring a single case study. A single case study was deemed to be 
appropriate for this type of applied legal research. 
 
Robert Yin offered indicators of when it is appropriate to use the case 
study method as a research strategy. These are, inter alia: 
 
• “the complex causal links within the primary data that could not be 
processed or measured through survey or experimental strategies; 
• the need to describe interventions in the real-life situation in which 
they occurred; 
• the fact that the situation in which interventions are being evaluated 
has no single set of outcomes; and 
• the possibility that the study could involve meta-evaluation”. 119 
 
Yin posited that case studies are the preferred research strategy when 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being investigated, when the boundaries 
between phenomena and their context are not clear and “when the 
researcher has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon with-in some real life context”.120 The reader is 
reminded that the research questions are in fact predominantly ‘why’ and 
‘how’ questions, namely: 
 
                                                
118 See, for example, Watson, Bruce (ed.) (with George, Bruce, Tsouras, Peter & Cyr, BL). 1993. 
Military Lessons of the Gulf War. London: Greenhill Books. 
119 Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research Design and Methods. Second Edition. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 15. 
120 Op cit Yin at 1. 
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• Why was the decision reached to roll back the nuclear arsenal and 
accede to the NPT? 
• How did South Africa set about acceding to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and relinquish its nuclear 
weapons? 
• How did South Africa set about acceding to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and relinquish its nuclear 
weapons? 
• How did South Africa’s relinquishment and accession process 
compare with Iraq’s?  
• How transferable is the experience of South Africa’s accession to 
NPT? 
 
Only one ‘what’ question was posed, namely: What impact, if any, did 
international law have on the South African (FW de Klerk’s) decision to 
relinquish South Africa’s nuclear arsenal? 
 
These favourable research conditions for applying the case study method 
have an obvious and direct application to conducting applied legal 
research studies in general. 
 
Primary interviews were conducted on a small but snowballing expert 
sample of persons who were involved with the relinquishment of the 
nuclear programme and accession to the NPT. One of the important 
benefits of this research is that it attempted to understand the lived 
experience of the persons who decided upon South Africa’s nuclear 
rollback and accession to the NPT in terms of international law. This lived 
experience was articulated in the five testimonies of the expert sample. 
 
These interviews were firstly subjected to the traditional process of 
triangulating the law with the testimonies of the respondents. This was the 
predominant method of data analysis. The data from these interviews was 
also, where appropriate, and at the discretion of the researcher, subjected 
to the structured methodology and method of phenomenological reduction. 
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The information was also analysed by subjecting the data to the 
phenomenological research method. The method of phenomenological 
reduction assisted in clarifying, systematising and enriching the 
understanding of the data. It was particularly helpful in identifying 
convergences and divergences in the information provided between the 
respondents, and within the respondents’ own testimony, in a structured 
and systematic manner.  
 
Kate Caelli pointed out that in phenomenological research, the terms 
‘methodology’ and ‘method’ are viewed separately. The former refers to 
the philosophical framework that must be assimilated so that that the 
researcher is clear about the assumptions of the particular approach he or 
she has selected, whereas the latter refers to the procedure used to carry 
out the research.121 
 
1.10.9 The Phenomenological Method 
The central features of the phenomenological method are outlined below. 
 
The first step in the phenomenological method is the so-called 
phenomenon of reduction, or ‘epoch’. Here, the mental acts that took 
place during the course of the relinquishment process were described in a 
manner that was free of theories and presuppositions, either about those 
acts themselves, or about the existence of objects in the world. This 
pertained specifically to the primary research data that was discovered 
from the interviews with those who were entrusted with the relinquishment 
decision. 122 
 
The second step involved the eidetic reduction, which was an important 
theory building aspect of the phenomenological method. Here, by 
reflecting on a particular act or sets of actions that occurred during the 
relinquishment process, the research questions were addressed. This 
                                                
121 Caelli, Kate. 2001. ‘Engaging with Phenomenology: Is it More of a Challenge than it Needs 
Be?’ Qualitative Health Research, 11(2):273–281, March. 
122 Op cit Caelli at 276. 
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included the search for the discovery of a comparison between the legal 
dimensions of South Africa and Iraq’s relinquishment processes.123  
 
1.10.10 The Layout of the Research 
The researcher obtained valuable verbatim testimony from the small 
expert sample against which the legal analysis is triangulated. The 
researcher’s view was that this testimony should be placed in the 
commons. For this reason some fairly lengthy quotations offered by the 
respondents have been included. 
 
The layout of this dissertation is similar to the format offered by Professor 
John Burroughs in his incisive analysis of The (Il)legality of Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice.124 In this book, Burroughs cited verbatim testimonies of 
the proponents and opponents of the legality of the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons in a focused and useful fashion. Professor Charles 
Moxley in his book Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post 
Cold War World125 offered a similar data presentation structure to that 
afforded by Professor Burroughs. The researcher was specifically inclined 
to follow the formatting approach of Burroughs and Moxley, because it 
was logically congruent with the type of data that was being analysed 
here. 
 
Leslie Paik126 and Austin Sarat & William Felstiner127 conducted legal 
research involving testimony from respondents, and the researcher was 
kindly referred by Professor Jonathan Klaaren to these studies as a 
general guideline in laying out this research.   
 
                                                
123 Loc cit. 
124 Op cit Burroughs (1997). 
125 Op cit Moxley (2000). 
126 Paik, Leslie. 2006. ‘Organizational Interpretations of Drug Test Results’. Proquest International 
Academic Research Library. Law & Society Review, 40(4):931, December.  
127 Sarat, Austin & Felstiner, W. 1986. ‘Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office’. Law & 
Society Review, 20(1). 
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1.10.11 The Study Sample 
This dissertation consisted of a small but uniquely experienced and 
relevant expert sample of five persons who were directly involved in 
conceiving, leading and project-managing the nuclear relinquishment 
process, and South Africa’s successful accession to the NPT. The sample 
included:  
 
• President FW de Klerk, who presided over the relinquishment of the 
nuclear weapons. Mr de Klerk was interviewed at the offices of the 
FW de Klerk Foundation in Plattekloof, Cape Town on 4 October 
2007.   
• Mr Pik Botha, who was the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs 
at the time. Mr Pik Botha was interviewed in Pretoria North on 
18 February 2008.  
• Professor Wynand Mouton, whom Mr de Klerk placed in charge of 
the oversight process associated with the relinquishment 
programme and accession to the NPT. Professor Wynand Mouton 
was interviewed at Gordon’s Bay in the Strand on 30 October 2007. 
• Professor Waldo Stumpf, who was in charge of the programme 
dismantlement which started in September 1989. Professor Waldo 
Stumpf was interviewed in his offices at the University of Pretoria, 
Minerals Science Building, Pretoria on 18 October 2007.128 129 
• Dr Neil Barnard, who was the Director of South Africa’s National 
Intelligence Service (NIS). Dr Neil Barnard was interviewed at the 
Chameleon Restaurant in Plattekloof, Cape Town on 29 October 
2007.  
 
Ian Brownlie points out: 
 
“There is a serious problem involved in finding reliable evidence on points of international 
law in the absence of formal proof and resort to expert witnesses. Secondly, issues of 
                                                
128 Stumpf, Waldo. 1995a. ‘South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to 
Dismantlement’. Proquest International Academic Research Library. Arms Control Today, 
25(10):3–8, December 1995/January 1996.  
129 Stumpf, Waldo: 1995b. ‘Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme’. 
Presentation given at the Conference ‘50 Years After Hiroshima’ organised by UPID (Unione 
Scienziati per il Disarmo), held in Castiglioncello, Italy. 28 September to 2 October. 
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public policy and difficulties of obtaining evidence of the larger issues of state relations 
combine to produce the procedure whereby the executive is consulted on questions of 
mixed law and fact, for example, the existence of a state of war or the status of an entity 
claiming sovereign immunity.”130  
 
It is for this precise reason that the researcher decided to assume the risk 
of securing a truly expert sample in pursuance of the research. The 
research was guided by a search for an expert sample and formal proof. 
 
The term animus denotes an intention or state of mind. The researcher’s 
intention was to interview these expert respondents in order to clarify how 
this animus and logos related to the decision to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. 
 
1.11 The Globalisation of the Law – Klug’s Notion of Constituting 
Democracy, as Read with Kuhn 
Heinz Klug offered an interesting and useful notion of what he terms 
‘constituting democracy’. Klug extemporised on a theory about the growth 
and development of the law in the context of political change that 
recognises the emergence and impact of global dynamics. He puts it thus: 
 
“Central to these, I will argue, is the emergence of a thin, yet significant, international 
political culture, which is shaping the outer parameters of feasible modes of governance. 
Although we may debate the effectiveness of law as a mechanism for social change and 
even wonder whether changes in the law merely reflects new social patterns it is 
generally acknowledged that rules, whether established through statute or as 
administrative regulations within the powers granted by legislation, are the primary means 
available to a democratic state to intervene in society. While constitutional amendment is 
in one sense merely a more complex form of legislation – in the requirement of increased 
majorities or special procedures- processes of state reconstruction, in which the 
fundamental structures of power are reorganised, are moments of fluidity and uncertainty 
quite distinct from normal politics and lawmaking.” 131 132 
                                                
130 Op cit Brownlie at 40. 
131 Klug, Heinz. 2000. Constituting Democracy, Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political 
Reconstruction. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 7. 
132 It was Resolution 1653 (XVI) when the General Assembly of the United Nations: 
“1. Declared inter alia that: 
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Klug’s notion of constituting democracy is compatible with the theory of the 
pattern of how Thomas Kuhn posited scientific knowledge is created. Kuhn 
offered a paradigmatic notion of the manner in which scientific knowledge 
is created. He reflected: 
 
“History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a 
decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. That 
image has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study 
of finished scientific achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more 
recently, in the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to practise its 
trade.”133 
 
The logic contained in this passage presented by Kuhn is, I would argue, 
analogous to that contained in Article 38 of the ICJ pertaining to how 
international law is created. Assuming this point, this dissertation uses this 
consistency to structure its understanding of laws role in the events 
discussed. 
 
While Kuhn provides the authority for understanding how scientific 
knowledge is created, Article 38, when read together with Klug and 
Brownlie, provides a useful framework for understanding how the 
incremental development of international law is created. In my reading, 
Klug offers a similar but legally-constituted thesis that attempts to 
understand the patterns and development of legal knowledge creation 
suggested by Thomas Kuhn in the case of the creation of scientific 
                                                                                                                                 
(a) The use of thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United 
Nations and as such a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) Is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;  
(d) Any State using nuclear or thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter 
of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime 
against mankind and civilisation.” 
United Nations Yearbook, 1961, at 30–31, cited in Hunt, Gaillard T. ‘The Judgment of the Jurists: 
The Law of Nations and Nuclear Weapons’. 8909 Grant Street, Bethesda, MD. 14–15. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.gthunt.com/backg.htm 
This Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 24 November 1961, by a vote of 55 to 
20, with 26 abstentions. The Soviet Union and other Communist countries supported it. The 
United States and the NATO countries opposed it. The US delegate, Mr Dean, said, “It is simply 
not true that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the Charter and to International Law.” 
Sourced in Hunt loc cit. 
133 Kuhn, Thomas. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Third Edition. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 1. 
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knowledge. In Kuhnian terms, an accepted and conventional legal view 
would constitute a legal paradigm. For Klug, the growth of law arises from 
a legal challenge which arises from the process of constituting democracy. 
That process of contesting the law seems to develop by a pattern of 
Conjecture and Refutations.134 
 
Indeed, the value of the approach I propose is reflected in the 
contemporaneous observations of one of the principal actors, Hans Blix.  
Blix interrogated the theme of the development and globalisation of law 
and offered a view which converged with that articulated by Brownlie and 
Klug, on the incremental growth of international humanitarian law. Blix 
commented that: 
 
“Whilst international law has grown and developed exponentially over the centuries, the 
rules of war that regulate the use of armed force have grown irregularly: has been tardy 
and remains shaky.” 135 
 
He observed that this law has developed unevenly.136 Blix hypothesised 
that “if the monopoly or near-monopoly on the possession and use of arms 
is one of the premises of a peaceful community -– whether national or 
global – law is a second, and institutions for the settlement of differences 
are a third”.137 
 
                                                
134 Popper, Karl. 1996. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Fifth 
Edition. London: Routledge. (Karl Popper contended that “[t]he way in which knowledge 
progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) 
anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems by conjectures. These conjectures 
are controlled by criticism: that is by attempted refutations, which may include severely critical 
tests”.) 
135 Blix, Hans, Dr. 2007. ‘The Globalization of Peace’. Speech made on receiving Sydney Peace 
Prize Award. University of Sydney, Sydney Town Hall, Sydney, Australia. 3. November. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.usyd.au/news/84.html  
136 Op cit Blix (2007). 
137 Loc cit. 
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Blix continues: 
 
“I am not suggesting that law invariably leads to durable social or international peace. 
Unfair or unjust rules may indeed lead to conflict. However, law generally reduces the 
potential for conflict between states as well as individuals, and it gives guidance for the 
settlement of conflicts when they arise. The rules of international law grew over the 
centuries, and during the last hundred years they have expanded exponentially, through 
treaties international tribunals and various mechanisms for supervision and dispute 
settlement have grown in number, but most rules are respected routinely and without 
access to court. 
 
We must note, however, that in the crucial area of rules regulating the use of armed force 
in the international community development has been tardy and remains shaky. 
 
It does not take much research to see that clear-cut legal restrictions on the use of armed 
force in the international community have been asserted only from the 20th century.”138 
 
1.12 Conclusion: The Chapter Outline  
The research was presented in the format offered below. The chapter 
structure developed from the natural flow of the data provided by the 
expert sample. The research was guided by the discovery of the central 
themes that were contained in the data itself. Phenomenology was used to 
present the data in a clear, logical sequence. 
 
• Chapter One: Research Questions, Aims and Methodology 
• Chapter Two: An Emerging International Consensus on the 
Possession, Legality and Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict: The Period from 1945 to 1995 
• Chapter Three: The International Court of Justice’s Advisory 
Opinion as to the Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (8 July 1996) 
• Chapter Four: Interpreting the Respondents’ Understanding of the 
Legality of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Policy  
• Chapter Five: The Logic Underlying the Decision to Relinquish the 
Nuclear Arsenal and Accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons  
                                                
138 Loc cit. 
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• Chapter Six: How the Nuclear Arsenal was Relinquished and 
Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and Compliance with International Law was Achieved 
• Chapter Seven: A Comparison of How South Africa and Iraq 
Relinquished their Nuclear Weapons in Terms of International Law 
• Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
• Chapter Nine: Bibliography 
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Chapter Two 
An Emerging International Consensus on the Possession, 
Legality and Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict: The Period from 1945 to 1995 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the growing global consensus on the status of 
international law as it applies to the legality of the possession and use of 
nuclear weapons. The period covered by this analysis is from 1945, when 
the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, up until 
1995, which was the year prior to the International Court of Justice issuing 
its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict. The period from 1945 to 1995 is important because South 
Africa’s development and relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal was deeply 
influenced by the evolution of the law as it pertained to the threat and use 
of nuclear weapons over this time-span. This period coincided with the 
conception, birth, controversial life, and death of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons programme. South Africa’s nuclear status was influenced by 
both the evolution of the law and the state of the law up to the time its 
nuclear weapons were relinquished and the country acceded to the NPT. 
 
2.1.1 An Overview of How the Law Evolved from 1945 to 1999 
The following paragraphs are devoted to offering the reader a brief 
overview of the chapter. It is intended that the selection of legal principles, 
cases and events which are analysed in this chapter will provide the 
reader with an appreciation of how international law on nuclear weapons 
gradually developed, albeit often irregularly and erratically, over the years. 
The cases and events cited here reveal that the law usually developed as 
a retrospective normative response to a sequence of complex, and often 
very dangerous, sometimes nearly catastrophic, atomic events. The 
chapter will proceed with an analysis of Article 38 of the Statute of the 
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International Court of Justice, which defines the sources of international 
law. 
 
Thereafter the chapter will explore the concepts of jus cogens and 
obligations erga omnes. Jus cogens consists of peremptory norms of 
international law accepted by all civilised nations and from which no 
deviation is permitted. The timeline which is followed from 1945 to 1995 is 
intended to be sequential, but the reader should forgive the fact that it is 
not always perfectly neat and sequential and that there is some spillage 
both before and after these cut-off dates. Sometimes, events which led to 
the development of the law on nuclear weapons occurred sequentially; 
and sometimes they occurred non-sequentially. Sometimes they occurred 
together and simultaneously, and sometimes the events occurred 
disparately and non-simultaneously. At times they were separated by 
lapses of time of years, and on other occasions they were compressed 
into rapid events over a few days or months. There were thus often 
variable lapses in time between the nuclear event and its distillation into 
international law. 
 
A cause–effect relationship between nuclear event and the codification 
into international law was sometimes evident and sometimes tenuous. 
Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor makes the following observation: 
 
“International law-making is rarely attributable to a single factor but, frequently enough, 
the decision to prepare a binding instrument is triggered off by major events, often a 
catastrophe – perceived ex post [facto] as having been potentially avoidable by the 
enactment and enforcement of proper legal norms … As to the nuclear field, it is recalled 
that in May 1986 the Board of Governors of the IAEA having ‘considered the recent 
reactor accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and other accidents of the past 
and noting the evident need for greater cooperation in nuclear safety …’ decided on the 
setting up of groups of government experts ‘ to draft on an urgent basis international 
agreements’ regarding early notification and information about nuclear accidents as well 
as the co-ordination of emergency response and assistance in the event of a nuclear 
accident. The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 
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Radiological Emergency was therefore prepared, adopted and signed within a few 
months only.”139  
 
This cameo offered by Jankowitsch-Prevor demonstrates the pattern of 
intersection between nuclear calamity and Convention that has often 
repeated itself. South Africa is party to the Convention on the Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident of 1986140 and the Convention on 
Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency of 
1986.141 I interpret South Africa’s accession to these two Conventions as 
being almost anticipatory to its accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Why otherwise would the 
decision have been made to become signatories to treaties that are non-
proliferation-orientated in their essence? It would have been logically 
inconsistent to subscribe to these treaties and then decline accession to 
the NPT. 
 
It is interesting that South Africa expressed two reservations with respect 
to the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident of 1986. 
The most pertinent to this research is the second reservation relating to 
non-recognition by South Africa of the authority of the United Nations 
Council on Namibia and its competence to act on behalf of South Africa. 
This reservation provides a fortuitous indication of South Africa’s real 
concerns underpinning its development of a nuclear arsenal. The issue is 
clearly one of recognition. South Africa’s authority to administer Namibia 
was not recognised,  
 
                                                
139 Jankowitsch-Prevor, Odette. 1994. ‘International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period: 
The Convention on Nuclear Safety’. Nuclear Law Bulletin, 54:155. 
140 Signed and ratified on 10 August 1987. South Africa expressed and registered reservations 
upon its consent to be bound by this Convention: 
“(a) The government of the Republic of South Africa does not consider it bound by either of the 
dispute settlement procedures provided for in Article II, paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
(b) The signature of this Convention by South Africa in no ways implies recognition by South 
Africa of the United Nations Council for Namibia or its competence to act on behalf of South 
Africa.” 
(Cited from the convention itself.)   
141 The date of signature was 10 August 1987 and it was ratified on the same day. 
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One aspect of the development of international law as it pertains to the 
legality of nuclear weapons has most certainly been to mimic in an 
approximate manner the rather turbulent pattern of crisis and catastrophe 
described by Ms Jankowitsch-Prevor. It was a decade after the Chernobyl 
catastrophe had occurred, in 1996, that the Protocol on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
were ratified. A related convention, the Joint Convention on the Safety of 
Spent Fuels and Waste Management, was also concluded in 1996.  
 
The response from the legal profession to the question of the legality of 
the possession and usage of nuclear weapons, in the immediate post-
Hiroshima–Nagasaki period after 1945, was a silence that endured for 
approximately five years. Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945, and the world had to wait until 1950 before the first 
legal opinion was proffered on the legality of deployment of atomic bombs 
on those cities. The silence from the legal profession might have been 
attributable to the fact that nuclear programmes in the United States of 
America and elsewhere were usually dominated by nuclear physicists, 
scientists and engineers, and that international lawyers were not involved 
in its early phases of development and usage. The silence could perhaps 
have been attributed to shock at the enormity of events. Other reasons 
might have been an all too human delay in understanding caused by the 
slow, unclear and erratic manifestation of the deadly and various forms of 
cancer and other dread diseases that arise from toxic radiation exposure. 
 
It needs also to be noted that there were high degrees of confusion in the 
immediate post-World War II period. Japan, for example, had much 
’mopping up’ to do to restore to the chaos left by the war. Tokyo had been 
burnt and bombed to rubble, and the country’s infrastructure was in a 
mess. There were other matters that retarded the development of clarity 
on the legal status of nuclear weapons, and these included the post-World 
War II diplomatic reconciliation between the United States of America and 
Japan, which probably disinclined Japan from seeking legal redress 
against the USA for dropping the atomic bombs. This possibly encouraged 
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political compromise rather than deep-seated legal solutions. This silence 
about the legality of nuclear weapons was eventually broken by Alexander 
Sack, an American lawyer, who offered the first comprehensive analysis of 
the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons in 1950 in an article 
which he submitted to the Lawyers’ Guild Review.142 Sack’s article on the 
legality of atomic, biological and chemical weapons was well crafted, and 
its findings are as relevant today as they were at the time of their 
articulation.  
 
It was four years after Sack had written his paper, in 1954, that the Lucky 
Dragon incident took place. A fishing trawler called the Daigo Fukuryu 
Maru (translation: the Lucky Dragon) was fishing off the Bikini Islands 
when the United States Navy detonated a nuclear test blast at the atoll. All 
the crew of the Lucky Dragon suffered from radiation illness, and one died 
from this affliction. The cargo of fish which had been caught by the 
fishermen on the Lucky Dragon was subsequently sold at a central fish 
market in Japan. At this time it was not known that the fish had been 
severely contaminated by radioactivity during the course of the test blast. 
It was only after the fish had been sold and consumed unwittingly by the 
general public that it was discovered that all these fish had, like the crew, 
been severely radioactively contaminated. 
 
The Lucky Dragon incident created the first international outcry against 
nuclear testing. The matter was settled out of court, and the United States 
made a without prejudice to rights settlement payment, with no admission 
of legal liability, of US$2 million to the Japanese government. In addition, 
each crew member received a once-off payment of US$5000 in full and 
final settlement of the incident, with no acknowledgment of legal liability 
forthcoming from the United States. This offer was accepted. The Lucky 
Dragon incident gained international coverage and drew the matter of the 
environmental and human hazards of peace-time nuclear testing into the 
realms of popular discourse. Subsequent protests and legal action against 
                                                
142 Sack, Alexander N. 1950. ‘ABC – Atomic, Biological, Chemical Warfare in International 
Law’. HeinOnLine. Lawyers’ Guild Review, 10:161–179.  
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nuclear testing in the South Pacific can be seen to have germinated from 
this important event. This incident showed that a nuclear explosion, 
whether conducted as a test in peace or used offensively in war, could 
cause untold damage.  
 
The international environmental law ramifications of nuclear testing slowly 
started to become concretised into environmental protests against nuclear 
testing. The Lucky Dragon incident also raised the question of the freedom 
to fish in international maritime waters and to make unmolested passage 
over the high seas. Thereafter, nuclear testing would become an 
increasingly controversial and legally contested matter, particularly in the 
West. It was four years after that incident, in 1958, that the Geneva 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas was concluded. The researcher could not definitively establish 
a clear cause–effect relationship between the Lucky Dragon incident and 
this Convention, but the timing was apposite.  
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there were few or no protests 
or legal contestation in the Eastern Communist bloc against nuclear tests 
and the transport of hazardous nuclear waste, because of limitations on 
civil liberties and the right to protest.   
 
The growing mood of public concern about the dangers of nuclear usage, 
whether deployed in war or tested in peace, resulted in the first failed 
attempt to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. This 
unsuccessful proposal was made in 1958 by the Polish Foreign Minister, 
Mr Rapacki, and was designated the ‘Rapacki Plan’. Although the Rapacki 
Plan was unsuccessful (largely because of the intensity of conflict between 
the West and the East arising from the Cold War), it was prescient in the 
sense that it heralded the subsequent establishment of various multilateral 
nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world. 
 
The next event that will be alluded to is the McCloy-Zorin agreement. It is 
the researcher’s view that the McCloy-Zorin agreement was in both its 
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contents and process an anticipation, or heralding, of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into being seven years 
later. 
 
On 25 September 1961, John J McCloy on behalf of the United States and 
Valerian A Zorin, on behalf of the Soviet Union submitted to the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly a ‘Joint Statement of Agreed Principles 
for Disarmament Negotiations’. This joint statement, which was popularly 
known as the McCloy-Zorin Agreement, was adopted unanimously by the 
General Assembly. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, which opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 
1970, was inspired by this little-known joint statement. The NPT resembles 
an approximate codification of the McCloy-Zorin Agreement.  
 
During the course of 1960, Cuba allied itself with the Soviet Union and its 
policies. This resulted in a deterioration in relationships with the United 
States of America. On 3 January 1961, America terminated its diplomatic 
and consular relationship with Cuba because of this new alliance with the 
USSR. The Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba on 17 April 1961 was an abortive 
US-supported attempt to unseat Fidel Castro by fomenting an anti-Castro 
revolution. Tensions between the United States and Cuba increased and 
Fidel Castro claimed that he had the military support of the USSR, and 
that any invasion of Cuba by the United States would trigger a third world 
war. Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) were discovered in various sites on Cuba, aimed 
in the direction of the USA. The United States defence force was placed 
on high alert during October 1962, which was the time when the Cuban 
Missile Crisis reached its apex. There was fierce diplomacy between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Fortunately, reason won the day, and 
no nuclear weapons were deployed.   
 
One of the legal consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. which was an agreement to form a 
Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. The previously mentioned 
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Rapacki Plan represented the key conceptual framework that resulted in 
the establishment of all subsequent nuclear-weapon-free zones in the 
world. These are generally multilateral regional or continental agreements 
between proximate sovereign states to eschew the development of 
nuclear weapons and prohibit nuclear proliferation. The Cuban Missile 
Crisis also gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This nearly-catastrophic event 
frightened the US, the USSR and the rest of the world into a form of sanity 
that was codified into the NPT.  
 
The Shimoda case is the first ever instance of a court having been tasked 
with the matter of assessing the legality of deploying nuclear weapons as 
an act of war. The Shimoda case was brought before a municipal court in 
Japan in 1965. This was a full twenty years after the nuclear bombs had 
been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The case was raised by Mr 
Shimoda, who had lost various family members as a result of the atomic 
bombs. The findings of this court case are discussed, and they are 
supportive and converge with the opinion offered by Alexander Sack 
fifteen years previously.  
 
New Zealand, Australian and the South Pacific Islanders were initially 
mute about nuclear tests being conducted in their region and space. It is 
suspected that they initially submitted to an arrogation of the right to 
nuclear deterrence and use by the nuclear-weapons-states (NWS). The 
initial disinclination by New Zealand, France and the South Pacific 
Islanders to contest this arrogation of their rights was probably attributable 
to the political and economic power of the NWS; the Cold War dynamics 
which split the world between East and West; and strong post-World War 
II allied loyalty. The Lucky Dragon incident and its subsequent resonance 
with the New Zealand, Australian and South Pacific Islanders protests 
about the hazards of nuclear testing indicated that it took some time 
before there was a clear scientific understanding of the trans-border and 
trans-generational environmental consequences that the testing and use 
of nuclear weapons implied. 
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There was an initial period of acquiescence, forbearance, and passivity 
displayed by New Zealand and Australia towards France with regard to 
nuclear testing and the transportation of nuclear waste, because these 
countries were long-term allies. The condoning attitude towards the 
atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France and the United States 
gradually changed into strong and focused political opposition and legal 
protest. From 1970 until 1995 there was an increasing number of protests 
against nuclear testing in the South Pacific. These protests arose from 
New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific Islanders, who became 
increasingly vociferous and outraged in their protests against France for 
conducting nuclear tests in the South Pacific. They took France to the 
International Court of Justice in 1973 in order to gain an Advisory Opinion 
on the legality of these nuclear tests. New Zealand, Australia and the 
South Pacific Islanders had in the past permitted their allies to transport 
nuclear materials or weapons in their territorial waters, but this concession 
was later revoked. New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific Islanders 
gradually developed a united opposition towards nuclear testing in general 
and the transportation of hazardous nuclear weapons and waste through 
their territorial waters and in their geographical proximity. It is noted that 
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal was reached in 1989 and that this 
Convention coincided with the outcry, protest and municipal legislation 
promulgated in these countries, which prohibited the transport of nuclear 
material in their territorial waters. A study of the contents of treaties 
concluded over the post-World War II period shows an increasing trend of 
environmental concern from the 1970s. This would appear to be related to 
the realisation of the dangerous environmental impact of nuclear weapons, 
and for this reason it is submitted that environmental concerns about the 
hazards of nuclear weapons and the associated waste disposal concerns 
have energised the development of international environmental law.    
 
In 1972 the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
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Systems (ABM Treaty) was concluded in Moscow. It was five years later in 
August 1977 that the two nuclear weapons silos were discovered by the 
USSR at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert. The Americans and the Soviets 
were obliged in terms of the ABM Treaty to co-operate on the limitation of 
anti-ballistic missile systems. It is submitted that this Treaty set the tone for 
smooth co-operation in the domain of South Africa’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons between these two staunch Cold War rivals.  
 
The Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown occurred in the United States of 
America over the period 30 March to 31 March 1979. In 1980 two 
important treaties were concluded relating to nuclear weapons. They were 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) and 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or 
have Indiscriminate Effects (1980). It is difficult to impute any causal 
relationship between the Three Mile Island incident and the conclusion of 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) 
although the events were sequential. In 1996 the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty came into being and vindicated all the years of protest 
from New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific Islanders. But at the 
time of writing, 14 years later, it still had not come into effect. 
 
2.2 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the authoritative judicial organ of 
the United Nations. Its remit is to help parties to resolve international 
disputes peacefully and determine international law. The ICJ was intended 
by its founders to be an ongoing dispute-resolution mechanism as 
opposed to shaping the law.  Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets out 
the sources of law which may be sought out and used by the Court to 
resolve disputes in international law. In this regard, the ICJ offers 
disputants advisory opinions and decisions. Its decisions do not have the 
authority of binding enforcement, and for this reason not all disputants 
have implemented the advisory opinions and complied with the decisions 
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that have emanated from the ICJ. Lawyers place a high regard on the 
authority of the advisory opinions and the integrity of the decisions 
reached by the ICJ, which therefore have high international credibility 
within the legal opinion, as they are regarded as an authoritative 
interpretation of the law. Decisions of the ICJ do not create a binding 
precedent. Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ provides the Court with the 
authoritative statement as to the sources of international law. It affords 
various methods that can be followed which will assist in determining the 
principles of international law. The headings contained in Article 38 
implicitly encapsulate core questions and explicitly denote core themes 
relating to the legality of nuclear weapons. The reader will notice that 
these Article 38 themes and questions are recurrent to the research. 
 
“Article 38(1): The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by contesting states; 
(b)  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists, of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.”143 
 
It is important to note that the Statute of the ICJ is actually annexed to and 
forms an integrated component of the United Nations Charter.144 The 
Statute’s purpose is to arrange the functioning and composition of the 
court.145 Article 38(1) assures that conventions such as the Geneva 
Convention, the Hague Convention and the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons146 played a prominent role in influencing 
                                                
143 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1) at 4. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index 
144 The United Nations Charter has affixed to it the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It 
consists of five Chapters, namely: Organization of the Court; Competence of the Court; Procedure; 
Advisory Opinions; and Amendment. 
145 Loc cit. 
146 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 
Signed at Washington, London and Moscow 1 July 1968. 
Ratification advised by the US Senate, 13 March 1969. 
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the development of the law as it pertains to the legality of nuclear 
weapons. Article 38(1)a, b and  c are viewed as primary sources of 
international law. Article 38(1)d is viewed as a secondary source of 
international law, as it is evidence based. 
 
The synoptic analysis which is presented below is broadly illustrative of 
how Article 38 has led to an increasing clarity on the legality of nuclear 
testing, possession, and deterrence during the period from 1945 to 1995. 
The researcher conducted a literature review in order to clarify how this 
law has gradually developed. The law evolved incrementally as it 
accompanied the reality of the experience of the development of nuclear 
weapons, deployment in war of nuclear weapons, testing of atomic 
weapons, the policy of nuclear deterrence, the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and nuclear calamities like the Chernobyl incident. Over the 
years there has been an accumulation of diplomatic protests, policy 
statements, press reportage, opinions of legal advisors,147 and other 
actions that have gradually led to the law as it pertains to nuclear weapons 
becoming more coherent. In 1945, the Japanese ineffectively used 
diplomatic protests about the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki,148 which they sent to the US via the Swiss Embassy.149 
                                                                                                                                 
US ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow 5 March 1970. 
Proclaimed by the US President 5 March 1970. 
Entered into force 5 March 1970. 
(It was opened for signature during the course of 1968 and entered into force in 1970. It was 
intended inter alia to create a bargain between the five Nuclear-Weapons-States (NWS) and the 
one hundred and eighty-two non-NWS that the non-NWS would not acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability as a quid pro quo for the NWS negotiating nuclear disarmament.) 
147 Article 38(1)d. 
148 Hunt, Gaillard T. 2003. ‘The Judgment of the Jurists: The Law of Nations and Nuclear 
Weapons’. 8909 Grant Street, Bethesda, MD. 807. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gthunt.com/backg.htm. Hunt mentioned that “[i]t was of course the nuclear bombs that 
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that brought the full immensity of the unfocused 
destructive power of nuclear weapons to the world’s attention. The power was so enormous that it 
was only some time later that calm legal minds were able to articulate its coherence. It is a little 
known and appreciated fact that within days after Hiroshima, the Japanese foreign office put 
together a protest which the Swiss embassy transmitted to Washington on 11 August 
1945. ... ’There is involved a bomb having the most cruel effects humanity has ever known, not 
only as far as the extensive and immense damage is concerned, but also for reasons of suffering 
endured by each victim, since the beginning of the present war, the American Government has 
declared on various occasions that the use of gas or other inhumane means of combat were 
considered in the public opinion of civilized human society and that it would not avail itself of 
these means before enemy countries resorted to them. The bombs in question, used by the 
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Diplomatic protests were again made by the Government of Japan to the 
United States of America after the US had conducted a nuclear bombing 
test which caused a large amount of radioactive fallout to contaminate the 
crew and cargo of fresh fish aboard the Lucky Dragon fishing trawler on 
1 March 1954, as a consequence of an atomic bomb test.150 Similarly, 
New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islanders initially used diplomatic 
means to protest against the many atmospheric nuclear tests and the 
resultant nuclear fallout. These tests were conducted by France in the 
South Pacific Ocean during the period extending from 1966 to 1973. 
 
New Zealand again used formal diplomatic channels to protest against the 
French military intelligence’s mining and sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in 
Auckland Harbour on 10 July 1985.151 152 Policy statements made by the 
French Ministry of Defence were used by the International Court of Justice 
in 1974 to declare the cases petitioned by Australia and New Zealand 
against France to be moot. Press reportage was also used (rather 
controversially) as substantiating evidence by the ICJ to declare the above 
case moot. 153 The opinions of legal luminaries including inter alia: Judges 
Lauterpacht, Oppenheim, and Weeramantry, and legal scholars including 
(among many others) Brownlie, Dugard, Moxley, Burroughs, Meyrowitz, 
Fried, and Falk have exerted a deep influence on the development of 
international law as it pertains to nuclear weapons. Richard Falk 
demonstrated with eloquence how the Japanese municipal legislation was 
used in the Shimoda case in 1963, and harmonised with international 
law.154  
                                                                                                                                 
Americans, by their cruelty and by their terrorizing effects, surpass by far gas or any other 
armament, the use of which is prohibited by the treaties for reasons of their characteristics’ ” 
149 Op cit Sack. 
150 Lapp, Ralph E. 1958. The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon. New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers. 126. Cited in ‘The Lucky Dragon Radiation Incident’. [Online]. Available: 
http://american.edu/ted/LUCKY.htm 
151 Hoadley, Stephen. 2005. ‘New Zealand and France – Politics, Diplomacy and Dispute 
Management’. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 
152 Scobbie, Iain. 1992. ‘Discontinuance in the International Court: The Enigma of the Nuclear 
Test Cases’. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 41(4). 
153 Ibid. 
154 Falk, Richard. 1965. ‘The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki’.American Journal of International Law. 59(4):759–794. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.jstor.org/view/0029300/di981738/9802212/0. 
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The development of international law can be closely correlated with the 
development of international environmental law. Both bodies of law have 
developed dramatically since 1945. Arguably one of the common 
denominators in this development lies in the legal response to the threat 
and usage of weapons of mass destruction on humans and the 
environment. One of the more important conventions on pollution is the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989).155  
 
Alyn Ware made the point: 
 
“Environmental law is one of the fastest growing areas of international law, with the 
development of provisions such as the precautionary principle and intergenerational 
equity which could apply to DU156 weapons. The precautionary principle, which is making 
its way into international environmental law, provides that when there is reason to believe 
a particular practice could generate trans-border environmental damage, the onus is on 
the practising party to prove its safety. 
 
Intergenerational equity holds that subsequent generations should not be threatened by 
current practices. The use of DU weapons threatens particularly the latter of these 
principles, in which the radiation released affects subsequent generations both in terms of 
genetic damaged to offspring, and the extremely long periods over which uranium is 
radioactive.”157 
 
Ware’s research leads to the deduction that there is an incrementally 
developing notion of jus cogens and erga omnes manifesting itself in 
international environmental law. One of the contributory reasons for this 
gradual development of peremptory norms is the impact of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction upon the 
environment.158 Nuclear testing has contributed very significantly to this 
development.  
                                                
155 (1989) 28 ILM at 657. 
156 DU – Depleted Uranium. 
157 Ware, Alyn. 1997. ‘Depleted Uranium Weapons and International Law’. International Action 
Center, New York. 6. 
158 Barboza, J.1994. ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by 
International Law and the Protection of the Environment (1994-III). Hague Recuel, 291. 
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International law is often made by a number of diverse multilateral 
processes and with the aid of law-making processes which may be 
traditional or non-traditional. The United Nations, with particular reference 
to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, other 
international organisations, diplomatic conferences, codification bodies, 
NGOs and the courts are some of the instruments which abrogate the old 
rules and create new rules of international law.159 The establishment of 
regional nuclear-weapon-free zones which create an enlarged 
international community and are accompanied by a consensus-driven 
lawmaking process is no longer the exclusive domain of individual states, 
and law may be made through a majority vote or by consensus. As 
mentioned previously, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice defines the sources of international law. These sources of 
international law are an appropriate lens through which to consider the 
development of the law as it pertains to the legality of nuclear weapons. 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1898 and 1907 were important 
agreements in creating international co-operation. They were also the first 
major international ‘law-making’ conferences. 
 
As a general pattern, it is asserted that Treaties have probably become 
the most important source of international law since 1945 as far as the 
legality of nuclear weapons is concerned. Because multilateral treaties 
include multi-state parties, they are arguably more efficient and effective 
sources of international law creation than bilateral treaties, which by 
definition would be constrained to only two parties. Multilateral treaties 
extend the law to more countries and people more efficiently than bilateral 
agreements. There are obviously instances where the opposite logic will 
apply. A bilateral agreement on nuclear proliferation between the United 
States and Russia on a precedent might be of greater practical value in 
the pursuit of international peace than an elegant but impractical 
multilateral treaty. Because multilateral agreements involve multiple 
                                                
159 Boyle, Alan & Chinkin, Christine, 2007. The Making of International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. ix. 
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parties, they can by definition be expected to be more time consuming, 
costly and intellectually complex to conclude than bilateral agreements. It 
is difficult to argue in an absolute sense that there is a rigid hierarchy of 
interpretation of the sources of international law. But it is quite clear that in 
relation to the matter of nuclear weapons and international law, multilateral 
treaties have been very important in the post-World War II period. The 
regional multilateral nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties are perhaps the 
most conspicuous examples of the law-making role of Article 38 in terms 
of the international legality of nuclear weapons. 
 
The tribunal role of the International Court of Justice has played an 
important role in clarifying important issues pertaining to the legality or 
illegality of nuclear weapons via its Advisory Opinions. The ICJ has 
clarified and developed legal principles including rules for interpreting 
treaties. The regional nuclear-weapon-free zone can be regarded as a 
product of globalisation, and Article 38 provides the principles for 
harmonising increasingly complex multilateral interaction. This has 
resulted in the simplification and codification of rules governing the 
interaction between states. Globalisation has also created an increased 
need to codify the rules that pertain between states. The Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons presents international rules and a 
normative treaty governing the conduct of both NWS and non-NWS as far 
as their responsibilities not to proliferate nuclear weapons are concerned.  
Bilateral agreements such as SALT160 and START,161 which were 
concluded between the US and the former USSR, were also very 
important instruments of international law. Treaties are applied on a day-
                                                
160 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in November 1969 and continued until 
May 1972. They were bilateral negotiations between the USA and USSR intended to limit the 
nuclear arms race. The two most important agreements which arose from SALT were the Anti 
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, both of which were signed on 26 May 1972. These agreements were intended to 
freeze the number and proliferation of nuclear arsenals. 
161 The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was concluded and signed on 31 July 1991 and 
expired on 5 December 2009. As was the case with SALT, it was a bilateral arrangement between 
the USA and USSR. Its goal was to reduce and limit strategic arms. It did result in the mutual 
reduction of nuclear warheads in both the USA and USSR. 
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to-day basis, governing relationships between states and setting the 
standards for normative conduct between them. 
 
Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly-qualified publicists 
may be a compelling source of international law. International custom may 
at times be a difficult source of international law to assert because 
customs vary from one country to the next and are often not codified. 
Indeed, it will be shown later in this chapter that New Zealand and 
Australia were unsuccessful in the argument that they brought before the 
International Court of Justice in 1973, submitting that France had violated 
international customary law by conducting atmospheric nuclear testing in 
the South Pacific Ocean. The applicants and respondents disagreed on 
whether atmospheric nuclear testing was prohibited by international 
customary law.  
 
2.3 Peremptory Norms of International Law – Jus Cogens and 
Erga Omnes 
The testimony of the respondents showed that the notion of jus cogens 
(compelling law) as peremptory norms of international law and obligations 
erga omnes, (toward all) offered an important rationale as to why the 
South African nuclear arsenal was relinquished and the decision was 
reached to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. If South Africa had dropped an atomic bomb on one of its 
townships, which were seething with unrest at the time, this would have 
constituted a jus cogens crime. Slavery, genocide, piracy and torture are 
examples of jus cogens crimes. A jus cogens crime is a higher level crime, 
which is regarded as being in contravention of peremptory norms 
accepted by all civilised societies. A jus cogens crime accordingly creates 
a reciprocal obligation erga omnes to rectify the higher wrong. Ian 
Brownlie cites the Genocide Convention case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Yugoslavia)162 in order to elucidate the notion of erga omnes. 
                                                
162 Genocide Convention, Provisional Measures (Bosnia & Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia & 
Montenegro)), 1993 ICJ Reports 3. 
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“The International Court adopted the view that territorial restrictions do not apply to rights 
and obligations that are erga omnes. In the words of the court: ‘[A]s to the territorial 
problems linked to the application of the Convention, the court would point out that the 
only provision relevant to this, Article VI, merely provides for persons accused of one of 
the acts prohibited by the Convention to be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in 
the territory where the act was committed’ …”. 
 
A few examples of these reciprocal obligations erga omnes include the 
following: 
 
• the duty to extradite persons who perpetrated such jus cogens 
crimes; 
• the inapplicability of states using municipal law to institute a statute 
of limitations on such crimes; 
• the inapplicability of any immunity being claimed by any person who 
perpetrated such crimes, including heads of state; 
• members of the military and intelligence establishments are subject 
to the non-applicability of the defence to senior or higher military 
commands; 
• erga omnes obligations are universally applicable, whether in war 
or in peace [whether a nuclear bomb were exploded in war or 
tested in peace]; 
• perpetrators of jus cogens crimes cannot claim a defence arising 
from the existence of a state of emergency, although they may 
claim the existence of a state of emergency, or political context in 
pleas in mitigation of sentence.163  
 
There is in essence universal jurisdiction over jus cogens and a resultant 
erga omnes obligation to prosecute such crimes, whether in war or in 
peace. 
 
The obligations erga omnes provide insight as to why and how the nuclear 
arms were relinquished and South Africa acceded to the NPT. The 
                                                
163 Cherif Bassiouni, M. 1996. ‘International Crimes: “Jus Cogens” and “Obligatio Erga Omnes” 
‘. Law and Contemporary Problems, 59(4): 63–75, Autumn, at 63n. Duke University School of 
Law. 
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meaning underlying these two terms will be briefly discussed, because the 
themes recurrently permeated the responses from the expert sample, and 
provided an indication as to the motives for relinquishing the nuclear 
weapons and acceding to the NPT. The motives were two-fold. The 
concept of jus cogens meant that a nuclear weapon could never be 
deployed in a war in which South Africa was engaged. Erga omnes meant 
that there was therefore a resultant reciprocal obligation to get rid of the 
weapons and accede to the NPT. The much sought-after international 
recognition for the new constitution would have been in tatters had such a 
weapon been deployed.   
 
John Dugard submits that: 
 
“Jus cogens refers to peremptory norms from which no derogation from international law 
is permitted. The notion of jus cogens has its origins in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties of 1969, which in article 53 provides: 
 
‘A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purpose of the present Convention, a peremptory norm 
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international 
community of states as a whole from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character’.”164  
 
Genocide, apartheid, piracy and slavery are contrary to jus cogens and 
peremptory norms of humanity. The deployment of a nuclear bomb during 
the war in Angola or the insurrections in South Africa would have been 
contrary to jus cogens because such action would have been wholly 
disproportionate, would not have distinguished friend from foe, and would 
have been indiscriminate; and perhaps genocidal. The Court noted that 
the obligation of each State is therefore to prevent and to punish the crime 
of genocide.165 It is contended, therefore, that the South African state had 
an obligation erga omnes to prevent by all means the deployment of a 
                                                
164 Dugard, John. 2007. International Law: A South African Perspective (with contributions by 
Bethlehem, Daniel, du Plessis, Max & Katz, Anton). Third Edition. Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd. 
43. 
165 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 568. 
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nuclear bomb in the Angolan war, or anywhere else in which it was 
militarily or politically engaged.  
 
2.4 Alexander Sack’s Opinion on the Legality of Atomic Weapons 
Alexander Sack was the first person to write a comprehensive analysis of 
the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons. He did this in 1950 – 
five years after the nuclear bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Sack was neither an unheralded prophet, nor a forgotten voice. 
He was a lawyer who dutifully followed his professional calling. His opinion 
was not radical or extraordinary in any way. It simply provided a carefully-
reasoned analysis of the law in a vitally important domain of war – that of 
the legality of atomic, chemical and biological weapons – which, perhaps 
because of the turbulence of the times then, had not yet been the subject 
of a comprehensive legal opinion. 
 
Alexander Sack wrote his classic opinion entitled ‘ABC – Atomic, 
Biological, Chemical Warfare in International Law’ for the Lawyers’ Guild 
Review.166 He opened his analysis with compelling ethical rhetoric: 
 
“International law is neither a collection of platitudinous prescriptions of good behavior, 
nor a miraculous means of protecting right against wrong. It is a body of principles 
grounded on basic needs of civilized humanity and tested by historical experience. It 
provides standards of conduct for nations, required as much in the interest of the 
community as a whole, as of every one of its members … The first and only legitimate 
object of warfare is to overcome the military forces of the enemy. The object of warfare is 
thus at its maximum, to break down armed resistance of the enemy, not to destroy or 
permanently weaken the enemy’s people or resources. The second principle is that, even 
within the scope of the legitimate object of warfare, the right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”167 168  
 
The deployment of a nuclear weapon therefore by definition often exceeds 
the primary objective of warfare of defeating enemy. It tends to destroy 
                                                
166 Op cit Sack. 
167 Corroborated by Hunt op cit at 11–12. 
168 This principle is supported by Stumpf in Chapter Four, which analyses inter alia “Reprisal and 
Escalatory Risks”. It is also explored under the ‘theme’ of “The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the 
Illegality of Not Distinguishing Friend from Foe”. 
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rather than to defeat the enemy. It goes further than destroying the enemy. 
It destroys all who stand in its path whether they be friend or foe, 
combatants or non-combatants. Furthermore, the destruction is not limited 
to humans only. It extends to all biological genetic structures and to the 
broader natural environment.169  
 
These laws and rules of limitation were derived from previous 
codifications, treaties and resolutions on international law which are 
deemed to be binding on all nations, compendium of those which were 
applicable during the 1950s. Alexander Sack asserted that the 
protagonists and belligerents are both protected by the laws of war in 
terms of natural law and the dictates of public conscience. The fact that 
military weapons will inevitably consist of new technologies that have not 
yet been proscribed does not mean that these are not covered by 
international law. It is inevitable that new military innovations will create 
new forms of warfare, and render others obsolete. For example, electronic 
warfare uses drone aircraft and pilotless aerial gunships. These create a 
no-risk situation to the soldier who is conducting such warfare from behind 
his/her desktop computer. That absence of personal risk does not 
exculpate the person operating the drone in the comfort of an air-
conditioned office, and personally disengaged from the warfare itself from 
ensuring that the violence that is used is proportionate to the military 
objective. Natural law and the dictates of public conscience will still prevail, 
whatever the novelty of the new military technology. In a hypothetical 
situation, if the computer network of an army deploying the drone were to 
fail and the drone set-off its munitions on a civilian festival, destroying all, 
this disproportionate violence would be illegal under international law, in 
                                                
169 The most important list of treaties and other instruments of international law that were pertinent 
to it in 1954 when Sack wrote this opinion on the legality of atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons were inter alia: The 1899 Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land; the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes;  
the 1920  Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice; the 1945 United Nations Charter; 
the 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice; the 1945 Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal; the 1946 Charter of the Military Tribunal for the Far East; the 1946 The Crime 
of Genocide ,UNGA Res 96 (1), 11 December; the 1946 Affirmation of the Principles of 
International Law; the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide; the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of 
War. 
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terms of both natural law and the dictates of public conscience. The fact 
that technological failures of drone aircraft might not have been proscribed 
does not render them legal because of this lack of foresight. 
 
The laws of armed conflict extend beyond positive law and accept that 
there is a moral code of natural law which refers to the dictates of public 
conscience that will be the test of the lawfulness of conduct in war. The 
researcher consequently asserts that Alexander Sack ascribed to an 
ethical notion of law as contained in the Martens Clause, which regarded 
the dictates of public conscience as pre-eminent. Sack seemed to have an 
implicit anticipatory subscription to the notions of jus cogens and erga 
omnes, which originated twenty-nine years after he had written his opinion 
at the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties in 1969, and which 
ensures that a treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with 
a peremptory norm of international law.  
 
Sack’s opinion was that violence could be authorised only for military 
objectives that could be deemed to be essential. Violence for the sake of 
violence, in other words, gratuitous violence, can never be a military 
objective and is illegal. The violence used must be proportionate to the 
military objective, and excessive violence is illegal. The violence that is 
applied must be selected for achieving a clear military-outcome,170 and 
 
“[t]he use of weapons that cause cruel suffering like chemical, gas and biological 
weapons may be illegal under almost all circumstances.171 ... The use of weapons needs 
to be discriminate and must discern between combatants and non-combatants. Killing, 
injuring and destroying civilians and their property is prohibited. There must be a 
correlation between the military objective that is being pursued and the arms that are 
used in pursuance of this objective.”172  
 
Sack’s opinion provided an early and eloquent circumscription of any 
presumptive notion of the legality of nuclear weapons.  
 
                                                
170 Op cit Sack at 162. 
171 Loc cit.  
172 Loc cit. 
 122 
2.5 The Lucky Dragon Incident 
The Lucky Dragon incident was provisionally discussed in the introduction 
to this chapter in order to provide the reader with an accessible 
understanding of the overall themes comprising this chapter. This matter 
will now be explored in greater depth. The Lucky Dragon incident was 
settled by agreement between the Japanese and United States 
governments, with the United States not accepting liability for their role in 
the events. The incident, if viewed as separate and in isolation, would 
have had minimal if any impact upon the creation of international law. But 
it should not be viewed alone as an isolated failure of nuclear testing. It 
has been argued that international law is often made from the interaction 
of catastrophic events and complex factors. The catastrophic event in this 
case was a United States atmospheric nuclear test that contaminated a 
fishing crew and its catch, which was the unwittingly sold for consumption 
by the Japanese public, who were ignorant of the radioactive hazards of 
the food. Over subsequent years, many nuclear tests were conducted in 
the South Pacific by the United States and France amidst snowballing 
public outrage. This moral outrage was subsequently converted into 
international law, and the culmination of this was the conclusion in 1996 of 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.173 
 
The Lucky Dragon incident was therefore seminal in the sense that it set 
the tone for subsequently clarifying the legality of nuclear testing and 
regulating the transport of nuclear material and other matters that were 
converted into international law via the conclusion of treaties and other 
mechanisms. It also undoubtedly would have been relevant to the Protocol 
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation.   
 
                                                
173 ECOSCOC Res 1996/31, 25 July. 
UNGA Res 50/54, 29 July. 
UNGA Res 51/45 S (1), 10 December. 
UNGA Res 51/210, 17 December. 
WHA Res 49.17. 
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The Lucky Dragon incident occurred in 1954 and created international 
awareness about the potential environmental hazards associated with the 
atomic fallout that accompanies nuclear testing.174 A cargo of fish on a 
Japanese fishing trawler – the Lucky Dragon – was contaminated by 
radiation from a bomb code-named ‘Bravo’ in a nuclear test conducted by 
the USA.  It was only after the fish had been sold off and distributed to the 
public at large that the extreme levels of nuclear radiation which were 
contained in this catch were realised. All of the crew on the Lucky Dragon 
fell ill because of the nuclear fallout and one person died from this 
affliction. This nuclear test also curtailed the economic right to earn a living 
and constrained fishing rights in the high seas. There was a series of 
profound birth abnormalities and foetal deformities among the Pacific 
Islanders which resulted from these nuclear tests, and which still persist to 
this day.175  
 
“At 6:45 on the morning of 1 March 1954, eight years after testing in the Marshall Island 
began, the US detonated a bomb codenamed ‘Bravo’ on the island of Bikini. The bomb 
was equivalent to 17 megatons of TNT. It was 1 300 times the destructive force of the 
atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and was specifically designed to create a vast 
amount of lethal fallout. That morning, wind was blowing in the direction of two inhabited 
atolls, Rongelap and Utrik, roughly 100 and 300 miles from Bikini.  
 
A Japanese tuna fishing boat, the Daigo Fukuryu Maru – the Lucky Dragon – was caught 
in the path of Bravo’s nuclear fallout. The fishing boat was sprayed by a cloud of 
radioactive ash. The Lucky Dragon was located 100 miles east of Bikini at the time of 
nuclear detonation. Its crew members suffered from radiation sickness, and one of them 
died of liver and blood damage on 23 September.”176 
 
The Lucky Dragon Incident raised some important issues on the regime of 
the High Seas –including the right to fishing. Ian Brownlie notes that the 
freedom of the high seas is best viewed as a general principle of 
international law, from which particular principles need to be deduced. Its 
                                                
174 Lapp, Ralph E. 1958. The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon. New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers. 
175 Testimony to this effect is offered in section 3.5 of Chapter Three, under the interrogation of 
the ‘Testimony Offered to the Court on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons – The Statement of 
Natural Law’. 
176 Op cit Lapp. 
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application to specific problems often fails to give precise results. Weapon 
testing which involves the closure of large areas of ocean is regarded by 
some as a legitimate form of enjoying the freedom of the seas and by 
others as a denial of that freedom.177 It is contended that weapons testing 
which does not: cause any environmental damage whatsoever and does 
not intrude on the freedom to traverse the high seas, does not intrude 
upon the freedom to fish and fishing rights as sources of food, and does 
not violate sovereignty may be lawful.  
 
Lapp maintains that the Lucky Dragon incident highlighted the legality of: 
 
• The atomic legacy of World War II;  
• Disruption in the supply of fish; a principal food item;178  
• Curtailment of fishing rights on the high seas; and 179  
• A deep-rooted concern that the United States was insensitive to the 
feeling and sufferings of the Japanese people and unduly 
preoccupied with the development of weapons for mass 
destruction.   
 
Earlier that year, US authorities had issued a general warning defining a 
danger zone around Bikini, but no specific warning had been given 
regarding the timing or location of the various atomic tests. The Japanese 
crew apparently knew of the warning and assumed that they were 
operating outside the danger area. Their tuna trawler was in fact about 
32 kilometres outside the zone.180 
 
The United States donated 1 million yen (US $2 800) to the widow of the 
deceased fisherman as a gesture of sympathy. The remaining crew 
members all recovered with no apparent after-effects despite their 
                                                
177 Op cit Brownlie at 225. 
178 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 ICJ Reports, which related to an attempt to enforce 
conservation measures in the high seas.  
179 Ian Brownlie at 11 discussed the role of the subsequent objector in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case (supra) and reflected that “… part of the Norwegian argument was that certain 
rules were not rules of general international law, and, even if they were, they did not bind Norway, 
which had ‘consistently and unequivocally manifested a refusal to accept them’.” This logic was 
certainly evident in France’s approach to Australia and New Zealand in the Nuclear Tests case. 
180 Op cit Lapp. 
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exposure to powerful doses of radiation aboard the ship while returning to 
Japan. Following extended negotiations, the United States made a 
payment of US$2 million to the Japanese government in January 1955, 
without acknowledging legal liability, to compensate for all injuries and 
damages caused as a result of five nuclear tests it had conducted in the 
Marshall Island (Bikini Islands) area, including damage and injuries 
sustained by the crew of the Daigo Fukuryo Maru. Each crew member 
received an average of US$5 000; the remainder was allocated to pay for 
their medical expenses and the damage done to the tuna fishing 
industry.181 182 This small, symbolic payment of compensation by the 
United States without acknowledgement of liability can be interpreted as a 
residual moral and ethical obligation for recompense under natural law. 
 
Although a ban on nuclear testing is one of the oldest items on the arms 
control agenda, the law in the first decade after Hiroshima up until the mid-
1950s was initially mute on the legality of testing. It took some time for this 
issue to be tested in the courts. Intensifying, and sometimes vociferous, 
international protests started to arise, as increasing numbers of people 
gradually became educated about the health and environmental hazards 
associated with nuclear testing. Incrementally and inconsistently, clarity on 
the legality of nuclear testing has developed slowly but significantly over 
the years since 1945. 
 
The law on nuclear testing has been incrementally clarified over the years 
from an initially hazy and rather ill-defined position in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II culminating in, firstly, the conclusion of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and then, thirty-three years later, in the 
conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996.183 This 
                                                
181 Op cit Lapp. 
182 It interesting that the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna was concluded 
in 1993 – the cargo of fish on the Lucky Dragon consisted of tuna.  
183 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
ECOSOC Res 1996/31, 25 July. 
UNGA Res 50/54, 29 January. 
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analysis will have revealed that there has been continuous pressure to 
render nuclear testing illegal from just after the conclusion of World War II. 
 
The goal of achieving a ban on all tests of nuclear explosions has been a 
constant theme of protests by anti-nuclear activists since the end of World 
War II. It was the radioactive fallout that was associated with these nuclear 
tests which began in earnest in the immediate post-World War II period. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis created very real fears about the dangers of 
nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union 
degenerating into nuclear conflict. There were many protests about this. It 
was clear that tensions between the United States and Soviet Union in the 
arena of nuclear weapons competition needed to be reduced.  
 
Jonathan Medalia offered a useful synopsis of how these confrontations 
between superpowers were correlated with the conclusion of the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty; the Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions Treaty, and ultimately the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty: 
 
“In the 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union conducted hundreds of hydrogen bomb 
tests. The radioactive fallout from these tests spurred worldwide protest. These 
pressures, plus a desire to reduce US–Soviet confrontation after the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of 1962, led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear explosions in 
the atmosphere, in space and under water. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in 
1974, banned underground nuclear weapons tests having an explosive force of more 
than 150 kilotons, the equivalent of 150 000 tons of TNT, ten times the force of the 
Hiroshima bomb. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in 1976, extended the 
150-kiloton limit to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. President Carter did not 
pursue ratification of these treaties, preferring to negotiate a Comprehensive [Nuclear] 
Test Ban Treaty, or CTBC, a ban on all nuclear explosions. When agreement seemed 
near, however, he pulled back, bowing to arguments that continued testing was needed 
to maintain reliability of existing weapons, to develop new weapons, and for other 
purposes. President Reagan raised concerns about US ability to monitor the two un-
ratified treaties and late in his term started negotiations on new verification protocols. 
These two treaties were ratified in 1990. The CTBC was negotiated in the Conference on 
Disarmament. It was adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996, and 
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was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. As of June 9, 2005, 175 states had 
signed it and 121, including Russia, had ratified.”184    
 
The Lucky Dragon incident is therefore considered to be the starting point 
of over four decades of contention that ultimately resulted in the ratification 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In this way an imperfect 
and fallible form of democracy pertaining to nuclear weapons was 
constituted.   
 
2.6 Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 
The Rapacki Plan to declare Central Europe a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
was the first suggestion proposing that states situated in common 
geographical regions should enter into multilateral negotiations with one 
another to achieve regional nuclear relinquishment, and more specifically 
to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapons-states. Mr Rapacki, 
the then foreign minister of Poland, envisaged that this zone would include 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The door was left open for other Europeans 
to accede should they so wish. In other words, it anticipated the formation 
of both the underlying principles of the NPT and the conclusion of regional 
agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. This regional framework 
agreement was unsuccessfully proposed in 1958 by Mr Rapacki. The 
Polish government was fearful that Soviet nuclear weapons would be 
deployed in its territory as the arms race between the US and USSR 
escalated. In hindsight, the Rapacki Plan was a useful and important 
failure. The proposal did create an awareness of the necessity for multi-
national agreements between states situated in geographical regions to 
prevent nuclear proliferation and contribute to nuclear disarmament. The 
Rapacki Plan opened up a debate about how to establish an 
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internationally-acceptable regional regime on nuclear disarmament, with 
the support of the United Nations and its agencies.”185  
 
The Rapacki Plan was obviously diagnostically correct; but it was ‘before 
its time’ in terms of prognosis. This putative treaty failed because it was 
conceived before it was ripe for implementation, in a time where its legal 
value was eclipsed by the hardening political attitudes of the Cold War. It 
took the intercession of the Cuban missile crisis to create the impetus for 
the establishment of Mr Rapacki’s conception of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones. A little-appreciated but positive outcome of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis was the reaching of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. This Treaty was 
concluded five years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and international law 
was created to prevent a repeat of this crisis by multilateral agreement. 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco created a Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zone and was congruent with the spirit and intent of the NPT, which 
opened for signature in 1968. In 1985 the Treaty of Rarotonga was 
reached in the South Pacific as a specific result of Australian, New 
Zealand and the Pacific Islanders’ antipathy towards the French nuclear 
tests that were conducted in that oceanic territory. 
 
In 1992 the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula was reached, and in 1995 the Treaty of Bangkok proclaimed 
South East Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Finally, Africa followed suit 
in 1996, when the Pelindaba Treaty was ratified and the entire continent of 
Africa was declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. 
 
The taste for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones was nothing new. 
Earlier, in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty had been concluded; followed by the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1971 Seabed 
Treaty. 
 
2.7 The McCloy-Zorin Agreement  
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The McCloy-Zorin Agreement represented an all-too-transient moment of 
consensus between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War on the matter of achieving a regimen to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and accordingly to relinquish nuclear weapons. It was 
reached on 25 September 1961 by John McCloy on behalf of the US and 
Valerian Zorin for the USSR. They submitted a Joint Statement on Agreed 
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. It was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. This agreement was prescient, and demonstrated how 
international law might be created by virtue of a joint statement being 
communicated to the USA and USSR, and being ratified as a Resolution 
before the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
 
Burns Weston put it thus: 
 
“[It] called for multilateral negotiations to design and implement an internationally 
acceptable programme of general and complete disarmament that would lead to the 
eventual dissolution of national armed forces, the creation of a standing UN 
peacekeeping force, and the establishment of effective and reliable mechanisms for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.”186  
 
The germ of idealism reflected in the spirit of nuclear non-proliferation 
would seem to have been contained in the McCloy-Zorin Agreement, 
which may be one of the ways in which international law has developed. 
Seven years later and after the intercession of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
the Mcloy-Zorin notion was re-codified in part into the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Article VI obligation of the NPT 
encapsulates the essence of the McCloy-Zorin Agreement and specifies 
the obligation of all states to pursue good faith negotiations to relinquish 
their nuclear arsenals under international supervision. Each of the Parties 
to the Treaty undertakes to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective 
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at early date, 
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and to disarm under strict and effective international control. Elements of 
the idealism underpinning the McCloy-Zorin Agreement emerged in 
subsequent nuclear arms negotiations and agreements, including the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the nuclear-weapon-free 
zone agreements. 
 
2.8 The Shimoda Case187 and its Implications in respect of the 
Legality of Nuclear Weapons  
Richard Falk presented an analysis of the Shimoda case in an elegantly-
crafted article published in the American Journal of International Law in 
1965.188 The Shimoda case raised the issue of the need to reconcile 
municipal law and international law. This conflict of laws was effectively 
reconciled by the Japanese municipal court, where this case was heard. 
The court sought to apply the best and most appropriate aspects of 
international law to the case. The researcher discovered that, although not 
even acknowledged as being of any importance to the South African case, 
this reconciliation of international law and municipal law was a 
fundamental legal theme of South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear 
arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. Article 38(1)c is the mechanism whereby the courts reconcile 
municipal law with international law. It was an implicit rather than explicit 
theme.   
 
Ian Brownlie cites Oppenheim in order to explain the dilemma: 
 
“The intention of article 38(1)c is to authorise the court to apply the general principles of 
municipal jurisprudence, in particular of private law, insofar as they are applicable to 
relations of states ... The latter part of this statement is worthy of emphasis. It would be 
incorrect to assume that tribunals have employed elements of legal reasoning and private 
law analysis in order to make the law of nations a viable system for application in a 
judicial process. Thus, it is impossible, or at least difficult, for state practice to evolve the 
rules of procedure and evidence which a court must employ. An international tribunal 
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chooses, edits, and adapts elements from better developed systems: the result is a new 
element of international law the content of which is influenced historically and logically by 
domestic law.”189  
 
Democracy is constituted in this way, according  to Klug’s exposition. 
 
For Richard Falk the Shimoda case was seminal because: 
 
(a) No similar case which explored the legality of the deployment of 
nuclear weapons in war had ever before been brought before a 
court of law. It presented the court with an occasion to deliberate 
upon the relevance of the laws of war as it pertained to the use of 
nuclear weapons. It raised questions about whether the 
technological development of nuclear weapons had rendered 
concepts of war contained in the pre-nuclear laws of war obsolete. 
Had any laws of war been abrogated by the reality of the 
technological developments underpinning war? The facts of the 
case therefore provided a lens whereby the relevance, and 
perhaps obsolescence of aspects of the law war as they pertained 
to the deployment of nuclear weapons might be viewed. 190 
(b) The case was unique because it was the first time that a court 
interrogated the matter of the lawfulness of a victor country (the 
United States) regarding its military policies towards a defeated 
country. War has traditionally been characterised by a dual 
morality: the morality of the victor which presides over the morality 
of the defeated. This case allowed for an inversion of that morality 
and a retrospective re-assessment of the legality of the military 
policies that underpinned the US decision to deploy the atomic 
bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki.191  
(c) Richard Falk made mention of the notion that at the time of the 
trial, Asian courts were reluctant to accept international law, which 
was perceived to be the progeny of the West, into their courts. The 
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Japanese municipal court accepted international law in its entirety 
with respect to the Shimoda case. This marked a shift in attitude by 
an important Asian court towards accepting international law. The 
Japanese court recognised the validity and applicability of 
international law in this case.192  
(d) This acceptance of the validity and applicability of international law 
meant that the Article 38(1)c ’bridge‘ between municipal law and 
international law raised by Brownlie and explicated upon by 
Oppenheim below was crossed. (This was apparently a repudiation 
of the parochialism which had in the past been demonstrated by 
Asian courts and was frequently indicated in the intersection 
between private law and international law.) It would appear that 
there were matters of national prestige and sovereign pride at 
stake and that the East found it difficult to validate international law, 
which was regarded as a discourse from the West. Richard Falk 
made the observation that some Asian countries had even gone so 
far as to ’attack‘ international law in the post-World war II situation. 
(e) Mr Shimoda brought this case before the municipal court in Japan 
in his personal capacity. The court therefore had to ascertain the 
extent to which a private citizen could in his or her personal 
capacity bring a case before the courts in terms of international 
law. More specifically, the court was called on to consider the 
extent to which sovereign immunity might bar the claims of an 
individual against a government that has broken international 
law.193 
(f)  The Shimoda case raised the question of the extent to which 
sovereign immunity permits the waiver of a peace treaty with 
respect to the claims of nationals against another country.194  
                                                
192 Loc cit. 
193 Loc cit. 
194 World War II was brought to an official conclusion upon the signing of The Treaty of Peace 
with Japan between 49 Allied Nations and Japan on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco. It came 
into force on 28 April 1952. The Shimoda case raised the question of whether sovereign immunity 
permits any waiver of this Treaty, by Japanese nationals against the United States. 
 133 
(g) The court was compelled to determine whether the case should be 
heard under United States or Japanese municipal law. It was 
required to reach a decision on the choice of law.195 
(h) The matter of the conflict of laws has already been alluded to in 
paragraphs c and d above. Related to this was the need to clarify 
the role of a domestic court in a court case which hears a case in 
international law.196  
 
Richard Falk’s summation of the importance of the Shimoda case will now 
be triangulated with the South African nuclear weapons case. 
 
Points a, b, c and f above would not have been specifically relevant to 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons status. There is no question about the 
validity and jurisdiction of international law in South African courts. Unlike 
the case of Japan in the 1960s, this has never been a controversial matter 
in South Africa. International law has been applied in many instances in 
South Africa’s conflictive history. Point d, dealing with the assertion of 
individual rights that arise from violations of international law, was never 
raised in the South African case. It might conceivably have been raised 
had nuclear tests been conducted in the Kalahari Desert or elsewhere, 
and had individuals (or the environment) been afflicted by the 
consequential nuclear fallout. Point f, relating to the degree to which 
sovereign immunity would have barred claims from individuals, did not 
arise in the case of nuclear weapons, but did arise out of the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which heard 
the testimony of persons who were subjected to gross violations of human 
rights during the struggle against apartheid. This point is therefore of 
passing relevance. Point g, which refers to the choice of law in the case of 
the deployment of nuclear weapons, would not (in the researcher’s view) 
have been controversial, as it would have required a harmonisation 
between South African municipal law and international law.    
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2.8.1 The Key Holding of the Shimoda Case  
Falk presents the key holding of the Court in the Shimoda case thus: 
 
“The principle holding of the Court is, of course, that the attacks with the atomic bombs 
upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 of 1945 were in violation of 
international law. The principal reasons given were as follows: 
 
1. International law forbids an indiscriminate and blind attack upon an undefended city; 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were undefended; therefore the attacks were illegal.”197  
 
This is congruent with Alexander Sack’s fourth limitation: “The objectives 
of permissible violence and the infliction of death, destruction and injury on 
civilians and civilian property as a separate measure of war is absolutely 
prohibited.” 
 
2. “International law only permits, if at all, indiscriminate bombing of a defended city, if it 
is justified by military necessity; no military necessity of sufficient magnitude could be 
demonstrated here; therefore the attacks were illegal.”198  
 
This is congruent with Alexander Sack’s fourth limitation, inasmuch as he 
contended that the “destruction of any property or devastation of a region 
must have a reasonably close connection with the military objective sought 
to be achieved”. 
 
3. “International law as it has specifically developed to govern aerial bombardment 
might be stretched to a permitted zone or area of bombing of an enemy city in which 
military objectives were concentrated; there was no concentration of military 
objectives in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki; therefore no legal basis exists for 
contending that the atomic attacks might be allowable by analogy to zone bombing, 
because even then, if the latter is legal, if at all, it is directed against an area not 
containing a concentration of military targets.” 
 
This is again congruent with Alexander Sack’s fourth limitation. 
 
4. International law prohibits the use of weapons and belligerent means that produce 
unnecessary and cruel forms of suffering and is illustrated by the prohibition of lethal 
poisons and bacteria, the atom bomb causes suffering far more severe and extensive 
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than the prohibited weapons, therefore it is illegal to use the atomic bomb to realise 
belligerent objectives: 
 
All the respondents to this research shared the view that there is a duty to 
refrain from causing unnecessary suffering under the very nature of 
international law by which all belligerent activity is tested, whether 
specifically regulated or not.199  
 
2.9 Nuclear Tests in the South Pacific: The Australian, New 
Zealand and Pacific Islanders’ Contending Legal Responses 
to France’s Atmospheric Testing in the South Pacific200  
It has already been mentioned that in 1985 the multilateral regional Treaty 
of Rarotonga was concluded as a specific result of Australian, New 
Zealand and the Pacific Islanders’ antipathy towards the French nuclear 
tests that had been  conducted in that oceanic territory, and the resultant 
fears about nuclear proliferation in that region. 
 
This discussion will attempt to place these matters in context. The 
controversial matter of the post-World War II nuclear tests conducted by 
the US and France, particularly in the South Pacific Ocean, is relevant to 
South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process and accession to the NPT. 
These tests created an enormous amount of antagonism between New 
Zealand, Australia, and the South Sea Islanders and France, who had all 
been historical allies. One of the reasons for this antipathy was the feeling 
that France, in conducting atmospheric nuclear tests, was presumptively 
arrogating itself a right of access and usage of the high seas that violated 
these countries’ rights to the freedom of navigation and fishing. France’s 
nuclear testing was experienced by these countries as a violation of their 
own sovereignty and a wilful imposition of French sovereignty upon them, 
which was contrary to the rules of international law.  
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According to Ian Brownlie, the Convention of the High Seas of 1958 
states: 
 
“The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part 
of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions 
laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises inter 
alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States: 
 
(1) Freedom of navigation,201 
(2) Freedom of fishing,202 203 
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.204 
 
These freedoms and others which are recognised by the general principles of 
international law shall be exercised by all States with regard to the interests of other 
States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”205  
 
The relevance of the nuclear tests in the South Pacific is analogous to the 
South African test scenario, and lies in the fact that South Africa 
developed two nuclear test silos at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert. 
Considerable internal pressure was exerted upon Mr Pik Botha by senior 
members of the South African Defence Force and ARMSCOR to authorise 
nuclear tests in the Kalahari Desert.  
 
It was New Zealand which originally raised the idea of requesting the 
United Nations General Assembly to call upon the International Court of 
Justice to provide an Advisory Opinion on the legality of France’s nuclear 
tests that were conducted in the region. This call was made in 1970, 
twenty-six years before the ICJ offered its famous Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
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1996.206 207 New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islanders became 
involved in an intensifying legal clash with France about their penchant for 
conducting atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific for nearly three 
decades.208 
 
John Dugard confirmed that France was taken to the International Court of 
Justice by Australia and New Zealand on 9 May 1973. These countries 
initiated proceedings against France on the grounds of a dispute 
concerning the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific 
Ocean. Australia and New Zealand asserted that these atmospheric tests 
were prohibited under customary international law and therefore violated 
their rights under international law. They claimed that the rule of law was 
forbidden by various United Nations resolutions which condemned 
atmospheric nuclear tests. In addition, they asserted that these tests had 
been conducted in contravention of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The 
outcome of the case was very disappointing for Australia and New 
Zealand, as it was declared moot.209 210 The concurring opinion of the 
other judges was that the dispute was non-justiciable, because there was 
no specific rule of law that forbade atmospheric nuclear testing. This 
reasoning led to the deduction that the conflict was consequently of a 
political rather than a legal nature, and therefore fell outside of the remit of 
the court.211  
 
John Dugard cited Judge Petren’s opinion presenting his reasons for the 
matter’s being non-justiciable: 
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“The Court ought in my view to have formed an opinion from the outset as to the true 
character of the dispute which was the subject of the Application; if the Court had found 
that the dispute did not concern a point of international law, it was for that absolutely 
primordial reason that it should have removed the case from its list, and not because the 
non-existence of the subject of the dispute was ascertained after months of 
proceedings.”212 
 
The Lucky Dragon incident had created an international awareness of the 
grave hazards associated with nuclear testing. It was in this climate that 
France persisted in carrying out 44 atmospheric nuclear tests at Moruroa 
and Fangataufa in the South Pacific Ocean between 1966 and 1974. 
 
Kate Dewes offers a contextual explanation of John Dugard’s reflections: 
 
“An outraged New Zealand public, increasingly aware of the health and environmental 
effects and in solidarity with smaller Pacific Island states, formed coalitions across society 
and explored several visionary initiatives with the government ... In 1970 Auckland CND 
petitioned the government to work to request the United Nations General Assembly to 
obtain an Advisory Opinion on the legality of French action, suggesting Australia, Japan, 
and Latin American nations bordering the Pacific as co-sponsors.”213  
 
The New Zealand Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Tests214 foreshadowed by 
two-and a-half decades the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by 
a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict.  
 
The Cook Islanders initially attempted to address France’s nuclear tests in 
their region by enacting their own municipal legislation to prohibit nuclear 
testing by France. This was ignored by France. The New Zealand 
embassy in Paris sent diplomatic notes to the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs requesting France to desist from nuclear testing in the South 
Pacific Ocean. These too were ignored by France.  
 
Hoadley explains: 
 
                                                
212 [1974] ICJ at 302. 
213 Dewes, Kate. 2000. ‘Legal Challenges to Nuclear Weapons from Aoteoroa/ New Zealand’. 
British Review of New Zealand Studies (1999/2000). 4. 
214 Nuclear Test Cases (Interim Measures of Protection), [1973] ICJ Reports 99, 135.  
 139 
“On 14 May 1973 the Attorney General submitted to the International Court of Justice a 
request by New Zealand for ‘Interim Measures and Protection’.215 The request listed five 
rights under international law that French testing would prejudice. Slightly abridged, these 
rights were stated as follows: 
 
• The right of all members of the international community including New Zealand, 
that no nuclear tests give rise to radioactive fallout be conducted; 
• The rights of all members of the international community including New 
Zealand and the Cook Island, Niue, or Tokelau, to the preservation from 
artificial unjustified radioactive contamination of the terrestrial, maritime and 
aerial environment; 
• The right of New Zealand that no radioactive material enter the territory of New 
Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue, or Tokelau, nor cause harm including 
apprehension, anxiety and concern to the people; and 
• The right of New Zealand to freedom of the high seas, including freedom of 
navigation and over flight ... without interference or detriment resulting from 
nuclear testing.  
 
To protect these rights, New Zealand requested that France refrain from conducting any 
further nuclear tests that give rise to radio-active fallout ... and asked the Court to rule 
accordingly. Treaty texts, United Nations Resolutions, resolutions and declarations by 
other international and regional organizations and scientific documents were appended in 
support of the Request, and oral presentations of judges followed.”216 
 
France rejected the jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds of the national 
security of sovereign states, and actually declined to appear before the 
Court. It did not offer a direct rebuttal to the points New Zealand put 
forward in its request, although it did take care to make its position clear in 
public announcements and diplomatic notes.  
 
On 22 June 1973 the Court issued the following ruling on provisional 
measures:  
 
”The French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive 
fallout in the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue, or the Tokelau Islands.” 
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While New Zealand had gained a favorable interim ruling overall, this was 
not a satisfactory outcome, since within a few months France conducted 
seven atmospheric tests in the restricted areas. The Court recommended 
that New Zealand submit a memorandum indicating why the Court should 
take jurisdiction of the dispute. New Zealand did so in November 1973, 
and presented oral arguments to the Court in July 1975. 
 
Again France declined to respond, citing the sovereign right to national 
security. In the period from June to September 1974 France conducted 
seven more atmospheric tests. But on 8 June 1974, the Office of the 
President of the Republic issued a statement that France ”[would] be in a 
position to pass onto the stage of underground explosions as soon as the 
series of tests planned for  ...  summer [was] completed”. 
 
The Court, however, took these and other French statements in their 
entirety to constitute a good faith pledge to end atmospheric tests. 
Consequently the Court in December 1974 found that: 
 
“The Court faces a situation in which the objective of the applicant has in effect been 
accomplished, inasmuch as the Court finds that France has undertaken the obligation to 
hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere of the South Pacific.”217 
 
Thereupon the Court ruled as follows: 
 
“The claim by New Zealand no longer has any object and ... the Court is therefore not 
called upon to give a decision thereon. In brief, it declared the case void and dismissed it 
without ruling on the substantive issues. A similar ruling was made in the parallel case 
brought by Australia. The votes of the fifteen justices divided nine to six. The six 
dissenters wrote separate opinions, some objecting to the use of French government’s 
communiqués as evidence on which to dismiss the case, others asserting New Zealand’s 
entitlement to a Court judgment, and others supporting the substance of New Zealand’s 
position.”218 
 
The division among the judges was important as it indicated the extent of 
the divide between the nuclear-weapons-states and the non-nuclear-
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weapons-states. In essence, the nuclear-weapons-states asserted the 
legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons in terms of positive law, 
while the non-nuclear-weapons-states contended that nuclear weapons 
are illegal in terms of natural law. 
 
Kate Dewes mentions the fact that New Zealand adopted municipal 
legislation which banned all nuclear-armed warships from its territory. It 
was the first country in the West to do this. This was achieved by means of 
mobilising the general public into a spirit of anti-nuclear weapons activism. 
This activism was oppositional to all nuclear weapons testing in the South 
Pacific Oceanic. The domestic governments in New Zealand were 
compelled to take cognisance of the activism and act upon these protests. 
New Zealand’s foreign policy on nuclear weapons became resultantly 
increasingly independent from its allies who possessed these nuclear 
weapons. The already-mentioned 1973 case, when New Zealand took 
France before the International Court of Justice, was indicative of this 
growing sense of independence. Visits by allied nuclear armed vessels to 
New Zealand were met with vociferous and sometimes physical protests, 
the most famous being the Rainbow Warrior affair, when this Greenpeace 
ship was sunk by the French intelligence service in Auckland Harbour. The 
sinking of the Rainbow Warrior hardened attitudes within New Zealand, 
and in 1984 they adopted a nuclear-weapon-free policy.219 The New 
Zealand Nuclear Free Disarmament and Control Act was passed in June 
1987.  
 
Kate Dewes asserted: 
 
“Although treated with barely concealed fury by most of its Western allies, it [New 
Zealand] won admiration and respect from many non-aligned states for being the first and 
only Western-allied state to legislate against nuclear weapons and thereby renounce 
nuclear deterrence.”220  
 
2.10 Conclusion 
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2.10.1 The Law as it has Evolved on the Usage of Nuclear Bombs 
from 1945 to 1995 
The Shimoda case is the only court case that has been held on the actual 
usage of nuclear bombs in war – those dropped at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. This case was heard in a Japanese municipal court which made 
meticulous and tightly-reasoned use of international and international 
humanitarian law in the argumentation of the case. The key finding was 
that the deployment of the nuclear bombs was a violation of international 
law, the essential reasoning being that “international law forbids an 
indiscriminate and blind attack upon an undefended city. Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were undefended; therefore the attacks were illegal”.221 
 
This judgment leaves room for a contrary view. It is conceivable that there 
might be a case which involves the recently-developed mini-nuclear 
weapons (‘mini-nukes’), where a state which is at war with another 
conducts a very carefully-specified, discriminate and targeted nuclear 
attack on a defended military installation, which is also discriminate and 
proportional. 
 
In the second holding it was found that “no military necessity of sufficient 
magnitude could be demonstrated here”222 to justify the deployment of 
these nuclear bombs. 
 
For the researcher, the key term here is ‘sufficient magnitude’. What 
military situation might justify the deployment of a nuclear bomb because 
of a case of ‘sufficient magnitude’? This translates into the question: 
”When, or under what conceivable circumstances, would it be 
proportionate to deploy a nuclear bomb in a military operation?“ Obviously 
the risks of nuclear reprisal and escalatory risks would have to be brought 
into consideration in addressing this question. These risks would in the 
researcher’s view significantly circumscribe the matter of ‘sufficient 
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magnitude’ and proportionality as a rationale for deploying a nuclear 
bomb. 
 
The fourth holding included the finding that “the atom bomb causes 
suffering far more severe and extensive than the prohibited weapons; 
therefore it is illegal to use the atomic bomb to realise belligerent 
objectives”.223  The researcher is inclined to agree with this finding 
because it would appear that the inducement of cruel suffering is 
analogous to torture, and therefore contrary to jus cogens.  
 
2.10.2 The Law as it has Evolved on the Testing of Nuclear 
Weapons from 1945 to 1995 
When the nuclear tests began in the immediate post-World War II period, 
their legality had obviously not yet been tested. At that time there seemed 
to be an overwhelming presumption among the nuclear-weapons-states 
that these nuclear tests could be justified in terms of the sovereign right to 
self-defence. 
 
The first hint that the legality of nuclear testing would eventually be 
contested arose from the contamination by nuclear fallout of the crew and 
fish cargo of the Lucky Dragon fishing trawler in 1954. This matter was 
settled by the US granting an ex gratia payment to the Japanese 
government and afflicted crew members. 
 
The controversy around nuclear testing escalated during the course of the 
1960s and 1970s with the recurrent French nuclear tests conducted in the 
South Pacific Ocean. These tests were strongly opposed by Australia, 
New Zealand and the South Pacific Islanders, and an Advisory Opinion 
was sought from the IJR. 
 
The case was declared moot, and the law as regards the testing of nuclear 
weapons was not noticeably advanced as a result of the Advisory Opinion. 
                                                
223 Loc cit. 
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Municipal law of Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Islands was 
then crafted in order to render the usage, possession, testing and 
transportation of nuclear weapons illegal. 
 
An international public outcry occurred because of the French sinking of 
the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour, and this incident again focused 
international attention on the legality of the threat, possession, usage, 
testing and transportation of nuclear weapons. 
 
The testing of nuclear weapons was also associated with a growth in the 
development of international environmental law, which was linked to global 
warming and trans-boundary pollution, and therefore international 
environmental law. International law and international environmental law 
increasingly started to intersect harmoniously with one another on the 
matter of the legality of nuclear testing. 
 
In 1995 the NPT Review Conference declared the entry into force of a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban. 
 
The law relating to the testing of nuclear weapons therefore developed 
significantly in the post-World War II period between 1945 and 1995. In 
1945 nuclear testing was deemed to be legal, and by 1995 it was subject 
to a comprehensive test ban. 
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2.10.3 The Law as it has Evolved in Nuclear Proliferation and 
Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons 
This research has shown that several states including South Africa have 
taken the decision to relinquish their nuclear arsenals, and nuclear 
weapons programme and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons. The finding was that the key common denominator 
for this pattern of relinquishment and accession pertained to matters 
relating to state recognition and state succession. 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded in 
1968. The researcher’s view is that it has been for the most an extremely 
effective treaty and has achieved what it was intended to do. However, its 
problematic areas are twofold. The first problem is the non-accession of 
the Threshold States – India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel. They could 
conceivably serve as a conduit for further disaffiliation from the treaty. 
Secondly, the Nuclear-Weapons-States are contravening Article VI of the 
NPT by being themselves the greatest proliferators of nuclear weapons. 
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Chapter Three 
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict (8 July 1996) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
presented in 1996, distils, integrates and offers a heightened 
understanding of the gradual and rather irregular development of the law 
of war as it relates to the possession, usage and testing of nuclear 
weapons in the post-World War II period, covered in the previous chapter. 
This opinion presented important findings about the customary nature of 
international humanitarian law and offered pronouncements as to how this 
law might be interpreted as it pertained to the threat and use of nuclear 
weapons. According to Francis Boyle: 
 
“It is the first decision which expresses the view that the use of nuclear weapons is 
hemmed in, and limited by a variety of treaty obligations. In the environmental field, it is 
the first Opinion which expressly embodies, in the context of nuclear weapons, a principle 
of prohibition of methods of warfare which not only are intended, but may also be 
expected to cause ‘widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage’, and the 
‘prohibition of attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals’.” 224 
 
 The Opinion clarified how these rules were interconnected with other laws 
and how this interconnectivity of law might be understood.225 The 
customary nature of international law was affirmed in the Opinion which 
confirmed certain non-derogable principles of international humanitarian 
law, all of which have been referred to already by Professor Charles 
Moxley. These included the principle of distinction; the prohibition on the 
                                                
224 Boyle, Francis. 1996. ‘The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence’. Humanitarian Law and War 
Tribunals, College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 4–5, 17 October. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.derechos.org/koaga/v/boyle.html at 4–5. 
225 Doswald-Beck, Louise. 1997. ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of 
the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’. 
International Review of the Red Cross,.316:35, 28 February. 
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use of indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition against causing 
unnecessary suffering to combatants, and the fact that States do not have 
unlimited choice of means in the weapons which they use.226 International 
humanitarian law contains the rules relating to both how a state might 
conduct a war, and a state’s obligations to protect victims and antagonists 
(the civilians and the hors de combat) who discover that they are caught in 
the middle of a military maelstrom. The Hague Law  was concerned about 
the laws of war relating to how hostilities are actually conducted, whilst the 
protection of victims in war was the predominant focus of the Geneva Law. 
These two differential though complementary points of legal focus were 
coalesced into a unitary body of law by the Additional Protocols of 1977. 
One of the objectives of the Advisory Opinion was to establish whether an 
opinio juris could be deduced on the legality of the use of nuclear 
weapons.  
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1969 submitted that for an 
opinio juris sive necessitatis, and therefore a customary law, to exist, there 
must be evidence of ‘settled practice by states’ on the matter: 
 
“In considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court has emphasized 
that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for a new customary rule 
to be formed, not only must the acts concerned ‘amount to settled practice’, but they must 
be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis.  
 
Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it must have 
behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of law requiring it. The need for such a belief i.e. the existence 
of a subjective element is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.”227 
 
The matter of a nuclear-weapons-state declining to sign a treaty on some 
facet of the legality of nuclear weapons because of parochial interest 
means that the development of an opinio juris sive necessitatis may be 
stillborn, and the development of customary law will be obstructed. 
                                                
226 International Court of Justice. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Advisory 
Opinion of 8 July 1996: Dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry at para 78. 
227 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) Merits, 1986 
ICJ Reports 14; 1969 ICJ Reports 44 at para 77. 
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David Bederman contends that it is often difficult to ascertain whether an 
opinio juris exists or not.228 An opinio juris is the subjective element of law 
and relates to the belief that action was conducted because it was morally 
obligatory. If there is clear evidence of constant practice and conduct over 
a substantial period of time, the need for an opinio juris diminishes. The 
judges therefore sought the intermediary measure of relevant United 
Nations Resolutions which had been reached over the years that had 
passed since the conclusion of World War II in order to help ascertain 
whether or not an opinio juris existed on the legality of the threat or use by 
a state of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.229 No opinio juris was 
affirmed in the case of the 1996 Advisory Opinion. This is because state 
practice since 1945 has often been quite inconsistent, although there is 
arguably a regular pattern underlying that inconsistency. The nuclear-
weapons-states have constantly asserted that their possession of nuclear 
weapons is lawful and, indeed, essential to ensure the maintenance of 
world peace. Many non-nuclear-weapons-states, on the other hand regard 
the possession and use of these weapons as illegal and a threat to world 
peace. There is therefore, broadly speaking, a divide in the opinion as to 
and interpretation of the legality of possession, usage and deterrent 
application of nuclear weapons between the nuclear-weapons-states and 
non-nuclear-weapons-states. This divide in opinion will be explored in this 
chapter and constitutes an important theme. It is in the context of a divided 
opinion, such as this that the search for the presence of an opinio juris 
intensifies. Bederman asserted that the presence of a custom need not be 
world-wide and can be restricted to a region. Custom arises from the 
manifestation of clear, regular, repeated and respected normative sets of 
behaviours which occur regionally and/or internationally. This division in 
opinion among the judges ties in with David Bederman’s assertion that 
custom need not be world-wide and can be regional in orientation. 
 
                                                
228 Bederman, David. 2001. International Law Framework. New York: Foundation Press. 15–16. 
229 Op cit Bederman. 
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The non-nuclear-weapons-states arguably have strong regional and 
weaker global influence. Conversely, the nuclear-weapons-states enjoy 
strong global, political and military influence accompanied by weaker 
regional influence than the non-nuclear-weapons-states. This differential 
pattern of influence has maintained itself in a relatively stable dynamic 
equilibrium since the end of World War. One could therefore contend that 
this equilibrium represents a custom. The nuclear-weapons-states and 
non-nuclear-weapons-states can be regarded as separate and distinct 
groupings of states and can be clearly defined as ’differing sets‘ on the 
basis of their mutually exclusive coalition of interests relating to the 
interpretation of the legality of the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons. These interests and interpretations of the law are ’almost’ 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, on the basis of 
fundamental presumptions and assumptions: the nuclear-weapons-states 
possess nuclear weapons, while the non-nuclear-weapons-states do not 
possess nuclear weapons. Both NWS and NNWS vigorously hold that 
their respective positions are lawful, but some (an increasing number) of 
the non-nuclear-weapons-states are starting to interrogate the 
presumptions of legality that  the nuclear-weapons-states assume with 
respect to the possession, use  and deterrent application and use of 
nuclear weapons. This is evident from the testimony and evidence 
presented before the ICJ, some of which is detailed in this chapter. 
 
The nuclear-weapons-states are a grouping with restricted membership 
and global influence, which arises from the scarcity of access to 
membership, and the power to assert the deterrent menace of these 
weapons. The nuclear-weapons-states have regularly asserted since the 
end of World War II that their possession of and right to use nuclear 
weapons is indeed lawful. Many non-nuclear-weapons-states regard the 
possession and right to use nuclear weapons as illegal. There was clearly 
a division in opinion between the groupings, and the judges could not find 
sufficient grounds to decide that an opinio juris existed regarding the 
legality of use of nuclear weapons. This subjective and divided opinion 
was reflected in negative votes and abstentions in voting.    
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The ICJ230 advised that: 
 
“The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may 
sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To 
establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to 
look at its content and conditions of adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an 
opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the 
gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule. 
 
Examined in their totality, the General Assembly resolutions put before the Court declare 
that the use of nuclear weapons would be a direct violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations; and in certain formulations that such use should be prohibited. The focus of 
these resolutions has sometimes shifted to diverse and related matters; however, several 
of the resolutions under consideration in the present case have been adopted with a 
substantial number of negative votes and abstentions; thus, although those resolutions 
are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they fall 
short of establishing the existence of an opinio juris on the use of nuclear weapons.”231 
 
In essence, therefore, the judges’ findings reflect a division between two 
essential (and ‘final analysis’) questions, which were whether a nuclear-
weapons-state possessed the fundamental right to use these weapons in 
self-defence when attacked by an aggressor, versus the opposing 
question and underlying sets of arguments which questioned whether the 
fundamental right of a state to self-defence was superseded by the 
requirement for the future survival of civilisation and life on the earth. Did 
the latter right obviate and supersede the former? This right to self-
defence might if asserted place the survival of life on the planet at risk, 
while the dilution of a state’s right to self-defence could imperil it and 
cause it to fail.  There was therefore both an advisory and a dissenting set 
of opinions which provided important insight into the legality and threat of 
the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict, and which would 
undoubtedly assist in the interpretation of the law.232 
 
                                                
230 1996 ICJ Reports 226. 
231 Op cit ICJ Reports at paras 70–71. 
232 Op cit Doswald-Beck. 
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The Dispositif of the International Court of Justice can be regarded as the 
formulaic exposition of the Court’s essential findings, and the discussion in 
this chapter is predicated on that legal keystone. The International Court of 
Justice was conceived of by its founders as a continuous dispute 
settlement organ rather than a shaper of the law. An unanimous or near-
unanimous Advisory Opinion will effect the creation of the law. The 
dissenting opinions in the Advisory Opinion as to the Legality of the Use 
by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict do not detract from the 
fact that there was a considerable degree of consensus as to the status of 
the law. Brownlie states that “[s]ince 1947, the decisions and advisory 
opinions in the Reparation,233 Genocide,234 235 Fisheries236 237 238 and 
Nottebohm239 cases have had a decisive influence in general international 
law.”240 This chapter will explore the basis of the dissent that is contained 
in the Advisory Opinion in terms of the ‘positivist versus natural law divide’ 
that was reflected in the thesis and antithesis of the Lotus case versus the 
Martens Clause, the latter of which is explored further in section 3.4. 
 
Moxley posed the question: 
 
“... whether the risk factors associated with all aspects of nuclear weapons are so 
inherently extreme that any manufacture, possession or use of nuclear weapons, in any 
circumstances, is so serious as to render even the most limited use of nuclear weapons 
unlawful.241 
 
Certain rules of law as to the prerequisites of the per se rule and as to civil and criminal 
liability for risk creation are so widely recognised as to constitute binding principles of 
international law.242  
 
                                                
233 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174. 
234 Genocide Convention, Provisional Measures (Bosnia & Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia & 
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239 Nottebohm (Second Phase), 1955 ICJ Reports 4. 
240 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 20. 
241 Moxley, Charles J. 2000. Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World. 
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For a per se rule to arise it is necessary that every single imaginable use be unlawful, or 
is sufficient if most, not necessarily all, such uses be unlawful, or if in the vast majority of 
the likely uses in the circumstances in which such uses would likely take place would be 
unlawful.”243  
 
The Nuclear-Weapons-States do not subscribe to the view that there are 
at present sufficient prerequisites for the establishment of a rule that the 
use or threat of nuclear weapons is illegal per se.  
 
3.2 The Lotus Case and the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion – The 
Positivist Testimony 
The Lotus case244 case related to the matter of deciding upon the criminal 
jurisdiction arising from a collision between ships at sea. The Lotus case 
embodies the permissive and positivist theory in international law which 
asserts that “what is not specifically prohibited is permitted”.245 The 
Nuclear-Weapons-States applied this permissive and positivist theory of 
international law in defence of their possession, deterrence and putative 
usage of nuclear weapons in war. The authority to build and use the 
bombs was derived from the permissive theory of international law. This 
interpretative theme recurrently emerged in the various submissions that 
were presented before the International Court of Justice’s Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict.  
 
 Judge Guillaume subscribed to this positivist opinion and cited the Lotus 
case in support of the point that States elect to prohibit weapons by the 
conclusion of a treaty, and if no such treaty is reached, the weapons will 
be lawful.246 The unifying theme of the Judges who afforded a positivist 
interpretation of the legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons was 
contained in the reasoning that, because there is no express legal 
                                                
243 Loc cit  
244 Lotus Case, 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10. 
245 Datan, Merav. 2003. ‘Nuclear Weapons and International Law’. Institute for Energy and 
Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland. Science for Democratic Action, 9(3), 14 
October; Energy and Security Law 17 of 2003, 7. [Online]. Available: 
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246 Judge Guillaume’s Separate Opinion para 10. 
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prohibition on the possession and threat of nuclear weapons, they are 
therefore permitted.247 The positivist rationale and permissive view of 
international law arguably constituted both a legal and a practical 
justification for the South African decision to design and build the nuclear 
bombs, as none of the respondents conceded to any notion that South 
Africa had acted illegally in developing and possessing its own nuclear 
arsenal. They subscribed to a positivist Nuclear-Weapons-State 
justification for the creation of the nuclear bombs. Non-Nuclear-Weapons-
States that intend to proliferate nuclear weapons may be tempted to 
employ the self-same positivist arguments proffered by the Nuclear-
Weapons-States to justify their recourse to nuclear proliferation, and the 
Lotus case may provide a rationale for claiming that this is lawful in terms 
of international law. 
 
Merav Detan contextualised this positivist interpretation by confirming that 
the Advisory Opinion “was also bound by a tradition of jurisprudence 
inherited from its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ). In a 1927 criminal jurisdiction case, Lotus, the PCIJ held 
that ‘restrictions upon the international law provide that what is not 
specifically prohibited is permitted’ ”.248  
 
Charles Moxley presented a thorough assessment of the United State’s 
stance on the law as it applies to the legality of the possession and use of 
nuclear weapons. The US interpretation of the law may be regarded as 
emblematic of the Nuclear-Weapons-States’ interpretation of the law. It is 
clearly positivist and affirms the Lotus case dictum that what is not 
expressly prohibited is permitted.249 For this reason, it has been decided to 
illustrate the general composition of the positivist argument. 
 
                                                
247 Researcher’s italics. 
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The first point that Moxley makes with respect to the United States’ stance 
on the legality of the possession and use of nuclear weapons is that they 
note that there is no per se rule. There is no international convention that 
prohibits usage of nuclear weapons purely because they are nuclear. This 
is a point which is grasped by the positivists – the nuclear-weapons-states 
– and weakens the argument for the relinquishment of nuclear weapons 
and accession to the NPT. This is precisely what Judge Guillaume 
asserted in the citation above. 
 
Secondly, Moxley asserts that under customary law there is no custom of 
non-usage of nuclear weapons, and therefore no customary prohibition of 
deployment. Indeed, the nuclear powers’ policy of deterrence constitutes 
an affirmation of the legality of the policy of deterrence by the Nuclear-
Weapons-States. The nuclear powers have regularly over the years 
indicated a readiness to use nuclear weapons.250 The policy of nuclear 
deterrence has continued unabated since the end of World War II. One 
could contend that customary law permitting both nuclear deterrence and 
the testing of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapons-states existed 
during the Cold War period. Moxley’s reasoning reveals why no opinio 
juris was reached by the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion. 
 
Moxley contended that the conclusion of the series of conventions 
between the nuclear powers on production, testing, maintenance, and 
proliferation indicates that these weapons are not generally prohibited but 
rather that they are permitted under a very specific regimen.251 He 
maintains that the Nuclear-Weapons-States have expressed a doctrine of 
the lawfulness of these weapons, and for this reason a per se prohibition 
cannot be deduced. 
 
It is the case of the nuclear-weapons-states that nuclear weapons, like any 
other weapons, can be used legally or illegally, and that each case of 
usage would have to be assessed on its own merits ... on “a case by case 
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determination”.252 The United States contended that many usages of 
nuclear weapons could comply with the rules of “proportionality, necessity, 
discrimination, moderation, civilian immunity, neutrality, humanity, and 
prohibition of genocide”.253  In addition, the US and other nuclear-
weapons-states held that they would have a right to reprisal, if there were 
a preceding nuclear strike.254 In recent times mini-nuclear weapons, 
referred to as ’mini-nukes‘, have been developed. The US contends that 
these weapons can be deployed with great accuracy and with controllable 
radioactive fallout. Professor Moxley cited the US Joint Chief of Staff, 
Doctrine for Joint Theatre Nuclear Operations as, confirming the US 
operational policy: 
 
“There is no customary or conventional international law to prohibit nations from 
employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict. Therefore, the use of nuclear weapons 
against enemy combatants and other military objectives is lawful.”255 
 
He further cited the US military manual on the Doctrine for Joint Theatre 
Nuclear Operations: 
 
“The law of armed conflict does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. 
However, any weapon must be considered a military necessity, and measures must be 
taken to avoid collateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Since nuclear weapons 
have greater destructive potential, in many instances they may be inappropriate.”256 
 
It is here that the positivist argument that nuclear weapons are permitted 
because they are not expressly prohibited becomes bridled. The usage of 
nuclear weapons in armed conflict is restrained by the basic principles of  
international humanitarian law that prevail in armed conflict; the principle 
of distinguishing  an enemy from neutral persons; the illegality of the  use 
of indiscriminate weapons (which could destroy not only the enemy but 
neutral states as well because, for example, the wind might blow nuclear 
fallout and deposit it in another country); the prohibition against causing 
unnecessary injuries  to combatants (it is for this reason that blinding laser 
                                                
252 Op cit Moxley (2000) at 106. 
253 Loc cit. 
254 Loc cit. 
255 Op cit Moxley (2000) at 107. 
256 Loc cit. 
 156 
beams are banned under international law); and the circumscribed choice 
that states have in their selection of weapons. 
 
Rupert Ticehurst argues that the positivist philosophy of international law 
has held sway since World War II, with treaty and customary law being the 
predominant regulatory mechanisms in relations between sovereign 
states. He argues that the nuclear-weapons-states have used this reliance 
on treaty and customary law actually to curtail the development of the law 
on armed conflict. The reason behind his assertion is that the nuclear-
weapons-states can decline to ratify treaties and concede to the 
development of customary norms and thereby assume control of the 
content of the law of war. They can retard the development of the law and 
sometimes assume control of the evolution of international law by 
strategically obstructing treaty ratification by withholding ratification and 
thereby not contributing to the development of customary law.   
 
Ticehurst postulates that: 
 
“Other states are helpless to prohibit certain technology possessed by the powerful 
military states. They can pass UNGA resolutions indicating disapproval but, in the 
presence of negative votes and abstentions, these resolutions are not from a strictly 
positive perspective, normative.257 
 
This means that there is interpretatively one set of international humanitarian law for the 
five Nuclear-Weapons-States and another set of international law for the non-nuclear-
weapons-states that have acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”258  
 
It is pointed out to the reader that this dualistic legal reasoning articulated 
by Ticehurst was given practical effect by Professor Stumpf and Dr 
Barnard in their respective interviews. They made explicit reference to the 
legal dualism of one set of self-justificatory laws applying to the nuclear-
weapons-states and another set of restrictive and sometimes punitive laws 
pertaining to the non-nuclear-weapons-states, as to the question of the 
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legality of possession and use of nuclear weapons. The International 
Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf case offered a 
positivist testimony on how a new customary rule may be formed. This is 
of obvious relevance to the exposition about the relevance of treaties and 
customary law in clarifying the law of war, and specifically to the question 
of the legality of the possession and use of nuclear weapons. 
 
A citation submitted to the ICJ by John McNeill259 on behalf of the United 
States represents a practical example of the reasoning contained in the 
positivist testimony, which asserted that nuclear weapons and their usage 
are lawful, as there is no express law to the contrary. This citation is then 
subjected to a critique by the researcher, which leads logically to an 
exposition of the counter-philosophy to the positivist argument, which is 
the statement of natural law and is illustrated in the Martens Clause, which 
is explored further in section 3.4. 
 
McNeill submitted that: 
 
“The World Health Organization and some States have submitted to the Court materials 
discussing the destructive effects of nuclear weapons, including the effect of their use on 
human health and the environment. It is true that the use of nuclear weapons would have 
an adverse collateral effect on human health and both the natural and physical 
environment. But, so too, can the use of conventional weapons. Obviously, World Wars I 
and II, as well as the 1990–1991 conflict resulting from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 
dramatically demonstrated that conventional war can inflict terrible collateral damage to 
the environment.260 The fact is that armed conflict of any kind can cause widespread, 
sustained destruction; the Court need not examine scientific evidence to take judicial note 
of this evident truth.261  
                                                
259 The citation from John McNeill is quite lengthy and the researcher apologises to the reader for 
this. It is included in the text on the basis of its practical relevance, and as an example of the 
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Conflict Law, 2(1):45, June. Nottingham University Press, University of Nottingham, Department 
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261 McNeill’s call ‘not to examine the scientific’ is logically inconsistent and selective. It is a good 
example of both obfuscation and moral relativism. McNeill is in fact calling for a scientific 
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Some States have adverted to studies of the effects of nuclear weapons in an attempt to 
demonstrate that every use of every type of nuclear weapon would necessarily violate 
principles of proportionality and discriminate use. But the material that has been 
presented for the Court’s consideration cannot support such a sweeping proposition. Any 
given study rests on static assumptions: assumption regarding the yield of a weapon, the 
technology that occasions how much radiation the weapon may release, where, in 
relation to the earth’s surface it will be detonated, and the military objective at which it 
would be targeted. 
 
The assumptions made by the World Health Organization in the material submitted to the 
Court are in fact highly selective (Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, 
2nd ed, 1987). The four scenarios on which the World Health Organization Report 
focuses address civilian causalities expected to result from nuclear attacks involving 
significant numbers of large urban area targets or a substantial number of military targets. 
But no reference is made in the report to the effects expected from plausible scenarios, 
such as a small number of accurate attacks by low-yield weapons against an equally 
small number of military targets in non-urban areas. The plausibility of such scenarios 
follows from a fact noted in the WHO Report by Professor Rotblat: namely, that 
‘remarkable improvements’ in the performance of nuclear weapons in recent years have 
resulted in much greater accuracy. Clearly such possible scenarios would not necessarily 
raise issues of proportionality or discrimination.”262 
 
3.3 Critique of McNeill’s Testimony 
In order to understand the meaning and intention of the positivist 
testimony, one needs to assess the underlying message that is contained 
in McNeill’s submission before the ICJ. McNeill acknowledged the truth 
that “nuclear weapons would have adverse collateral effects on human 
health, on both the natural and physical environment”. 
 
Euphemism is used as a linguistic technique to sterilise, objectify, diminish 
and obfuscate the statement of natural law. The term ‘adverse collateral 
damage’ is applied euphemistically to diminish the fact that the use of 
nuclear weapons is indiscriminate, that it is impossible to distinguish friend 
from foe, and that the damage inflicted by the deployment of these 
                                                                                                                                 
promotion of the analysis of conventional weapons, and a demotion of the scientific analysis of the 
impact of nuclear weapons.  
262 Verbatim Record, 15 November 1995 at 89–90.  
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weapons will always be disproportionate to the military objectives. 
Collateral damage actually means that perhaps millions of non-
combatants, innocent people, and civilians are killed, maimed, and suffer 
cancers and genetic birth damage which may be trans-generational, from 
the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. McNeill’s statement is also 
intended to diminish the environmental damage that may ensue from 
nuclear fallout. Environmental damage can also be deemed to be 
‘collateral damage’ of a sort. It is the researcher’s view that McNeill would 
seem to be using this linguistic technique of euphemism to skirt over and 
avoid interrogating the legality of the principles of permissible violence, 
discrimination, proportionality, and the destruction of non-military property 
as a result of the deployment of nuclear weapons. The researcher has 
noticed that in common parlance the notion of ‘collateral damage’ has 
gained currency in recent years and is often used as a cliché to discount 
and divert attention away from war crimes. This catch-all terminology 
inhibits the ability to diagnose the status of what is actually being 
contended – that nuclear weapons which can cause trans-generational 
genetic destruction and trans-border environmental pollution that can 
endure for millennia are lawful. 
 
The linkage of the destruction caused by nuclear weapons to conventional 
weapons can be interpreted as diversionary information calculated to 
detract from the remit of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, which pertains to the 
use of nuclear weapons in war, and not to their comparability with 
conventional weapons. It is a red herring intended to divert the reader’s 
attention away from the core intention of the hearing, which was to decide 
upon the legality of the possession and use of nuclear weapons. McNeill 
used the term ‘collateral’ twice in order to emphasise the appearance of 
objectivity and the rationality of his presentation. He also magnified the 
impact of damage (presumably resulting from burning oil rigs) caused to 
the environment by the use of conventional weapons as a linguistic 
technique to discount and set off the damage that is caused by nuclear 
fallout. He was presenting a case that the damage caused by conventional 
weapons and nuclear weapons is comparable and therefore implies, by a 
 160 
contortion of logic, that the damage caused by conventional weapons 
legitimates the surgical use of nuclear weapons, and therefore that two 
wrongs make a right. A scientific assessment of the human and 
environmental damage caused by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki is conspicuously absent from his analysis.  This critique of 
McNeill’s submission therefore pertains to both what is said and also what 
is left unsaid by him.  
 
So, too, is an analysis of the human and environmental damage caused 
by peacetime nuclear testing. McNeill makes no mention of the human 
and environmental damage that ensued from the peacetime meltdown of 
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the Ukraine, as well as the many 
other well-documented nuclear power failures that have occurred over the 
years. McNeill refrains from reflecting upon the grave criminal danger that 
may ensue from the proliferation of mini-nukes by terrorist groupings 
almost anywhere in the world, which make for an alarming spectre.263  
 
Rupert Ticehurst contended that the development of military weapons and 
of the law controlling these weapons can be asynchronous. The law will 
logically always be required to ’catch up‘ on military innovation. Ticehurst’s 
view is that positive law can be particularly weak and ineffective in 
protecting persons from indiscriminate new advances in military 
technology, and he contends that a moral code vested in natural law 
should be seen as complementary to a positivist code.264 Ticehurst’s 
assertion is of obvious relevance to the mini-nuke debate referred to 
above. 
 
“The assumption that a state may do anything that is not explicitly prohibited goes to the 
heart of the Lotus case. This is clearly a narrow interpretation of the law. The legality of 
the use and threat of nuclear weapons needs to be assessed in terms of congruency with 
                                                
263 Corera, Gordon. 2006. Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Security and the 
Rise and Fall of the AQ Khan Network. London: Hurst & Company.  (Dr Barnard referred to the 
danger of an exponential proliferation of nuclear weapons which might occur through the 
miniaturisation of this technology. He regards this as a potentially grave threat to international 
peace, because criminals would be able to trade and store these weapons if this scenario were to 
manifest.)  
264 Op cit Ticehurst. 
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Article 38 [of the Statute] of the ICJ. The notion that the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons is legal per se is deeply flawed, and cannot be adjudged upon the existence or 
non-existence of a rule.”265 
 
Finally, it is noted that the Lotus case, with its assertion of legal positivism, 
arose from a divided bench. This division among the bench constricts the 
presumption that what is not prohibited is permitted, and suggests that the 
principle may be generalised without restriction and reservation to other 
contexts. 
 
Ian Brownlie, in discussing the Lotus case, cautions: 
 
“Some discretion is needed in handling decisions. The Lotus decision arose from the 
casting vote of the President, and was much criticised, and was rejected by the 
International Law Commission in its draft articles on the law of the sea, and at the third 
session the Commission refused to accept the principles emerging from the Genocide 
case … Moreover, the view may be taken that it is incautious to extract general 
propositions from opinions and judgments devoted to a specific problem or settlement of 
disputes entangled with the special relations of two states.”266 
 
Brownlie’s caution pertains to the danger of selectively extracting 
principles from a case such as the Lotus case, where the findings of the 
Court are context-specific, and then attempting to generalise these 
context-specific principles to other inapplicable situations. Using 
analogous reasoning, it is asserted that the weakness in John MacNeill’s 
positivist testimony is too literal and strident, and is almost an invocation of 
the Lotus finding, which is fallible in terms of the reasoning contained 
above. 
 
For Datan: 
 
“Lotus was the brooding omnipresence in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion [researcher’s italics] 
causing it to look for explicit prohibitions of nuclear weapons, for example, Judge  
Weeramantry moves beyond this extreme deference to state sovereignty, noting also that 
                                                
265 Meyrowitz, Elliott  & Fried, John HE. 1981. ‘Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons’ 
(Drafted by Meyrowitz and Fried.) Approved  by the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy on 24 
November 1981. Cited in Burns H Weston (ed.). 1984. Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global 
Security A Search for Alternatives. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 147. 
266 Op cit Brownlie at 20. 
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in times of war, when humanitarian law applies, there can be no presumption of 
permissibility.”267   
 
Datan observed: 
 
“Judge Weeramantry’s268 analysis of Lotus foreshadows a fundamentally different 
interpretation of sovereignty and permissible state behavior than that espoused by the 
Nuclear-Weapons-States. He recognizes that the law contributes to and functions within 
the premise of continued existence of the community served by that law. Legal systems 
are postulated upon the continued existence of society.”269 
 
Judge Weeramantry’s affirmation of the abiding relevance of the Martens 
Clause (see section 3.4 below) provides a balance contained in natural 
law to a strident positivist argument. It will be shown in the following 
analysis that the ICJ itself also affirmed the continued relevance of the 
Martens Clause both in itself and to the law of war.270 
 
3.4 The Martens Clause271 – The Testimony of Natural Law  
The proponents of the illegality of the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons used arguments based upon natural law to counter the 
positivists stance on the legality of these weapons. An important 
component of the natural law logic was the authority provided by the 
Martens Clause, which offered an important rationale under customary law 
for declaring the use and threat of nuclear weapons to be illegal. The ICJ 
in fact “confirmed that the basic principles of humanitarian law continued 
to apply to all new weapons, including nuclear ones, and pointed out that 
no State disputed this”.272 It needs to be conceded at the outset that the 
ICJ, while acknowledging that there was an irrefutable place for natural 
                                                
267 Op cit Datan.   
268 Refer to the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry. 
269 Op cit Datan. 
270 Opinion, para. 87 
271 Contained in Article 23(e) of the Hague Convention No. II Preamble to Fourth Hague 
Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899, and modified in 1907; used in the 
Nuremberg jurisprudence; modified in main body of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 of 1977; Preamble to Additional Protocol II, and used by the ICJ in the 
Advisory Opinion; Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980, Preamble, para.5 1342 UNTS 609, Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996). 
272 Opinion, para.86. 
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law in the law of war, did not indicate the extent to which the Martens 
Clause would be accepted into the development of the law of war. Those 
who sought to confirm that possession and use of nuclear weapons are 
illegal actions tried to do this by reaching beyond the positivist norms 
contained in MacNeill’s and other similarly-formulated positivist testimony. 
The Martens Clause has been relied upon and has endured over the 
years, albeit with amended wording and therefore varying interpretations 
with the passage of time. The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion afforded the 
Martens Clause a special emphasis. The Martens Clause naturally forms a 
counterpoint to the positivist view that ”that which is not prohibited is 
permitted”, which was discussed in the previous analysis, and provides a 
testimony to natural law. In 1899, when originally formulated, the Martens 
Clause read as follows:  
 
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties 
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience.”273 
 
The Martens clause therefore insists that if a particular rule is not 
positively encrypted into treaty law, belligerents will remain under the 
protection and authority of customary law, the principles of humanity, and 
the dictates of the public conscience.274 Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out 
in his dissenting opinion proffered before the ICJ that the Martens Clause 
had been invoked in the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremburg in 
the case of Krupp 1948,275 where it had been asserted: 
 
“The Martens Clause is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, 
making the usage established among civilised nations, the laws of humanity and the 
dictates of public conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific 
provisions of the convention do not cover specific cases.”276   
                                                
273 The Hague II Convention of 1899. 
274 Op cit Doswald-Beck at 44–45. 
275 In re Krupp and others, 15 Ann. Dig. 620, 622 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948). Interestingly, the 
powerful NWS accepted the primacy of natural law in the Nuremberg Trials and then eschewed it 
insofar as the legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons was concerned. 
276 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shabuddeen at 22–23.  
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In a complementary explication on the continuing pertinence of the 
Martens Clause, Rupert Ticehurst asserts that: 
 
“... the laws of armed conflict do not simply provide a positive legal code, they also 
provide a moral code. This ensures that the views of smaller states and individual 
members of the international community can influence the development of the laws of 
armed conflict. This body of international law should not reflect the views of the powerful 
military states alone. It is extremely important that the development of the laws of armed 
conflict reflect the views of the world community at large”.277  
 
This can be regarded as a counterpoint to the Lotus case. Louise 
Doswald-Beck makes the point that it is much contested “whether the 
‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of the public conscience’ are 
separate, legally-binding yardsticks against which a weapon or a certain 
type of behaviour can be measured in law, or whether they are rather 
moral guidelines”.278 
 
For Rupert Ticehurst, the Martens Clause offers a bridge between the 
legal positivists’ position and for the intercession of natural law. He 
contends that natural law fell into decline because of its subjectivity, with 
contending states criticising its legal consistency by submitting that it was 
supportive of differing and contradictory norms of natural law. He contends 
that the Martens Clause lays out an objective means for determining 
natural law, which is the dictate of public conscience. Ticehurst argues 
that this enriches the law of war and ensures participation of states in its 
development, because these states participation in the creation of the law 
is effectively the manifestation of the dictates of public conscience.  
 
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict involved an 
extensive analysis of the laws of armed conflict. Inevitably, the oral and 
written submissions to the ICJ and the resulting Opinion made 
considerable reference to the Martens clause, revealing a number of 
                                                
277 Op cit Ticehurst. 
278 Op cit Doswald-Beck. 
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possible interpretations. The Opinion itself did not provide a clear 
understanding of the Martens Clause. However, submissions from the 
States and some dissenting opinions provided very interesting insight into 
its meaning.  
 
Judge Koroma in his dissenting opinion challenged the whole notion of 
searching for specific bans on the use of weapons, stating that ”the futile 
quest for specific legal prohibition can only be attributable to an extreme 
form of positivism”,279 the sources of which are contained in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
 
Judge Shahabuddeen in his dissent also provided an analysis of the 
Martens clause. He commenced by referring to the ICJ’s Advisory 
Opinion, paragraphs 78 and 84, where the Court determined that the 
Martens clause is a customary rule and therefore has normative status. In 
other words, the clause itself contains norms regulating State conduct – 
jus cogens and erga omnes.  
 
With reference to submissions made by Nuclear-Weapons-States such as 
the United Kingdom, he stated that ”it is difficult to see what norm of State 
conduct it lays down, if all it does is to remind States of norms of conduct 
which exist wholly dehors the Clause”. Judge Shahabuddeen was clearly 
of the opinion that the Martens clause is not simply a reminder of the 
existence of other norms of international law not contained in a specific 
treaty – it has normative status in its own right and therefore works 
independently of other norms.280  
 
3.5 Testimony Offered to the Court on the Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons – The Statement of Natural Law 
A citation offered by Lijon Eknilang of the Rongelap Atoll in the Marshall 
Islands situated in the South Pacific Ocean on the physical and 
                                                
279 Op cit Ticehurst. 
280 Op cit Ticehurst at 126.  
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psychological effects of the testing of nuclear weapons is offered as a 
contrast to positivist testimony asserting the legality of the use and threat 
of nuclear weapons provided by John McNeill. Lijon Eknilang281 was a 
member of the Rongelap Atoll’s local government, and she was on land 
when the Bravo test shot occurred.  Her statement is a moral testimony of 
the great power of public conscience and therefore encompasses 
concerns of the Martens Clause and natural law. Eknilang referred to the 
radiation and fallout effects on physical, psychological, and environmental 
health in the aftermath of the Bravo atmospheric nuclear testing, which 
tests were conducted by the US.282 This is an elegant statement of natural 
law.283 
 
Lijon Eknilang’s citation together with the positivist testimony of John 
McNeill was contained sequentially in The (Il)legality of Nuclear Weapons 
by John Burroughs. She testified as follows to the Court: 
 
“Mr President, Members of the Court, I would like to begin by thanking you for allowing 
me to present a statement on the effects which the explosion of nuclear weapons have 
had on my life and family, friends, and other fellow citizens of the Marshall Islands. These 
experiences are relevant to the questions put to this Court, because unnecessary injuries, 
indiscriminate impacts, and adverse collateral environmental effects of the radioactive 
fallout resulting from the atmospheric tests have so gravely affected the Marshall Islands 
would be repeated for other people and their lands in the event of any military use of 
nuclear weapons ... 
 
On the morning of 1 March 1954, the day of the Bravo shot, there was a huge, brilliant 
light that consumed the sky. We all ran outside our home to see it. The elders said 
another world war had begun. I remember crying. I did not realise at the time that it was 
the people of Rongelap who had begun a lifelong battle for their health and a safe 
environment. Not long after the light from Bravo, it began to snow in Rongelap. We had 
heard about snow from the missionaries and other westerners who had come to our 
                                                
281 The reader is reminded of the fact that the Bravo tests in the South Pacific actually caused the 
nuclear fallout associated with the Lucky Dragon incident of 1 March 1954, discussed in the 
previous chapter. An incorrect and misleading impression may have been created that the crew on 
the Lucky Dragon were the only persons who were contaminated by the Bravo nuclear fallout and 
that only one person died as a result of this event. This was not the case. Entire communities were 
contaminated by the nuclear fallout that accompanied the Bravo atomic tests. 
282 Eknilang’s testimony echoes the Lucky Dragon affair, discussed in the previous chapter. She 
lived on one of the islands afflicted by the nuclear radiation fallout in 1954. 
283 Verbatim Record, 14 November 1995 at 26–27, 30–31. 
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islands, but this was the first time we saw white particles fall from the sky and cover our 
village. Of course, in 1954, Marshallese children and their parents did not know that the 
snow was radioactive fallout from the Bravo shot … 
 
Women have experienced many reproductive cancers and abnormal births. Marshallese 
women suffer silently and differently from the men who were exposed to radiation. Our 
culture and religion teaches us that reproductive abnormalities are a sign that women 
have been unfaithful to their husbands. For this reason, many of my friends keep quiet 
about the strange births they had. In privacy, they gave birth, not to children as we like to 
think of them, but to things that we could only describe as ‘octopuses,’ ‘apples,’ ‘turtles,’ 
and other things in our experience. We do not have Marshallese words for these kinds of 
babies because they were born before the radiation came … The most common birth 
defects on Rongelap and nearby islands have been ‘jellyfish’ babies. These babies are 
born with no bones in their bodies and with transparent skin. We can see their brains and 
hearts beating. The babies usually live for a day or two before they stop breathing. Many 
women die from abnormal pregnancies and those who survive give birth to what looks 
like purple grapes which we quickly hide away and bury.”284 
 
The researcher’s view is that Lijon Eknilang has offered an eloquent case 
in natural law for the illegality of nuclear testing which should simply be 
tested against the dictates of public conscience, and therefore peremptory 
norms of international law and jus cogens. The individual, trans-
generational and environmental consequences of such atmospheric tests 
are so self-evidently harmful that it is difficult to conceive of a lawful 
nuclear test. In this regard, the Court found the existence of customary 
environmental law.285 
 
“The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment.”286 (and) 
 
“The Court stated that environmental treaties are not intended to divest a State of its right 
to self defence but ’States must take the environmental considerations into account when 
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military 
objectives’.”287 
                                                
284 Verbatim Record, 14 November 1995 at 26–27, 30–31. 
285 Op cit Doswald-Beck at 42. 
286 Opinion, para.29. 
287 Opinion, para.30. 
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It is noted that the NWS in their testimony skirted over the effects of 
nuclear weapons on health and the environment.288 The reason for this 
reluctance on the part of the NWS to discuss the effects of nuclear 
weapons is in the researcher’s view rather obvious. The testimony offered 
by Lijon Eknilang on the effects of nuclear weapons is so powerful in terms 
of the dictates of public conscience and individual morality that it is very 
difficult to counteract without bringing their own motives into disrepute.  
 
3.6 The Arguments For and Against the Presumed Lawfulness of 
Nuclear Deterrence  
The Nuclear-Weapons-States argued before the ICJ that the policy of 
nuclear deterrence was indicative of continuous usage of nuclear weapons 
in the post-World War II era, and that they were therefore legal in terms of 
customary law. The NWS contended that this policy was both lawful and 
essential, and should continue uninterrupted because it ensured that the 
nuclear-weapons-states would continue to uphold a balance of power 
which ensured world peace opinio juris sive necessitatis. The thrust of the 
evidence of the NWS regarding the deterrent threat of nuclear weapons 
was not so much to engage in the specific legality of the merits and 
demerits of the policy in terms of its meaning and application under 
international law. The NWSs instead argued that the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons is integral to the policy of deterrence and therefore to 
international security. They claimed that nuclear weapons are not so much 
military means to wage war as political instruments to prevent war.289  
 
It is the researcher’s view that the ‘public security’ focus in which the 
Nuclear-Weapons-States presented their case before the ICJ on the 
legality of deterrence was purposive. It is contended that it is much easier 
to both assert and defend a policy of nuclear deterrence before the 
general public on the basis of international security arguments than to 
                                                
288 Burroughs, John. 1997. The (Il)legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the 
Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice. Munster, Amsterdam: Die Deutsche 
Bilbliothek. 93. 
289 Op cit Burroughs at 133. 
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assert and defend this policy on the basis of arguments submitted in terms 
of international law. An international law argument will be much more 
stringently and exactingly assessed than an argument presented in a 
doctrine of public security formulation. It is one matter to present a public 
security argument which is emotive; is easy to understand; and appeals to 
the fears and prejudices of the general public. It is quite another matter to 
present a carefully-reasoned international law argument asserting the 
legality of nuclear deterrence before a court with a bench of eminent 
judges. The basic line of reasoning employed by nuclear-weapons-states 
to justify the policy of nuclear deterrence was that the threat of the use of 
nuclear weapons was such an extreme and outrageous notion that it 
deprived any state that might contemplate using them of a logical rationale 
actually to use them. This point does not hold water, because there might 
well be a state (or states) that might enact the deterrent threat and deploy 
nuclear weapons because they are extreme and outrageous weapons and 
in spite of the fact that their use would be totally irrational. The 
presumption of an inevitable rationality in the threat and use of nuclear 
weapons is indeed a fragile notion. The nuclear-weapons-states submitted 
that this policy of deterrence has led to international stability since World 
War II and conformed that no nuclear weapons have been used in war 
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This policy of deterrence therefore created 
a stable equilibrium between states and should remain in place, because 
the reality is that it is effective. They accordingly contended that the policy 
of nuclear deterrence was legal, on the basis of custom.  
 
John Burroughs cited the French representative, Perrin de Brichambaut, 
as contending that “a nuclear weapon is a weapon intended to prevent war 
by depriving it of any possible rationale”.290 In this regard, Burroughs 
asserted correctly, in the researcher’s view, that “because deterrence 
depends on the threat and apparent willingness to employ weapons in 
war, the argument had to circle back to the legality of its use”.291 
 
                                                
290 Verbatim Record (translated), 1 November 1995, at 33.  
291 Op cit Burroughs. 
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Perrin de Brichambaut’s testimony to the ICJ in the 1996 Advisory Opinion 
was entirely consistent with the stance assumed by France in 1973 when 
New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific Islanders took France to the 
ICJ to prohibit it from conducting nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean. There 
was effectively no change to the French assessment of the legality of the 
threat, testing or deterrent usage of nuclear weapons over the interceding 
twenty three year period.  
 
John Burroughs continues: “Indeed, the nuclear-weapons-states implied 
that because deterrence is essential to international security, the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons must therefore be legal.“292 
 
Matheson presented the public security argument in favour of the legality 
of the policy of nuclear deterrence for the United States thus: 
 
“If these weapons could not lawfully be used in individual or collective self-defence under 
any circumstances, there would be no credible threat of such use in response to 
aggression, and deterrent policies would be futile and meaningless. In this sense, it is 
impossible to separate the policy of deterrence from the legality of the use of the means 
of deterrence. Accordingly, any affirmation of a general prohibition on the use of nuclear 
weapons would be directly contrary to one of the fundamental premises of the national 
security policy of each of these many states.”293  
 
Matheson confirmed the circular pattern of reasoning mentioned by John 
Burroughs above. He contended before the ICJ on behalf of the United 
States that the threat and the usage of nuclear weapons cannot be 
separated. Both must be lawful if world peace is to be upheld. Matheson’s 
reasoning implies that one cannot have a legal threat and illegal usage of 
nuclear weapons and vice versa, as one postulation would negate the 
other. He linked his contention to a public security argument rather than an 
explication of the legality of deterrence in terms of international law, as 
explained early on in this discussion.   
 
                                                
292 Loc cit. 
293 Verbatim Record, 15 November 1995 at 78.  
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Matheson’s argument raises serious practical problems associated with 
the legality of deterrence and the possible unintended consequences that 
might arise were this policy to be declared illegal. France’s position on the 
legality of nuclear deterrence as presented before the ICJ was quite 
similar in its logic to that proffered by Matheson of the USA. It was likewise 
presented according to a public security doctrine, discussed above. 
 
Burroughs cited Perrin de Brichambaut again as stating for France: 
 
“The policy of deterrence publicly stated by the Nuclear-Weapons-States is only 
meaningful if the threat of the use of such weapons is not considered unlawful in any 
circumstances. 
 
France’s doctrine of deterrence is the keystone of its security. It also constitutes a pre-
eminent factor of stability, more particularly for the European continent, through its 
positive effects for the allies of France and for the entire international community. It has 
thus contributed, for several decades, to maintaining that essential asset – world security 
and peace … I should like to warn against any pronouncement which directly or indirectly 
might imply judgment being passed on a policy based on deterrence.”294  
 
The reasons underpinning Great Britain’s submission before the ICJ on 
the legality of deterrence converged with those afforded by the United 
States and France. They are very similar to those afforded by France and 
the United States. Sir Nicholas Lyell, the representative of the United 
Kingdom, presented his country’s case before the Court in terms of what 
he referred to as ‘real world’ imperatives, implying that disagreement with 
his contentions would be relegated to the ‘unreal world’, a place which he 
unfortunately did not define. Sir Nicholas Lyell’s argument, too, was clear 
in terms of its public security assertions, rather than its cogency in terms of 
international law.  
 
Burroughs cites Lyell as asserting that deterrence should be deemed 
lawful because of the following: 
 
“Since the Second World War, the concept of deterrence has been fundamental to the 
maintenance of the peace and security of a substantial number of States. Not only the 
                                                
294 Verbatim Record (translated), 1 November 1995 at 33, 36. 
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nuclear powers themselves, but many non-nuclear States, have sheltered under the 
umbrella of these weapons. We might wish nuclear weapons away, as we might wish all 
weapons and, indeed, the whole concept of war and coercion. But nuclear weapons do 
exist and the Court – as a Court of Law – must operate not in some idealized world but in 
the real world … Some start has been made in the reduction of those massive nuclear 
arsenals which are rightly feared. But huge numbers of nuclear weapons still exist. Our 
real world remains a fragmented and dangerous place and in this real world, to call in 
question now the legal basis of the system of deterrence on which so many States have 
relied for so long for the protection of their peoples could have a profoundly destabilizing 
effect.”295 
 
It would appear as though Nicholas Lyell is reasoning that the non-
nuclear- weapons-states should gratefully accept on faith the ‘shelter’ of 
nuclear weapons that are benignly provided by the NWS for their security, 
created by the enduring peaceful military equilibrium that is offered by 
deterrence. Lyell’s logic is in its very essence actually a religious 
argument … the imprecation to believe. The public policy case for the 
legality of nuclear deterrence, together with the customary law argument 
that is predicated on a post-World War II period of international 
acquiescence to the policy of deterrence, created an impediment to the 
judges’ reaching an opinio juris regarding the legality of use of nuclear 
weapons. 
 
In this regard, Charles Moxley contended: 
 
“There is a sense in which the policy of deterrence presents the greatest barrier to the 
broad recognition of the unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. It seems to be 
widely recognised that nuclear weapons are not reasonably useable. Yet many thoughtful 
and sincere people, leaders and populace alike, widely believe that the policy of 
deterrence makes sense: we have these weapons so no one else will use such weapons 
or commit acts of extreme violence against us.”296 
 
John Burroughs observed in his penetrating analysis of the ICJ’s Advisory 
Opinion: 
                                                
295 Verbatim Record, 15 November 1995 at 22–23. 
296 Moxley, Charles. 2001. ‘Unlawfulness of the United Kingdom’s Policy of Nuclear Deterrence 
– Invalidity of the Scots High Court’s Decision in Zelter’. Disarmament Diplomacy, 58(1):17, 
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“In addition to the UN Charter’s prohibition of the threat of force for aggressive ends 
contrary to the UN purposes, non-nuclear-weapons-states invoked humanitarian and 
other provisions of international law in support of the illegality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons.297 In reply the nuclear-weapons-states stressed the value of deterrence 
to international security, provoking an intense wide-ranging debate.” 
 
The Solomon Islands argued in a written submission: 
 
“Any use of nuclear weapons would prima facie violate international humanitarian law. 
The threat of their use must be considered as totally incompatible with the solemn 
obligation undertaken by States under Article 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and Article 1(1) of the 1st 1977 Additional Protocol to respect, and ensure respect, of the 
four Conventions and the Protocol. Given the inevitably of the lethal effects of nuclear 
weapons, threatening their use, must surely violate the rights of potential victims as set in 
Article 40 of the 11th Additional Protocol.”298  
 
The Non-Nuclear-Weapons-States (like the Solomon Islands, cited above) 
did not invoke public security arguments to assert the illegality of the threat 
and use of nuclear weapons. They used straightforward and powerful 
arguments that were based in international law to present their case. The 
researcher’s view is that this will prove to be more enduring than public 
security arguments, which will arguably become obsolete with the vagaries 
of political alliances. Berchmans (who represented Indonesia at the ICJ) 
argued that if the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal under any 
circumstances, the policy of nuclear deterrence would be illegal because 
there is no right to commit a crime, whether it be in self-defence or 
reprisal.299 Berchmans substantiated this argument by citing the 
Nuremberg Principles300 and the Genocide Convention: 
 
“The Nuremberg Principles prohibit planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of 
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. 
Planning and preparation for a war involving the use of nuclear weapons, whether or not 
aggressive, is prohibited, because such a war would entail the commission of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, and therefore would be in violation of international treaties 
                                                
297 Article VI of the NPT read with Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
298 Written Observations of the Solomon Islands re General Assembly Question, para 3.10, at 25–
26. 
299 Verbatim Record, 3 November 1995 at 39–40. 
300 Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 1947  American Journal of International Law, 41:172.   
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and agreements. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide of 1948 renders punishable not only genocide, but also conspiracy, and public 
incitement.”301 
 
Berchmans’s reasoning identifies the legal danger of presumptively 
assuming the legality of deterrence. If the use of these weapons is illegal, 
the threat of their usage will also, as a corollary, be illegal.  
 
Francis Boyle asserted that the importance of the Advisory Opinion 
resides in the fact that it was the first occasion that the ICJ clearly 
articulated the restrictions that pertain to nuclear weapons as they relate to 
the United Nations Charter, and it expressly explored “the contradiction 
between nuclear weapons and the laws of armed conflict and international 
humanitarian law”.302 
 
The Opinion also insisted that all nations are obliged to enter into 
negotiations to ensure and expedite all aspects of nuclear relinquishment 
and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
The Opinion acknowledged that the threat and use of nuclear weapons 
represents a threat to the integrity of international law.303 
 
3.7 Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence as a Threat to World Peace 
Moxley maintained that deterrence itself is intrinsically risky, because the 
policy is extremely provocative, and provocation together with national 
pride might create the escalatory danger of triggering a nuclear war”.304 
The reason the United States of America and the Soviet Union were so 
concerned about South Africa’s development of a nuclear arsenal was that 
in a moment of extreme stress and irrationality, it might have precipitated a 
nuclear conflict. Secondly, the decision of actual usage might be provoked 
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by a policy of deterrence and a political and military crisis.305 The decision 
of usage might not be rational. The policy of nuclear deterrence includes a 
dangerous and unreliable presumption of human rationality. There are 
many cases in history where the heart has overwhelmed the mind and the 
presumption of rationality is a perilous view. 
 
Moxley contended also that the policy of nuclear deterrence by its very 
nature creates an arms race, because countries will always aspire towards 
better, bigger, more powerful and more modern arsenals. Accordingly, the 
policy of nuclear deterrence may in itself sew the seeds of nuclear 
proliferation.306 This threat arises from the natural and inherent 
competitiveness of humans, which may lead to terrorism and jeopardise 
respect for the law.307 308  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This analysis of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, together with an assessment of the 
1945 to 1995 development of the law, was conducted in order to offer a 
legal and conceptual framework for addressing the matter of the legality of 
South Africa’s nuclear arsenal, which is analysed and discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the policy of nuclear deterrence will remain 
integral to the system of international law. The researcher’s view is that an 
argument on the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons will in 
the fullness of time become unsustainable and indefensible in terms of 
international law. The public security arguments are muddying the waters 
and are not a substitute for the cogent logic of international law. This legal 
clarity will probably occur over a period of time and be encouraged by a 
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nuclear weapons crisis. This line of reasoning is congruent with the thesis 
offered by Klug on ‘constituting democracy’.  
 
It is contended that the notion of South Africa’s constitutional sovereignty 
and statehood has changed dramatically since 1945. This is reflected in its 
descent into pariah status, which reached its nadir in about 1989. Mr de 
Klerk’s invocation of constitutional negotiations, relinquishment of the 
nuclear arsenal, and pursuit of accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons resulted in a reversion of that pariah 
state status. The persons who assumed responsibility for negotiating 
South Africa’s democratic constitutional settlement understood this. One of 
the reasons for the constitutional negotiations being conducted in South 
Africa was to create respect for human rights and the culture of the law, 
which had been trampled upon during the period of apartheid. Any attempt 
to retain the nuclear arsenal would have flouted that respect and 
undermined Mr de Klerk’s imperative for constitutional continuity and 
international recognition free of pariah status. They realised that they had 
little choice but to metamorphose South Africa’s Constitution into a system 
that was congruent with global geo-governance. 
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Chapter Four 
Interpreting the Respondents’ Understanding of the 
Legality of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Policy  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will be devoted to seeking an understanding of the 
respondents’ interpretation of the legality of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons policy. The changing interpretation of the legality of nuclear 
weapons will be, in part derived by deduction from the facts that are 
presented, and in part by inference and imputation from the various 
interviews that were conducted with the expert sample, triangulated with 
the literature. The respondents portrayed a variety of interpretations of the 
law relating to the legality of nuclear weapons. It is intended that this 
research will be of assistance to persons in other countries around the 
world who may be grappling with similar challenges of relinquishment and 
accession. The diverse interpretations of the law all occurred in the 
complex reality of South Africa’s constitutional transition, which coincided 
with the switch from the war in Angola to a gradually emerging peace. The 
interviews grapple with important events that led to the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal and to accede to the NPT. The 
interpretation will initially be set out from the broad perspective of 
international customary law and will subsequently flow under the lens of 
international law. This interpretation will furthermore be contextualised into 
a chronology of events that indicate a gradual and uneven pattern of initial 
rejection by the South African leadership, then acquiescence, and later 
acceptance of customary law as it pertains to the legality of nuclear 
weapons. It is to be noted that the respondents’ understanding sometimes 
had to be de-coded and imputed via inference.309 An attempt has been 
                                                
309 The respondents were involved over different periods and for different purposes in the nuclear 
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duration of their involvement. Professor Stumpf’s involvement in the nuclear relinquishment and 
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of the period preceding September 1989 was learnt rather than lived. Professor Stumpf specifically 
acknowledged this delimitation during his interview. A similar delimitation applies to Professor 
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made to compensate for this weakness by triangulating the inference with 
chronological facts exacted from the literature and the law. In certain 
cases, the respondents’ commentaries did have the status of state policy 
and could be interpreted as being ‘soft law’ and heralding customary 
norms. In other instances, they went further and indicated the creation of 
customary law as such.  
 
The Angolan civil war began in 1967 and intensified to such an extent that 
the Portuguese dictator Marcello Caetano fell in April 1974. Portugal 
abandoned both Angola and Mozambique in quick succession.310 The 
resultant military vacuum in Angola was soon filled by the South African 
Defence Force, which entered the war with the initial support of the United 
States. In December 1975 a ban was imposed by the US Congress which 
prohibited military assistance to any of the parties involved in the war in 
Angola. The ban was subsequently termed the Clark Amendment and was 
later extended by the Carter administration to 1980.311 South Africa’s 
apartheid policy was politically unacceptable to the United States and 
resulted in the withdrawal of overt US military support to South Africa 
under inter alia the aegis of the Clark Amendment. South Africa 
consequently found itself increasingly isolated and pitted again the military 
might of the Soviet Union through Cuban and East German intermediaries. 
 
Isolationism in general and the Clark Amendment in particular were 
important driving forces behind the development of the South African 
armaments industry. They precipitated a quest for self-sufficiency and 
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autonomy in all fields of weaponry, including nuclear weapons. The 
armaments industry was developed because of the perception that the 
United States could not be relied upon to stand by its initial commitment of 
support offered to South Africa against the expansionism of the Soviet 
Union in the early days of the Angolan civil war. There was consequently 
an escalation in military expenditure during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
which inter alia included investment in nuclear and conventional 
weapons.312 Nuclear weapons were not the only weapons of mass 
destruction that were developed; a small but highly sophisticated chemical 
and biological weapons industry was also established.  
 
The interview with Mr Pik Botha revealed that there were strong 
indications that accession was being seriously contemplated many years 
before it formally occurred, notwithstanding the build-up in nuclear 
weapons and technology. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, support for 
accession to the NPT within South Africa, was often divided and 
begrudging, attributable partially to the perilous military status of the war in 
Angola. It would appear that security concerns generally usurped 
concerns about international law. 
 
There was also a lack of consensus between and within the political 
leaders and the military establishment at that time on whether or not to 
accede to the NPT. The South African Defence Force, the South African 
Police, the National Intelligence Service, the security apparatus, 
ARMSCOR, and the industrial military complex were undoubtedly in the 
political ascendency during the late 1970s and early 1980s. There were 
powerful persons and interest groups who were strongly opposed to South 
Africa’s accession and relinquishment. Some sought a hard, tangible, 
deterrent bargain. Others advocated nuclear testing, and there were still 
others who might well even have seriously considered deploying a nuclear 
bomb in armed conflict. The leaders who ultimately prevailed thankfully 
                                                
312 Shearer, Jeremy. 1994. Jeremy Shearer Papers. Denuclearization in Africa: The South African 
Dimension. South African Foreign Affairs Archive  Derived from Anna-Mart (Martha) van Wyk, 
cited below. 
 180 
rejected these ideas as being self-destructive, possibly genocidal, and 
probably suicidal. Over time, the complex matter of whether or not to 
accede to the NPT distilled into a conundrum manifested in an impasse. It 
became increasingly evident that South Africa was not antagonistic to 
acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as 
such, but it was adamant that such accession should be supported by 
United States security guarantees that would negate the expansionistic 
policies of the Soviet Union in the sub-continent.313 The United States 
could not provide these security guarantees to the satisfaction of the 
South Africans, so the proliferation stalemate continued, and South Africa 
refused to accede to the NPT.   
 
4.2 Chronology of South Africa’s Relationship with the IAEA   
A brief chronology of South Africa’s relationship with the IAEA will be 
offered in this section in order to set the stage for interpreting the 
respondents’ personal understanding of the legality of South Africa’s 
nuclear policy. South Africa’s changing policy relationship with the IAEA 
over the years is important as it can be regarded as a litmus test of both 
Pretoria’s relative degree of estrangement from the decision to accede to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and norms of 
customary law; and the inclination towards acceding to the NPT and 
acceptance of customary international law. (This chronology will be framed 
by the literature in this section, and later triangulated with the respondents’ 
views in subsequent sections of this chapter.) 
 
South Africa declined for many years to sign the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into effect on 1 July 1968. 
The Treaty had three objectives, which included: (1) prevention of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons; (2) encouraging co-operation in cases 
where nuclear science is used for peace, for example, in the realms of 
civilian energy usage and nuclear medicine; and (3) facilitating 
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negotiations relating to arms control, which includes nuclear 
relinquishment.314 South Africa’s decision not to accede to the NPT 
created an attitude of deep mistrust towards the integrity of its nuclear 
motives, which soon crystallised into policy in the form of mandatory 
sanctions and an increasingly pariah recognition status. It begged the 
question: “Why would a state decline an international agreement that 
opposes nuclear proliferation, encourages civilian usage of nuclear 
science, and opposes negotiations that advance arms control? It must be 
a regime that has scant regard for international customary law and the 
notion of the community of nations …” 
 
South Africa served as a member of the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until June 1977. It was 
stripped of its role in 1979 because of pressure that arose from the Non-
Aligned States and African countries about its suspected proclivity towards 
developing nuclear weapons. In 1979 South Africa’s credentials were 
rejected at the General Conference of the IAEA in New Delhi, India.315 In 
spite of being divested of its role on the Board of Governors, it continued 
to retain full membership of the IAEA and accrued the benefits that arose 
from its membership, which included resources and knowledge on 
peaceful nuclear usage. Abdul Minty recalled that the United Nations 
General Assembly had adopted various resolutions calling upon its 
members to desist from co-operating with South Africa on nuclear matters 
because of its perceived tendency to proliferate nuclear material.316 
 
During the course of 1977, in the midst of the intense conflict of the 
Angolan war, South Africa discontinued safeguards negotiations with the 
IAEA regarding enriched uranium, which is a vital component of an atomic 
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bomb.317 At that time there was an absence of normative consent between 
Pretoria and the IAEA concerning state obligations with respect to nuclear 
protocols, safeguards and accession to the NPT. With the knowledge of 
hindsight, this break-off in negotiations with the IAEA may be interpreted 
as South Africa’s assertion, by the dominant leadership group at that time, 
of the legality of nuclear deterrence and the lawfulness of the possession 
and use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. South Africa was not ready 
to concede to settled practice – usus – with respect to being bound by the 
NPT, as the state did not accept an obligation to be bound by the NPT 
opinio juris sive necessitates. The leadership at that time subscribed to a 
strongly positivist interpretation of international law. The quiet voice of 
customary law was drowned out by the more bombastic voice of the 
positivist militarists. Their prime concerns revolved around winning the war 
in Angola and mitigating their inherent military risks in that country. The 
militarists required concrete security undertakings from the United States 
with respect to supporting South Africa in the Angola war, with particular 
emphasis on counteracting the threat of Soviet expansionism in Southern 
Africa. These security undertakings were not forthcoming. The Clark 
Amendment, mandatory arms embargoes and sanctions made it very 
clear that South Africa was on its own and had to be militarily self-
sufficient if it were to survive. Its apartheid policy rendered it a recognition 
pariah.  
 
Dr Neil Barnard captured South Africa’s and the Nuclear-Weapons-States’ 
security dilemma in an article that he wrote in 1979, when he contended 
that: 
 
“Since the NPT (1968) the nuclear powers have stated again and again that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously affect international order. The non-
nuclear states, however, have no guarantee that the superpowers would guard their 
security or that their sovereignty is indeed threatened by the awesome nuclear power of 
privileged nuclear states. In an international order consisting of national states this is 
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altogether discriminatory. Either nuclear weapons must be banned altogether or the 
security dilemma will undoubtedly lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.”318 
 
Dr Barnard appeared to be advocating that nuclear weapons should be 
declared illegal for all states including the nuclear-weapons-states, and 
banned outright. If they were not banned, he feared that the law of the 
jungle would prevail and that further proliferation would take place to the 
extent that it could become very difficult to regulate. He argued that if the 
normative rules of society continued to permit nuclear proliferation 
amongst the nuclear-weapons-states, the natural competitiveness of the 
human spirit would soon result in general nuclear proliferation. 
 
The United States was not prepared to offer any formal security to South 
Africa to counteract the Soviet Union during the war in Angola. Indeed, the 
Clark Amendment heralded America’s official withdrawal of military 
support for South Africa in Angola.319 It is noted that during the course of 
my interview with Dr Barnard, he did not deviate from his view cited in his 
expostulation noted above.320 
 
It is submitted that South Africa’s 1977 decision to discontinue safeguards 
negotiations was directly linked to its being stripped of its role on the 
Board of Governors of the IAEA in 1979. South Africa’s withdrawal begged 
the questions as to whether uranium was being enriched for a nuclear 
weapon programme and whether enriched uranium was being illegally 
traded. On 8 June 1977, the Soviet Union discovered South Africa’s 
nuclear silos, which were situated at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert. The 
fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America jointly co-
operated on this matter, and were unanimous in their condemnation of 
South Africa’s nuclear proclivities, gave cause for pause. The interview 
with Mr Pik Botha revealed that South Africa’s ally (the United States) in 
the proxy Cold War in Angola and its enemy (the Soviet Union) were in 
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consensus that South Africa’s nuclear inclinations constituted a threat to 
world peace. Alarm was expressed by both the United States of America 
and the Soviet Union about this development. The message of alarm was 
conveyed by US Ambassador Extraordinary Mr William B Edmondson to 
Mr Pik Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in South Africa at the time. 
 
The researcher’s view is that Mr Pik Botha’s subsequent warning and 
communication with Prime Minister BJ Vorster about the mutual alarm 
from both the United States and the Soviet Union on this matter led to the 
creation of soft law. It was quite clear that there would be enormous 
international consequences if South Africa conducted a nuclear test or 
operational deployment of nuclear weapons. The United States and Soviet 
Union (by implication) hinted at the possibility of anticipatory self-defence 
being used to remedy nuclear escalation. South Africa’s renegade nuclear 
weapons status at that time could have quite feasibly eclipsed the 
significance of the proxy war in Angola for both the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union, and might in an extreme scenario even 
have led to joint United States–Soviet Union military co-operation against 
South Africa if it were deemed to be a threat to world peace. The matter of 
the nuclear silos also helped to consolidate the decision by the IAEA to 
reject South Africa’s membership of the Board of Governors. In 
substantiation, Annette Seegers notes that in 1977 the United Nation 
Security Council implemented “a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa, including in its justification reference to South Africa being on the 
threshold of producing nuclear weapons”.321 
 
The South Atlantic Double Flash incident occurred on 22 February 1979. 
South Africa was suspected of having conducted some type of nuclear test 
in the South Atlantic, but this was never proved. Whether true or false, this 
incident arguably consolidated the IAEA’s decision to unseat South Africa 
from the Board of Governors.  
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The relationship between South Africa and the IAEA from 1981 to 1984 
was particularly fractious. In September 1981 the Board of Governors of 
the IAEA resolved to exclude South Africa from all involvement in the 
Committee on Assurance of Supply of Enriched Uranium. Abdul Minty in 
his analysis of South Africa’s relationship with the IAEA pointed out: 
 
“Further investigations of the World Campaign revealed that South Africa’s membership 
of the IAEA was of greater importance to the apartheid regime than was first expected. 
The IAEA confirmed that South Africa was a member of several special working groups 
on uranium. In one category of six groups established jointly by the IAEA and the OECD, 
South Africa was a member of all six and served as the chairman of two. It therefore 
played a central role within all of these groups and it was remarkable that this was 
permitted when everyone knew of South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia and the 
plunder of its uranium resources … On 17 September 1982, a letter was addressed to the 
General Conference, repeating the request to exclude South Africa from the Working 
Groups. The UN Special Committee against Apartheid sent a supporting cable to the 
IAEA and stated that it was ‘most concerned that the South African regime is enabled 
though these groups to obtain nuclear technology and maintain close relationships with 
nuclear experts in other countries’. It called for immediate action to exclude South Africa 
from IAEA Working Groups and joint Working Groups in which the IAEA participates.”322  
 
The Uranium Red Book incident also occurred during the period from 1981 
to 1983. This matter is discussed under a separate sub-heading in this 
chapter. The essential point relating to the Uranium Red Book incident is 
that South Africa used the IAEA’s international publication network to 
propagandise for the recognition of the Bantustan states. These Bantustan 
states were constitutional fictions and recognised by no states in the world 
except South Africa itself. The Uranium Red Book incident confirmed that 
South Africa’s pariah recognition status was entangled with its nuclear 
weapon status. 
 
Annette Seegers commented: “Of course, South Africa was not alone in 
trying to break into the nuclear weapons club. Indeed, observers pointed 
out that those trying hardest to get into inside the door were a group of 
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pariah states.”323 This observation is congruent with my assertion that 
threshold nuclear states most frequently have severe constitutional 
recognition problems and therefore choose to follow the path of nuclear 
proliferation in order to try (usually unsuccessfully) to compensate for this 
absence of recognition, which in turn often has a genesis in the absence 
of political leaders’ appreciation of and buy-in to the general principles of 
international customary law.   
 
In 1982 South Africa passed the Nuclear Energy Act 92 of 1982, which 
rendered it illegal to convey any information relating to the country’s 
uranium reserves without the consent of the government. I interpret this 
municipal law as being promulgated in an attempt to circumvent, negate 
and eclipse the safeguards and inspectorate duties and obligations of the 
IAEA. It served only to harden attitudes from the IAEA and the United 
Nations, with ever more resolutions, sanctions and embargoes being 
ratified. It is contended that the sanctions regime imposed on South Africa 
created a commercial incentive for persons involved in trading uranium 
and nuclear hardware and software to operate outside the scope of the 
IAEA, in an unregulated and illegal market. 
 
It is the researcher’s view that these sanctions actually had a twofold 
effect. They unquestionably created a persecution mentality, which led to 
significant nuclear proliferation, and probably also created a siege 
mentality. The sanctions also led to the creation of a climate that 
enhanced the possibility of a favourable prognosis for a negotiated 
settlement in South Africa. It would be dangerous and naïve to hold a 
simplistic view on the efficacy of these sanctions. It is quite conceivable 
that a highly-threatened and fanatical regime might have used a sanctions 
regime to escalate tensions by deploying nuclear armaments. The 
deployment of sanctions is therefore a gamble. In South Africa it 
undoubtedly contributed to a moderate view and a negotiated settlement. 
That was partially because the leadership was sober and thoughtful. Many 
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other nuclear threshold states do not have the privilege of excellent 
leadership like this, and some may attempt the unexpected. The literature 
of that time offered hardly a whisper indicating consent between Pretoria 
and the IAEA on acceding to the NPT and complying with the IAEA’s 
safeguards regime. Hints of that consent are, however, discovered in the 
testimony of the expert respondents. 
 
In August 1984 South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
resumed the negotiations that had been broken off in 1977 concerning 
safeguards.324 It is acknowledged that ”one swallow does not signify a 
summer”, but this resumption of negotiations indicated a silent 
acquiescence to the authority of the IAEA in international law. This was at 
the time of the early phases of the establishment of the Koeberg nuclear 
power station outside Cape Town, and South Africa needed peaceful 
international nuclear co-operation in order to ensure the success of this 
electrical energy project. The IAEA had the means and wherewithal to 
expedite the peaceful usage of nuclear materials to the benefit of South 
Africa. For this reason, meetings between South Africa and the IAEA were 
resumed. Later, on 29 November 1984, South Africa, France and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency reached an agreement on the export 
and reprocessing of high-level radioactive waste from the Koeberg nuclear 
power station. The researcher regards this as an indication that the 
relationship between South Africa and the IAEA was slowly being 
reconstituted and edging towards consent under customary law.325 The 
reality started dawning on the political leadership in South Africa that the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy to power the national electrical grid and 
economy was of much greater day-to-day strategic value and importance 
to South Africa than the military nuclear programme. By 1984 it was 
starting to become clear that the Soviet Union, Cuba and South Africa all 
wanted to extricate themselves from the war in Angola.326 
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At the same time as South Africa’s relationship with the IAEA was 
improving, its relationships with Great Britain, the United States of America 
and West Germany (FRG) deteriorated, and nuclear co-operation 
agreements with them were terminated.327 The path towards achieving 
consent on nuclear regulation was often rocky. South Africa conflicted with 
these important allies on nuclear norms. The pattern of constituting 
nuclear democracy by acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons in South Africa was as envisaged by Heinz Klug: 
irregular, fraught, and often crisis driven. It was energised by the real 
world problems of war and peace.328 
 
In 1985 President PW Botha was informed by his advisors that 
ARMSCOR was engaged in a serious weaponisation and miniaturisation 
process, which included advanced missile development for the 
deployment of nuclear warheads. According to testimony offered by 
Professor Stumpf, Mr PW Botha was appalled by this information, and 
exercised his right as president of South Africa and Chairman of the 
Witvlei Committee to call a meeting with the top management of 
ARMSCOR responsible for nuclear weapons. He instructed that the 
nuclear weapons programme should be terminated forthwith. The 
ARMSCOR management pleaded that the nuclear project should not be 
wound down because of the job losses that would ensue. Mr PW Botha 
granted a reprieve, but prohibited any further weaponisation. The 
scientists saw that the writing was on the wall and soon started seeking 
alternative employment.   
 
After 1987 it seemed as though there was a clear trajectory towards South 
Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons. On 
31 January 1987 the Atomic Energy Corporation issued a statement 
indicating that South Africa had reached a binding undertaking with the 
                                                
327 Op cit Masiza (1993) at 41. 
328 Klug, Heinz. 2000. Constituting Democracy, Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political 
Reconstruction. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
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United States that it would observe the spirit and the letter of the NPT and 
adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines in the conduct of its 
affairs.329 This agreement with the United States was important and 
anticipatory of South Africa’s accession to the NPT. (This was confirmed 
by Mr Pik Botha during the course of his interview and is referred to later 
on in this chapter.) My view is that South Africa was effectively bound by 
the NPT at that point, although it had not formally acceded to it. It was 
locked into a consistency arrangement. If it repudiated its binding 
undertaking with the US and declined to uphold the spirit and the letter of 
the NPT, it would have been in breach of agreement with the United 
States and suffered from serious credibility problems. Having agreed to 
abide by the spirit and the letter of the NPT with the United States, what 
motivation could conceivably and coherently justify South Africa’s not 
formally acceding to the NPT in the form of a multilateral arrangement? Its 
signature would simply change the bilateral agreement with the United 
States into a multilateral treaty with many states. 
 
In August 1987 South Africa failed to reach a Safeguards Agreement with 
the IAEA on the Valindaba facility.330 This failure to reach agreement 
foreshadowed the stringent requirements that would be imposed upon 
South Africa by the International Atomic Energy Agency during the period 
of technical accession to the NPT and relinquishment of the nuclear 
arsenal, which later included the safeguarding process itself and the 
Statement of Opening Inventory. South Africa was able to make some 
compensatory progress in the same month in 1987, and ratified two 
international nuclear safety conventions.331 This state conduct can again 
be interpreted as a general indication of acquiescence to the IAEA’s 
customary regime. 
 
                                                
329 Fisher, David. 1990. ‘South Africa as a Nuclear Supplier’. In WC Potter (ed). International 
Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers. Toronto: Lexington 
Books. 273. 
330 Masiza, Zondi. 1987b. ‘South Africa Suspension Vote’. Nuclear Engineering International, 
8:3. 
331 Masiza, Zondi. 1987a. ‘IAEA Headed for a September Vote on South African Suspension’. 
Nucleonics Week, 5, 12 August. 
 190 
Zondi Masiza observed that the West placed intense pressure on 
President PW Botha to make a public declaration that South Africa would 
accede to the NPT. Mr Botha was a stubborn man, and this type of 
pressure only made him more obdurate. The pressure which arose from 
the West for South Africa to accede to the NPT was intended to obviate 
attempts by the Group of 77 to deprive South Africa of its rights and 
privileges as a member of the IAEA. The reason for the West taking this 
stance was that there was a fear that leverage to direct and influence 
South Africa’s nuclear regulatory regime would be lost if it were divested of 
its IAEA membership privileges.332 (This contention was corroborated by 
Mr Pik Botha and to an extent by Professor Stumpf during the course of 
their interviews.) With the knowledge of hindsight, I believe that the 
decision reached by the West to keep South Africa within the ambit of the 
IAEA was the wiser alternative, as exclusion could have resulted in South 
Africa’s becoming increasingly adept in an unregulated and illegal system 
of nuclear proliferation. 
 
In August 1989 Mr Pik Botha led a delegation to the headquarters of the 
IAEA in Vienna to discuss the matter of South Africa’s accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.333 This meeting was 
ceremonially important and portended both consent and acquiescence.  
On 16 October 1989 South Africa sent Dr Hans Blix, who was then the 
Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a letter 
confirming that it wished to accede to the NPT provided that various terms 
and conditions were met specifically relating to South Africa’s being 
permitted to market its uranium on the international market subject to IAEA 
safeguards.334 This letter signified unequivocal state consent for accession 
to the NPT, and as a corollary to that, the obligation for South Africa to 
relinquish its nuclear arsenal opinio juris sive necessitatis. Settled practice 
was becoming the norm – usus. 
                                                
332 Op cit Masiza (1993) at 43.  
333 Op cit Fisher at 279. 
334 Loc cit. 
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An obvious indication of the existence of customary law on nuclear 
weapons policy is evidenced when a Bill is signed into an Act. On 18 May 
1993 the South African parliament passed the Non-Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993, which obliged the state to 
forgo designing and building nuclear weapons. The signature on this Act 
denoted formal state acceptance of the customary norms relating to the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The journey to this destination was 
long and complicated. The pre-1980 period is much more difficult to 
interpret from a customary law perspective because clues relating to the 
evolution of usus and opinio juris sive necessitatis are often quite obscure 
and need to be uncovered. The literature is particularly scanty in this 
regard and the respondents filled in some useful and interesting omissions 
that existed in the literature. The reader will note that there were 
intermittent moments of ‘thaw’ and ‘frosting’ in the relationship between 
South Africa and the IAEA over the period. A careful reading of the 
respondents’ feedback will reveal that South Africa seemed to be 
generally inclined towards accession and relinquishment, even in the 
fraught period during which international customary law held sway.   
 
4.3 An Analysis of the Respondents’ Understanding of the 
Legality of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Policy 
It has already been argued that between 1987 and 1988 the state 
accepted an obligation to be bound by the NPT opinio juris sive 
necessitatis on at least four public occasions. Firstly. South Africa 
concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States which included 
inter alia a commitment to honour and uphold the spirit of the NPT. 
Secondly. South Africa ratified two nuclear treaties during the course of 
1987 which were sponsored by the IAEA. Thirdly, Mr Pik Botha, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, led a South African delegation to the IAEA 
headquarters to explore the state’s putative accession to the NPT in 1989. 
Finally, in 1989 an official letter from the South African state was sent to 
Dr Hans Blix indicating that South Africa was prepared to accede to the 
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NPT provided that certain terms and conditions were met. Usus and opinio 
juris sive necessitates are the two most important requirements for a 
customary rule to exist.335 The state actively displayed its commitment to 
the NPT at this time, and there is hardly a problem of proof that South 
Africa had a customary intention to accede to the NPT with regard to the 
above four examples. The interviews with the respondents revealed that in 
their meetings and conferences with high officials, they personally created 
the ‘soft law’ which converted into an acceptance of customary law.   
 
The essential contention of the customary law argument is that South 
Africa was bound by the NPT without ever having signed it. The literature 
review and secondary research leads one to the plausible conclusion that 
this obligation initially began to arise in 1977.  The respondents’ testimony 
differs from the literature. It indicates that the customary obligation to 
accede to the NPT was reached much earlier than is evidenced by the 
literature. This is an important point, because a state may have 
considerable pre-accession normative obligations which may extend for 
some years before formal accession to the NPT takes place. I do not 
believe that the respondents consciously held the view that South Africa 
was bound by the NPT although it had not yet been signed. My personal 
theory is that there appears to have been a conflict between the minds 
and hearts of the respondents on this question. Their positivist legal minds 
were convinced that ”[t]here is no law that says we are bound to accede to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons”. Their legal 
hearts, on the other hand, asserted with emotion: ”We are guided by the 
principles of natural law and jus cogens and have an obligation erga 
omnes to get rid of these weapons if we want to be humane.“ The 
respondents did, however, generally accept an obligation to be bound by 
the NPT opinio juris sive necessitates.  
 
                                                
335 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 29–38. 
 193 
4.4 Mike Louw’s Contention that South Africa’s Nuclear Crisis 
Signified a Breach of International Customary Law 
The analysis will now proceed to reflect on South Africa’s recognition 
crisis, which can be understood broadly as a crisis arising as a result of 
South Africa’s not playing fairly with regard to international customary law. 
The question of state recognition was deeply connected to the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This in turn had implications for the 
respondents’ interpretation of the legality and morality of South Africa’s 
nuclear weapons. An opinion is offered by Mike Louw, who succeeded Dr 
Neil Barnard as Director of the National Intelligence Service. It will be 
recalled that the Martens Clause established the notion of the ‘dictates of 
public conscience’ for connecting natural law to international humanitarian 
law.  In his testimony, Louw offers an eloquent lived-understanding of how 
the Martens Clause related to the ‘dictates of public conscience’ insofar as 
South Africa’s possession of the nuclear arsenal was concerned. 
Furthermore, he assessed the legality of South Africa’s nuclear 
possession and deterrence in accordance with the dictates of public 
conscience: 
 
“I knew that South Africa was in a position that was morally unsustainable. It was morally 
totally corrupt. If you could not act morally, then you could at least try to act legally. But 
even that option was diminishing. 
 
In the 1960s grand apartheid failed. In the intelligence service we had to deal with a 
progressively deteriorating situation. We were involved in, and being sucked into, an 
escalating military conflict, in Angola and South West Africa. We were engaging with the 
military might of the Soviet Union. 
 
It was clearly a ‘no-win’ situation for us. The questions arose: ‘How can we get out of this 
situation? What can be done?’ As I got older and more mature, I realised that we could 
not become victorious by military means. ARMSCOR336 had developed atomic weapons, 
and South Africa was a rising military power. In spite of this nuclear power, I experienced 
a sense of helplessness. There was a deep futility about possessing power in a military 
                                                
336 ARMSCOR – the Armaments Corporation of South Africa – became increasingly powerful as 
the threats to national security intensified. Bertsch and Shaw make a similar contention. See 
Bertsch, Kenneth & Shaw, Linda. 1984. The Nuclear Weapons Industry. Washington DC: Investor 
Responsibility Research Center. 
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sense. It was counter-productive. It resulted in South Africa drawing more fire. We were 
regarded as dangerous and hated. We were perceived as being a threat towards world 
peace. My basic instinct was that what we were doing was unjust and indefensible.”337 
 
Mike Louw’s general contention was that South Africa was acting contrary 
to jus cogens and had an obligation erga omnes to rid itself of these 
nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. Mr Louw’s feedback at the time 
that he recalled his feelings in this regard was of a society that was 
characterised by an absence of normative order and respect for 
international customary law. The view that he presented was one of 
comprehensive pessimism which would abate only when South Africa 
discovered the courage to overcome its fears and enter the twofold 
process of relinquishing its nuclear arsenal and acceding to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the same time developing 
the courage to negotiate on a democratic non-racial democratic 
constitution. Flouting of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal before the 
international community could have readily degenerated into a perceived 
act of international aggression, particularly if the nuclear weapons had 
been tested or, in an extreme scenario, used operationally. Indeed, the 
passive policy of nuclear deterrence by South Africa, if it had become 
public, could even have been construed as an act of international 
aggression. Secondly, apartheid itself was subsequently deemed to be a 
crime against humanity, and there was an obligation erga omnes for South 
Africa to rid itself of the dual millstones of nuclear weapons and apartheid. 
Mr de Klerk possessed the wisdom, bravery and leadership to convert this 
obligation erga omnes into action. 
 
As a result of South Africa’s embracing a new normative order which 
embraced international customary law and integrating it into the practical 
constitutional negotiations, the recognition crisis afflicting South Africa was 
ultimately dissolved, and the country was accepted among the community 
of nations once again. 
                                                
337 Louw, as cited in Heald, Geoffrey Ronald. 2006. ’Learning Amongst Enemies: A 
Phenomenological Study of the South African Constitutional Negotiations From 1985 to 1998’. 
PhD submitted to University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. 224–225.   
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4.5 Mr de Klerk’s Reflections on the Obligation Erga Omnes to 
Relinquish the Nuclear Arsenal and Accede to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
Mr de Klerk’s response offers both a thesis and synthesis to the antithesis 
raised by Mr Louw. Mr Louw lamented about the moral and legal vacuum 
that afflicted South Africa during the heyday of apartheid. There was an 
absence of receptiveness for the normative value of international 
customary law as it pertained to South Africa’s two constitutional crises: 
(1) the nuclear arsenal, and (2) the apartheid constitutional framework. 
(The first crisis was unknown and unspoken, and the second crisis was in 
the commons.) Mr de Klerk provided answers to the questions posed by 
Mr Louw and revealed that respect for and buy-in into a moral and 
international framework of customary law might be achieved through the 
acceptance of both jus cogens338 (which consists of peremptory norms 
from which no derogation is permitted) and obligations erga omnes339 
(which South Africa owed to the international community to be able to 
accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). Mr de 
Klerk was able to create goodwill and trust (comity) at sufficient depth to 
enable the credibility of the constitutional negotiations to be accepted and 
granted positive international recognition status. 
 
The starting point was the trust and comity between the inspectors and the 
inspected. De Klerk recalled in his preamble to this interview that:  
 
“I became President of South Africa in September 1989. I started to address the issue of 
nuclear relinquishment on the fringes before the fall of the Berlin Wall. I requested that 
verifying investigations should be conducted into the precise status of the South African 
nuclear programme. I needed to understand its precise status (in limine clarification). I 
needed to understand whether the country needed to change its course on nuclear 
armaments. I also needed to understand the practical and pragmatic implications of 
reversing the direction of the nuclear weapons process.” 
 
                                                
338 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 43. 
339 Loc cit. 
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Phenomenological reduction 
Mr de Klerk was assessing the nature of South Africa’s obligations erga 
omnes to the international community to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and 
accede to the NPT. Negotiations should be wisely conducted so as to 
ensure that the democratic constitutional settlement in South Africa would 
be achieved in a stable and wise manner. 
 
“The fall of the Berlin Wall opened up a vitally important window of opportunity for South 
Africa, which was entrapped in political mire at that time (ratione temporis). The collapse 
of the Berlin Wall removed the rationale for the USSR’s expansionist policy into Africa.” 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
The term ‘syzygy’ was used by Aristotle in his book entitled Rhetoric to 
denote ‘the alignment of the cosmic forces’. In modern-day parlance, 
‘syzygy’ usually relates to the matter of perfect timing (the time being ripe.)  
Mr de Klerk seems to be asserting that the fall of the Berlin Wall created a 
rare moment of syzygy for South Africa, as it signalled the end of the 
Soviet Union’s involvement in Angola and therefore removed the 
requirement for security guarantees from the United States if South Africa 
were to accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It 
also opened up the space for him to negotiate with the communists, 
because communism was no longer a threat. The falling away of the 
requirement for security guarantees meant that South Africa’s request for 
a quid pro quo became increasingly tendentious, avaricious and 
opportunist. There was an obligation erga omnes not to pursue this 
unjustifiable reciprocity. That would create complications and very risky 
patterns of behaviour. 
 
In addition, the military scenario in Namibia had been resolved via the successful 
implementation of United Nations Resolution 435. The Cubans were withdrawing from the 
African continent. 
 
In a very short period of time, the assessment of military threats and risks changed 
fundamentally. There was a basic change in the geopolitical equation in Africa towards 
the better. South Africa was no longer subjected to a foreign threat with the implosion of 
international communism. The disappearance of the hostile military threat to South Africa 
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opened up an opportunity to address the issue of our nuclear arms in the most direct and 
fundamental way. In military terms it was quite clear that there was no justification for 
retaining the nuclear weapons. 
 
The realisation that any possible arguments in favour of having nuclear weapons were no 
longer valid coincided with our South African constitutional initiative. The relinquishment 
of the nuclear arsenal opened up the opportunity to get South Africa away from being a 
country that was torn apart by sanctions (jus cogens and de lege ferenda – the ‘New’ 
South Africa). 
 
Emotionally, I have never supported nuclear weapons. It was as fundamental as that. I 
never liked the idea of South Africa having such a capability.” 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Mr de Klerk would appear to subscribe to a natural law position on the 
legality of nuclear weapons. They are contrary to jus cogens and should 
be declared illegal per se. 
 
“I believe in non-proliferation. [Mr de Klerk articulated both a jus cogens and an erga 
omnes obligation to disarm the nuclear deterrent and accede to the NPT.] 
 
… For that reason, when I made the public announcement that South Africa had 
relinquished its nuclear bombs, I expressed the hope that Africa would become the first 
continent to be completely free of all atomic armaments.340 
 
It is my conviction that nuclear weapons should be relinquished by all countries and that 
this principle should not just apply to ‘rogue countries’.341 Those countries that have 
developed atomic weapons ‘legally’ should also be placed under pressure to actively 
divest themselves of that capacity in a responsible and well-thought-out way.342 
 
                                                
340 This is indeed what happened when the Treaty of Pelindaba was concluded, and the continent 
of Africa was declared a nuclear-weapons-free zone. 
341 It has been inferred that Mr de Klerk deemed that he regarded nuclear weapons as being illegal 
per se, and this assertion confirms that assertion. This is also congruent with Paragraph F of the 
Dispositif of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
in Armed Conflict: ‘Unanimously, there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a 
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective 
international control.’  
342 Mr de Klerk, in this concession that accepts that certain countries which have developed 
nuclear weapons legally should also be obliged erga omnes to accede to the NPT, would by a 
process of logical deduction be conceding to a legal positivist perspective interpretation of 
international law. Mr de Klerk does not differentiate between Nuclear-Weapons-States and 
Threshold Nuclear States in this regard, and contends that all States should be obliged to relinquish 
nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT.  
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I am not one of those that do not believe a country should have weapons per se, one of 
the ‘wild ones’ …343 I was at a conference recently where there were some people who 
had those beliefs. That is not what I believe. Countries need arms and weapons, but they 
don’t need weapons of mass destruction.”344 
 
Mr de Klerk couched his decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and 
accede to the NPT with an insistence that a state does have the 
inalienable right to self-defence, and other military weapons are not 
precluded from usage. This position, of course, has the authority of the 
United Nations Charter. Rabinder Singh and Alison Macdonald offer an 
authority for this interpretation of the law.  As they confirm: 
 
“Article 51 of the Charter reserves a State’s rights to self-defence. The right is additional 
to the provisions of Article 42. A State does not require a Security Council resolution in 
order to defend itself by force, but even the right to self defence is subject to action by the 
Security Council, as is clear from Article 51: 
 
‘Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall 
immediately report to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any such 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.’ ”345 
 
Mr de Klerk continued: 
 
“Weapons of mass destruction create more problems than they are ever likely to solve. I 
draw the line against weapons of mass destruction.346 PW’s strategy was never to 
confirm that we had an arsenal of nuclear weapons and never to deny that we had them. 
                                                
343 Mr de Klerk therefore logically would be supportive of the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello. He is not an idealistic pacifist.  
344 Interview with FW de Klerk at the Offices of the FW de Klerk Foundation in Plattekloof, Cape 
Town on 4 October 2007. 
345 Singh, Rabinder & Macdonald, Alison. 2002. ‘Legality of the Use of Force Against Iraq’. 
Opinion Public Interest Lawyers, Matrix Chambers, Gray’s Inn, London. 7. 10 September. 
346 Mr de Klerk is a practical man and apart from their usage being presumptively illegal, their 
danger, storage, cost of upkeep, political ramifications, environmental hazards, humanitarian 
effects, and general extreme level of associated risk make them immensely impractical. In 
addition, Mr de Klerk presented a case which is congruent with the logic of the prospective 
illegality of nuclear weapons into the future. The argument is not congruent with the logic of 
antecedent legality. 
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His approach was one of ambiguity. It was part of PW’s strategy to keep the world 
guessing as to whether we had a nuclear deterrent or not.347 
 
In retrospect, I firmly believe that I did the right thing, especially when I assess the 
present situation in Iran and Iraq, and the intensely complicated problems that the issue 
of weapons of mass destruction is creating.348 
 
We had very little international support before we started the negotiations for a 
constitutional transition. I foresaw that the decision to relinquish the arsenal of nuclear 
weapons would be very helpful in achieving the lifting of international sanctions.349 The 
ANC were indeed violently opposed to the lifting of sanctions. Early on in my tenure as 
new leader of my party I went on an international tour, and I met with Maggie Thatcher 
and Helmut Kohl at the start of the negotiations here in South Africa.”350 
 
Mr de Klerk clearly took the Article VI obligations of the NPT seriously. The 
Article VI obligation states: 
 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to disarmament under strict and effective international control.”351   
 
De Klerk’s concluding comment was that the reason he relinquished the 
nuclear arsenal was to achieve state recognition for the constitutional 
changes that he had enacted in South Africa. The recognition afforded by 
the United States to the constitutional changes was a vitally important 
cornerstone of the international credibility that would be accorded to the 
process. The United States took the lead in this regard, which resulted in 
other countries following and according the constitutional negotiations 
recognition.   
 
“We had extensive discussions about the political transition in South Africa. I remember 
very clearly when I at a later stage stood in the Rose Garden with President George Bush 
senior and he announced that he accepted that the constitutional negotiations in South 
                                                
347 This is in fact shown to be the official nuclear weapons policy of the Witvlei Committee. 
348 Mr de Klerk’s acceptance of the obligation erga omnes to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and 
accede to the NPT prevented a doctrine of anticipatory self-defence being exercised against South 
Africa and arguably prevented an international war from occurring in South Africa. 
349 The realisation that South Africa was indeed negotiating in good faith was ultimately sufficient 
for the barrage of sanctions to be dropped.  
350 Op cit De Klerk.  
351 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article VI.   
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Africa were irreversible and my satisfaction that sanctions were on their way out.352 There 
was an immediate sea-change in the quality of the international relationships with the key 
countries in the West after President Bush’s announcement.”353 354 
 
Mr de Klerk remained true to the beliefs and principles he had professed. 
He relinquished the nuclear arsenal because he believed that it should not 
exist. He subscribed to the principle that other Nuclear-Weapons-States 
should do the same and thereby comply with the obligations imposed by 
the NPT. Mr de Klerk implemented the destruction of the South African 
nuclear arsenal.355 356  
 
4.5.1 Professor Stumpf Verifies Mr de Klerk’s Rationale for 
Relinquishing the Nuclear Arsenal and Acceding to the NPT  
Professor Stumpf recalled that: 
 
“At his first meeting in September 1989, where I was asked to be present (only two weeks 
after he had taken office), De Klerk stated that his Government would do two major things 
to make ‘South Africa a respected member of the international community again’. Firstly, 
the political process would be reversed to [become] a full democracy, and secondly, the 
nuclear weapons programme would be reversed so that SA can accede to the NPT as a 
Non-Nuclear-Weapons-State (NNWS)’.357  
 
                                                
352 This meeting took place on 24 September 1990 at the White House. This is interesting because 
Mr de Klerk is asserting that there was a normative obligation on the part of the United States of 
America to recognise reciprocally the changes that had been initiated by South Africa to its 
approach to international customary law. This gesture of US state recognition was soon emulated 
by other countries, and South Africa was re-accepted as a member of the international community 
of nations. 
353 In this citation from Mr de Klerk, it is again clear that relationships of trust with Thatcher, Kohl 
and Bush were vital to the success of the nuclear relinquishment process in South Africa. 
354 The first process that De Klerk initiated to ensure South Africa’s accession to the NPT prior to 
accession was to call for an accurate inspection of the nuclear weapons. De Klerk was clearly able 
to identify a syzygy opportunity for the constitutional change that would be enhanced by the 
nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT, and justified by the reversal of Soviet military 
policy and the conclusion of hostilities in Angola, together with the peaceful transition to 
independence of Namibia. 
355 See Proceedings of a Symposium held at The American Academy of Arts and Sciences 13–15 
January 1983. ‘The Nuclear Weapons Freeze and Arms Control’. Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
356 See Wander, Thomas, Kirk, Elizabeth & Arnett, Eric (eds.). 1988. ‘Technology and Arms 
Control for the 1990s’. Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security. Washington 
DC: The American Association for the Advancement of Science. 13–14 October. 
357 The corollary to this would be that South Africa would not be a respected member of the 
international community if it did not design a new Constitution, relinquish the bomb, and accede 
to the NPT.  
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The actual instruction was conveyed in a written directive: ‘Dismantle the six devices, re-
melt the HEU and return it to the AEC, and advise the Government on the timing of 
accession to the NPT as a full NNWS’.358  
 
The last device was fully dismantled and the HEU re-molten [sic] and cast in June 1991, 
about two weeks before South Africa signed the NPT as a Non-Nuclear-Weapons State. 
This was legally the only way a State other than the Big Five could enter the NPT. If 
South Africa [had] acceded to the NPT without having fully dismantled the devices, it 
would immediately have broken the NPT at the moment of accession.”359 
 
Professor Stumpf’s testimony serves as confirmation of the veracity of Mr 
de Klerk’s rationale for relinquishing the nuclear arsenal and acceding to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Stumpf’s 
explanation is that Mr de Klerk accepted the obligation erga omnes to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. It was anticipated 
that this action would create a climate of goodwill and reciprocity. The 
logical consequence of this improved climate which related to South 
Africa’s acceptance of international customary law into its state conduct 
would be re-admission to and recognition as an honourable member of the 
community of nations. The matter of achieving positive state recognition 
constituted the essential logic underpinning this decision. It is noted, 
incidentally, that Mr de Klerk deemed it essential for South Africa to prove 
to the IAEA that its internal regulatory and legal framework within the 
ministries, companies, agencies and organisations associated with nuclear 
relinquishment and accession were conducted with integrity. It was also 
imperative that those persons who were accorded the necessary formal 
authority from the President to proceed with the relinquishment and 
accession processes were able to prove to the leadership in the Atomic 
Energy Corporation (AEC), ARMSCOR and the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) that they were duly authorised to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal and accede to the NPT. Had this formal authorisation not been 
provided, it is possible that the entire accession process might have been 
stillborn. 
                                                
358 It is an important procedural formality to note that De Klerk’s instruction to relinquish the 
nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT was issued in the form of an unequivocal written directive. 
359 Interview with Professor Waldo Stumpf at the University of Pretoria, Minerals Science 
Building, Pretoria on 18 October 2007. 
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4.5.2 The Matter of Deterrence 
In my view South Africa’s approach towards nuclear deterrence should be 
understood as an evolving cyclical policy, rather than as static and 
absolute. Pretoria was confronted by two different deterrent options. The 
first was an external deterrence option that revolved around attempting to 
derive a deterrent quid pro quo for relinquishment and accession from the 
IAEA and the Extra Team (which consisted of nuclear scientists from the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Russia who were responsible for 
conducting the oversight audit of the relinquishment and accession). 
Attempts to derive a tangible deterrent quid pro quo for relinquishment and 
accession were singularly unsuccessful, although intangible reciprocal 
benefits were received in the form of the discontinuation of sanctions, 
goodwill, and international recognition for the constitutional transition. 
 
South Africa possessed a second deterrent option which it wisely did not 
pursue. It could have used deterrence as an internal option to the nuclear 
relinquishment and accession to derive a quid pro quo from the African 
National Congress (ANC) during the course of the constitutional 
negotiations. Thankfully, this option was never even contemplated, 
because it was considered to be extremely high risk and inappropriate. 
The matter was of such high risk and sufficiently inflammatory that it could 
even have scuppered the constitutional negotiations and placed the 
country at grave risk, even perhaps of civil war. The enactment of 
deterrence was never permitted to escalate beyond phase one of the 
Witvlei policy (“neither confirm nor deny South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
policy”). 
 
It is contended that South Africa’s approach towards deterrence changed 
significantly within phase one of the Witvlei policy. This was because of 
the reality of fundamentally changing circumstances in the Southern 
African region. The matter of neither confirming nor denying possession of 
nuclear weapons was never publicised. But it was also hardly a watertight 
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secret, particularly among various countries’ intelligence services and 
senior political leadership, who, Mr Pik Botha informed, always had a very 
good approximate idea of South Africa’s developmental status. A careful 
reading of the Witvlei policy shows that it holds that deterrence is an 
escalatory matter pertaining to ever-higher degrees of threat, counter-
threat and reprisal.  
 
The intended policy of deterrence changed as South Africa edged from 
war into peace. The goals and intended benefits of the policy of 
deterrence under war were different from what they were under peace. 
Even when the nuclear weapons were in the process of actually being 
relinquished, one could argue that there was an ‘element of deterrence in 
the act’. The relinquishment act created a reciprocal obligation among 
other nations to grant South Africa’s constitutional negotiations the dignity 
of legitimacy and to start unwinding the international sanctions and 
embargoes that existed at the time – erga omnes. 
 
It has been observed that a serious security threat to South Africa arose 
from the Soviet Union during the period from 1975 to 1986 because of the 
war in Angola. The policy of nuclear deterrence was passively pursued at 
that time to mitigate the Soviet security risk. Had the Soviet Union 
escalated the war in Angola, the deterrence policy directed that South 
Africa should formally notify the United States of America about its nuclear 
capabilities. This step was never reached. Deterrence itself created a 
series of deeper risks to the security of the state. The prime risk was that 
South Africa’s nuclear arsenal might be internationally exposed in the 
world media and create panic amongst friends and enemies alike. Such 
panic could have imploded the constitutional negotiations and in turn 
degenerated into racial civil war, together with an international escalation 
of the conflict along similar lines to what happened in Iraq in 1989 to 1990. 
Such an escalation might have involved the use of certain other 
devastating weapons of mass destruction. 
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The first part of the cycle of nuclear deterrence from 1975 to 1986 was 
rationalised by the large asymmetry in military nuclear capacity that 
existed between the Soviet Union and South Africa. I call this the ‘war-time 
deterrence phase’. The quantum and quality of military nuclear hardware 
was skewed in the USSR’s favour. The policy of deterrence (1975–1986) 
developed in the context of the war that was being waged in Angola. It is 
often forgotten that at the same time that war was being waged, peace 
was also being explored, and real politik dictated that negotiated 
frameworks such as United Nations Resolution 435 should be considered. 
The existence of the policy of deterrence was based on a deep sense of 
military insecurity and isolation. The atmosphere of belief that existed then 
led to a presumption that the very survival of the South African state was 
at stake.360 This perception of crisis was referred to in the propaganda of 
the time as the ‘total onslaught’. The reasoning underpinning the wartime 
policy of deterrence was basically that ‘desperate times require desperate 
measures’. South Africa did attempt to use its ambiguous policy of 
deterrence (phase 1) to exact concessions in terms of the supply of 
enriched uranium for Koeberg nuclear power station and other matters 
during this period. 
 
Mr Pik Botha offers an interesting commentary on his meeting with 
President Ronald Reagan and General Alexander Haig about how this 
was achieved, and I infer that this meeting resulted in the creation of soft 
law, which subsequently became more sophisticated and was modified 
into international customary norms. I think that the speculation as to 
whether or not South Africa indeed possessed, or did not possess, nuclear 
weapons may possibly have given Pretoria access to influential 
international audiences (and concessions). Some of these concessions 
were no doubt tangible, while others were intangible. An example of a 
tangible deterrent benefit was that Mr Pik Botha was able to reestablish 
the supply of enriched uranium for Koeberg nuclear power station after it 
                                                
360 One of the questions posed in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use 
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict was: “Could nuclear weapons be used lawfully in armed 
conflict in the extreme case when the very survival of a State is at stake?” The answer to this 
question in the South African case was, “Under no circumstances.” 
 205 
had been cut off by the Carter administration. Another possible deterrent 
benefit is that the nuclear-weapons-states rallied against the non-aligned 
states to try to ensure that South Africa retained its membership of the 
IAEA. South Africa’s continued membership of the IAEA smoothed the 
way to negotiate accession to the NPT. One could also argue that South 
Africa’s possession of a nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass 
destruction, including chemical and biological weapons of warfare, might 
have discouraged the Soviet Union from escalating the war in Angola. 
 
The second phase of the deterrence cycle started in 1986 and lasted until 
late 1989. This can be understood as ‘South Africa’s peacetime 
deterrence phase’, where Pretoria attempted to gain both material and 
intangible payoffs for voluntarily relinquishing the nuclear and acceding to 
the NPT. I call this the ‘quid pro quo phase’. In my view, the policy of 
deterrence during this second phase was remarkably unsuccessful. Very 
few quid pro quos were achieved, and the pressure from the IAEA, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in rejecting South 
Africa’s overtures was relentless. The third deterrent phase was a period 
that lasted from late 1989 until 10 July 1991 (which marked the day of 
South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons).  
 
4.5.3 Mr de Klerk’s Decision Not to Use South Africa’s Nuclear 
Weapon’s as a Deterrent Negotiation Strategy with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and Accessory Powers 
During this final short period Mr de Klerk realised that there was little point 
in South Africa’s attempting to negotiate a deterrent quid pro quo for 
relinquishing the nuclear arsenal and acceding to the NPT. South Africa 
had an obligation erga omnes to do so if it wished to be recognised as a 
respected member of the community of nations. South Africa’s 
relinquishment and accession were regarded as a necessary corrective 
action to legitimate South Africa’s constitutional recognition. This induced 
further reciprocal obligations erga omnes: abandonment of apartheid; 
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ending of the sanctions campaign; reintegration of the Bantustans into 
South Africa; and readmission to the international community of nations. I 
call this ‘the international customary law phase’. Mr de Klerk officially 
recognised that certain norms of behaviour could not be derogated and 
these norms were subsequently codified into the Constitution – jus 
cogens.  
 
Mr de Klerk’s contention was that South Africa would have been 
discredited in the eyes of very important allies and international public 
opinion had it attempted to derive a quid pro quo in exchange for 
relinquishing the nuclear arsenal and for acceding to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The pursuit of a quid pro quo might 
have been perceived as a Faustian compact with Mephistopheles himself 
and analogous to extortion. It would almost certainly have raised questions 
of both morality and legality. In the interview, Mr de Klerk asserted that he 
had not sought a deterrent quid pro quo. Professor Stumpf and Dr Barnard 
claimed that Mr de Klerk authorised Mr Pik Botha to seek a quid pro quo at 
the meeting held with the IAEA in Vienna in November 1989, with 
representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia. 
Dr Barnard informed that he lamented to Mr de Klerk about the fact that Mr 
Botha was not able to achieve a significant material deterrent trade-off for 
accession to the NPT. He mentioned that it was on the basis of this 
differing view of what benefits could be derived from deterrence that Mr de 
Klerk replaced him with Professor Wynand Mouton as the oversight 
auditor of the nuclear relinquishment and accession process. One might 
deduce from this episode that Mr de Klerk acknowledged that a quid pro 
quo might arise as a windfall. When it was realised that it would not work, 
he decided not to waste his time on this issue. He would not be diverted 
from his purpose, which was to negotiate a new democratic Constitution. 
Mr de Klerk stated: 
 
I specifically did not seek any tangible quid pro quo that would benefit South Africa and 
the direction where it was going by using our capability as a pawn. I sought to create an 
atmosphere and culture of trust from within the international community. I was seeking 
 207 
their trust and support for the sincerity of our constitutional transition, and the creation of 
a new South African society.361 
 
Mr de Klerk confirmed that he specifically had not sought a tangible quid 
pro quo in exchange for South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment. This does 
not preclude gaining an intangible quid pro quo – erga omnes in the form 
of international recognition, which would be facilitated by abandoning 
apartheid and writing a non-racial democratic constitution which was of the 
highest legal elegance. Mr de Klerk used the term ‘pawn’ to denote the 
use of the nuclear weapon capability as a bargaining chip. He did not 
engage in this type of game playing, because it would have created 
mistrust, which would have discredited the constitutional transition. South 
Africa’s apartheid policies and nuclear policies had placed it in a situation 
where it was a pariah, and Mr de Klerk set about changing this. The 
reciprocity that Mr de Klerk sought was trust in the sincerity and depth of 
the constitutional change that was being negotiated. 
 
Professor Stumpf also commented about the 1989 meeting with the IAEA 
in Vienna and collaborated with Barnard that no deterrent quid pro quo 
was achieved. 
 
“Some political return for accession to the NPT was explored on a number of occasions 
by Mr Pik Botha on behalf of the Government. (I was present at one such meeting with 
him in Vienna in November 1989), but the three Accessory Powers to the NPT (USSR, 
US and UK) were adamant that accession must come first before any quid pro quo could 
be considered. At that meeting even an offer to close the HEU plant unilaterally (which Mr 
Pik Botha took with him from Mr de Klerk), did not result in any promise of visible returns 
on the international front. The three superpowers were actually ‘rock hard’ and did not 
budge. But Mr Pik Botha would be in a better position to explain this.”362 363 
                                                
361 Op cit De Klerk. Mr de Klerk did, of course, achieve very significant ‘intangible’ quid pro quo 
for this action in the form of international recognition; unwinding of sanctions and cancellation of 
embargoes against South Africa.  My interpretation of the deterrent quid quo pro scenario is that 
Mr de Klerk initially afforded  Mr Pik Botha with a mandate to trade the Y Plant at the November 
1989 meeting with the IAEA, US, UK and USSR in Vienna. He saw that this would not work and 
dropped the notion. International recognition and normative acceptance of South Africa’s bona 
fides in terms of international customary law was the most valuable benefit that could be achieved, 
and was all the more valuable because it arose unsolicited.  
362 Op cit Stumpf. 
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Had South Africa gained a quid pro quo for accession, rewarding this 
might have created a dangerous precedent for prospective proliferators 
who might perceive that they would be able to use their nuclear 
capabilities to extort and bribe the United Nations and others into power 
and influence – ex injuria non oritur jus. This would be a dangerous 
practice with potentially escalatory implications. It is the researcher’s view 
that the accessory powers were correct and wise in their decision to refuse 
to grant this deterrent trade-off. 
 
Heald: “You mentioned that you attended a meeting with Pik Botha in Vienna. You said 
that the Russians were there, the Americans were there and the Brits were there. Your 
words were that ‘they were rock hard’?”364 
 
Stumpf: “Let me talk about that …”365 
 
Heald: “What was their agenda at this meeting in Vienna, and how were they pushing 
you?”366 
 
Stumpf: “Let me explain. When the NPT was created in the 1960s it only included the 
three Superpowers, who were then members of the NPT ... the USA, UK and the Soviet 
Union. They were called the three Accessory Powers. At that point France and China had 
not yet become Accessory Powers. That only came much later. Those three were called 
the Accessory Powers because they acceded to the NPT right at the beginning. Many of 
the negotiations happened between them … 
 
That is why I said you must get to Pik Botha, because he will tell you about all the 
discussions that he had around our nuclear programme. He will tell you about our political 
capabilities, programmes, political situation and processes over many years, from the 
time before I got involved in September of ’89 onwards. 
 
South Africa had its back against the wall at that time. We were isolated internationally. 
We were in a corner with sanctions and all that. We had no credibility. South Africa had 
tried over many months and indeed, some years, to exact some quid pro quo from an 
offer to dismantle the nuclear programme. Could we at least get some support in the UN? 
Lifting of sanctions? 
                                                                                                                                 
363 See The Harvard Study Group: Carnesale, Albert, Doty, Paul, Hoffman, Stanley, Huntington, 
Samuel, Nye, Joseph & Sagan, Scott. 1983. Living with Nuclear Weapons. Toronto: Bantam 
Books. 
364 Op cit Stumpf. 
365 Loc cit.  
366 Loc cit. 
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Pik Botha and I had many meetings. Dawie de Villiers was there. (He was my Minister 
then.) Pik Botha was there, and a few officials were there. Neil van Heerden was there. In 
all those meetings I was just a small fish listening to all these big people talking. Pik 
jumped around and tried ... 
 
Before we went to Vienna, there was a meeting where the matter of achieving a quid pro 
quo was discussed. FW said: ‘Don’t tell them now that we are going to dismantle the 
nuclear weapons,’ because he did not want the news to leak out. But he did say: ‘Offer to 
them that we will close the Y Plant.’ Now that was the enrichment plant where the HEU 
was made. The Y Plant had been the focus of attention from the US for many years. 
 
Earlier on in Vienna, Pik tried to solicit some political concession and support from the 
UN. We tried to seek some concessions from the UN, like lifting a few sanctions here and 
there. They were rock hard. They would not budge. They said: ‘No, you accede to the 
NPT as a non-nuclear- weapon state, and then we will talk about a system of help.’ 
 
Pik then made the offer that we would consider closing the Y Plant. Although the 
relinquishment did not lead to direct benefits, it did lead to indirect benefits, of that I am 
sure. That is something that Pik maybe can clarify.”367 
 
Professor Stumpf presented an important insight into how South Africa’s 
request for a quid pro quo for rolling back the nuclear arsenal and 
acceding to the NPT was rejected. The Accessory Powers developed a 
unified stance against rewarding South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
adventure. Any watering down of that determined stance and granting of 
nuclear trade-offs would have signalled to other proliferating countries that 
they could attempt the same. To condone bilateral side-deals with 
prospective proliferators might have incrementally undermined the integrity 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby 
contributed towards nuclear proliferation.368 
 
Professor Waldo Stumpf attended the meeting that Dr Barnard referred to 
in Vienna, and his viewpoint is that Mr de Klerk did initially seek a 
                                                
367 Loc cit.  
368 See Draft Paper by Blum, Gabriella. 2006. ‘Does International Law Need More Universal Law? 
A Multifaceted Approach to Multilateralism and Bilateralism in International Treaty-Making’ at 
1–2. 26 September. She comments: “For universalists, multilateralism is both the cause and the 
effect of a transition from anachronistic notions of sovereignty and self-aggrandizement – 
epitomized in bilateral, power-based pacts – to a more enlightened international society that might 
merit description as a community, a global village, a neighborhood, a family of nations.” 
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deterrent trade-off and quid pro quo from the Accessory Powers for South 
Africa’s accession to the NPT, but this stance was changed when the 
attempt failed. 
 
4.5.4 Mr de Klerk’s Decision Not to Use South Africa’s Nuclear 
Weapons as a Deterrent Negotiation Strategy with the ANC 
It would have been unwise for Mr de Klerk to have opened up the issue of 
the intended relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
NPT with the ANC. There would have been no conceivable deterrent 
benefit from such action. This gesture would possibly have fatally 
poisoned and complicated the constitutional negotiations. Deterrence was 
therefore rather ineffective in South Africa’s external negotiations with both 
the IAEA and the Extra Team. It is recalled that on 22 December 1982, the 
African National Congress planted and detonated four bombs in Koeberg 
nuclear power station. The damage caused by this explosion was quite 
extensive.369 Given this precedent, it would have been extremely risky to 
share information on nuclear weapons and use it as a deterrent tool with 
the ANC.  
 
Professor Stumpf recalled that:  
 
“De Klerk never considered using nuclear deterrence as a negotiation tactic with the 
ANC. Just imagine the damage that this hot potato could have done in derailing an 
already very difficult process of power handover.  
 
Secondly, I personally do not believe Mr Mandela would have had the immediate 
international stature that he had if he had ‘some nukes in his back pocket’.  
 
Overall, I think that Mr de Klerk’s decision was the right one: ‘Get these things out of the 
way as soon as possible so that political transition can proceed as smoothly as possible.’ 
 
Although I respect Mr Malan’s point of view, I think that it was unrealistic at the time to 
think of any quid pro quo (arms contracts and so forth). There would just not have been 
any takers! South Africa would have been in a corner with nowhere to go!”370 
 
                                                
369 Op cit Masiza (1993) at 40. 
370 Op cit Stumpf.  
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Phenomenological Reduction 
Stumpf claims here that if FW de Klerk had used the nuclear weapons as 
a negotiation tactic with the ANC, he would have been presenting them 
with a poisoned chalice. The essential point is that De Klerk negotiated in 
good faith with the ANC. This is a practical case where it is evident that he 
contributed to Mr Mandela’s success and to the successful conclusion of 
the constitutional negotiations. 
 
The relinquishment process was conducted in camera and without the 
involvement of the ANC and Mr Mandela because of the risk of creating 
distrust in the constitutional negotiations. South Africa would have 
arguably retained its pariah international recognition status had it used 
these weapons as a deterrent negotiation tool in the internal negotiations 
with the ANC. It was judged that the exclusion of the ANC from all 
involvement in the nuclear relinquishment and accession process would 
protect the constitutional settlement from unnecessary national and 
international negotiation pressure. It was believed that the constitutional 
negotiation process itself was too fragile to open up this additional and 
very complicated aspect of the negotiations. In addition, the legal process 
of relinquishment and accession might have had serious unintentional 
political consequences, rendering the ANC and Mr Mandela politically 
accountable for these weapons, in the eyes of the world. Suffice to 
mention that this international scrutiny would have been withering and 
would have arguably rendered the constitutional negotiations null and 
void.  
 
4.5.5 Internal Disagreement About about the Value of Deterrence 
as a Negotiation Instrument  
Dr Barnard investigated the matter of the internal leadership conflict that 
arose from the search for a quid pro quo in response to South Africa’s 
relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal:  
 
 212 
“FW de Klerk knew about this nuclear weapons programme, because he had been the 
Minister of Energy Affairs and this matter naturally fell under his remit.371 At the time of 
the relinquishment, Dr Dawie de Villiers had assumed leadership of the Ministry of 
Energy. Pik Botha was involved in international negotiations on this matter in 1988 and 
1989. 
 
I was part of a furious internal struggle with the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
ARMSCOR during this period. We were not sure whether we should seek to accede to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or not. 
 
This ‘furious internal struggle’ appears to have revolved around the degree 
to which deterrent trade-offs could be achieve by virtue of the 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT. Dr Barnard held the view that 
much more could have been achieved by using the process of deterrence 
to its full effect, and he lamented that this was not done. Doubt as to 
whether or not South Africa should accede to the NPT related to the fact 
that South Africa had just emerged from a war, and the security situation 
was far from resolved. 
 
“There was a very important meeting in Vienna ... in November 1989. Pik Botha, Dawie 
de Villiers and Jannie Roux were in attendance, together with some guys from 
ARMSCOR. It was a very tough meeting. 
 
We agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at this 
meeting. I felt that we should get some recognition for this ... the Americans should give 
some recognition to our internal negotiation process. I felt that we needed to at least get 
some recognition from the US for the constitutional negotiations which we were showing 
all the signs of embarking upon in earnestness.”372  
 
“Pik Botha had been trying for many years to please the Americans. We started 
dismantling the nuclear capability after we returned from Vienna. I explained to FW de 
Klerk that I was disappointed in Pik Botha for not being more effective in gaining a quid 
pro quo. Thereafter, FW appointed Professor Wynand Mouton in charge of this 
                                                
371 Mr de Klerk as President of South Africa would presumably have been Chairman of the Witvlei 
Committee. 
372 Interview with Dr Neil Barnard at the Chameleon Restaurant in Plattekloof, Cape Town on 
29 October 2007. Dr Barnard in this paragraph states that he felt that an intangible quid pro quo of 
recognition should have been granted for this accession. This recognition came eventually and 
could not be hurried. It followed its own pace. 
The meeting alluded to was held at the head office of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
Vienna, and involved the US, UK and USSR. They refused to grant South Africa any quid quo 
pro. 
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relinquishment process, and I was sidelined. I explained to FW that I had a close 
relationship with President PW Botha and that he must choose people that he is 
comfortable with.”373 
 
It appears as though Mr de Klerk sidelined Dr Barnard from this process 
on the basis of his views on deterrence, that the relinquishment of the 
nuclear arsenal could be used as pawn – a bargaining chip. Mr de Klerk 
rejected this view. Indeed, the person who took Dr Barnard‘s place, 
Professor Mouton, held that the nuclear weapons were absolutely useless.  
 
The essential feature of that ‘furious internal struggle’ was about gaining 
’some recognition’ for the relinquishment and accession decision. It is my 
view that Dr Barnard’s approach towards nuclear deterrence would have 
fitted more closely into phases one (the war time deterrence phase) and 
two (the peacetime phase) of the deterrent cycle mentioned above, and 
not fitted in well with phase three – the erga omnes phase. The United 
States was not prepared to grant a quid pro quo, presumably on the basis 
of ex injuria non oritur jus. 
 
In contrast to Dr Barnard, Professor Mouton held the view that nuclear 
weapons were of absolutely no value. He did not see any deterrent value 
in them whatsoever. This view corresponded more closely with Mr de 
Klerk’s perspective at that particular stage in South Africa’s transition. 
Professor Mouton contended that: 
 
“The central question to ask about the nuclear weapons is, ‘What can you do with the 
things?’ The answer, I think, is that you can do absolutely nothing with them. They are 
absolutely useless.  
 
All the documentation relating to the nuclear weapons was brought to a central point and 
we made one hell of a fire with a blow-pipe to destroy them. It took two days to burn all 
the documents. We burnt the whole blooming lot. 
 
The bombs were of the Hiroshima type. They were essentially very simple”.374 
 
                                                
373 Op cit Barnard (2007).  
374 Interview with Professor Wynand Mouton at his apartment at Gordon’s Bay in the Strand in 
Western Cape on 30 October 2007. 
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The contrast between Professor Mouton’s interpretation of the utility of 
deterrence and Dr Barnard’s view of the same matter could not have been 
starker. Professor Mouton saw no utility whatsoever in deterrence, while 
Dr Barnard saw potential utility in the strategy. Mouton seemed to regard 
nuclear weapons as having no place whatsoever in state conduct and 
therefore designated them as being utterly useless. I interpret this as 
meaning (for Professor Mouton) that antecedent illegality extends to all 
conceivable contexts, and that nuclear weapons are illegal per se. 
Professor Mouton’s view of deterrence was well suited for phase three – 
the erga omnes phase of the nuclear relinquishment and accession. 
Pretoria was compelled to enter two sets of audit reviews on its nuclear 
status. The first round of audit reviews was with the IAEA and the second 
with the Extra Team, which included nuclear scientists and experts from 
the United States, United Kingdom and Russia who double-checked on 
the IAEA’s adjudication to make sure that nothing slipped through. Had 
Professor Mouton used these two vitally important meeting forums to try to 
secure a deterrent quid pro quo, he would have discredited the integrity of 
the entire process of nuclear relinquishment and South Africa’s accession 
to the NPT. 
 
It was only by not pursuing a quid pro quo that the reward of positive 
international recognition and an end to sanctions and embargoes would 
arise. Silence and restraint led to rewards; noisy negotiations and 
demands would have complicated matters and led to mistrust. My 
supposition therefore is that Professor Mouton would accept that “[t]he UN 
Charter provides the framework for modern international law”. 
 
Article 2(4): ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.’”375  
 
It was because Professor Mouton saw no value in perpetuating the 
nuclear arsenal that Mr de Klerk appointed him to the task of Oversight 
                                                
375 United Nations Charter, Article 2(4). 
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Auditor in South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and accession process. 
An individual who foresaw deterrent value in the nuclear arsenal might 
have been tempted to delay the relinquishment and accession.  
 
4.5.6 The Irrationality of the Policy of Deterrence   
At this stage I intend to explore Dr Barnard’s interpretation of the legality of 
nuclear deterrence in greater depth by analysing his testimony. 
 
Dr Neil Barnard stated:  
 
“Let me briefly explain two fundamental points. Nuclear weapons are not military 
weapons. They are psychological weapons of deterrence in the power play of 
international politics. They have not been used in the field of battle since Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. A nuclear bomb is an extreme psychological weapon of deterrence.  
 
No one has really developed these weapons in the field of battle as you typically would 
do with other conventional weapon types. Nuclear weapons are used to intimidate 
opponents”.376 
 
The essential point made by Barnard is that nuclear weapons are 
weapons of terror and threat. They are not intended to be used as 
weapons of war, although the right to use them is constantly reserved. 
Their power arises from their non-use. From a legal perspective, I cannot 
see how one can segregate the threat of deterrence from a subsequent 
act of usage, whether it is in the form of testing or operational deployment. 
It is contended that the deterrent threat of nuclear weapons is illegal in 
terms of international law under the Geneva Convention. 
 
The Solomon Islands in their testimony before the ICJ on the Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons provided an 
authority for this contention: 
 
“Any use of nuclear weapons would prima facie violate international humanitarian law. 
The threat of their use must be considered as totally incompatible with the solemn 
obligation undertaken by States under Article I of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
                                                
376 Op cit Barnard (2007). 
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and Article I(I) of the 1st 1977 Additional Protocol to respect, and ensure respect, of the 
four Conventions and the Protocol.”377  
 
A number of questions arise from Dr Barnard’s comments. The first is, 
what is the role of state responsibility in the matter of nuclear deterrence? 
In this regard it is apposite to cite Ian Brownlie, who defers to the authority 
of Judge Huber in the Spanish Zone of Morocco claims.378 He states:  
 
Judge Huber commented thus: 
 
“Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character 
involve international responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met, responsibility 
entails the duty to make reparation.”379  
 
Can nuclear deterrence, the ultimate extreme weapon of fear, ever be 
invoked with responsibility? This would seem to be a rhetorical question. 
Huber’s contention that responsibility and right are corollaries is 
instructive. Could the threat to annihilate a city, or state or people ever be 
a responsible act? Could the act of annihilation be a right? I do not believe 
this is so. In my view, Huber’s maxim leads to the logical deduction that a 
nuclear weapon can never be lawfully deployed because it would displace 
both right and responsibility and render any military usage of nuclear 
weapons illegal per se.  
 
The essence of Barnard’s argument is that ‘what is sauce for the goose 
should be sauce for the gander’. His contention is that if the nuclear-
weapons-states can legally embark on nuclear proliferation via an arms 
race, and also abide by a strategy of nuclear deterrence in conflict with 
and in breach of their disarmament obligations laid out under Article VI of 
the NPT, why then can the threshold nuclear states not also legally 
assume a nuclear deterrent posture? Barnard expanded upon his 
argument above:  
 
                                                
377 Written Observations of the Solomon Islands re: General Assembly Question, para 310 at 25–
26. 
378 Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims: Translation, French text, RIAA ii 615 at 641.   
379 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
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“There are another two points that I wish to make. Uninformed critics will say that we 
spent millions on a weapon that could never be used in anger.“ 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
For Barnard, any operational usage of a nuclear bomb would be per se 
illegal. If usage is illegal, then surely the threat of use must also be illegal. 
I interpret Dr Barnard as having a positivist perspective on the legality of 
deterrence as articulated by the United States, United Kingdom and 
France before the ICJ. These countries are nuclear-weapons-states. 
International law would seem to be interpreted differentially, with one set 
of rules applying to the nuclear-weapons-states and another set applying 
to the non-nuclear-weapons-states. Barnard’s implicit presumption that 
nuclear deterrence is lawful because it is accepted as such by the nuclear-
weapons-states does not necessarily apply to a threshold state and 
cannot be blandly generalised. 
 
“The point is that the nuclear arsenal is a weapon that can never be used in anger. Its 
mere presence is sufficient. 
 
The question of ‘whether nuclear weapons can ever be used in war’ is a brutally stupid 
question. Nuclear weapons cannot ever be used in war. The nuclear weapon is not a 
military weapon. It is a psychological weapon and signifies a psychological capability or 
incapability. It serves a very powerful psychological capacity in a community. It creates a 
feared psychological standing. 
 
Think of Israel. Israel is effectively saying to the Accessory Powers – the Nuclear-
Weapons-States: ‘You are not the only ones that can drive a smart car like a Mercedes 
Benz. I do not have to drive that pedestrian Kia car that you are imposing on me. I can 
drive a Mercedes Benz as well.’ 
 
The development of the nuclear bomb in South Africa was never intended to be used 
militarily. In the US the development of nuclear weapons is currently following a very 
dangerous pattern. I made this assessment after Israel was wrong-footed by Hezbollah in 
Lebanon last year. The United States are now starting to seriously develop ‘mini-nukes’ 
to blow up basements, and warrens, and underground places that are used as fortresses 
for guerrilla warfare. This could start a new process of massive proliferation. Mini-nukes 
are extremely dangerous. They could create a terribly dangerous world. 
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One question that you need to raise with Professor Wynand Mouton (and he is a good 
man) is: ‘Was all the money that was spent on this programme worthwhile?’ As South 
Africans, we were fighting a revolutionary war that required gaining hearts and minds. 
The monstrosity of a nuclear bomb would never win hearts and minds. It would achieve 
the opposite. If the bomb were dropped we would have had to discover the answer to the 
question: ‘Who do we kill and who don’t we kill?’ You know what? You could never know 
the answer to this question. Nuclear weapons are very indiscriminate.380 You could not 
drop a nuclear bomb on Soweto.381 
 
Unfortunately the South African nuclear programme was left in the hands of the military 
people who did not understand how to use its power, which was psychological and 
political power. It was not about military power.  
 
We started dismantling the nuclear capability after we returned from Vienna.”382 
 
Barnard asserted in the paragraphs cited above that a nuclear weapon 
has only one justifiable function and that is to serve the purpose of nuclear 
deterrence by creating fear. Finally, he views the ‘mini-nukes’ that are 
currently being developed to be extremely dangerous, and believes that 
they could evolve into a threat towards world peace. His reasoning 
appears to be that they could miniaturise a deadly nuclear war, and 
provide enormous proliferation dangers. They could be an ideal terrorist 
weapon, in terms of their miniature scale. Dr Barnard assessed the dolus 
implications of deploying a nuclear bomb – that is, the intention to inflict 
harm, together with the foreseeable consequences of such intended harm. 
My inference is that he effectively contended that nuclear weapons could 
never be deployed because of dolus. 
 
Barnard asserted that the NPT is applied in a most discriminatory manner 
which is biased towards the nuclear-weapons-states at the expense of the 
non-nuclear-weapons-states. For him, it is as though two sets of 
international law apply to nuclear weapons. A lenient set of laws applies to 
the nuclear-weapons-states, which are permitted to possess nuclear 
weapons, apply the policy of nuclear deterrence, and even possibly use 
                                                
380 Prins, Gwyn (ed.). 1983. Defended to Death – A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race from the 
Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
381 Stumpf used the identical terminology in his interview. 
382 Op cit Barnard (2007).  
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them in armed conflict. The non-nuclear-weapons-states are allowed no 
such privileges and powers. There is consequently a flaw in the enactment 
of the NPT, reflected in a fundamental absence of reciprocity. 
 
Jonathan Granoff offered a commentary that is apposite to Dr Barnard’s 
reflections on the discriminatory nature of the NPT, which allows the 
Nuclear-Weapons-States to proliferate nuclear weapons and does not 
allow the NNWS to have the same recourse.  
 
“Many norms are universal and have withstood the test of human experience over long 
periods of time. One such principle is that of reciprocity. It is often called the Golden Rule: 
‘Treat others as you wish to be treated.’ It is an ethical and moral foundation for all the 
world’s major religions. Several states sincerely believe that this principle can be 
abrogated and security obtained by the threat of massive destruction.  
 
The Canberra Commission highlighted the impracticality of this posture. Nuclear weapons 
are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security 
benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is 
highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of 
nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.”383 
 
The legal inference that arises from Barnard’s exposition is that the 
application of the NPT is discriminatory and there exists an obligation erga 
omnes on the Nuclear-Weapons-States in terms of the principles of 
reciprocity to relinquish their nuclear arsenals and abide by the NPT. His 
argument is that the NPT is in its essence both morally and legally flawed, 
and has led to the problem of threshold nuclear states acting outside the 
NPT. 
 
Charles Moxley explored the irrationality of the policy of deterrence. His 
reflections about the Zelter case will be briefly presented in order to place 
Barnard’s testimony into perspective. 
 
“One can wonder and dispute whether law is relevant – whether Great Britain, the United 
States or other nuclear states care about the requirements of the law. But the 
                                                
383 Granoff, Jonathan. 1999. ‘Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals and Law’. Presentation for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty Prepcom, New York. May. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles 
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requirements of the law, at least as defined by the ICJ, are beyond reasonable dispute. 
Yet now the Scots High Court comes along and, purporting to apply the ICJ decision, 
emasculates it. 
 
If the policy of deterrence were simply innocent, threatless possession of weapons whose 
use was recognized as irrational and not tenable, perhaps the risk of use would diminish. 
But, it is not; deterrence is a policy of threatening overwhelming, disproportionate, and 
indiscriminate damage – threatening that, to be effective, must be credible, backed up by 
weapons procurement, personnel training, contingency planning, pre-targeting, and 
weapons placement and alertness evidencing the resolve, on a virtually instantaneous 
basis, to actually use these weapons. The notion that deterrence may be unthreatening 
because we independently recognize the unusability of these weapons is contrary to the 
nature of deterrence and hence illusory. Deterrence is a Faustian bargain promising at 
best only to delay the suicidal apocalypse it portends.”384 
 
The excessive and indiscriminate use of force could not be justified under 
international law as it simply contravenes the United Nations Charter, 
which provides the framework for the use of force in international law. 
South Africa is party to the Charter.385  
 
The discrimination between the nuclear-weapons-states and the non-
nuclear-weapons-states should be opposable erga omnes against all other 
legal persons, irrespective of their legal consent. 
 
4.6 The Respondents’ Chronology: The Discovery of the Vastrap 
Nuclear Test Site in the Kalahari Desert (April 1977) 
It is my contention that the most important set of events underlying South 
Africa’s decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and accede to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons occurred as far back as April 
1977, when South Africa accepted an obligation to be bound by the USSR 
and US (opinio juris sive necessitatis) and discontinue developing the 
nuclear weapon test site located at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert. This 
eventually led to settled practice (usus) in 1985, when President PW 
                                                
384 Moxley, Charles. 2001. ‘Unlawfulness of the United Kingdom’s Policy of Nuclear Deterrence 
– Invalidity of the Scots High Court’s Decision in Zelter’. Disarmament Diplomacy, 58(1):17, 
June. 
385 International Committee of the Red Cross. 2005. ‘Rules of International Humanitarian Law and 
other Rules Relating to the Conduct of Hostilities Collections of Treaties and Other Instruments’. 
Revised and Updated Edition. 19 Avenue de la Paix, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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Botha instructed that ARMSCOR should cease its nuclear weaponisation 
process, and effectively run down the nuclear weapons programme from 
that moment onwards. In an extraordinary testimony offered by Mr Pik 
Botha, we learn that the Soviet Union and United States of America were 
unified in their agreement that South Africa’s proclivity towards developing 
nuclear weapons was a threat to world peace, and that they would 
address this matter accordingly, if need be by means of anticipatory self 
defence. It will be recalled that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was deemed by 
the United Nations Security Council as an act of aggression and 
legitimated the allied invasion of Iraq. Accordingly, it authorised the use of 
force against Iraq in terms of Resolution 678 (1990)386 The same principle 
in international law could feasibly have been extrapolated to South Africa’s 
nuclear ambitions. The US issued South Africa with a formal warning that 
they would do whatever was necessary to stop the nuclear weapons 
programme. It was apparent that the nuclear test site would only 
exacerbate South Africa’s pariah recognition status and the intensity of 
sanctions. South Africa’s nuclear weapons posture would alienate friends 
and enemies alike. Mr Botha informed that he communicated his disquiet 
to Prime Minister John Vorster in a most direct manner. In consequence, 
the Vastrap test site was shut down. My view is that the closure of Vastrap 
was a highly significant, but little appreciated, legal event. It marked the 
beginning point of usus – the settled practice of winding down the entire 
nuclear weapons programme in terms of international customary law.  
 
In his testimony, Mr Pik Botha recalled the US–Soviet Union discovery of 
the nuclear test site at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert and the US–South 
African interaction on this matter. Mr Botha reached a policy decision to 
roll back the site. This policy decision can be seen as ‘soft law’ in the 
making. 
 
“In April 1977 the US Ambassador, William B Edmondson, urgently requested a meeting 
with me. This was shortly after he arrived in South Africa and he had only been stationed 
                                                
386 Greenstock, Jeremy. 2003. ‘British Attorney General’s Advice to Blair’. Global Policy Forum. 
7 March. © 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.65.181.175.195/component/content/article/ 
168/36072.html  
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here for a few months. He asked to meet with me urgently at my offices at the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria.387 
 
The Ambassador had one of those large cases, which had zip folders or folios in it. There 
is a French word to denote it … a portmanteau. I remember this meeting vividly. I was 
immediately struck by the Ambassador’s sombre mood. This was reflected in the 
Ambassador’s unsmiling facial expression. (You get different types of facial expressions, 
serious, laughing, worrying, confused, and so forth.) The Ambassador was looking really 
severe. ‘Hy was op sy bakkies.’388 He opened his suitcase, which had the files in it. He 
selected 12 or more photographs and placed them in front of me on my desk. The 
photographs were of a huge, indeed, a gigantic rig, deployed over the earth in the 
Kalahari Desert.  
 
The Ambassador explained to me that these photographs were actually taken by a Soviet 
satellite and that the Russians had passed them over to American intelligence and 
requested the Americans to follow up with South Africa.389 The photographs were of the 
Vastrap Nuclear Test Site situated in the Kalahari Desert.390 The Russians actually went 
to the Americans with this information. South Africa’s relationships with the Soviet Union 
were extremely antagonistic at that time.391 392 
                                                
387 Zondi Masiza asserts in the Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1993 at 38 that the Soviet Union 
discovered these nuclear silos on 8 June 1977. There is consequently a difference of opinion 
regarding recollection of the precise date. The researchers’ view is that this type of inaccuracy is 
inevitable over a period of nearly 40 years. The central facts about which there is consensus are 
that the Soviet Union discovered the silos with their satellite technology; they reported this to the 
United States notwithstanding the fact that these two countries were engaged in a proxy war with 
each other in Angola at that time; and that Ambassador Edmondson summonsed Mr Pik Botha to a 
meeting and was extremely concerned. He demanded that South Africa should immediately stop 
its nuclear weapons programme.  
388 Translation: ‘He was deadly earnest.’ 
389 See Myrdal, Alva. 1980. The Game of Disarmament – How the United States and Russia Run 
the Arms Race. Nottingham: Spokesman Publishers. 
390 See Blackwell, Robert & Larrabee, Stephen. 1989. Conventional Arms Control and East West 
Security. Institute for East-West Security Studies. Durham: Duke University Press. 
391 The Soviet Union had collaborated with the United States in developing a joint approach 
towards closing down South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. This is entirely congruent with 
the principles contained in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) that pertained at that 
time. It is interesting that David Albright attributes the discovery to either ‘Western or Soviet 
Intelligence’ rather than to the verified fact that it was Soviet intelligence. He stated that “[s]ome 
South African officials have said that they believed that Western or Soviet intelligence discovered 
the shed and that this exercise convinced Western powers that South Africa was serious about 
nuclear weapons. This in turn led them to start putting pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba to 
withdraw from Angola. Whatever the case, during the mid-1980s the South African nuclear 
weapons program was under the twin pressures of budget cuts and heightened requirements.” 
Albright, David. 1994. ‘South Africa and the Affordable Bomb’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 
50(4):13, July/August. 
392 Hans Blix placed the Soviet obligation to inform the US about South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
capability in perspective: “The IAEA must have access to information from sources besides where 
the inspections are conducted. If the State itself does not declare nuclear installations, we must 
learn through other sources where to look. The nuclear inspection teams sent to Iraq this year 
[1991] have been provided with such material from Member States, through the Special 
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The US Ambassador was very serious, but he spoke tactfully. He asked me: ’What do 
you think that constructed rig is doing in that part of your country?’ I knew immediately 
what it was. It clearly was a large nuclear test site. I could see that. The SADF worked on 
a ‘need-to-know’ basis, so I had not been informed about this particular development. 
 
It was clear to me that something more than farming was taking place in the Kalahari 
Desert. I said to the Ambassador: ‘They (the Boere)393 might be drilling for water.’ This at 
least elicited a smile from him.394  
 
He said, ‘I respectfully disagree with your assessment. Our experts and technicians have 
pored over these photographs and studied them meticulously. They have confirmed that 
there is no place on God’s earth that you would need a drill of that size to get water. The 
official US government view is that it is a nuclear weapons test site intended for exploring 
and exploding a nuclear device’.”395  
 
Mr Botha referred to the matter of the nuclear test site in the previous 
exposition. In the following commentary, he reflects upon the pressure to 
conduct nuclear tests that he was subjected to by the militarists. Concepts 
often lead to action. The nuclear test site begged the question of a nuclear 
test, and that was extremely dangerous. Botha explained that he 
sometimes had to counteract considerable enthusiasm among the military 
establishment, who were in favour of conducting nuclear tests: 
 
“The idea in South Africa’s military establishment was that in a dénouement, South Africa 
would show that it had the ability to use this weapon as a deterrent, to put pressure on 
the West to off-set the USSR’s power play in Southern Africa. The military wanted to use 
it as a penetrative political tool. I did not share that sentiment and assessment with them. 
I thought that it was naïve and simplistic thinking. 
                                                                                                                                 
Commission designated suspected sites for inspection. Our inspectors cannot comb through every 
inch of a State’s territory blindly searching for nuclear material and installations. We need and 
receive information from supplier States in exports of such material. In a system where the IAEA 
was informed by Member States of relevant data obtained through national technical means, 
satellite cameras and other intelligence-gathering activities, I see no reason why a special unit in 
the Agency should not receive selective information from a Member State’s national satellites. 
These are used for national security and preventing nuclear proliferation is surely a national 
security activity. Such information would allow our inspectors to identify targets that require 
special inspections.” Blix, Hans. 1991. ‘Inspections in Iraq’. Statement to the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington DC. 23 October. 3.. 
393 Translation from Afrikaans into English: ‘Boere’ means farmers.  
394 This was indeed a very serious political situation, between South Africa, the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union. Botha defused the tension at a personal relationship level with the 
use of humour. 
395 Interview with Mr Pik Botha in Pretoria North on 18 February 2008. 
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During a meeting in the 1980s, I attended a meeting with the military. They were 
considering testing a bomb in the Kalahari. I vehemently opposed this crazy notion and 
said that I had made a commitment on South Africa’s behalf to the President of the 
United States of America that South Africa would not test the bomb. I said that we would 
stop producing the seventh bomb. 
 
Tactical offensive nuclear strategies were never contemplated, planned or foreseen by 
South Africa. We always knew that there would be massive retaliation from the nuclear 
powers. In practice the government never went further than Phase One”.396 
 
In practice, the government did not ever go further than Phase One of its 
nuclear strategy. The reader will notice that the starting point of this 
discussion was the discovery of the latent nuclear test site at Vastrap in 
the Kalahari Desert. The midpoint of this exposition was Mr Botha’s 
reflections about the pressure that he was subjected to by the militarists to 
conduct a nuclear test shot in the Kalahari Desert after the Vastrap 
incident. The third and final phase is expounded on by Professor Stumpf, 
who speculated about what type of situation might possibly have arisen 
that could have conceivably resulted in Pretoria authorising the 
deployment of a nuclear weapon in armed conflict.   
 
Stumpf asserted that:  
 
“The only feasible scenario that could have possibly triggered an operational nuclear 
option was a full invasion by 75 000 Cuban troops in Angola into South Africa. No other 
conflict, whether internal or on our or on Namibia’s borders could have triggered such an 
action that South Africa would have hurt itself far more than any gains achieved.397 Just 
ask yourself: ‘where would these devices have been used in anger without hurting 
ourselves or inviting massive retaliation?’398 Mr PW Botha was wise enough to fully grasp 
                                                
396 Op cit Botha. The official policy was that the nuclear weapons were never intended for use. But 
Botha is now highlighting the fact that there were in fact powerful voices in the SADF who would 
have liked to have used these weapons. These paragraphs demonstrate how fragile the policy of 
deterrence was and that, had the voices in the SADF prevailed, there would have been a nuclear 
test. This would have totally compromised Botha’s undertaking to President Reagan. 
The paragraphs also deal with what Moxley (2000) regards as one of the causes of nuclear 
proliferation, which is the natural competitiveness of humans. This competitiveness leads directly 
to the escalation of conflict. 
397 The scenario that Stumpf is projecting is the one where the very survival of a State is at stake. 
398 The massive retaliation that is anticipated would render this illegal. 
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this, even if some individuals in the security establishment might have wanted otherwise, 
but they were not in charge! Don’t give them credibility if it is not warranted.  
 
Consider the three-point strategy by Mr PW Botha: that was the only official one, no 
matter what others may have wanted or wished.399 We followed all international nuclear 
agreements to the letter. It is as simple as that. They (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) did 
not.”400  
 
The scenario that Professor Stumpf highlights is one in which the very 
survival of the state is at risk, as was considered by the ICJ in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons. Professor Stumpf’s scenario, 
in my view, is not far-fetched. It would not have been unrealistic for an 
army of 75 000 Cubans, Russians and East Germans to amass on South 
Africa’s borders. Much larger armies have amassed on the borders of 
other states during times of war. South Africa would not have been able to 
invoke the doctrine of necessity to justify the deployment of a nuclear 
weapon in armed conflict even when the very survival of the state was at 
stake. Professor Stumpf asserted that the tactical deployment of a nuclear 
bomb would have resulted in a massive retaliation. An operational and 
tactical use of nuclear weapons was therefore never a logical option. 
Professor Stumpf’s essential reasoning related to the legal question of 
affirming necessity and balancing that with state responsibility (South 
Africa’s, in this instance) to wrongful actions. In this regard, John Dugard 
asserted that the defence of necessity probably occasions the greatest 
difficulty in practice, as it is the defence most open to abuse.  
 
“In order to bring it to acceptable limits art 25 provides: 
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a general ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with international obligation of that State 
unless the act:”401 
 
                                                
399 Op cit Stumpf. Stumpf is asserting that there were interest groups that might have benefited 
from South Africa’s failing to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. This would 
have been a civil war scenario, which was quite plausible at the time. 
400 Op cit Stumpf.  
401 International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: Report of the International Law Commission (2001). GAOR 56th 
Session. Supplement No 10 (A/56/10)29. 
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Ad 1 South Africa could not feasibly have proffered a justification ‘in terms 
of necessity’ to drop a nuclear bomb on 75 000 Cubans invading South 
Africa. 
 
 “a. is the only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril; and”402 
 
Ad 1a Nuclear bombs would not have been the only way to safeguard 
South Africa from Cuban attack. 
 
  “b. does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”403 
 
Ad 1b The deployment of a nuclear bomb would have impaired state 
obligations that are congruent with accession to the NPT, the deployment 
of such weapons, and other treaty obligations. 
 
“2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: 
 a. The international obligation of a question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity;”404 
 
Ad 2a It not foreseeable that South Africa could have invoked necessity as 
justification for dropping a nuclear bomb, because this would have created 
a threat to world peace, and the possibility of invoking necessity would 
have been totally far-fetched. 
 
 “b. the state has contributed to the situation of necessity.”405    
 
Ad 2b South Africa would have contributed to creating the situation of 
necessity. This means that necessity could not have been invoked. Had 
South Africa dropped a nuclear bomb during the course of the Angolan 
war, it would have created a force majeure. The act alone would almost 
inevitably have constituted a crime against humanity. 
 
                                                
402 Loc cit. 
403 Loc cit. 
404 Loc cit. 
405 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 266–267. 
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It is difficult to conceive of any situation whatsoever which would have 
been authorised by the United Nations. It is also difficult to conceive of any 
situation in which such deployment of a nuclear weapon would have been 
jus in bello – the law governing how war is conducted and prosecuted. 
 
Stumpf, like Barnard, asserted that any conceivable military tactical usage 
of nuclear weapons would constitute a crime against humanity. It would 
also invite and indeed legitimate massive retaliation, including a Security 
Council-authorised invasion of South Africa, because any military usage of 
these weapons would have been in breach of the United Nations Charter 
and deemed a threat to world peace. 
 
Stumpf: “It is absolutely inconceivable that somebody might use these things in a tactical 
way and destroy half the world. I once said to an American: ‘You know, you have got 
thirty thousand warheads. Is it not good enough for you to destroy the world once over? 
Why do you want to destroy it ten times over?’ 
 
It is completely out of all proportion and does not make sense. It is a crazy situation that 
the world is in … 
 
Could you imagine the ramifications that would have arisen had South Africa dropped a 
nuclear bomb on Maputo or in Angola? There would have been an outraged international 
outcry! In two weeks Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town would not have been 
there.406 They would have been flattened in retaliation. 
 
I think that PW Botha realised this.”407 
 
Heald: “There would also have been Nuremberg Trials.”408  
 
Stumpf: Absolutely, absolutely, and I think that that probability gave him some 
credibility.409 410 
 
                                                
406 See Brodie, Bernard. 1986. Escalation and the Nuclear Option. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
407 Op cit Stumpf. This is effectively the identical argument that Barnard and Mouton raised. There 
could be no lawful use of nuclear weapons.  
408 Loc cit. 
409 Loc cit. 
410 Falk, Richard, Kolko, Gabriel & Lifton, Robert Jay (eds.). 1971. Crimes of War – A Legal, 
Political, and Psychological Inquiry into the Responsibility of Leaders, Citizens and Soldiers for 
Criminal Acts in Wars. New York: Vantage Books.  
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Stumpf conceded that individuals have duties and obligations to comply 
with accepted norms of behaviour, and that a transgression of these rules 
might invoke a tribunal, which would be imposed under international law. It 
also invokes the legal question of the extent of state responsibility for 
wrongful actions. 
 
Ian Brownlie observed: 
 
“International law imposes duties of certain kinds on individuals as such, and these 
national and international tribunals may try persons charged with crimes against 
international law including war crimes and genocide. The International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg and many national tribunals did not admit pleas by accused persons charged 
with war crimes that they had acted in accordance with their national law.”411 
 
He furthermore contended that: 
 
“In a considerable number of countries, municipal courts, in dealing with cases of war 
crimes and issues arising from belligerent occupation, for example, the validity of acts of 
administration, of requisition, and transactions conducted in occupation currency, have 
relied upon the findings of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
as evidence, even conclusive evidence, of the illegality of the war that resulted in the 
occupation.”412 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons itself provides 
clear authority in support of Stumpf’s assertion that the nuclear arsenal 
could not been deployed tactically. 
 
The NPT states in the Preamble that: 
 
“Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are promoted with the least diversion armaments of the 
worlds economic and human resources.”413  
 
                                                
411 Op cit Brownlie at 35.  
412 Op cit Brownlie at 51. 
413 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
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The researcher’s view is that any conceivable military usage of nuclear 
weapons by the South African Defence Force would have been deemed to 
be ethnic cleansing by the ICJ and an act of genocide in terms of the 
Genocide Convention of 1948.414  
 
4.6.1 The United States of America Invoke a Warning of 
Anticipatory Self-Defence if South Africa Proceeds with 
Nuclear Testing (1977) 
The United States and Soviet Union had the authority of the United 
Nations Charter to back up their disquiet. Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter would have been relevant to Ambassador Edmondson’s warning. 
It reads thus: 
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence, if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right to self-defence shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”415  
 
South Africa’s construction of a nuclear weapon silo at Vastrap was clearly 
a provocative gesture and could have been construed as signifying an act 
of aggression. This could have legitimated a decision on the part of the 
USA and USSR to engage in anticipatory self-defence against South 
Africa although this matter is indeed controversial. 
 
John Dugard confirmed that there is little consensus among legal scholars 
as to whether article 51 allows anticipatory defence or not. He points out: 
                                                
414 The following cases, conventions and treaties would have become relevant to the legality of the 
use of nuclear weapons had South Africa deployed  a nuclear bomb during the war in Angola: 
Genocide Convention, Provisional Measures (Bosnia & Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) 1993 ICJ Reports 3; Genocide Convention, Preliminary Objections, 1966 ICJ 
Reports 595; Nuremberg Judgment (1947) AJIL Reports; Attorney-General of the Government of 
Israel v Eichmann (1961) 36 (ILR); Guatemala Genocide Case (2003) 42 ILM 683; Peruvian 
Genocide Case (2003) 42 ILM 1200. 
415 United Nations Charter Article 51. 
 230 
 
“One school argues that art 51 permits force to be used in self-defence if, and only if, an 
armed attack occurs. Another argues that the customary-law right of anticipatory self-
defence is preserved by the phrase ‘inherent right’ in art 51, and that in the context of 
modern weaponry it is ridiculous to argue that the drafters of the Charter could have 
intended to exclude such a right.”416  
 
The point is that, although improbable, South Africa might have invited a 
military intervention had it persisted with the nuclear weapons programme 
and conducted nuclear tests. In the following citation offered by Mr Botha, 
the seriousness with which the United States and Soviet Union regarded 
South Africa’s development of these nuclear silos is highlighted. It was 
quite clear from the testimony of Mr Botha that neither the United States 
nor the Soviet Union would bow down to South Africa’s nuclear weapon 
ambitions:  
 
Mr Botha continued: 
 
‘The US417 was now formally warning South Africa that it would under no circumstances 
countenance this nuclear test site’.418 I listened attentively to what the US ambassador 
had said to me and I explained to him that I valued his concern and his assessment, and I 
assured him that I would take steps to terminate the operation. 
 
After this meeting I immediately informed Prime Minister John Vorster about it. 
Instructions were issued to stop all activities at Vastrap forthwith.419 I ascertained that 
John Vorster knew about Vastrap. I warned him: ‘This is going to have incalculable and 
serious repercussions for South Africa.’ (Repeats sentence.) 420 ‘It would invigorate and 
intensify the sanctions campaign and compound South Africa’s political isolation and 
pariah status.’ ”421 422 
 
                                                
416 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 507. 
417 And therefore by implication the Soviet Union as well. 
418 Ambassador Edmondson was instructing South Africa with the active support and in fact upon 
the initiative of the Soviet Union to dismantle and discontinue its nuclear programme. This 
instruction was made under compulsion. It was made as far back as April 1977. The official seeds 
of South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment could be asserted to reside in this incident. 
419 Mr Botha accepted the obligation erga omnes to demolish the nuclear silos, and the obligation 
was enacted. 
420 The establishment of the nuclear silos was contrary to the ethos of international customary law 
and would have enhanced South Africa’s pariah status if retained. 
421 President John Vorster complied with the US/USSR insistence that the nuclear test site at 
Vastrap should be disbanded. 
422 Op cit Botha. 
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The remainder of this discussion about the United States of America 
Invoking a warning of anticipatory self-defence against South Africa will be 
devoted to conducting a brief legal analysis of this matter in the light of the 
bombing by Israel in 1981 of the Osirak nuclear power station in Iraq in 
anticipatory self-defence. Israel had for some time developed a growing 
fear that Iraq was developing a nuclear arsenal under the pretext of 
peacetime nuclear energy creation at Osirak. The building of the Osirak 
nuclear power station, as in the case of the Vastrap nuclear silos, was 
interpreted as an act of aggression, and Israel blew up the power station in 
anticipatory self-defence. Fortunately for South Africa, the United States 
and Soviet Union did not invoke the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence in 
the case of the Vastrap nuclear silos.   
 
Dr Hans Blix, in reflecting upon the Israeli bombing of Osirak, puts it thus: 
 
“In 1981, one country demonstrated clearly that the safeguards inspections performed by 
the IAEA in Iraq did not give it confidence. In a spectacular raid, Israel planes destroyed 
the Iraqi research reactor at Osirak, which had not yet started to operate. Israel was 
unanimously condemned by the IAEA, and in a resolution unanimously adopted on June 
19, 1981, the Security Council described the action as a serious threat to the entire 
safeguards system.”423  
 
It is recalled that South Africa broke off safeguards negotiations with the 
IAEA in 1977. Had South Africa maintained these safeguard negotiations 
and associated agreements, it could perhaps have prevented and pre-
empted acts of anticipatory self-defence from being brought against it. The 
Israeli case makes it very clear that South Africa would have been 
powerless to countermand the United States and Soviet Union had they 
decided to engage in anticipatory self-defence and pre-emptively bombed 
all of its suspect nuclear installations. 
 
Singh and Macdonald cited Professor Antonio Cassese, President of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as follows: 
                                                
423 Blix, Hans. 2004. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. London: 
Bloomsbury. 19. 
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“One particularly relevant example (of anticipatory defence) is the international reaction to 
an Israel bombing on an Iraqi nuclear reactor: When the Israel attack was discussed at 
the Security Council, the USA which implicitly indicated that it shared the Israeli concept 
of self-defence. In addition, although it voted for the SC resolution condemning Israel 
(resolution 487/1991), it pointed out after the vote that its attitude was only motivated by 
other considerations, namely Israel’s failure to exhaust peaceful means for the resolution 
of the dispute. All the other members of the SC expressed their disagreement with the 
Israeli view by unreservedly voting in favour of the operative paragraph 1 of the 
resolution, whereby the SC strongly condemned the military attack by Israel in clear 
violation of the Charter of the UN and the norms of international conduct. Egypt and 
Mexico expressly refuted the doctrine of anticipatory self defence. It is apparent from the 
statement of these states that they were deeply concerned that the interpretation they 
opposed might lead to abuse. In contrast, Britain, while condemning the Israel attack as a 
grave breach of international law, noted that the attack was not an act of self-defence. 
Nor could it be justified as forcible measure of self protection.”424    
 
Singh and Macdonald confirmed that: 
 
“Article 51 of the Charter reserves states’ rights to self-defence. This right is additional to 
the provisions of Article 42. A state does not require a Security Council resolution in order 
to defend itself by force, but even the right to self-defence is subject to action by the 
Security Council, as is clear from the terms of Article 51:  
 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in this right to self-defence shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.’”425 
 
Acts of the nature of the anticipatory self-defensive attack by Israel against 
Iraq are condemned by the United Nations Security Council. This 
condemnation did not deter Israel from bombing Osirak. Equally, South 
Africa’s nuclear weapons programme was both provocative and passively 
aggressive. It could plausibly have resulted in major unintended 
                                                
424 Op cit Singh and Macdonald at 9–10. 
425 Op cit Singh and Macdonald at 7.  
 233 
consequences, including the invocation of the doctrine of anticipatory self-
defence. 
 
4.6.2  The South Atlantic Double-Flash Incident of 22 February 1979 
Two years after the nuclear test site at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert was 
uncovered by the US and the Soviet Union, the South Atlantic Double-
Flash incident occurred. It took place during the course of the Carter 
administration. The facts are that on 22 February 1979 the CIA recorded a 
double-flash incident. This was initially taken as an indicative signal of a 
nuclear test shot being conducted in the South Atlantic Ocean. Suspicion 
was directed at South Africa, which was alleged to have conducted a 
nuclear test and questioned as to whether or not it had. The allegation has 
never yet been proved or disproved, because no nuclear fallout 
accompanying the explosion was detected. The researcher sourced the 
CIA file on this matter by conducting an electronic search.426 This search 
revealed that while part of the information is available, the remainder of 
the CIA file on the South Atlantic Double-Flash Incident is still classified, 
and therefore not all the facts on this matter have yet been presented. The 
matter remains unresolved to this day. 
 
Nuclear tests that are conducted in times of peace raise very similar 
hazards and risks to nuclear bombs that are dropped as an act of war. 
South Africa would have created a grave international danger to world 
peace if it had conducted nuclear tests. The danger could have manifested 
itself in a breakdown in US–Soviet trust and co-operation on the matter of 
nuclear weapons. Testing might have resulted in the deployment of 
deterrent nuclear weapons, as happened at the time of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and the danger of escalation was intrinsic to any such putative 
nuclear test. 
 
                                                
426 Directorate of Intelligence: Central Intelligence Agency. 1983. ‘New Information on South 
Africa’s Nuclear Program and South Africa–Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation’. 
Washington DC. 30 March. Approved for release 5 July 1996. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs  
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The events surrounding the South Atlantic Double-Flash incident were 
briefly referred to by Mr Pik Botha. In the citation below, Mr Botha denied 
that South Africa had conducted the alleged test. He alluded thus to the 
Double-Flash incident:  
 
“The so-called double-flash incident on the 22/2/79 justifies mention. A US satellite 
recorded signals suggesting that a nuclear explosion had occurred over the South 
Atlantic Ocean, and there were some suspicions that it was a South African fissionable 
device. This is simply not true. 
 
It is important to place on the record that there were no signs of radioactive fallout after 
this explosion. The double-flash might have been some other phenomenon and might not 
have been nuclear. I was most certainly not aware of any involvement of South Africa in 
that event. I was assured by the Department of Defence that they were not involved in the 
event.427  
 
Year by year the meetings with the DOE [Department of Energy] continued, and the 
political pressure on South Africa increased inexorably.428 I attended meetings in Vienna, 
and my officials attended the meetings in Washington. Sometimes we held meetings in 
Pretoria. 
 
Towards the latter part of the 1980s the political pressure on South Africa increased 
markedly. This was in those turbulent months just before PW Botha resigned from his 
position of President of South Africa.”429 
 
                                                
427 Op cit Botha. The Double-Flash incident has been much discussed. If South Africa was party to 
this test shot, why did they not admit it? They had nothing to lose. They had revealed the entire 
nuclear weapons programme to the inspectorate.  
Had South Africa tested a nuclear device, it would surely have made sense for them to admit that 
they had done so to the IAEA and the Extra Team, since they were acceding to the NPT. 
Had South Africa been involved in this incident, the only reason that the researcher can conceive 
of for not admitting any involvement in the double-flash incident may have been to protect other 
nations which may have been involved in this nuclear test. These may have been threshold states 
and/or accessory states. 
428 Mr Pik Botha immediately discussed the inexorable pressure that South Africa was subjected to 
in the light of the South Atlantic Double-Flash incident. Notwithstanding the fact that no proof has 
yet been provided confirming that South Africa conducted a test shot, the perception remains that 
South Africa was somehow or other involved in this matter.   
429 The Department of Energy (DOE) was an institution with considerable political power. 
Although its focus was on nuclear non-proliferation, it could exert political power way beyond the 
nuclear realm, within the State Department itself. This intensification of pressure correlated with 
the growing certainty that there would be a change of government in South Africa. It raised the 
concern in the USA about the security of the nuclear arsenal being bequeathed to an unproven 
liberation movement. 
The purpose of the pressure was to induce South Africa to accede to the NPT, to relinquish its 
nuclear weapons, and for the whole of Africa ultimately to accede to the Pelindaba Treaty. 
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The South Atlantic Double-Flash incident, probably at a perceptual level at least, and 
South Africa’s being compelled to vacate its seat on the Board of Governors of the IAEA 
contributed to the strained relationship that South Africa had with this organisation. 
 
4.6.3 The US Spy Plane Incident (April 1979) 
It is my contention that the discovery of the Vastrap nuclear silo, the 
anticipatory warning, the South Atlantic Double-Flash incident, and the US 
Spy Plane incident should be regarded together as indicative of how the 
possession of nuclear weapons led to the erosion of international 
customary law, and paradoxically inspired the aspiration towards a higher 
normative order in the longer term. This erosion of the normative order 
was manifested in South Africa’s withdrawal from safeguard negotiations 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its subsequently being 
unseated from its role on the Board of Governors of the IAEA, while its 
affirmation was ultimately manifested in the relinquishment of the nuclear 
arsenal and accession to the NPT. The US Spy Plane incident is 
interesting, because it replicated (on a very small scale) the U-2 Spy Plane 
incident which had occurred twenty-nine years previously on 1 May 1960, 
when Francis Gary Powers was shot down in his U-2 aeroplane for 
allegedly spying on the USSR. The US Spy Plane incident raised 
important questions of sovereignty, comity,  the accepted rules of mutual 
conduct between states, and countermeasures.   
 
Mr Pik Botha recalled the incident thus: 
 
“South Africa was under severe and constant pressure from the United States to 
relinquish its nuclear weapon capability over many years. The US exerted this pressure 
on us all the time.430 I believe that the United State’s and other countries’ intelligence 
services knew full well that South Africa was indeed capable of producing a nuclear 
device. 
 
                                                
430 Botha immediately refers to the severe and constant pressure that South Africa was placed 
under by the USA to relinquish its nuclear weapon capability. This emphasis is constant 
throughout his text. Was the relinquishment of the weapons and its accession to the NPT thrust 
upon South Africa? Was South Africa pushed or did it jump? 
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I clearly recall that the US Embassy in Pretoria had an aircraft of its own and it flew over 
Pelindaba, which was where the HEU was created. Our intelligence service detected a 
camera in its nose and that it could serve as a spy-plane. 
 
As a result of this exposure, some senior US officials were declared personae non 
gratae. This resulted in a tit-for-tat, and the US expelled some of our staff from our 
embassy in Washington DC.”431 
 
The U-2 Spy Plane incident represents a much more serious precedent, 
but the essential facts in both incidents are analogous. On 1 May 1960 
Francis Gary Powers was flying a U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union 
near Sverdlovsk. This was during the period just prior to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, when the Cold War was intensifying. The Soviets shot the U-2 
down, captured Powers, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. 
The Soviet Union complained vehemently to the United Nations Security 
Council, alleging that the US venture was an act of aggression in terms of 
international law. The Security Council rejected the Soviet Union’s 
                                                
431 The Time Magazine of 23 April 1979 reported about the incident as such (in ‘Carter’s 
Desperate Crusade: A Crisis with South Africa and Pakistan over Nuclear Weapons’): 
“Like mushrooms after a spring rain, nuclear plants have sprouted all over the globe. The reason is 
clear: as the price of oil becomes ruinously expensive, and oil’s availability more uncertain, most 
nations must take steps to acquire alternate sources of energy. But the spread of this potent 
technology has also led several countries to try to acquire nuclear weapons on their own. 
Persuading them not do this has become a desperate diplomatic crusade of the Carter 
Administration. Washington’s opposition to expanding the nuclear club is often at odds with other 
vital US objectives and subjects the White House to charges of fumbling or incompetence. South 
Africa and Pakistan last week became cases in point. 
In a toughly-worded statement read on prime-time television in South Africa, Prime Minister PW 
Botha announced the expulsion of several members of the American mission in Pretoria for aerial 
espionage. A grim-faced Botha told South Africans that a twin-engine Beechcraft turboprop used 
by US Ambassador William B Edmondson had been converted for use as a spy plane by the 
installation of an aerial-survey camera under the seat of the co-pilot. The Prime Minister charged 
that the embassy aircraft was engaged in a systematic program of photography of vast areas of 
South Africa, including some of our most sensitive installations. Botha’s disclosures seemed 
designed both to embarrass the Carter Administration at a time when the US is pressing South 
Africa to accept a United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, and to deflect attention 
from his scandal-ridden government at home. 
The State Department flatly refused to deny the charges, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said 
that ‘no apology’ would be issued, as the South African Prime Minister had demanded.  
The following day, Willem Retief, South Africa’s Charge d’Affaires, was summoned to the State 
Department and told that two of his mission’s military attaches were being ordered to leave the US 
within a week, in direct retaliation for the expulsion of three American defence attaches. 
The brusque US response to Botha’s charges, as well as the refusal to deny that espionage was 
involved, reflected the Administration’s worries about South Africa’s nuclear capacity. 
In 1977 US and Soviet aerial reconnaissance photos provided evidence that the South Africans 
were preparing to test a nuclear device in the Kalahari Desert. Despite Pretoria’s assurances that ‘it 
does not have and does not intend to develop nuclear explosives’, President Carter declared at the 
time that the US would continue to monitor very closely South Africa’s nuclear development.” 
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resolution.432 South Africa would arguably have been entitled under 
international law to shoot down this aircraft because of the violation of its 
sovereignty and breach of comity. Such a gesture would, of course, have 
been inappropriate, dangerous and inflammatory, but nonetheless it would 
have probably been lawful in a narrow sense. The conduct would have 
escalated sanctions, undermined South Africa’s recognition status, and 
acted counter to the prospect for a peaceful negotiated settlement. 
 
The US Spy Plane incident involved foreign military personal exercising 
their governmental functions within South African airspace. This incident 
was therefore conducted contrary to Article 2(7) of the Charter of the 
United Nations Charter and to South African municipal law. It was a clear 
violation of South Africa’s sovereignty. 
 
John Dugard provided authority for this by virtue of this observation: 
 
“South Africa, like other states, zealously guards against any attempt on the part of other 
states to exercise their governmental functions within its territorial limits. Foreign police 
officers may not make arrests in South Africa and foreign governments may not enforce 
their sovereign acts through South African courts. Any intervention in the domestic affairs 
of South Africa by other states or international organisations will be resisted as a violation 
of the prohibition on foreign intervention that receives recognition in Article 2(7) of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”433   
 
Reciprocal countermeasures were used by both the United States and 
South Africa in the case of the US Spy Plane incident. 
 
The promulgation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978434 in the 
United States and the consequent ban on delivering enriched uranium to 
South Africa can be described as a countermeasure. (So, too, can the 
Clark Amendment, which prohibited US military support to South Africa in 
                                                
432 ‘The U2-Airplane Incident’. 1960. US Department of State Vol X, Part 1, Frus, 1958–60. E. 
Europe Region, Soviet Union, Office of the Historian. May–July. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/u2.htm 
433 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 148. 
434 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 [HR 8638], 92 Stat. 120. Approved 10 March 1978 
(US) (as amended by Public Law 99-661 [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1987, 2638], 100 Stat 3816. Approved 11 November 1986). 
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the Angolan war, be understood as a countermeasure.) These 
countermeasures were indicative of the escalatory dangers associated 
with nuclear weapons and the very real risks of reprisals and escalation of 
conflict that are contained therein. Fortunately they did not involve the use 
of force. John Dugard makes this point: 
 
“The term ‘countermeasures’ is used to describe self-help not involving the use of force. 
Countermeasures must be distinguished from retorsion – that is, unfriendly conduct which 
does not violate an international obligation even though it may be a response to an 
internationally wrongful act. Acts of retorsion may include a limitation of normal diplomatic 
relations, a trade embargo not in violation of a treaty obligation, or the termination of an 
aid programme.”435  
 
Dugard expressed concern about the danger of the abuse of 
countermeasures, and contended that certain members of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) would have preferred not to include 
any provision in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility in case this could 
be construed as approval. His concern was that they could degenerate 
into a puerile pattern of tit-for-tat. 
 
It is clear that the matter of countermeasures needs to be very finely 
balanced. Dugard observed that the ILC ultimately decided to include a 
section on countermeasures, while at the same time making it clear that 
such measures were to be limited to special circumstances and subjected 
to strict control. 
 
4.6.4 The Meeting between President Ronald Reagan, General 
Alexander Haig and Mr Pik Botha on Koeberg – The Eastern 
Greenland Case 
4.6.4.1 Acts of Retorsion and Countermeasures: 1981–1982 
It will be shown in the following testimony from Mr Pik Botha that South 
Africa’s development of a nuclear arsenal caused sufficient concern in the 
United States of America to invoke US countermeasures which then 
                                                
435 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 280. 
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escalated into acts of retorsion when diplomats were expelled from the 
respective host countries. Normal diplomatic relations between the United 
States and South Africa were limited for the period of the dispute, and an 
enriched uranium trade embargo was placed on South Africa. Mr Pik 
Botha conceded in his submission that the Koeberg nuclear power station, 
constructed to serve the peaceful purpose of domestic electrical supply 
creation, was also used incidentally as a convenient foil or camouflage, 
together with Pelindaba, to legitimate the pursuit of the nuclear weapons 
programme. 
 
Mr Botha contended that: 
 
“Pelindaba’s capacity to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) was actually quite an 
open secret. Pelindaba had the most massive monolithic chimney structure. This begs 
the question: ‘Why might a country require a massive chimney structure at a nuclear 
facility which was not being used as a power station?’ The enrichment plant was then 
producing low-grade enriched uranium for peaceful energy-related purposes. 
 
At the same time Koeberg nuclear power station in the Western Cape was in an 
advanced phase of development as a peaceful nuclear energy project. My recollection is 
that construction on the Koeberg nuclear power station commenced somewhere around 
1977, if I am not mistaken. Construction reached its peak in the early eighties.  
 
Jimmy Carter was elected President of the USA at the beginning of 1977 – or was it 
1978? At the time when Carter assumed the Presidency, Koeberg nuclear power station 
was in an advanced phase of construction. The Koeberg nuclear power station lent some 
credibility to South Africa’s nuclear programme. South Africa could use Koeberg as a foil 
to assert that what they did at the Pelindaba nuclear facility was being conducted for 
peaceful energy-related purposes.  
 
The West knew about these nuclear developments.”436  
 
In the following citation offered by Mr Botha, the reader will notice that Mr 
Botha afforded Mr Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States of 
America at that time, certain undertakings relating to South Africa’s 
nuclear intentions with respect to providing a guarantee that the United 
States would be informed prior to South Africa’s conducting any nuclear 
                                                
436 Op cit Botha. 
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test. In my view, an excellent example of the evolution of usus occurred 
when South Africa a few years later, on 31 January 1987, concluded an 
agreement that it would abide by the spirit and the letter of the NPT with 
the USA. This incident also served as an equally good example of the 
principle of opinio juris sive necessitatis. The reader should carefully note 
the various undertakings that Mr Pik Botha provided to Mr Ronald Reagan; 
including that no nuclear tests would be conducted without informing the 
United States first, and other similar assurances. Soft law was being 
created which would in due course convert into an adherence to 
international customary law. These undertakings would clearly have been 
binding in terms of international law. The Eastern Greenland case 
provides authority for this assertion.437 The Norwegian Foreign Minister 
had accepted Danish title to Eastern Greenland in an informal agreement. 
This informal agreement was held to be binding under international law. 
For this reason, I contend that Mr Pik Botha’s seemingly informal 
undertakings were indeed binding under international law. In fact, the 
enactment of these undertakings as displayed by the relinquishment of the 
nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT proved that Pretoria regarded 
Mr Botha’s undertakings as binding. 
 
The agreement that was reached between Mr Botha and Mr Reagan also 
involved recognition by America of South Africa’s rights to the usage of 
nuclear energy for civilian purposes. It involved both a waiver and an 
estoppel of US rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and resulted 
in the resumption of a supply of enriched uranium to energise the Koeberg 
nuclear power station. 
 
Mr Botha effectively used the meeting with President Ronald Reagan and 
General Alexander Haig to make a claim to rectify an alleged breach of 
international law, insofar as the United States had halted an agreement to 
supply HEU to run the Koeberg nuclear power station, and declined to 
deliver enriched uranium that had already been paid for. The purpose of 
                                                
437 Eastern Greenland Case, 1993, PCIJ, Ser.A/B, No 53, at 52. 
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the agreement was to revalidate the previous agreement that had existed 
between the United States and South Africa to enrich uranium for civilian 
usage, and resulted in South Africa achieving a waiver from America’s 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.  
 
Mr Botha continues: 
 
“As a result of this Peace Accord, there was a reduction in political pressure, and the 
stress and strains inherent to South Africa’s relationships with Mozambique diminished.438 
439 In South Africa, the peaceful production of nuclear energy was used as a diversion to 
establish a nuclear weapons programme. 
 
America’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act interrupted the delivery of fuel elements which 
were required by Koeberg nuclear power station. This Act created a very serious situation 
for South Africa, because it could have starved it of domestic energy.440 441 
 
The stand-off was resolved only in 1981, when Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as 
President of the USA. I was received by him in the Oval Office very soon after he 
assumed the Presidency and requested discussions about US–South African 
relationships. The topics of discussion included the war in Angola.  
 
South Africa’s nuclear status was not mentioned as a topic of discussion in the preceding 
vetting meetings. To the chagrin of General Alexander Haig, who was Secretary of State, 
I made a direct appeal to President Ronald Reagan during our actual meeting to have the 
nuclear restrictions levied by the US on South Africa lifted, so that the French could 
                                                
438 Op cit Botha. The Nkomati Peace Accord was a sign of a changed and more conciliatory 
approach towards the regional conflicts. It rendered South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme 
increasingly irrelevant. 
439 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Article IV states that: 
“1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to 
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall all co-operate 
in contributing alone or together with other States or international organisations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the 
territories of non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs 
of the developing world.” 
440 South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme came at a very high potential cost. The message 
was clear. If it continued with its nuclear weapons, it would not receive energy to run the 
economy. 
441 In the Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ Reports at paras 244–245 it was found that the 
discontinuation of US aid to Nicaragua, reduction in the sugar quota and a trade embargo against 
Nicaragua were not a violation of the principle of non-intervention.  
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deliver the required enriched elements in order for Koeberg nuclear power station to 
function. 
 
General Haig interjected when I made this request to Ronald Reagan and said: ‘I did not 
clear this matter of nuclear supplies with Mr Botha, Mr President.’ (The protocol in the 
Foreign Ministry was that Foreign Ministers should clear the entire agenda with the 
Secretary of State before meeting with the President of the USA.) 
 
Fortunately President Ronald Reagan came to my rescue and he said to General Haig: ‘I 
invited the Foreign Minister to raise any matters that he considers important.’ 
 
I thanked President Reagan and then continued by saying: ‘If this matter is not resolved, 
Koeberg nuclear power station will not be able to supply South Africa with its electricity 
and it will end up as a white elephant.’ I made the point to Ronald Reagan that the first 
nuclear power station in Africa would end up being a white elephant because of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act that had been promulgated in the USA. I also said: ‘Power 
stations don’t grow like mushrooms overnight.’442 
 
General Haig warned President Ronald Reagan that South Africa was suspected of being 
in the process of developing a nuclear bomb. He said that the US could not afford to be 
associated with any activity even vaguely condoning activity of this nature. 
 
President Reagan then looked to me for an appropriate reply. I said to him: ‘Mr President, 
it is true that South Africa does have the capacity to build a nuclear device. This capacity 
may act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union’s expanding involvement in the war in Angola 
and regional conflicts.‘443 
 
I appealed to Ronald Reagan not to remove this deterrent capability. I could see that I 
struck the right chord with President Reagan. He was a person who was in favour of all 
forms of deterrence against the USSR.444 
 
General Alexander Haig again interjected. He said that there could be serious and 
unintended consequences for the US if they supported South Africa’s appeal. I assured 
President Reagan: ‘South Africa would never test a nuclear device without informing and 
consulting with the US government.’445 
                                                
442 The civilian nuclear power project was used as a partial foil for the military nuclear project. 
443 Mr Reagan succumbed to Mr Pik Botha’s deterrent argument, which was very weak in terms of 
international law. 
444 See Krepon, Michael. 1989. Arms Control in the Reagan Administration. Lanham: University 
Press of America. 
445 Dugard op cit (2007) at 409 informs: “In practice the Department of Foreign Affairs is 
principally responsible for the drafting and negotiation of foreign treaties. In order to provide the 
other party with evidence that the person entering into the treaty has the necessary authority to act 
on behalf of his state, he must produce an appropriate ‘full powers’ – i.e. a document designating 
him as an authorized person – unless it is obvious from his office that he enjoys this power. Thus, 
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As a result of this meeting, the restriction on the supply of uranium was rescinded against 
the French and this allowed Koeberg nuclear power station to come into operation.” 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Botha was able to use his relationship and rapport with Ronald Reagan 
effectively to gain a waiver of the application of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1976. In this process, the caution to President Reagan 
offered by Secretary of State Alexander Haig was overridden. Haig’s 
caution to Reagan was in fact that he should adhere to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act. Botha was able to use Africa’s energy vulnerability 
weakness as a bargaining chip to induce this waiver. 
 
The war in Angola and the implicit use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent 
against Soviet expansion was a second aspect of Botha’s argument to 
secure the required enriched uranium from the US. At the time, the legality 
of nuclear deterrence had not been clarified by the International Court of 
Justice. In any case, South Africa was merely mimicking the US’s 
deterrent approach. But in the case of South Africa, the weapons were not 
intended for usage. Haig’s concern that “there could be serious and 
unintended consequences for the US if they supported South Africa’s 
appeal” was correct. An agreement to waive the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Act for the special circumstances could have abrogated the USA’s non-
proliferation policy. 
 
It would appear as though Mr Reagan granted this concession on the 
basis of Mr Botha’s personal assurance that ‘South Africa would never test 
a nuclear device without informing and consulting with the US 
government’. Botha was later placed under extreme pressure by the SADF 
and ARMSCOR to test a nuclear device. He was able to withstand this 
pressure, but a weaker person might not have been able to do so. The 
                                                                                                                                 
heads of state or government, foreign ministers, and heads of diplomatic missions are not required 
to produce ‘full powers’.” 
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essential conclusion is that Reagan trusted Mr Pik Botha and for this 
reason acceded to his request.   
 
“In 1977 South Africa was denied its seat on the board of the International Atomic Energy 
Association. Egypt took its place. In 1980 South Africa was barred from participating at 
the international nuclear conference of the IAEA in India.446 This was ironic, as India had 
exploded a test bomb four years previously and it was not a member of the NPT.447 In 
1978 President PW Botha drafted a three-phase nuclear weapons strategy”.448 
 
John Dugard cites the findings of the Court in the Nuclear Tests case.449  
 
“It is well recognised that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning factual 
or legal situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. … When it is the 
intention of the State making the declaration that it should be bound according to its 
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the 
State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the 
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly and with intent to be bound, even 
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding.”450 
 
Mr Botha served President Ronald Reagan with an undertaking that South 
Africa would never test a nuclear device without giving the United States 
prior warning. It is contended that the obligation was binding in law. This 
undertaking, although apparently insignificant, prefaced a second deeper 
commitment to the United States that took place six years later on 
31 January 1987. That was when the AEC on behalf of South Africa 
agreed with the United States that it would abide by the spirit and the letter 
of the NPT with respect to its nuclear dealings.451  
 
                                                
446 South Africa was isolated from very important international conferences. It would appear that 
its military nuclear capabilities played an important contributory role in that international isolation.  
447 It would appear that there was little legal logic and consistency relating to India’s nuclear 
weapons capacity and its hosting of the IAEA conference. It probably was condoned because 
India’s nuclear weapons capability was seen as being aligned with the US’s strategic concerns in 
China. It provided a deterrent effect on China’s burgeoning nuclear weapons capability. 
448 Op cit Botha.  
449 Nuclear Tests Case, 1974 ICJ Reports 253 at 267–268.  
450 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 41. 
451 Op cit Masiza (1993) at 43. 
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4.6.5 The Uranium Red Book Incident – South Africa’s Recognition 
and Nuclear Weapons Policy Converge (1982–1983) 
The Uranium Red Book incident is an important albeit barely noticed 
event. Its importance resides in the fact that it provides the first evidence 
that South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme was directly interlinked 
with its international recognition crisis, which included the non-recognition 
of the Bantustans, which were a cornerstone of the apartheid constitution. 
This incident, which is contained in archival sources in the literature, 
converges in a significant way with the testimony offered by the 
respondents and in particular Mr de Klerk, who clearly indicated the 
linkage between international recognition and accession to the NPT.452 
South Africa’s relationship with the IAEA entered into a destructive phase 
of mistrust in 1982, and as extraordinary as it may seem, South Africa 
attempted to use the platform offered by the IAEA to access signatories to 
the NPT to bolster recognition of the Bantustan states. These states 
constituted a small but significant component of South Africa’s 
geographical territory. They were constitutional fictions and the physical 
manifestation of the apartheid policy, and were recognised only by South 
Africa and themselves. (South Africa without any fuss re-integrated these 
fictitious states into South Africa during the constitutional negotiations.) 
Pretoria was compelled to re-integrate these territories into South Africa in 
order to assure that the new constitution was imbued with international 
credibility and gained international recognition.453  
 
Abdul Minty explained how the recognition of South Africa’s Bantustan 
states was brought into the policy domain of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in 1982. He recalled that there was a technical book 
entitled the Uranium Red Book, which had been published by the IAEA for 
the advice of its members. In the 1982 edition, an allusion was made in it 
to ‘the Republic of Bophuthatswana’ as being ‘a newly independent 
African state’. This reference was untrue, as the Republic of 
                                                
452 Op cit Minty at 205–220.  
453 Ebrahim, Hassen. 1998. The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press. 
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Bophuthatswana was a fictitious state recognised by South Africa alone. 
This abuse of the good name and services of the IAEA’s publication 
continued for two years, until it was discovered that Bophuthatswana was 
being portrayed as a duly recognised state and not an apartheid fiction. An 
instruction was passed by the IAEA that this misrepresentation should be 
corrected in the next edition, due to be published in December 1983. In 
that subsequent edition of the Uranium Red Book, the problem was 
compounded when not one, but three Bantustan states were camouflaged 
along with Swaziland and Lesotho and entered into this IAEA publication 
under the guise of being legitimate recognised states. 
 
According to Abdul Minty, this propagandistic information on these 
fictitious South African states was allegedly included by Dr PO Toens, who 
was the head of the Atomic Energy Board in South Africa at the time. Dr 
Toens was responsible for the publication of the Uranium Red Book for the 
IAEA. Toens allegedly engaged in this illegal activity in order to attempt to 
facilitate international recognition for the Bantustans and the apartheid 
policy, by stealth and through the offices of the IAEA, which has a truly 
global network of states with whom it is in regular interaction. (South 
Africa’s attempts to gain recognition for these fictions had all been 
singularly unsuccessful up to that time.) A United Nations Security 
Council-endorsed organ of nuclear science was used to disseminate 
apartheid propaganda, and became an instrument which was used 
illegally in an attempt to mitigate South Africa’s self-created recognition 
crisis. Dr Toens achieved this by “stretching the universality principle 
contained in the statute of the IAEA”.454 In discussing the recognition 
issue, John Dugard commented thus: 
 
“The collective non-recognition of the Bantustan states on the ground that their creation 
and continued existence violated peremptory norms of international law resulted in their 
invalidity.”455 
 
                                                
454 Op cit Minty at 214. 
455 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 102. 
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4.6.6 The Nkomati Peace Accord 1984: Could there be an Appetite 
for Negotiated Settlements in South Africa?  
It is evident from Mr Botha’s commentary cited above that the retention of 
the nuclear arsenal would have exacerbated South Africa’s pariah 
recognition status. The legal status of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal, the 
wars in Angola and Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe’s 
independence, and the constitutional developments were complex themes 
that were deeply interconnected.  
 
Mr Botha puts it thus:  
 
“Jimmy Carter became President of the USA in January 1977, and held this position for 
four years until Ronald Reagan was elected as President of the United States of America 
at the beginning of 1981. South Africa was then under a constant international political 
barrage. We were under continuous pressure with respect to the war in Angola, the 
constitutional status of Namibia, the conflict in Mozambique, the crisis in Rhodesia, and 
our own internally deteriorating domestic circumstances.456  
 
Certain countries that were serving on the Security Council gave us a draft document that 
became Resolution 435 and culminated in the independence of Namibia, on the basis of 
an internationally-supervised election. 
 
The conflict in Rhodesia increased the pressure on South Africa for internal change, and 
South Africa was in turn impelled to put pressure on Ian Smith to negotiate a 
constitutional settlement for the country that would subsequently become Zimbabwe. 
 
South Africa’s relationship with Mozambique had degenerated into animosity. At that 
time, there was much anxiety about this complex set of crises. Further complications 
arose from South Africa being placed under increasingly intense pressure to sign the 
NPT.457 
 
In early 1980 South Africa faced an even greater compulsion for constitutional change, as 
a consequence of Robert Mugabe being inaugurated as President of Zimbabwe. At that 
                                                
456 The pressure that Botha is referring to in this instance was not pressure to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal. It was political pressure because of the complexities and the regional conflicts and internal 
constitutional crisis. 
457 South Africa’s regional conflicts within Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe created a highly pressurised situation which was intensified by the US’s 
insistence that South Africa should accede to the NPT. 
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time, I started the negotiations with Samora Machel in Mozambique that led to the 
Nkomati Peace Accord.”458  
 
The Nkomati Peace Accord was intended to counteract military escalation 
and reprisal and counter-reprisal cycles between South Africa and 
Mozambique. This treaty was intended to be an instrument to reduce 
regional military tensions, which might have included, in an extreme 
scenario, the invocation of nuclear deterrence. It was the first use of treaty 
law that was aimed at breaking the military stalemate in the region. It 
achieved a fair measure of success. 
 
John Dugard discussed the Nkomati Peace Accord while considering the 
matter of the use of force by states: 
 
“Suggestions during the apartheid era that neighbouring states were permitted to allow 
the ANC and PAC to operate from their territories, on the grounds that the prohibition on 
support for armed bands did not extend to forces engaged in the struggle to overthrow 
apartheid, led the regime to enter into non-aggression pacts with Swaziland and 
Mozambique in which the prohibition on support for armed bands was reiterated, the 
Nkomati Accord of 1984, between South Africa and Mozambique, provided in art 3 that: 
 
‘The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories…to be used as a 
base … by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals 
which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its 
inhabitants.’459 
 
Mozambique had as much to gain from this Accord as South Africa, as the South African 
government had secretly permitted the Mozambique rebel group RENAMO to operate in 
its territory. Similar non-aggression agreements were entered into between South Africa 
and the Bantustan states.”460    
 
Dugard maintained that: 
 
“The degree of control to be exercised by the state in order for conduct to be attributed to 
it arose in the Nicaragua Case. Here the question was whether violations of international 
                                                
458 Op cit Botha.  
459 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 505. 
460 Loc cit. 
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humanitarian law committed by a rebel group operating against the government of 
Nicaragua – known as the contras – might be attributable to the United States.”461 
 
The same question that arose in the Nicaragua case was begged in the 
case of South Africa’s support of the rebel group RENAMO in 
Mozambique’s civil war, and equally their support of ANC and the armed 
struggle in South Africa. 
 
4.6.7 Mr PW Botha Stops ARMSCOR’S Weaponisation Programme: 
Shutting-Off of the Development of Nuclear Weapons – the 
1985 Meeting 
The term ‘weaponisation’ as it pertains to nuclear weapons includes ‘pre-
nuclear testing’ in a research laboratory. Weaponisation is one of the 
applied research processes that occur contiguously with the gradual 
development of a deliverable nuclear bomb. Weaponisation includes inter 
alia the miniaturising of cumbersome non-deliverable nuclear components, 
including miniaturising nuclear explosive devices, and involves the 
iterative improvement of delivery systems. For this reason the researcher 
decided to include the weaponisation process in the pre-testing phase of 
the development of a nuclear bomb, which itself is a subset of nuclear 
testing.  
 
Professor Stumpf confirmed that Mr PW Botha was deeply opposed to 
South Africa’s nuclear weaponisation process and that it was when further 
weaponisation and testing were contemplated that he curtailed the nuclear 
programme: 
 
“Mr PW Botha had always been adamant that they would never be used as a tactical 
deterrent, even if some members of the security establishment may have had such 
ideals. 
 
Firstly, use of any such device (that would literally have to be dropped out of the door of a 
large aircraft, as they were never designed for delivery) by South Africa would have 
invited massive retaliation by the Superpowers, and South Africa’s major cities would 
                                                
461 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 275. 
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have been flattened within two weeks, and secondly the conflict in Southern Africa at that 
time was of a dispersed type and very much of an internal one.462…  
 
Where would South Africa have used such weapons without harming itself? Although a 
lot of negative things have been said about Mr PW Botha (and I am not a fan of his), he 
was realistic enough to know that any military intentions with the devices would have 
destroyed South Africa at the time.463 For that I think one should give credit where credit 
is due, at least in academic circles.”464 
 
“They were only devices suitable for testing and the weapons were not deliverable glide-
bombs.” 465 … My comment on PW Botha is based solely on his role in rolling back South 
Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. Very few people are aware of this. My commentary 
is not based on the political aspect of this process, because politics is outside of my 
domain of expertise.  
 
I need to correct your thinking on an important matter. I was never part of the 
development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. I got involved at a very late 
stage in its relinquishment. 
 
My predecessor (Wynand de Villiers) at the AEC was obviously in the Chair until I took 
over. De Villiers had been part of the build-up process over many years. Now, he is 
unfortunately dead. He died some years ago – he was a heavy smoker. He was head of 
the AEC when I was brought in on the dismantling side of the nuclear weapons 
programme. De Villiers was first of all the Chairman, and then later the non-executive 
Chairman, of the AEC. (It was a part-time job for him in the non-executive Chairman role.) 
 
It follows that I had many discussions with him about the dismantling process. I needed to 
have an in-depth understanding of the entire process.”466 
 
Professor Stumpf confirmed that although some members of the military 
establishment might have had ideals of a tactical deterrent usage of 
nuclear weapons, their view did not hold sway. Implicit in Stumpf’s 
                                                
462 Op cit Stumpf. Stumpf’s stated concerns are about the escalatory potential of nuclear weapons, 
their lack of proportionality, and their indiscriminate nature. All of these matters were raised 
before the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion.  In this regard Stumpf’s view converges with that of 
Barnard, Mouton, De Klerk and Botha. 
463 The anticipated retaliation would have been disproportionate.   
464 Mr Pik Botha made a similar observation in his interview.  
465 Stumpf’s critique of the research proposal revealed to the researcher that there is a pervasive 
factual inaccuracy in the literature on South Africa’s nuclear weapons status. This inaccuracy is 
characterised by: exaggeration of South Africa’s technological advancement, incorrect dates, 
incorrect technical specifications, incorrect understanding of the nuclear chain of command; and 
incorrect understanding of the structured and legal role of the IAEA and the remit of the 
inspectors.  
466 Op cit Stumpf. 
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argument is the submission that the wars in which South Africa was 
involved at that time were not the right types of war for the deployment of 
this type of weapon. Had they been deployed in the course of these 
regional wars, this deployment would not have been jus in bello – it would 
have been contrary to international humanitarian law, because the waging 
of such a war would have annihilated civilians and non-combatants. South 
Africa arguably did have the right to go to war – jus ad bellum; but this 
right is in itself acknowledged by the laws of war as they pertain to jus in 
bello. 
 
Professor Stumpf confirmed that the processes of nuclear relinquishment 
and accession to the NPT were set in motion at least as long ago as 1985, 
and that President PW Botha was the person who precipitated this. It is 
also clear that the dismantlement process was the opposite to that of 
weaponisation. Professor Stumpf recollected that:  
 
“De Villiers told me that at all of the meetings that he attended with President PW Botha, 
PW was always adamant that these nuclear devices would never be used in war. De 
Villiers explained to me that PW Botha was absolutely horrified at some point when the 
ARMSCOR people start talking in that direction. 
 
De Villiers informed me that he had attended a decisive meeting in 1985. It was at this 
meeting that the future of this whole nuclear weapons programme was decided. This was 
the key 1985 meeting. 
 
Wynand de Villiers told me that that the meeting was called to review the entire nuclear 
weapons programme in South Africa. He explained to me that at that point the 
ARMSCOR people had started thinking about how to expand this nuclear technology into 
more sophisticated deliverable devices. They also started assessing how to miniaturise 
them into missiles and so forth. ARMSCOR had already started on some paper work and 
designs capable of sophisticated deliverable devices.  
 
Evidently, PW Botha came to hear about ARMSCOR’s plans and was deeply alarmed. 
He said. ‘Let’s have a meeting to decide where this matter of the nuclear arsenal is 
going.’ 
 
Wynand de Villiers actually said to me that at that meeting PW almost exploded. He was 
actually very angry, and he was known for his anger and temper. He told the ARMSCOR 
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people: ‘You guys are crazy!’ He said: ‘There is no way that we can ever use these 
devices in a military context.’ 
 
I have to say that I agree with this logic for the following reasons: Where would we have 
used the nuclear bombs? They could not feasibly be used in the bush war. They could 
not throw them on Soweto or destroy Johannesburg. These nuclear bombs simply did not 
make sense. 
 
PW Botha actually ordered that this nuclear weapons programme should be immediately 
curtailed. He stated that it would never be allowed to go beyond (the then) current six-
and-a-half devices. At that point there were about four or five nuclear devices. 
 
Then the ARMSCOR people said to PW: ‘What do we do with all our people who will lose 
their jobs? We have lots of people that are doing paperwork and making designs.’ 
 
PW eventually relented. He said that ARMSCOR could continue with the nuclear 
programme until they had made the seventh device, but thereafter there would be no 
further work and the programme would end then. He said that the ARMSCOR employees 
who were involved in the nuclear weapons programme could carry on with ‘some 
paperwork ... nothing else’. 
 
PW Botha should be given credit for this. He was realistic enough to have realised that 
there was no way that he could use these things. 
 
Another point is that in 1985 the ARMSCOR employees who had been involved in the 
nuclear weapons programme started gradually moving out of this programme. Engineers 
and scientists were able to judge for themselves that this process was going nowhere. 
They started looking for other work elsewhere. They started moving out of ARMSCOR 
slowly, to seek employment in areas involving the design of conventional weapons and 
so forth”.467 
 
A nuclear programme is also an economic and financial programme, and 
the nuclear scientists naturally had personal career objectives. It was 
when these career plans were curtailed that the nuclear scientists sought 
work elsewhere. One can therefore deduce that the reason the nuclear 
programme was extended until 1989 was because it offered a form of 
social job provision, until the scientists were able to find alternative 
employment. 
 
                                                
467 Loc cit.  
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It would appear that there was a danger of an internal ‘bandwagon’ effect 
developing at ARMSCOR, where a powerful group of scientists might have 
developed tactical nuclear weapon proclivities. Professor Stumpf 
emphasised the concerns about the disproportionate, indiscriminate, and 
escalatory nature of nuclear weapons, which would render their usage 
illegal in terms of natural law.  
 
Professor Stumpf referred to the danger of a pre-test nuclear 
weaponisation process developing its own momentum and then spiraling 
out of control. The testing scenario could then have slipped into testing, 
field usage and deployment. PW Botha understood this danger and 
stopped it. Professor Stumpf stated that extreme reprisal and escalation 
risks would have been associated with any military usage of nuclear 
weapons, testing of nuclear weapons and possession of such weapons. 
The rules of proportionality, neutrality, necessity, and discrimination would 
all have come under threat had these weapons been deployed in any way 
whatsoever.468 Stumpf identifies all these themes in his expostulation (as 
do all the other respondents in theirs) with varying degrees of emphasis 
and differing degrees of nuance.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter the respondents’ understanding of the legality of South 
Africa’s nuclear policy was explored by analysis of their testimony, 
together with phenomenological reduction and literature research. In 
South Africa, the evolution of agreed-upon customary norms on the 
legality of nuclear weapons took place over a long period of time, at least 
from 1977 to 1991. The evolution of the higher customary norms on the 
legality of nuclear weapons took place in a polarised society and in the 
context of war and peace. 
 
                                                
468 Moxley, Charles J. 2000. Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World. 
Lanham, MD: Austin & Winfield. 1–7.  
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The general themes of this analysis were: 
 
• The legality of military usage;  
• The legality of deterrent usage of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal; 
• The legality of possession of nuclear weapons; and 
• The legality of testing of nuclear weapons.   
 
These questions could not be neatly disaggregated and were articulated 
by the respondents as bonded themes. The reader will have noted that the 
respondents’ views often differed from one another and so should be 
cautious about making generalisations. The respondents afforded an 
ambiguous justification on the legality of South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
programme. This ambiguity was manifested in the unanimous view that 
any actual military usage of nuclear weapons would have been illegal, a 
malum, a crime against humanity, and therefore contrary to international 
humanitarian law per se. This insight was offered in the form of a moral or 
ethical argument and presented in the form of natural law – jus cogens. 
 
But on the other hand, the respondents contended that South Africa’s 
limited policy of nuclear deterrence was lawful. The respondents deemed 
that any military usage of nuclear weapons would be illegal. The 
respondents seemed to infer that a State might lawfully possess nuclear 
weapons and use this possession as an ambiguous threat to signify 
possible preparedness to deploy the weapons as a part of real politik. 
They did not appear to construe the deterrent threat as being illegal, 
because the nuclear-weapons-states had possessed them for years, and 
there was usus in deterrence (on the part of the nuclear-weapons-states). 
The respondents’ view on nuclear deterrence seemed to correspond with 
a narrow interpretation of the Lotus case, namely; that what is not 
expressly prohibited is permissible. They subscribed to a natural law 
corollary that the escalation of deterrence into actual operational usage 
would be illegal per se, but did not present the concepts of deterrence and 
usage as causally connected. The respondents therefore justified South 
Africa’s use of nuclear weapons as a limited instrument of deterrence. The 
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basic line of reasoning was that the Big Five Nuclear-Weapons-States, 
which included the Accessory Powers to the NPT, used nuclear weapons 
for deterrent purposes, so why could other states such as South Africa not 
do the same? South Africa’s attempt to derive a tangible deterrent quid pro 
quo for nuclear relinquishment and accession does not appear to have 
been successful, but it did derive various intangible benefits of creating 
goodwill, trust and therefore may have contributed directly to the 
withdrawal of sanctions and international embargoes. It probably did 
therefore set the stage for inverting South Africa’s pariah status into a 
more positive international recognition. I inferred from the respondents that 
any nuclear testing would have been extremely provocative and 
tantamount to an act of aggression. For this reason, my inference is that 
they regarded nuclear testing as illegal and in breach of international 
customary law. 
 
I inferred that similar logic applied to the possession of nuclear weapons. 
One could quibble about whether it was legal in a limited sense, but it was 
unquestionably highly provocative and might have been construed as a 
symbolic act of aggression. 
 
Table 4.1 offers a synopsis of the researcher’s interpretation of the 
respondents’ understanding of the legality of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons policy as inferred from the interviews. This synopsis is 
impressionistic and derived by inference from the contents of the 
interviews and is subject to criticism and correction. The legal themes that 
were reflected upon included: legality of any military usage; deterrence; 
possession and testing. 
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Table 4.1: A Synopsis of the Respondents’ Understanding of the 
Legality of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Policy  
 
Respondent Neil 
Barnard 
Pik Botha FW de Klerk Mike Louw Wynand 
Mouton 
Waldo 
Stumpf 
 Military 
usage  
Per se 
illegal 
Per se illegal Per se illegal Per se 
illegal 
Per se 
illegal 
Per se 
illegal 
Deterrence  Legal, but  
iniquitous. 
Should be 
able to 
derive 
maximum 
tangible gain  
Legal (Mr 
Botha used 
the deterrent 
argument to 
get a reprieve 
from USA)  
Legal, but 
iniquitous. 
Should not 
seek 
maximum 
tangible gain 
Per se 
illegal 
Legal, but 
futile 
Legal, but 
futile 
Possession Perhaps 
legal, but 
highly 
provocative. 
Should be 
obligation on 
NWS as well 
as NNWS to 
relinquish. 
Should be 
universally 
illegal 
Currently 
legal, but 
highly 
provocative. 
Should be an 
obligation to 
relinquish 
Currently 
legal, but 
NWS should 
have 
obligation to 
relinquish. 
The method of 
relinquishment 
needs to be 
very carefully 
discovered. 
Should be 
universally 
illegal (Treaty 
of Pelindaba) 
Per se 
illegal 
Currently 
legal, but 
should be 
obligation to 
relinquish 
Currently 
legal, but 
should be 
obligation to 
relinquish  
Testing Per se 
illegal 
Per se Illegal 
– an act of 
gross 
irresponsibility 
Per se Illegal Per se 
illegal 
Per se 
illegal 
Per se 
illegal 
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Chapter Five 
The Logic Underlying the Decision to Relinquish the 
Nuclear Arsenal and Accede to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter will explore the logic underlying the decision to relinquish the 
nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. In essence, it addresses the ‘why’ 
question. In this regard, it presents a commentary on state recognition in 
South Africa and the concerns that existed relating to state continuity in 
the light of the transition to a non-racial constitutional democracy. It will be 
shown that the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
NPT constituted an important feature of that transition. Mr de Klerk was 
concerned about codifying the rules relating to the succession of the State 
as they pertained to inter alia the NPT in order to ensure juridical security 
with respect to South Africa’s international relations.469 Mr de Klerk’s 
concerns under international law could be broadly categorised by the 
themes raised in certain articles of the Vienna Convention on Succession 
of States in Respect of Treaties470 as they related to the ‘new’ South 
Africa’s “position with respect of the treaties of the predecessor State”;471 
“participation in treaties in force at the date of the succession of States”;472 
“participation in treaties not in force at the date of the succession of 
States;”473 and “participation in treaties signed by the predecessor State 
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval”.474 
 
Secondly, the views or animus of the respondents will be presented 
together with phenomenological reductions in order to clarify the logic 
underlying the decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the 
                                                
469 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. Signed at Vienna 23 August 
1978. Not yet entered into force. 
470 Op cit Vienna Convention. 
471 Loc cit Article 16. 
472 Loc cit Article 17. 
473 Loc cit Article 18. 
474 Loc cit Article 19. 
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. These will lead 
towards a conclusion. 
 
The most important reason underlying South Africa’s decision to relinquish 
its nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT was that this was deemed by 
Mr FW de Klerk to be an absolutely necessary, but not sufficient, step that 
should be taken in order to pave the way for the successful negotiation of 
South Africa’s constitutional transition.475 South Africa’s racial policy of 
apartheid effectively accorded it the recognition status of a ‘pariah state’. 
This deteriorating international recognition status was acquired 
incrementally over a period of many years. The comprehensive 
international sanctions and trade embargoes that were levied against 
South Africa were emblematic of this pariah status. Mr de Klerk took the 
decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT because 
he calculated that this action would mitigate the risks of a break-down in 
state continuity and juridical security both during and after- the 
constitutional transition. Had Mr de Klerk not taken great care in 
relinquishing the nuclear arsenal and acceding to the NPT, the stark truth 
is that South Africa could have become a failed state. 
 
According to John Dugard, a failed state has the following legal status: 
 
“An existing recognised state may descend into anarchy and lawlessness to such an 
extent that it ceases to meet the requirements of statehood expounded in the Montevideo 
Convention. It retains its territory and population but lacks an effective, central 
governmental authority. 
 
Warlords control parts of the state. But the state itself, without a central government, is 
unable to maintain order or to provide the most basic services for its people. Such a state 
may be described as a ‘juridical state’ in the sense that it exists only as an international 
legal person with no substance to back its claim to statehood. Alternatively, it may be 
described as a ‘failed state’ ... International law cannot be blamed for the break-down of 
government authority in a state, but it can be blamed for maintaining the appearance of 
                                                
475 The de-aggregation of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions into two separate chapters was structured 
for reasons of clarity. It is a fact that these two questions are actually interrelated. The ‘why’ and 
the ‘how’ questions are in fact inseparable, and dialectically interrelated. For this reason, the 
reader should regard Chapter Five and Chapter Six as presenting a logical continuum. 
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statehood by continuing to accept such an entity as a state; and for allowing such an 
entity to continue to function at the international level through membership in international 
governmental organizations. Moreover, international law can be blamed for 
accommodating the failed state by relaxing the requirement of effectiveness – effective 
government – as a requirement for statehood, for allowing legality to replace 
effectiveness.”476   
 
This spectre of failed statehood articulated by Professor Dugard above 
was the labyrinth that Mr de Klerk negotiated to avoid its becoming a 
reality and manifesting itself in South Africa. It is noted that South Africa’s 
northern neighbour, Zimbabwe, circa 2010 fits quite solemnly into these 
failed state criteria and that the reality of failed statehood has close 
proximity.  
 
John Dugard makes the additional point that: 
 
“Changes in government do not affect the personality of the state or its rights and 
obligations of its predecessor, however it came into existence…The core question 
confronting the matter of recognition was ‘does the government actually represent the 
government and does it warrant recognition?’ ”477 
 
For this reason it is argued that the ANC would have had an obligation 
erga omnes under international customary law to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons had they been bequeathed these weapons. Furthermore, it is 
obvious that the question of international recognition of the ANC would 
have been vastly complicated by their possession of a nuclear arsenal.  Its 
status as a national liberation movement was as yet unproved in its 
transition to statehood.  
 
Dugard cited Oppenheim thus: 
 
“A government which is in fact in control of the country and which enjoys the habitual 
obedience of the bulk of the population with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, 
                                                
476 Dugard, John. 2007. International Law: A South African Perspective (with contributions by 
Bethlehem, Daniel, du Plessis, Max & Katz, Anton). Third Edition. Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd. 
109–110. 
477 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 111. 
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can be said to represent the state in question and as such to be deserving of 
recognition ...”478  
 
In South Africa, the majority of the population became habitually and 
increasingly disobedient under the civil disobedience campaigns which 
were manifested in strikes, mass action, violence and the programme of 
making the country ungovernable.  Mr de Klerk was preoccupied with the 
continuity of the South African state.  He was very worried about a 
constitutional hiatus developing between the old Constitution and the new. 
There was concern about the absence of the assured protection and 
juridical security under an interim government. 
 
This preoccupation was manifested in inter alia the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution) and in 
the intense concern about interim governmental issues which was in its 
essence a structure created to ensure constitutional continuity during the 
negotiated settlement. The ANC sought to draft a new Constitution in an 
elected constituent assembly after an interim government had been 
installed. Mr de Klerk opposed this, because the ANC left unstated the 
question of what constitutional principles would prevail to guide the interim 
government. This is the constitutional vacuum to which Mr de Klerk refers 
in his animus, and it can be understood as the practical manifestation of 
his concern about juridical security.479 
 
The ANC set out these principles in the proposed ’Transition to 
Democracy Act‘, which consisted of a discussion document suggesting 
amendments to the South African Constitution, intended to lead to the 
establishment of an interim government.  
 
Ian Brownlie has this to say on the issue of state continuity: 
 
                                                
478 Loc cit.  
479 Ebrahim, Hassen. 1998. The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press. 59. 
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“The term ‘continuity’ of States is not employed with any precision, and may be used to 
preface a diversity of legal problems. Thus it may introduce the proposition that the legal 
rights and responsibility of states are not affected by changes in the head of the state, or 
the internal form of government. This proposition can, of course, be maintained without 
reference to a concept of continuity or succession, and it is in any case too general, since 
political changes may result in a change of circumstances sufficient to affect particular 
types of treaty relation. More significantly, legal doctrine tends to distinguish between 
continuity (and identity) and state succession. The latter arises when one international 
personality takes the place of another, for example by union or lawful annexation. In 
general, it is assumed that cases of state succession are likely to involve important 
changes in the legal status and rights of the entities concerned, whereas if there is 
continuity, the legal personality and the particular rights and duties of the state remain 
unaltered. Unfortunately, the general categories of continuity and state succession and 
the assumption of a neat distinction between them, only makes a difficult subject more 
confused by masking variations of circumstance and the complexity of the legal problems 
that arise in practice. Succession and continuity are levels of abstraction unfitted to 
dealing with specific issues … 
 
Further, political and legal experience provide several examples of situations in which 
there is continuity but the precise circumstances, and the relevant principles of law and 
good policy, dictate solutions which are only partially conditioned by the element of 
continuity. Legal techniques may well entail relying on continuity in one context, but 
denying its existence in another.”480 
 
Brownlie’s commentary cited above will be shown to be of general 
contextual relevance to Mr de Klerk’s logic underlying the decision to 
relinquish the weapons and accede to the NPT. 
 
5.2 State Recognition 
There are many countries with exceptionally poor and indeed atrocious 
human rights records which have been recognised and admitted by the 
United Nations. The abuse of human rights has not been used as a basis 
for the retraction of UN recognition. In recent times, particularly since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been suggestions, particularly by 
the European Community, that a priority criterion for statehood should be 
                                                
480 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 80. 
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that only those states which afford respect to human rights should be 
afforded recognition.481 
 
South Africa’s constitutional transition took place at the same time as did 
the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and it was influenced by a similar set of 
constitutional values and optimism that prevailed at the time. One of the 
core purposes of the South African constitutional negotiations was to 
establish a framework for the pre-eminence of human rights inscribed in a 
Bill of Rights. This would contribute to changing South Africa’s stigma of 
being regarded as a pariah state into being acknowledged as a respected 
member of the community of nations. Had South Africa retained its nuclear 
arsenal, its policy of apartheid, and opposition to state independence, its 
jaundiced international recognition status would have remained 
unchanged, because respect for human rights and self-determination are 
requirements for effective and organised government. There is no legal 
duty for a state to recognise another that complies with the criteria of 
statehood. The recognition of a state is a considered political and legal 
decision.482  
 
John Dugard asserted: 
 
“While it would be ridiculous to deny the statehood of North Korea, which it has 
demonstrated in its capacity to enter into relations with other states by entering into 
diplomatic relations with over fifty other states, it would be equally ridiculous to accord 
statehood to an entity which produces no evidence of such a capacity other than its 
government structure – as was the case with Bophuthatswana and is the case with the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In the final analysis, therefore, recognition does 
play a role in the creation of a state.”483    
 
Dugard contended further: 
 
“No rules are prescribed for the act of recognition. Usually it will take the form of a public 
declaration by the recognising state which is conveyed to the claimant state. In some 
                                                
481 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 88. 
482 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 92. 
483 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 93. 
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cases it may be implied from the conduct of the recognising state, but such an inference 
should not be drawn too readily.”484  
 
This absence of proscribed rules does not diminish the importance of state 
recognition. For Mr de Klerk, the symbolic moment when South Africa’s 
changed recognition status was acknowledged was when he met with Mr 
George W Bush (Senior) in the Rose Garden at the White House in 
Washington DC. At that historic meeting, Mr Bush pronounced that the 
changes in South Africa were irreversible.485 This was interpreted by Mr de 
Klerk to be indicative of a practical manifestation of a new and positive 
form of state recognition that would in due course be attributed to South 
Africa. 
 
John Dugard486 outlined the trajectory of South Africa’s pariah recognition 
status thus: 
 
“Initially South Africa was attacked for its discriminatory treatment of Indians. Later, after 
the National Party came to power on the platform of apartheid, South Africa became a 
symbol of racial injustice in a world committed to racial equality and decolonisation. South 
Africa’s protests that her racial policies were a domestic issue that fell outside the 
jurisdiction of the United Nations at first received the support of Western States, but after 
the police shooting of peaceful demonstrators at Sharpeville in 1960, this support 
disappeared, and apartheid was regarded as a matter of international concern, as a 
violation of the clauses in the Charter promoting human rights, and later as a crime 
against humanity. In the ensuing thirty years, South Africa became a pariah state against 
which a wide range of United Nations-sponsored measures were taken, including a 
mandatory arms embargo in 1977 and exclusion from participation in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1974.”487    
 
Mr de Klerk’s intention was to invert this pariah status. That was a key 
motivating force behind his decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and 
to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This 
                                                
484 Loc cit. The reader will recall that this matter of the failed recognition attempt with regard to 
Bophuthatswana came into prominence in the preceding chapter in the analysis of the Uranium 
Red Book incident, which involved South Africa’s using the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s international publication and membership to promote recognition of this phantom state. 
485 Interview with FW de Klerk at the Offices of the FW de Klerk Foundation in Plattekloof, Cape 
Town on 4 October 2007. 
486 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 88 and 96. 
487 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 20. 
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initiative can be understood as a proactive attempt by Mr de Klerk to 
secure a new and positive form of state recognition for South Africa. It was 
Mr de Klerk’s view that South Africa’s constitutional settlement would lack 
the necessary international approval and legitimacy if these nuclear 
weapons were retained and if South Africa were not to accede to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
The five Accessory Powers (United States of America, Soviet Union, 
United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China, and France) were ad 
idem that South Africa’s possession of a nuclear arsenal was a threat to 
world peace. Mr de Klerk clearly understood that retaining these weapons 
could effectively veto the legitimacy of the constitutional transition.  
 
This is a new research finding and no such finding based on an expert 
research sample has been reported in the literature pertaining to South 
Africa’s constitutional transition. The imperative to create a new and 
credible Constitution in South Africa was therefore the inspiration behind 
the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT. If 
South Africa had retained its nuclear arsenal, and not acceded to the NPT, 
the credibility of Mr Mandela would have been compromised. Mr 
Mandela’s presidency would have been hobbled in the controversial legal, 
moral, political and military quagmire of nuclear possession and nuclear 
threshold statehood. North Korea, Iran and Iraq have all had experience of 
this demeaning international recognition status.  
 
The African National Congress (ANC), like the National Party government 
of South Africa, had experienced recognition challenges. It was listed as a 
terrorist organisation in the United States of America even after it had 
become the democratically-elected government of South Africa. In fact, Mr 
Mandela’s name was taken off a United States list of terrorist travellers 
only in 2008.  
 
It would have been very difficult for the ANC, which was a national 
liberation movement prior to becoming the government of South Africa, to 
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pursue an internationally-legitimate constitutional settlement while 
retaining a nuclear-proliferating capability. The ANC was accorded a 
specific type of legal personality in terms of international law. Had it been 
involved in nuclear proliferation, it would have proscribed its legal authority 
as a national liberation movement, accorded by the Nuclear Weapon 
States and the United Nations. No national liberation movement would be 
legally permitted to possess nuclear weapons. 
 
Brownlie explained that: 
 
“Exile governments may be accorded considerable powers within the territory of most 
states and be active in various political spheres. Apart from voluntary concessions by 
states and the use of exile governments as agencies for illegal activities against lawfully 
established governments and states, the legal status of exile governments is 
consequential on the legal community it claims to represent, which may be a state, a 
belligerent community, or non-self-governing people. Prima facie legal status will be 
established more readily when its exclusion from the community of which it is an agency 
results from acts contrary to jus cogens, for example, an unlawful resort to force. 
 
It is my view that the ANC’s bombing of Koeberg nuclear power station 
during the period of construction and prior to its becoming operational 
created lasting international suspicion as to its good faith.488 The decision 
by the leadership of the ANC to bomb a civil nuclear power station situated 
on the outskirts of metropolitan Cape Town surely created considerable 
alarm amongst the IAEA; the General Assembly of the United Nations; the 
Security Council and many individual states and gave credence to the 
ANC’s being cast as a terrorist organisation. Had significant mortality and 
nuclear fallout accompanied this bombing, I am quite confident that this 
incident would have converted into a major long-term recognition problem 
for this mass democratic movement, from which they might not have ever 
recovered. 
 
Ian Brownlie discussed the legal status of belligerent and insurgent 
communities: 
                                                
488 The bombing took place on 22 December 1982. 
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“(c) Belligerent and insurgent communities 
 
In practice, belligerent and insurgent bodies within a state may enter into legal relations 
and conclude agreements valid on the international plane with states and other 
belligerents and insurgents. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has attributed treaty-making capacity 
to parastatal entities recognised as possessing a definite if limited form of international 
personality, for example insurgent communities recognised as having belligerent status – 
de facto authorities in control of specific territory. This status of the particular belligerent 
community may be affected by the considerations offered elsewhere as to the principle of 
self-determination and the personality of non-self governing peoples. A belligerent 
community often represents a political movement aiming at independence and 
secession.”489 
 
This citation from Ian Brownlie shows that the ANC as an insurgent 
movement did have the necessary legal personality to be involved in the 
relinquishment and accession decision. It was not involved in these 
matters because its credentials of diligentia quam in suis were unproved, 
and South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and accession were matters too 
weighty to be delegated to unproved novices. 
 
5.3 The Reasons the Decision was Reached to Relinquish the 
Nuclear Arsenal and to Accede to the NPT: Mr FW de Klerk’s 
Testimony and Animus 
The term animus refers to an intention or a state of mind. In this analysis 
Mr de Klerk’s animus as it related to the decision to relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal and accede to the NPT will be explored. Mr de Klerk’s 
predominant focus in his interview was to address the question of why he 
had reached the decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal. This decision 
was reached because South Africa’s possession of a nuclear arsenal 
would have prevented, or significantly obstructed, his mission to negotiate 
a non-racial and democratic Constitution. 
 
                                                
489 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 63. 
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The essential reason for this was contained in the search for international 
trust. In the Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, one of the aims of the NPT is stated as: 
 
“Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of 
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and international control.”490 
 
Mr de Klerk effectively enacted the intention of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as cited above.  
 
5.3.1 To Have Retained Possession of Nuclear Weapons While 
Actively Advocating a Peaceful Negotiated Constitutional 
Settlement would have Signified a Cynical and Opposite 
Intent 
Mr de Klerk was uncomfortable with nuclear weapons. He did not see any 
place for their ever being used except in a limited deterrent sense. This 
discomfort had moral, legal and practical origins. A decision to retain these 
weapons would have begged the questions: Why and for what purpose 
were they retained? What would be done with these weapons in South 
Africa, and would they have been proliferated in the international weapons 
market? This would have been petitio principii. 
 
Mr de Klerk was sincerely pursuing a peaceful and inclusive constitutional 
settlement. The retention of the nuclear arsenal and non-accession to the 
NPT would have signified that he was not pursuing this constitutional 
settlement in good faith. This is substantiated by Mr de Klerk’s decision 
not to bequeath the nuclear arsenal to the ANC. He actually protected Mr 
Mandela from the odious pariah state recognition connotations of the new 
South Africa being born a threshold nuclear state. South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons had very rapidly become a military relic of the pre-Berlin Wall 
phase of the Cold War. For Mr de Klerk, the notion that agreements are 
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binding and need to be implemented in good faith was a basic moral value 
as far as the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons was concerned – pacta sunt servanda. 
 
The inappropriate and obsolete deterrent power of the South African 
nuclear arsenal was manifest to Mr de Klerk at a time when hitherto sworn 
enemies were coming together after many years of bitter conflict, laying 
down their differences, and seeking to negotiate a new shared 
Constitution. There could be no pacta sunt servanda if the ominous threats 
of nuclear weapons were to be included in the constitutional transition, as 
this would have implied the desire to revert to the previous apartheid order 
rather than the pursuit of an unknown, risky and shared future together. 
There is, of course, another doctrine, which is a much better analogy than 
pacta sunt servanda, given that there was no pact. This is contained in 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and 
concerns the “obligation not to defeat the object of a treaty prior to its entry 
into force”.491 In this regard: 
 
“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty when: 
 
(a) it has signed the treaty or exchanged instruments constituting a treaty subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not 
to become a party to the treaty; or  
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into 
force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly 
delayed.”492 
 
It is recalled that South Africa had acquiesced in a bilateral agreement 
concluded with the AEC (on behalf of South Africa) and the United States 
on 31 January 1987 that it would abide by “the spirit and the letter of the 
NPT”.493 It is my contention that this bilateral agreement signified 
compliance with Article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
                                                
491 The Convention entered into force on 27 January 1980 and 91 states became parties.  
492 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
493 Masiza, Zondi. 1993. ‘A Chronology of South Africa’s Nuclear Program’. The 
Nonproliferation Review, 35–55, Fall. 43. 
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Treaties. Ian Sinclair asserts that “there is some inchoate authority for the 
Proposition that States which have signed a treaty subject to ratification 
must observe certain restraints on their activity during the period 
preceding entry into force, particularly if these activities would render the 
performance by any party of the obligations stipulated impossible or more 
difficult”.494  
 
It will be shown in the next chapter dealing with how South Africa 
relinquished its nuclear arsenal that it showed great restraint in its 
approach towards accession to the NPT. Ian Sinclair’s ‘inchoate authority’ 
was coherent in the instance of South Africa’s relinquishment and 
accession. South Africa had signalled an intention to be bound by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in terms of Article 18(b) from 
the time when the nuclear weapons silos were discovered at Vastrap in 
the Kalahari Desert on 8 June 1977, although I concede that the latter 
argument is more tendentious. The cumulative observations that were 
offered in the previous chapter in terms of international customary law 
about South Africa’s intention to accede to the NPT, over the years and in 
the context of various crises in its international relations, signal that there 
was a growing, but unconscious, compliance with Article 18(b). This gives 
further credence to the assertion I have made that South Africa was bound 
by the NPT long before it had signed it. 
 
Mr de Klerk recalled that:  
 
“I was never enthusiastic about South Africa having atomic bombs. I always felt deep 
down that there were many more negatives than positives in having nuclear arms. When I 
became the President of South Africa, I immediately realised that I had to address the 
issue of South Africa’s nuclear status as a priority.  
 
I was quite uncomfortable with our nuclear capability, and my instincts led me to act 
sooner, rather than later. One of the reasons I was uncomfortable with our nuclear arms 
capability was that I, as the leader of the National Party, was actively advocating a 
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negotiated constitutional solution for South Africa, and here we had weapons of mass 
destruction that signified the diametrically opposite intent. Part of my political strategy that 
underwrote my advocacy of the pursuit of a negotiated constitutional solution was what I 
regarded as the imperative to credibly convince the international community that we were 
not playing games about our intention to negotiate a constitutional solution. I needed to 
act in a way that would build trust. I did not want to be seen by the international 
community as playing games and playing for time.”495 
 
Phenomenological Reduction  
Mr de Klerk’s focus on the imperative for being seen as ‘not playing 
games ... by the international community’ can be assessed in a variety of 
different ways. Dr Hans Blix refers on many occasions to how the Iraqis 
chose to play the game of what he termed ‘cat and mouse’, and effectively 
defied the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission for Iraq (UNMOVIC). This defiance or flouting of an 
organisation entrusted with the remit from the United Nations Security 
Council, which is the highest voice of international law in the world, was 
most provocative. It meant firstly that the inspectors were not able to 
ascertain properly the substantive facts of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction. Secondly, playing games damaged trust and interpersonal 
relationships. Playing games was interpreted by members of the Security 
Council as non-co-operation by Iraq, under international law. This 
destruction of trust for the inspection regime had enormously negative 
human consequences for Iraq, as it was one of the factors that legitimated 
the subsequent invasion. Thirdly, it meant that the process of the 
relinquishment of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was 
inappropriate. It follows therefore that the failure in Iraq existed at the level 
of substance, relationship and process. De Klerk is asserting that all three 
of these dimensions were essential to the success of South Africa’s 
relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT. 
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“I wanted sanctions lifted. (Recognition I also deeply wanted, to ensure that a negotiated 
solution between South Africans would be negotiated free from international pressure.)496 
I perceived that this matter of the bomb was one of the areas that could assist in 
achieving a turnabout in international pressure, away from sanctions, if it was handled 
with delicacy and appropriately.”497 
 
Mr de Klerk asserted that the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal would 
create an excellent intangible trade-off of ‘goodwill’ in the area of state 
recognition, and counteract South Africa’s pariah recognition status. It was 
a qualitative trade-off and not a tangible, measurable and quantifiable 
trade-off. A qualitative trade-off is obviously different from a quantifiable 
trade-off. These different types of trade-offs have very different legal, 
logical and moral assumptions. They are predicated on different sets of 
values, and each requires a different negotiation strategy if benefit is to be 
derived. The achievement of a quantitative monetary reward for 
relinquishing nuclear weapons would have required engaging in 
distributive negotiations with the United States on the matter of nuclear 
relinquishment. The search for a qualitative trade-off (of positive 
recognition status being accorded to the new Constitution) required 
integrative negotiations. Dr Barnard advocated the goal of seeking a 
quantifiable and tangible quid pro quo in exchange for nuclear 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT. Negotiations around 
quantitative pay-backs in return for the relinquishment of the nuclear 
arsenal and accession to the NPT would have been value-claiming with 
competitive and conflictive underlying rules of engagement. However, the 
risk is that they could have invoked escalatory processes of tit-for-tat. 
Negotiations around qualitative pay-backs in return for the relinquishment 
of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT would have been value-
                                                
496 Neil Barnard, cited in Heald op cit, offers a comment that concurs with that of De Klerk: “I 
now want to discuss the matter of agreement that sovereign ownership of the negotiation solution 
would be South African. This is equally as important as the others that I have mentioned. From the 
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the Americans, and the UN, and Africa, and the Eminent Persons Group ... or anyone else.” 
Botha (2008) in his interview emphasised that the international pressure on South Africa to 
relinquish its nuclear weapons was sustained and relentless. The constitutional negotiations, 
although highly pressurised, were conducted, for the most part, without intrusive international 
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497 Op cit De Klerk.   
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sharing, with co-operative and collaborative rules of engagement. They 
would not have been accompanied by as great a risk of inducing 
escalatory processes of tit-for-tat.  
 
Mr de Klerk’s viewpoint was ultimately quite pragmatic. The qualitative 
strategy would render a return of affording a positive recognition status on 
South Africa’s new Constitution, while a search for a quantifiable and 
measurable trade-off for relinquishing the nuclear weapons was in actual 
fact much more risky and complex. The quest for material monetary and 
tangible rewards from the USA (for example) for relinquishing the nuclear 
arsenal and acceding to the NPT could easily have become a tortuous 
process, escalating international tension and exacerbating South Africa’s 
(then) pariah recognition status.   
 
The matter of treaty accession was used to signify South Africa’s re-
acceptance as a respected member of the international community after 
many years of pariah recognition status. This reacceptance would have 
been acknowledged through, inter alia, a Resolution from the United 
Nations General Assembly, acknowledging South Africa’s accession to the 
NPT; endorsement by the Nuclear-Weapons-States (US, Russia, China, 
France and the UK) that the relinquishment of the nuclear weapons was 
conducted with integrity, to the satisfaction of all Safeguards criteria; and 
confirmation from the USA that the constitutional negotiations were 
sincere and irreversible, and therefore legitimate. 
 
Mr de Klerk contended that the nuclear relinquishment process, accession 
to the NPT, and the constitutional transition in South Africa were deeply 
intertwined and interrelated. His essential argument was that it accorded 
South Africa’s democratic Constitution a new and positive form of 
recognition. 
 
Mr de Klerk specified that: 
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“My decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal was essentially a pragmatic decision. I 
instructed that it should be done rapidly. My conviction was that if we addressed the 
matter gradually in South Africa, it would create enormous problems. I was acutely aware 
that South Africa needed to adopt an internationally credible process to do so. I have 
always felt that the world should take a step backwards from nuclear weapons.”498 
 
The spectre of South Africa’s status deteriorating into that of a failed state 
was one that haunted the constitutional transition and represented a 
scenario that was totally unacceptable to Mr de Klerk and his team.   
 
Mr de Klerk consciously set himself four key performance standards with 
respect to the principle of diligentia quam in suis that needed to be met 
with respect to the nuclear relinquishment and accession process. The 
diligentia quam in suis essentially related to maintaining juridical security 
with respect to the succession of the apartheid state into the New South 
Africa. The more speedily relinquishment and accession was achieved, 
the more it would compel the ANC to adhere to treaties that were in force 
at the time of accession. In short, they would be met with a fait accompli. If 
the accession to the NPT had not been in place at the time of the 
conclusion of the constitutional negotiations it could have made it much 
more tortuous for the ANC to reach a decision on how to address the 
matter, because it was so intensely intricate.  
 
Mr de Klerk recollected that:  
 
“My announcement that the South African nuclear capability was relinquished, when I 
made it, was important because it provided proof that the constitutional negotiations and 
what was happening in that regard were: 
 
(a) Fundamental;  
(b) Serious; 
(c) That we were not playing games; 
(d) That there were no hidden agendas.499 
 
                                                
498 Op cit De Klerk. 
499 The four points mentioned above represent Mr de Klerk’s synopsis of the criteria that were 
essential for the creation of trust in the nuclear relinquishment process as a subsidiary factor and 
the Constitution itself as the dominant priority. 
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(In other words, the emerging South African constitutional framework should be 
recognised as having being negotiated in good faith, and with comity.) 
 
The package which I announced on 2 February 1990 was an initiative in the true sense of 
the word. I was acting on my deepest inner convictions when we embraced a new vision 
for South Africa. What was being done constitutionally in South Africa was being done 
because it should be done. It needed to be done. Continuous modifications needed to be 
incorporated into the constitutional transition in an orderly and structured manner. The 
change had to be ongoing and never interrupted.  Momentum could not be displaced.”500   
 
Mr de Klerk referred to both ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions pertaining to the 
relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal in the above citation. It has been 
submitted that the nuclear relinquishment process and accession to the 
NPT constituted an acid test for the credibility of the constitutional 
settlement. This acid test resides in Mr de Klerk’s four self-imposed criteria 
of credibility: 
 
• The nuclear relinquishment process, like the constitutional 
negotiations, was ‘fundamental’ in the sense that the weapons 
programme was disassembled and rolled back in its entirety under 
strict international oversight; 
• The nuclear relinquishment process was ‘serious’. It was almost 
perfectly and empirically verified; 
• It was conducted with comity, in a respectful, co-operative and 
collaborative manner, and there was no ‘playing games’; 
• There was complete and appropriate disclosure and discovery of 
nuclear information, and there was no residual retention of HEU 
and inappropriate alliances pertaining to the relinquishment and 
accession process. In other words, ‘there were no hidden agendas’. 
 
The above four criteria together encapsulated Mr de Klerk’s intention to 
create trust and good faith. 
 
                                                
500 Op cit De Klerk. 
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5.3.2 The Imperative of Retaining a Framework of Constitutionality 
in Relinquishing the Nuclear Weapons and Acceding to the 
NPT 
Mr de Klerk deemed it imperative that the Constitution should be written in 
a framework of constitutionality, and not in the vacuum of a Constitutional 
Assembly. The old Constitution (the interim Constitution) was the 
appropriate chrysalis for the creation of the new law. This analysis again 
falls logically into the framework offered by the Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978. It is inferred from Mr de 
Klerk’s testimony that it was intended that the treaties that were in force 
and pertained to apartheid South Africa should prevail in the new South 
Africa as well. In other words, the new South Africa would remain party to 
the NPT at the time of succession and all multilateral agreements that 
existed in international law would be upheld without variation. 
 
Mr de Klerk specifically wanted to ensure that the accession and 
relinquishment processes were completed prior to the ratification of the 
interim Constitution, because he deemed it preferable for the NPT to be 
concluded with the predecessor state. This was to ensure that parties that 
might have proliferation motives were confronted by a fait accompli in 
terms of international law. 
 
It can be deduced that In a worst case scenario, had there been a delay in 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
NPT, the following principle that arises from Article 19(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties would have 
been held to apply: 
 
“…if before the date of succession of States the predecessor State signed a multilateral 
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval and by the signature intended that 
the treaty should extend to the territory to which the succession States relates, the newly 
independent State may ratify, accept or approve the treaty as if it had signed that treaty 
and may thereby become a party or a contracting State to it.”501   
                                                
501 Op cit Vienna Convention Article 17(1). 
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According to Brownlie: 
 
“For certain legal purposes it is convenient to assume continuity in a political entity and 
thus give effect, after statehood has been attained, to legal acts occurring before 
independence. Considerations relating to the principle of self-determination and the 
personality of non-self-governing peoples may of course reinforce the doctrine of 
continuity.”502    
 
Professor Brownlie in the paragraph cited above is simply offering a 
converging opinion to Article 17(1) mentioned above.  
 
Mr de Klerk indicated that: 
 
“At the starting point the ANC insisted that we should suspend the Constitution and 
insisted that we should simply negotiate the composition of an interim government. They 
sought to use this process to call a Constitutional Assembly, whose main task would be 
then to write a constitution. 
 
We said ‘no’ to this, because you have to write a Constitution in a framework of 
constitutionality.”503  
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
It is evident that the differences in opinion between the preceding and 
successor regime were in this instance technical and related specifically to 
the matter of state continuity. Mr de Klerk’s basic intention was that there 
should be continuity in South Africa’s legal personality and that its rights 
and duties in terms of international law would remain unaltered. Mr de 
Klerk is entirely lucid on this point and it does not require further 
qualification. Professor Brownlie in the paragraph cited below provides 
further legal context for the choices that were posed to Mr de Klerk.  
 
According to Brownlie: 
 
“In general, it is assumed that cases of state succession are likely to involve important 
changes in the legal status and rights of the entities concerned, whereas if there is 
                                                
502 Op cit Brownlie at 62. 
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continuity the legal personality and the particular rights and duties remain unaltered. 
Unfortunately, the general categories of continuity and state succession and the 
assumption of a neat distinction between them, only makes a difficult subject more 
confused by masking the variations in circumstances and the complexities of the legal 
problems which arise in practice. ‘Succession’ and ‘continuity’ are levels of abstraction 
unfitted to dealing with specific issues.”504 
 
In the following citation, Hassen Ebrahim offered an ANC viewpoint on the 
matter. Their concern was that CODESA would prove to be an exercise in 
filibustering and they did not appear to regard the matter of South Africa’s 
State continuity in terms of juridical continuity with the same sense of 
urgency. They questioned the integrity of the motives. Ebrahim expressed 
the dilemma of state continuity and succession thus: 
 
“Mandela warned that progress in the talks depended on the decisions of CODESA 
having the force of law, since the ANC feared that without such a guarantee, the talks 
would be reduced to no more than a talk-shop. The government, however, was unwilling 
to compromise the sovereignty of Parliament. As an option, NP Secretary-General, 
Stoffel van der Merwe, argued that this would not be the case if the decisions of 
CODESA were also made with the express acquiescence of the NP. The ANC rejected 
this, as it would constitute a veto for the NP. The matter was finally resolved in a late-
night bilateral meeting between the ANC and the NP on 18 December, where the 
government agreed that CODESA would draft the legislation needed to give effect to 
convention decisions. The government undertook to do everything in its power to have 
the decisions of CODESA implemented.”505  
 
Mr de Klerk continued with his line of reasoning: 
 
“We were against creating a constitutional vacuum. The compromise that we reached 
was that we agreed to negotiate a transitional Constitution in terms of which there would 
be an election for Parliament. Parliament would then also act as the Constitution-making 
body to negotiate a final Constitution, which had to be in line with agreed-upon inviolate 
constitutional principles. 
 
The Constitutional Court then needed to certify the 1996 Constitution which, as you know, 
it duly did. In this way we removed the biggest stumbling block to the negotiations and it 
gave us the moral high ground. We did this in an orderly and constitutional way. 
 
                                                
504 Op cit Brownlie at 80. 
505 Op cit Ebrahim at 100–101. 
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Again, if you compare South Africa to Israel, they (Israel) have invoked a step-by-step 
approach to their constitutional transition. My viewpoint is that it is not working for the 
reason that I have offered above. (Constitutional continuity is not being well secured in 
Israel.) 
 
As a point of strategic principle, if I were to say to you, Geoff, at the outset that we 
needed to find a framework to reach ABC, then you need to give ABC a ‘kick-start’ that 
makes the achievement thereof a viable process.  
 
The pursuit of achieving the goal of ABC should not be pursued through a tortuous 
route.”506 [The route which Israel and Palestine chose circa January 2009 was precisely 
that circuitous route.] 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
This commentary illustrates unequivocally that for Mr de Klerk the biggest 
potential threat and stumbling block to the constitutional transition was the 
hazard of stepping into constitutional discontinuity. The emblematic theme 
of his discourse is the matter of juridical security of the South African 
State. Constitutional discontinuity could have most plausibly have arisen 
from the controversy associated with South Africa’s relinquishment of its 
nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT. 
 
Mr de Klerk’s concern about state continuity and succession related to the 
need for a guarantee that the transition in government did not alter the 
legal personality of South Africa and its associated rights and obligations 
that would be inherited from its predecessor in the process of coming into 
existence. South Africa needed to be conducting its ‘business as usual’, so 
that diplomatic relations continued unaltered. That was why Mr de Klerk 
deemed it imperative that the change to a new government should be 
conducted constitutionally. Had the changes in South African been 
achieved unconstitutionally, problems would have arisen over the status of 
the territory, international obligations, and other matters. The nuclear 
relinquishment process and accession to the NPT is a good example of 
such a matter. It was conducted within the framework of South African 
municipal law and international law. 
                                                
506 Op cit De Klerk. 
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5.3.3 State Continuity – Prevention of Internal Social 
Fragmentation  
Mr de Klerk was acutely aware of the need to manage carefully the ever-
present risk of social fragmentation. These were very practical worries and 
risks that needed to be identified and mitigated. The risks of social 
fragmentation were as complex and intricate an exercise as the 
relinquishment and accession process itself. Mr de Klerk put it thus:  
 
“You must remember that we needed to convince our electorate to support the 
constitutional negotiations. I believe the best way to bring about change is not by stealth. 
You need to deliberately and thoughtfully create a new positive vision. We sought to 
create a new and powerful all-embracing vision for South Africa.”507  
 
In these words we see that Mr de Klerk’s diagnosis of the nuclear 
relinquishment process in South Africa coalesced into the prognosis for 
the successful conclusion of the constitutional transition. The constitutional 
transition was, of course, his primary concern, and the nuclear 
relinquishment was an important contiguous process that if conducted 
effectively and wisely would enable the achievement of a constitutional 
democracy. 
 
The above citation provided an unequivocal testimony as to Mr de Klerk’s 
understanding of the linkage between the nuclear relinquishment process 
and accession to the NPT, and the creation of a new and internationally 
credible Constitution for South Africa. The legitimacy of the new 
Constitution rested on the international credibility that would be attributed 
to it at the time of its birth. The retention of these nuclear weapons would 
have signified a lack of trust and an intention to re-invent the tensions of 
the Cold War. 
 
                                                
507 Loc cit. 
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5.4 The Reason the Decision was Reached to Relinquish the 
Nuclear Arsenal and to Accede to the NPT: Professor 
Wynand Mouton’s Testimony and Animus 
Professor Wynand Mouton contended simply that the nuclear arsenal was 
relinquished and South Africa acceded to the NPT because it was a 
useless weapon and served no purpose in either offence or defence. He 
raised the point of there being significant opposition to the relinquishment 
process from the right wing. This is congruent with Mr Pik Botha’s 
reference to the elements within the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
and ARMSCOR who advocated conducting nuclear tests in the Kalahari 
Desert. There was influential opposition to the nuclear relinquishment 
process and accession to the NPT from certain elements of the SADF, 
from the armaments industry, and from elements within the ANC and the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as well. Mouton’s testimony is 
essentially that nothing could be done with nuclear weapons militarily, by 
means of deterrence or otherwise. His view was that they were useless as 
weapons. For Mouton, any conceivable use of a nuclear weapon would be 
a delicta juris gentium and a mala in se.  
 
Mouton recalled that:  
 
“I had always speculated that South Africa had nuclear weapons on the basis of the 
advanced development of nuclear physics in this country. But I did not know for certain 
whether we actually had them or not. I was not included in that circle of persons who 
were informed and who needed to know. 
 
There was opposition to this relinquishment process from the right wing. My viewpoint is 
that these bombs were of no use.508 They could not be dropped on Pretoria or 
Johannesburg. They could not be dropped on Soweto. We were fighting the wrong type 
of war to possess them. They would cause indiscriminate damage. The bomb was a 
deterrent and never intended for military usage. 
 
                                                
508 Babbage, Maria. 2004. ‘White Elephants: Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb and the 
Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy’. Princeton University: Journal of Public and 
International Affairs, 15, Spring. 
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The central question to ask about the nuclear weapons is, ‘What can you do with the 
things?’ The answer, I think, is that you can do absolutely nothing with them militarily.”509 
 
The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of 1996 could not clearly specify a single 
credible military case where a nuclear weapon could be lawfully deployed 
in war, even when the very existence of a state was at risk. Again we have 
confirmation that the bomb was never intended for usage but was 
intended as a deterrent. Any military usage of nuclear weapons would 
have been in violation of the United Nations Charter Article 2(4), which 
reads: 
 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”510 
 
This is because of the nuclear fallout associated with these bombs. 
 
5.5 The Reason the Decision was Reached to Relinquish the 
Nuclear Arsenal and to Accede to the NPT: Mr Pik Botha’s 
Testimony and Animus 
Mr Pik Botha reflected upon the reason that South Africa reached the 
decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. He introduced the interview by 
showing the researcher a newspaper photograph of himself shaking hands 
with Dr Hans Blix, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, at a splendid formal ceremony held in Vienna, arranged in 
celebration of South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal. The 
photograph depicted Mr Pik Botha handing over a small sculpture of a 
ploughshare to Dr Blix, while the President of Austria officiated. The 
ceremonial event celebrated South Africa’s embrace of constitutionality 
and peace among nations, and respect for international law. This 
ceremony provided an indication of comity and consent to be bound by the 
NPT. Mr Botha informed the researcher that Dr Blix had presided over 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
                                                
509 Interview with Professor Wynand Mouton at his apartment at Gordon’s Bay in the Strand in 
Western Cape on 30 October 2007.  
510 United Nations Charter Article 2(4). 
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NPT. Botha also mentioned that Dr Blix was highly respected in South 
Africa. Dr Blix later presided over the relinquishment of the weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq.  
 
Mr Botha explained that: 
 
“The sculpture of the ploughshare was made out of some of the metal casings that were 
used in the construction of South Africa’s nuclear bombs.511 A Biblical verse is engraved 
on the plinth of the sculpture. The verse is from the prophet Isaiah, and the reference is 
Chapter 2 Verse 4 (King James Version). These are the words: 
 
‘And He shall judge among the nations and shall rebuke many people: and they shall 
beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not 
lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.’ “512  
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
It is quite apparent from this reference to the Book of Isaiah and the event 
that it celebrated that Mr Botha paid tribute to the role of one of the ancient 
sources of international customary law, the Bible, in making this 
celebration of sanity coherent. 
 
Mr Pik Botha commenced the interview by reflecting on the concluding 
phase of the nuclear relinquishment process in South Africa and its 
accession to the NPT. The ‘end’ is an appropriate place to start, because it 
is a new beginning. Mr Botha expounded on the post-accession phase of 
South Africa’s nuclear experience, and reflected with some evident pride 
on the conclusion of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which declared Africa to be a 
nuclear-weapons-free continent. Botha articulated the recurrent theme that 
the Superpowers had placed extreme and sustained pressure on South 
Africa to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and to accede to the NPT, prior to 
the change of regime in this country. This pressure can be understood as 
the symptomatic manifestation of the international communities’ pursuit for 
constitutional continuity and juridical security. Mr Botha mentioned that the 
                                                
511 Interview with Mr Pik Botha in Pretoria North on 18 February 2008. 
512 Holy Bible. King James Version., Isaiah Chapter 2, Verse 4. 
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Americans were of the view that constant pressure would positively affect 
the direction of change in South Africa and result in a credible and 
legitimate constitutional settlement. My personal viewpoint is that they 
were actually correct in this assessment, although they might just as easily 
have been wrong. Mr Botha asserted that the pressure on South Africa by 
the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE),513 the IAEA and the 
Nuclear-Weapons-States to accede to the NPT had taken place 
relentlessly over many years of travail. He referred to South Africa’s period 
of pariah recognition status, and the bitter years of ostracism in the 
political wilderness. 
 
Mr Botha made the important point that the relinquishment process and 
accession to the NPT was not an idea that was ‘immaculately conceived’ 
in 1989. It was the product of years of fermentation, experience and 
thought, which had begun many years prior to this. Professor Waldo 
Stumpf concurred with Mr Pik Botha’s longer view. The chronology of the 
nuclear relinquishment and accession process when triangulated with the 
primary testimony offered by the respondents substantiates Mr Botha’s 
assertions in this regard. 
 
It has already been argued by recourse to international customary law that 
the relinquishment and accession to the NPT actually began in 1977 when 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons silos at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert 
were discovered by the Soviet Union and exposed to the United States of 
America. Mr Botha presented the case that the United States were very 
concerned about the prospect for nuclear proliferation that might arise 
from regime change in South Africa, and to whom these weapons might 
be bequeathed. The testimony provided by the expert sample concurs with 
                                                
513 Department of Energy. See ‘International Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties, 
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Consultation with the Department of Defence Concerning Export of Plutonium and Enriched 
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that assertion. It can be inferred from his testimony that the United States 
were also deeply concerned about the question of constitutional continuity 
and state succession in South Africa. They needed assurance that the 
new regime would abide by the legal, diplomatic and commercial 
obligations established by its predecessor. It is submitted as a general 
comment that this concern was well grounded, because liberation 
movements on the continent of Africa have a very poor track record of 
successfully metamorphosing themselves into responsible constitutional 
governments.  
 
Mr Pik Botha unsuccessfully attempted to gain a quid pro quo from the Big 
Five for the relinquishment process and accession to the NPT. The quid 
pro quo that he sought included inter alia the cessation of sanctions. An 
unexpected benefit was received for the accession to the NPT, and this 
was the gaining of international trust in and recognition of the 
constitutional settlement.  Mr de Klerk in his commentary envisioned this 
outcome quite clearly. The cessation of sanctions followed later as a 
logical corollary to South Africa’s remarkable constitutional settlement and 
little-publicised nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. 
 
My view is that in retrospect, the energy that was devoted towards trying 
to achieve a tangible quid pro quo for relinquishment seems to have been 
misdirected and unnecessary. This is because the quid pro quo of tangible 
acknowledgment for the relinquishment of nuclear weapons would have 
arisen in any case because of the reciprocal obligation that such a 
commitment to international customary law presupposes. 
 
Mr Botha reported that the Americans constantly contended that they 
could not offer such a quid pro quo deal because the matter of 
relinquishment and accession fell under the scope and remit of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, which was mandated by the Security 
Council of the United Nations.  
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Mr Botha confirmed that:  
 
“My role in contributing to the relinquishment of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal was one of 
the last duties that I performed in my capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The first 
democratic election in South Africa took place on 27 April 1994. I then assumed the 
portfolio of the Minister of Minerals and Energy. 
 
Dr Hans Blix was much better known for his role in inspecting whether Iraq had weapons 
of mass destruction, prior to the Second Iraq War, while director of UNMOVIC, than for 
his involvement in South Africa’s nuclear rollback as Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. It is a little-known fact that Dr Blix played a pivotal role in South 
Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal whilst he was director of the IAEA. He also 
therefore played a vitally important role in South Africa’s accession to the NPT.514  
 
The symbolic handing-over ceremony with Dr Blix in Vienna – when I presented him with 
the sculpture of the ploughshare – formally concluded South Africa’s voluntary rollback of 
its fissile nuclear weapons. South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal led to 
concluding the Pelindaba Treaty, which was formally ratified, and designated the entire 
African continent as a nuclear-weapons-free zone. 
 
The Pelindaba Treaty was reached soon after the formal nuclear relinquishment process 
was completed in South Africa and was a logical corollary to South Africa’s nuclear roll 
back. It extended the nuclear-weapons-free zone scope to the entire African continent.515 
 
Again, I have no doubt that the intelligence agencies in both the USA and UK knew 
precisely what was going on within the South African Cabinet. They had to be aware of 
the squabbles and the deteriorating relationship between the newly appointed National 
Party leader Mr FW de Klerk and President PW Botha. This relationship was crumbling. 
 
The internal jockeying created additional uncertainty, so much so that it ensured that the 
major powers felt an urgent necessity to increase the pressure on South Africa to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. They were of the view that this 
pressure would positively influence the direction of change towards a negotiated 
constitutional solution for the country.”516  
 
                                                
514 Op cit Botha. 
515 Loc cit. 
516 Loc cit. The international pressure was aimed not only at edging South Africa towards a 
constitutional democracy, but also at reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. Both were 
important. 
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Phenomenological Reduction 
The central theme of Mr Botha’s testimony is that the nuclear 
relinquishment and accession contributed towards ensuring juridical 
security and continuity in the context of the state transition towards a 
constitutional democracy. The reference to the role that Dr Blix played in 
South Africa and Iraq was intended to reveal that the process was of 
international importance. Dr Blix’s reputation is used as a source of 
authority. The sword and ploughshare analogy can be interpreted as 
confirmation of South Africa’s transition from a pariah state to its embrace 
of international customary law and its new and positive international 
recognition. It designates the ethics that accompany the commutation from 
war into peace. It acknowledges a prohibition of the use of threat and force 
in South Africa’s affairs of state. In addition, it conjures respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all humankind. Mr Botha’s testimony 
resonated with the ethos of a commentary contained in the Preamble to 
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 
which reads thus: 
 
“Emphasising that the consistent observance of general multilateral treaties which deal 
with the codification and progressive development of international law and those the 
object and purpose of which are of interest to the international community as a whole is of 
special importance for strengthening of peace and international co-operation.”517  
 
This is equated with a broader embrace of multilateralism in the form of 
South Africa’s primary role in setting up the Pelindaba Treaty, which 
resulted in the entire continent of Africa becoming a nuclear-weapons-free 
zone. South Africa’s role in establishing this Treaty can be regarded as an 
indication of its conversion from an agent of nuclear proliferation to an 
agent of peace. 
 
Mr Botha continued: 
 
“During the meetings in the late 1980s (and not only in the crucible year of 1989), I 
repeatedly experienced intense pressure that was directed by the United States of 
                                                
517 Op cit Vienna Convention. 
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America for South Africa to accede to the NPT. I likewise repeatedly tried to exact a quid 
pro quo if South Africa were to take the decision to adhere to the NPT. 
 
The quid pro quo that we required for starters was a relaxation of economic sanctions 
and an end to the academic boycott in order to allow South African scholars to attend 
international conferences so that they might stay in the forefront of their particular 
fields.518 
 
I made repeated attempts to exact a quid pro quo for accession to the NPT.”519 
 
The objective of the United States’ legacy of pressure on South Africa was 
to change the mindset of the leaders of South Africa from being a threat to 
world peace to being agents for peace. It was intended to impel South 
Africa’s leaders into ensuring juridical security in the conduct of its 
international affairs, by honouring the treaties and all obligations to which it 
was bound in terms of international law. The mandatory and 
comprehensive sanctions enacted against South Africa were instruments 
of international law and were used as sticks and carrots to induce this 
mindset of respect among the leaders for the principles of international law 
contained in the Charter of the United Nations. The mindset of respect 
was later codified into South Africa’s Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
 
The following citation from Mr Botha referred once again to his failed 
pursuit for a quid pro quo for relinquishing the nuclear weapons and 
acceding to the NPT. My simple deduction is that one of the contributory 
reasons that the nuclear arsenal was relinquished and accession took 
place was because the bargaining would not work. The ridiculousness of 
this pursuit is captured in the passage below. 
 
                                                
518 Phenomenological Reduction: It would appear on first impression from this commentary that 
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included international legitimacy, and the delayed withdrawal of economic sanctions. It is 
tendentious to equate the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal to the withdrawal of economic 
sanctions and according of international legitimacy. 
519 Op cit Botha.  
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Mr Botha reflected that: 
 
“My task was complicated by the fact that I had to exact a quid pro quo – without 
admitting in so many words that we had actually successfully produced six-and-a-half 
nuclear bombs. 
 
In my many hours of meetings with our American colleagues, I had no doubt in my own 
mind that they clearly realised that we had had already produced this nuclear capability. I 
once felt compelled to speak to the Americans about our nuclear capability in a riddle. I 
said: ‘Look, without admitting that the girl is pregnant ... let us assume that she is 
pregnant ... Let us use that as an analogy for you to roll back economic sanctions, and for 
South Africa to do the necessary and accede to the NPT.’ 
 
The Americans repeatedly claimed that they were powerless to do this. They mentioned 
that they had no rights in international law to give the IAEA any instructions whatsoever. 
This was because the IAEA’s legal remit came from the Security Council of the United 
Nations. The Americans said that they could not, and would not intercede with the IAEA’s 
insider staff, and they could not dictate to the IAEA staff how they should run this Security 
Council-sanctioned organisation.”520 
 
Mr Botha could not formally admit to the Americans that South Africa had 
a nuclear arsenal prior to its accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At that time, the NPT was worded so as 
to prohibit a state that possessed nuclear weapons from legally acceding 
to the NPT, because the mere acknowledgement of this prior possession 
would automatically have placed the acceding state in a technical breach. 
This catch-22 situation resided in the manner and phraseology of how the 
NPT was then worded. The wording that pertained at that time has 
subsequently been amended to correct this contradiction. The United 
States were arguably correct to decline to agree to a quid pro quo for 
South Africa’s accession to the NPT. It might have created a dangerous 
precedent by invoking a monetary auction relating to the relinquishment of 
nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT. Monetary quid pro quos were 
granted for nuclear rollback and accession in the cases of the Ukraine, 
Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. North Korea also received a material quid 
pro quo for toning down its nuclear weapons programme. The 
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respondents, however, subscribed to the individually-held moral view that 
the South African government had a responsibility erga omnes to accede 
to the NPT and relinquish these weapons. 
 
The Americans contended that if apartheid were not abandoned, South 
Africa’s isolation and recognition crisis would be deepened by inter alia the 
deployment of ever-constricting comprehensive and mandatory sanctions.  
There would be no concessions and relaxation of sanctions while 
apartheid was still on the Statute books. Mr Botha attempted to lobby for 
United States support to intercede with the IAEA’s insider staff to use their 
offices with the United Nations to relax the pressure of sanctions. This was 
arguably illegal in terms of international law, and was to no avail. It recalls 
the Uranium Red Book incident, discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
The DOE also declined to concede to a quid pro quo for South Africa’s 
accession to the NPT. This was also a correct decision in terms of United 
States municipal law and international law. The United Nations Security 
Council provided the IAEA’s remit. Had South Africa’s request been 
entertained by the United States, it would have created a conflict between 
US municipal law and international law. 
 
Mr Botha continued: 
 
“It was absolutely clear that South Africa would receive international relations plaudits 
and acknowledgement from the US, the UK and other countries if it acceded to the NPT. 
[State recognition]  
 
The point that I am making is that the nuclear rollback was not as a result of a single first 
effort. It came as a result of years of ellende [English translation: travail]. 
 
We had tried to manoeuvre around the diminishing and constricting political space 
created by apartheid for years.521  
 
Then PW resigned and FW came in ... 
                                                
521 South Africa’s re-acceptance into the international community was the greatest quid pro quo 
that it could ever receive. Once again, Mr Pik Botha made the point that the nuclear rollback 
occurred over many years. It was a case of trial and error, and manoeuvring in an increasingly 
intensified hostile political and military space. 
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During my first proper meeting with FW de Klerk I said: ‘We need now to: 
 
• Firstly, release Mandela and the political prisoners;  
• Secondly, sign the NPT.’ 
 
Mr de Klerk said to me: ‘You do not need to persuade me ... that is precisely what I am 
going to do.’”522 523  
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Mr Botha’s first recommendation to Mr de Klerk consisted of a statement 
of the obligation erga omnes to accede to the NPT, and Mr de Klerk 
conceded to this obligation. The research concurs with his assertion that 
the nuclear rollback had its origin in gradually accumulating obligations 
arising from nuclear crises in terms of international customary law. Mr 
Botha’s comment that “[t]he nuclear rollback was not a result of a single 
first effort. It came as a result of years of ellende (travail)” is congruent with 
Klug’s notion of constituting democracy. Constitutionality develops 
unevenly, incrementally, often over many years, sometimes almost 
opaquely; and in the case of South Africa, it was intrinsically linked to the 
erratic development of constitutionality in the greater territory of Namibia, 
Angola, Zimbabwe, and the erstwhile Soviet Union itself. The theme of 
Botha’s testimony was one of systemic constitutional interrelatedness 
between states – whether at war or in peace. 
 
Mr Botha offered a case for positive state recognition in the paragraphs 
cited above. It can be deduced that the development of the nuclear 
arsenal created its own problems of momentum. Once the nuclear 
weapons programme was started, internal financial, economic, scientific, 
and political forces ensured its continuation. 
 
A cadre of the country’s best scientific, engineering and project-
management brains were deployed together in what must have been to 
them an exciting and clandestine project. For those involved, it arguably 
                                                
522 Op cit Botha. 
523 Loc cit. 
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added the aesthetics of adventure to their lives. Once the nuclear 
weapons programme was started, it was very difficult to stop. 
 
The comment ‘we had tried to manoeuvre around the diminishing and 
constricting political space created by apartheid for years’ is telling. It is 
submitted that the ever-constricted space was caused inter alia because 
of a vaguely-articulated clash of laws: the parochialism of South African 
municipal law, which was infused with apartheid legislation at the time, 
and the requirement for international standards of excellence in 
international law, which respected the United Nations Charter and the 
embodiment of universal human rights. 
 
The clash between South African municipal law and the imperative for this 
country to become compliant with an emerging international human rights 
culture – jus cogens – associated with international law were forces 
behind South Africa’s process of constituting democracy, nuclear 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT. 
 
The commentary about the exit of Mr PW Botha from the office of 
Presidency and the entry of Mr de Klerk to this office resonates with an 
almost identical comment made by Dr Neil Barnard during the course of 
the researcher’s doctoral studies. Dr Barnard commented: 
 
“Then PW had a stroke. Enter De Klerk ... Exit PW, in with  FW de Klerk ...”524 
 
Similarly, Mr Botha’s comments about Mr de Klerk’s objective of releasing 
Mr Mandela and the political prisoners converge almost totally with 
Professor Stumpf’s assessment of this matter. 
 
Heald: “Did the relinquishment of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme have a 
beneficial impact on the creation of a new legal and constitutional framework for South 
Africa?”525 
 
                                                
524 Op cit Heald. 
525 Op cit Botha. 
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Botha: “Of course it did. It helped enormously. This has been the constant theme of what 
I have been saying to you. It created trust. It was a vital ingredient and it underpinned the 
monumental constitutional and transformational process that we negotiated in South 
Africa. 
 
You will have noticed that South Africa’s nuclear, constitutional, and political re-alignment 
began many years earlier than you might have ever expected. The international pressure 
for this change was sustained; it intensified, and never wavered. 
 
I have sketched you the vitally important, complex and interacting context which led to 
South Africa’s decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal, and to offer you the reason for its 
accession to the NPT. My experience was that it was a long-term process that started in 
the 1970s and came to reality in 1994. 
 
International research on South Africa’s political transition is starting to gradually realise 
and acknowledge the central thrust of what I am saying to you ... that the changes in 
South Africa in 1989 were set decades before they manifested themselves in reality. 
Researchers in many countries around the world are starting to converge on the 
importance of these historically-interacting themes. 
 
The importance of ending the war in Angola cannot be understated.526 527 It interacted 
[with] and paved the way for the political independence of Namibia which was granted at 
the end of 1988.528 
 
On 22 December 1988 South Africa, Cuba and Angola signed agreements to withdraw all 
their troops from these areas and therefore to cease the intense military hostilities.529 The 
next year, 1989, saw Namibia have its first free election. 
 
We should see all these complex events in a dynamically interacting and intersecting 
context. They played out across the globe.”530 
 
                                                
526 Berridge, GR. 1989. ‘Diplomacy and the Angolan Namibian Accords’. Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 65(3), Summer. 
527 See International Edition of Granma (Havana) 1 January 1989 for full text of two final 
agreements. See also ‘Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa’. Signed by 
Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 13 July 1988 and released on 20 July 1988. Reprinted in 
Southern Africa Record No 51 of 1988. Johannesburg: SA Institute of International Affairs. 2–4; 
‘The Protocol of Geneva’. Signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 5 August 1989; ‘Joint 
Statement on a Ceasefire Agreement for Angola and Namibia’. Issued simultaneously in Pretoria, 
Havana and Luanda. 1988 All references cited in this section derive from the research of GR 
Berridge.  
528 Dugard, John (ed.). 1973. The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute Documents and Scholarly 
Writings on the Controversy between South Africa and the United Nations. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
529 Op cit Dugard (1973), reference cited by Berridge. 
530 Op cit Botha. 
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This commentary is once again both congruent with, and illustrative of, 
Klug’s notion of ‘constituting democracy’. 
 
South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process and accession to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was not an isolated exercise. 
It took place at a time when Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Byelorussia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Libya were doing the same. It 
would be erroneous to posit a case of ‘South African exceptionalism’ with 
respect to nuclear relinquishment and accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While what South Africa did was 
undoubtedly a precedent, and was predicated on its own unique set of 
underlying facts, unique complexities and specific political conditions, it 
was the first nuclear rollback which formed part of a growing international 
trend. 
 
Mr Botha continued: 
 
“The year 1989 was the turning point in the recent history of South Africa. Apartheid had 
made the whole world entirely suspicious of South Africa’s trustworthiness. The ending of 
the war in Angola, and the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from that 
country, was accompanied by an immediate and dramatic reduction in the tensions and 
conflicts that had been suffered in Southern Africa for many decades. 
 
The release of Mandela from prison, the release of the political prisoners, the freeing-up 
of all political activity, the negotiation of a new Constitution, can all be seen as the logical 
consequences of the steps that we had taken much earlier. 
 
I was convinced that what was being done was intrinsically necessary. These events 
were onafskeidbaar (English translation: inseparably) part of our thinking and what we 
had done to prepare South Africa for a new chapter in its thinking. There was actually no 
way that we could release Mandela without taking the necessary steps to dismantle the 
nuclear weapons. Had we not done this, the nuclear weapons would have stood out like a 
sore thumb.” 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Mr Pik Botha is making the point absolutely clear. There is no way that 
Mandela could have been released and a new democratic Constitution 
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could have been negotiated had the nuclear arsenal not been 
relinquished. In other words, the constitutional settlement was contingent 
upon the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT. 
 
Mandela’s release from prison was inexorably linked to the nuclear 
relinquishment. Had De Klerk not decided to relinquish the nuclear 
weapons quietly and had he included the ANC in this relinquishment 
process, these hypothetical negotiations could have broken down, leaving 
the ANC with the nuclear arsenal and bequeathing them international fear, 
loathing and opprobrium. 
 
“All the nuclear powers, including the USSR, welcomed our decision to relinquish the 
nuclear weapons inter alia out of a deep and abiding fear that this very advanced nuclear 
technology could land in the wrong and dangerous hands and threaten the world order.531 
 
During the events and meetings of 1988 it was clear that the world was waiting for 
irreversible and irrevocable events signifying permanent change in South Africa.532 
 
There were suspicions about our motives.”533 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Mr Botha confirms that the year 1989 was a turning point for South Africa. 
It was also a turning point for the Soviet Union, Europe, the People’s 
Republic of China, and the world. South Africa was a part of these world 
events. The political revolution in South Africa appears to have preceded a 
legal revolution by a narrow margin, and both appeared to play 
themselves out together. Mr Botha’s private conviction that that which was 
being done was essential reflected a growing national consensus which 
was ultimately codified in the Constitution. ‘The new way of thinking’ that 
Mr Botha refers to could be characterised as an acceptance of the basic 
tenets of the United Nations Charter, and rejection of all arguments of 
                                                
531 The Nuclear-Weapons-States were all concerned about who might inherit the nuclear bombs. 
This was their abiding fear, and they were fearful of the integrity of the ANC. It was an unproved 
liberation movement that had yet to prove its credentials. It had recently been classified as a 
terrorist organisation by the USA. 
532 Op cit Botha. The signification of the first irrevocable event was South Africa’s decision to 
relinquish its nuclear arsenal and to accede to the NPT. 
533 The theme of trust has again re-emerged as a perennial motif.  
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South African exceptionalism as justification for apartheid in legislation 
and practice which had brought the country to the edge of ruin. 
 
Mr Botha provided a clear linkage between the pursuit of a negotiated 
constitutional settlement and the imperative to rid South Africa of the 
nuclear weapons. As was the case with Mr de Klerk, they were for him a 
contradiction in terms. All the respondents shared this view, although they 
expressed it in different terms. 
 
Heinz Klug presented a conceptual analysis of the manner in which South 
Africa constituted democracy. This analysis resonates and provides an 
interesting counterpoint to the reality of Mr Botha’s lived experience. It 
objectifies the subjectivity of the animus of Mr Botha’s recollections. Klug 
asserted that South Africa underwent two revolutions which occurred 
simultaneously. One was a political revolution and the other a legal 
revolution. The political revolution was granted structure and form by an 
equally important legal revolution, which reached its apex in the 
conclusion of the democratic Constitution. The legal revolution involved an 
embrace of the globalisation of law and acceptance of international 
customary law by South African leaders. It also involved an exculpation of 
a worldview focused on a parochial apartheid-centric municipal law.534 In 
Mr Botha’s testimony, the legal revolution and the political revolution are 
seen to coalesce. Parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by the new and 
unfamiliar sovereignty of a supreme Constitution.535 Klug provided a 
converging perspective on Mr Botha’s utterances: 
 
“South Africa’s system of apartheid, or legally constituted racism, may have been unique 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the decision to embrace democratic 
constitutionalism as the basic legal element if the country’s political reconstruction was 
much less unusual. Instead, South Africa’s political reconstruction and its embrace of 
democratic constitutionalism were part of a massive international process of political 
reconstruction culminating in the collapse of state socialism in 1989.”536  
                                                
534 Klug, Heinz. 2000. Constituting Democracy, Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political 
Reconstruction. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1. 
535 Op cit Klug at 1. 
536 Ibid. 
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It is reiterated that there is a powerful convergence between the reality of 
experience as articulated by Mr Botha and the broader international 
conceptual framework offered by Klug. 
 
5.6 The Reason the Decision was Reached to Relinquish the 
Nuclear Arsenal and to Accede to the NPT: Professor Waldo 
Stumpf’s Testimony and Animus 
Professor Waldo Stumpf contended that during his entire involvement in 
relinquishing the nuclear weapons and acceding to the NPT, Mr de Klerk 
never once mentioned, or alluded to, any fear of passing on the nuclear 
weapons to the ANC as being a motive for relinquishing them. Stumpf did 
interrogate the matter quite extensively during the course of the interview. 
His viewpoint was that this was not a deciding influence in South Africa’s 
relinquishment and accession process. 
 
Stumpf indicated that:  
 
“I was designated to become the new CEO of what was then called the AEC (Atomic 
Energy Corporation) in September 1989. I became the actual CEO only on 1 January 
1990, but I was designated to take up this position in September ’89. At the same time Mr 
de Klerk took over the Presidency from PW Botha. You know all about those politics.  
 
Within two weeks of Mr de Klerk taking office I was summoned to attend a meeting at the 
Union Buildings in Pretoria. I did not know what it was about. I was very ‘green’ at that 
time. 
 
I arrived at the Union Buildings and attended a smallish meeting. About four or five 
Cabinet Ministers were in attendance. Those present included Pik Botha, Dawie de 
Villiers, Barend du Plessis, and obviously General Magnus Malan ... In addition, Neil van 
Heerden was there. I think that Neil Barnard came in later. I did not know what this was 
all about. After we had settled down Mr de Klerk opened the meeting. His opening words 
were ‘Gentlemen’ (there were only gentlemen present). ‘In my term of office I am going to 
take South Africa back into the international community as a respected member of the 
international community. 
 
There are two things that must happen. Firstly, we are going to turn the political system 
completely around, to a full democracy. 
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Secondly, we are going to dismantle the nuclear weapons entirely and get them out of the 
way, because they are actually a liability at the moment.’ 
 
I realised then that this was why I had been invited to attend the meeting. This really 
drove home the seriousness of the whole project to me. 
 
Many persons have posed the question to me: ‘Was Mr de Klerk afraid of handing these 
things over to the ANC?’ That was not an issue and was never even discussed. (You 
might want to ask him whether that concern was in the back of his mind.) A fear of 
handing over nuclear weapons to the ANC was never mentioned as a driving force ...”537 
 
The opinions offered by Mr Pik Botha, Professor Wynand Mouton and Dr 
Neil Barnard converged on the explanation that one of the reasons the 
nuclear weapons were relinquished was because of the fear that the ANC 
might proliferate nuclear weapons to its former allies out of, inter alia, a 
sense of reciprocity for past assistance during the time of the struggle.  
 
Mr de Klerk did not voice proliferation concerns about the ANC’s nuclear 
inclinations. Suffice it to mention that he excluded the ANC in its entirety 
from this nuclear decision-making process.  
 
Professor Stumpf claimed that the potential nuclear proliferation risks by 
the ANC were not raised by Mr de Klerk as a specific concern in his 
meetings with him. It is noted, though, that Professor Stumpf did explore 
the matter of nuclear proliferation fears associated with a national 
liberation movement. In this regard, Professor Stumpf’s assessment was 
similar to that of Mr Pik Botha, inasmuch as: 
 
• he acknowledged the OAU’s desire to possess a nuclear capability; 
• he acknowledged that there were elements within the leadership of 
the ANC who shared this view. 
 
Professor Stumpf contended that the exclusion of the ANC from this 
relinquishment process should be understood as conduct offered in good 
                                                
537 Interview with Professor Waldo Stumpf at the University of Pretoria, Minerals Science 
Building, Pretoria on 18 October 2007. 
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faith, intended to induce constitutional continuity and a positive state 
success. 
 
The researcher’s view is that Mr de Klerk’s silence was wise, because any 
utterances on the matter at the time of relinquishment and accession 
would have created a furious political controversy. The retention of the 
nuclear weapons would have complicated the matter of state succession 
and constitutional continuity. Mr de Klerk’s silence about the potential for 
nuclear proliferation among the ANC is indicative of restraint on his part. It 
is inconceivable that he would not have devoted the utmost thought and 
reflection to this matter. 
 
For Professor Stumpf, the relinquishment and accession was essentially a 
very practical matter that required a high level of care and discretion in 
order to ensure that the constitutional negotiations were not placed at risk 
by the controversy associated with nuclear weapons and accession. 
Stumpf contended in this fairly long but important citation that: 
 
“Mr de Klerk realised (and there I must say I fully agreed with him) that to have kept these 
nuclear weapons operational throughout the very difficult negotiation of a political 
handover would have increased the complexity and the risk of the constitutional 
negotiations failing quite significantly. 
 
It would have been a hot potato of:  
 
• How do you hand them over? ( constitutional succession and continuity)  
• When should we hand the nuclear weapons over?   
• Who would be issued with the authority to control the nuclear weapons during the 
handover?  
• Who should not have control over the nuclear arsenal?  
 
It is my view that Mr de Klerk realised that the political transition to democracy was going 
to be difficult enough as a project on its own. I think that his thinking followed these lines: 
‘Let us not make the constitutional negotiations even more difficult than they should be, 
by making this relinquishment of the nuclear weapons a compounding part of the political 
process.’ 
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That for me is the fundamental reason underlying his decision to embark on this 
dismantling process unilaterally. I think that that he made a wise and considered choice. 
It was De Klerk’s view that the nuclear arsenal itself had converted into a serious national 
liability. 
 
Secondly, De Klerk realised that it would be far too risky for both sides, the blacks and 
the whites, to have these very sensitive constitutional negotiations imperilled by the 
nuclear weapon ‘hot potato’, which by its inherent nature is a matter fraught with mistrust. 
 
Once again the indicators of mistrust would be reflected in questions like the preceding 
ones: 
 
• Are the nuclear weapons going to be handed over? (erga omnes)  
• When will they be handed over?  
• What is going to happen to them once they have been handed over?  
 
The constitutional negotiation agenda would have been one of escalating complexity and 
social fragmentation between black and white, had it been combined with the nuclear 
relinquishment project. 
 
De Klerk fully appreciated that he needed to get these things quietly out of the way and 
not to allow them to contaminate the integrity and success of the constitutional 
negotiations, which was his prime goal. This argument suggests the fundamental reasons 
that that considered decision was taken. It was taken in such a way as to bring South 
Africa back into the international community, and away from its pariah-like isolation. 
 
There were quite understandably many people in the new government who felt that they 
should have inherited these nuclear weapons. Their view was that they should have been 
accorded the task of dismantling the nuclear weapons. If this had happened, it would 
have certainly complicated the handover of political power. You can’t simply put nuclear 
bombs behind a door and then lock them away (diligentia quam in suis). I can indeed 
understand why people expressed the sentiment that the ANC should have inherited the 
bombs and then dismantled them. It is my considered view that the political transition 
would not have gone as smoothly as it did, had this process of nuclear relinquishment 
been addressed as a discrete contiguous negotiation project. 
 
Mr de Klerk appreciated that fully, and this appreciation was reflected in his words: 
‘Gentlemen, we will have to get these things out of the way before we proceed with a 
turnaround of the political system.’ That is really the fundamental driving force that you 
will need to address in your study. If De Klerk had other motives underlying the 
dismantling process, he never voiced them. Then they would have been in his head. He 
never at one point (even in his body language) indicated that he was afraid that the ANC 
would inherit these. 
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There is a second point that needs to be reflected upon. If he had (hypothetically) kept 
the nuclear devices and had made these a part of the constitutional negotiations with the 
ANC, what would this share have done to the political stature of Mr Mandela? Would 
these leaders have been so ready to invite Mr Mandela onto all their platforms around the 
world, had they know that he was arriving on the world stage with some nukes in his back 
pocket? 
 
These nuclear bombs would have been a poisoned chalice for Mr Mandela. Although Mr 
Mandela might have said immediately (to assure the world) that the ANC would dismantle 
these bombs, I do not think that this assurance would have been readily believed. 
Nuclear weapons by their very nature are fraught with mistrust. 
 
In addition, the matter would have been complicated by dissenting voices from the 
political leadership of the African continent. They would not have easily accepted South 
Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal. The OAU would, I think, have applied 
intense pressure on Mr Mandela to hold onto the nuclear arsenal because of the political 
status that would derive from the possession of nuclear weapons. 
 
One of the views that was strongly advocated was that Africa should have retained this 
nuclear capability, as it would place the continent in the company of the Superpowers.538 I 
think that Mr Mandela’s stature would have been diminished had he retained the nuclear 
arsenal. This would almost certainly have occurred at the beginning of his leadership, had 
the nuclear weapons been retained. 
 
Just imagine Mr Mandela going to visit the USA with some nukes in his back pocket. The 
US is paranoid about nuclear weapons, and this would not have assisted political 
relationships at all. 
 
My core argument is that the manner in which the nuclear weapons were rolled back in 
South Africa was probably the best way that the matter could have been undertaken, 
given the reality of the circumstances that existed at that time. I do not contend that it was 
the ideal way. I do contend that it probably was the best way.539 
 
These are the fundamental reasons underlying the nuclear relinquishment in South 
Africa. You would have to verify my explanation with Mr de Klerk in order to ascertain 
whether he agrees with this reading. I was in extensive meetings where the rollback of 
the nuclear weapons was discussed with him. In all of those meetings, his driving force 
                                                
538 This was in fact confirmed by Mr Pik Botha during his interview. 
539 Op cit Stumpf. 
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seemed to be ‘to get this nonsense out of the way, so that we can proceed with the 
political transition purposively’.”540 
 
Professor Waldo Stumpf concurred with Mr FW de Klerk’s view that had 
these nuclear weapons been retained and had they remained operational 
throughout the very difficult negotiation of the new Constitution, they would 
have starkly increased the complexity of the constitutional negotiations 
and the risk of their failing. 
 
Professor Stumpf submitted that the decision to relinquish the nuclear 
weapons and to accede to the NPT in such a way was intended as a tool 
for state re-recognition, to re-introduce South Africa as a respected 
member of the international community of nations. He asserted that Mr 
Mandela would have had a major international credibility problem had he 
entered the world stage with ‘nukes in his back pocket’. His [Mr Mandela’s] 
legitimacy would have been seriously compromised.  
 
It is significant to note that Mr de Klerk and the nuclear relinquishment 
team showed a deep concern and also played an important contributory 
role in assuring Mr Mandela’s credibility. They acted with comity and were 
concerned about ensuring that Mr Mandela had a positive ratione 
personae. 
 
The credibility problem for Mr Mandela under an ANC nuclear-retention 
scenario would almost certainly have impacted on his international status 
and the legitimacy accorded to the new Constitution. The relinquishment of 
the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT was a delicate process 
requiring persons who possessed a deep knowledge of the physics of 
nuclear weapons, and long-standing relationships with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
 
It would have been a very risky burden for the ANC to assume the 
responsibility for the nuclear relinquishment and accession process at the 
                                                
540 Loc cit. 
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time that it was striving for international recognition, and to convert itself 
from a national liberation movement into a government of international 
standing. It is contended that the ANC simply did not have the technical 
expertise, the experience and the knowledge at its disposal to master this 
complexity effectively. This knowledge was acquired by their counterparts 
over a period of approximately thirty years of involvement in the 
development of this nuclear capability. International disquiet about South 
Africa’s nuclear arsenal would have escalated had these weapons been 
naïvely bequeathed to an unproven national liberation movement. 
 
It was decided that the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal should be 
done in camera. By its very nature, knowledge of the possession of 
nuclear weapons could have created a wave of international panic. 
Professor Stumpf’s and Mr de Klerk’s reasoning therefore converged as to 
the reasons that the nuclear arsenal was relinquished. Their testimonies 
are entirely congruent and consistent with each other. 
 
Professor Wynand Mouton did allude to an incident where he was 
approached by a senior ANC Minister who chastised him about South 
Africa relinquishing its nuclear arsenal and its accession to the NPT. Dr 
Neil Barnard referred to a similar incident, when he was confronted by the 
incoming Minister of Defence at that time, Mr Joe Modise, who bemoaned 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal. He indicated that the 
weapons should have been retained by the ANC.  
 
Mr Pik Botha also referred to two important instances where the putative 
matter of the nuclear weapons being proliferated by the incoming regime 
of the ANC was brought into stark relief. The first was when Mr Pik Botha 
had a joint-staff luncheon with the United States Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa Affairs, Mr Hank Cohen, and the matter of the ANC 
potentially proliferating nuclear weapons was informally raised by one of 
Mr Cohen’s staff members as a US concern. 
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The second occasion pertained to a meeting with Mr Julius Nyerere, who 
was President of Tanzania and an important indicative ‘voice’ of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), who also chastised him for South 
Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT. Mr 
Botha was bemused by Mr Julius Nyerere’s views on this matter.  
 
The concerns that were expressed by Mr Pik Botha, Dr Neil Barnard and 
Professor Wynand Mouton about the possible proliferation inclinations of 
the regime-in-waiting were mirrored in informal discussions with the 
ambassadorial representative of the United States.  
 
5.7 The Conundrum of the ANC’s Hypothetical Proliferation 
Inclinations: Rebus Sic Stantibus 
Mr Pik Botha reflected on the views expressed by Mr Herman (Hank) 
Cohen, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
about the risk of the ANC as a ‘regime-in-waiting’ acting as an agent of 
nuclear proliferation. His testimony reveals an insight into United States 
motives for pressurising South Africa to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and 
accede to the NPT. The fear expressed by the United States at the 
meeting was of the danger that an ANC regime might be tempted to 
proliferate nuclear weapons to countries that were hostile to US interests. 
The United States wished to ensure that the transition from the 
predecessor regime to successor regime in South Africa would be 
conducted in a manner that insured juridical security in international 
relations. The ANC’s position on nuclear weapons was at that stage 
opaque and mistrusted because of the nature of their allies, who included 
Libya, Cuba, and North Korea, all of whom had chequered associations 
with nuclear weapons. 
 
Mr Pik Botha informed that: 
 
“Chester Crocker’s successor was Mr Herman (Hank) Cohen, Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs. He entered the arena after Chester Crocker retired. 
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Mr Cohen once told me confidentially at a lunch that we ‘had better hurry up with our 
accession to the NPT’, as South Africa was rapidly moving towards a new phase in its 
history. He said that the Americans were deeply concerned that the technology and the 
bomb could fall into the wrong hands. That would be a worst-case scenario for the USA. I 
am sure that Cohen would now deny what I am saying, but he actually did say it. At this 
same lunch one of his officials said to one of my officials that South Africa had better do it 
now (accede to the NPT) before there was a major change in the political leadership in 
the country (South Africa) that might be politically aligned to ‘who knows who’.” 541 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
One of the burning reasons for the pressure that the United States placed 
on South Africa to relinquish its nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT 
was that the US feared that they might have less control over the matter of 
nuclear proliferation with the successor regime than they had had with the 
predecessor regime. Washington was deeply concerned about ensuring 
state continuity and assuring juridical security, both during and after the 
constitutional transition. The successor regime’s approach towards the 
treaties that were bequeathed to it by the predecessor regime was 
unknown. It was not then known whether the ANC wished to be bound by 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or not. It was very 
important that the successor regime should be bound to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons prior to its assumption of political 
power, and that the ANC were presented with a fait accompli, which would 
mitigate the risk of their proliferating these weapons, as they would be 
expected to be deeply involved with their incoming responsibilities. 
 
The next citation also offered by Mr Pik Botha pertained to a conversation 
that he and Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, had about the 
South African legacy.542 It related to the regret that Mr Nyerere expressed 
that South Africa had not retained these weapons and bequeathed them to 
Africa. It will be recalled that Mr Nyerere enjoyed a high level of 
                                                
541 The assertion here is that the pressure from the US on South Africa to roll back the nuclear 
arsenal was predominantly inspired by the fear of its being inherited by a regime that was hostile 
to US and Western interests. The ANC were seen as being suspect in this regard, particularly 
because of their close relationships with Libya, Cuba and other anti-Western regimes.  
542 This concurs with a similar point made by Professor Stumpf. 
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continental prestige in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) because of 
his role in the decolonisation struggle. 
 
It is in this context that Mr Botha maintained:  
 
“Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, came to visit me personally in either late 1994 
or 1995. He requested a friendly meeting with me and a discussion. In the first part of the 
meeting, Mr Nyerere provided an excellent overview of the seminal changes that had 
taken place in Southern Africa. He was highly influential in the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), which had been an important institution in Africa’s decolonisation struggle in 
the Post-World War II period – from the 1950s up into most of the 1960s. 
 
At one point Nyerere said to me, ‘You have displayed great courage and wisdom in what 
you have done. You have assisted in setting South Africa on a democratic path and 
restoring human dignity. But I cannot understand why you decided to demolish South 
Africa’s atom bomb.543 The whole of Africa would have been so proud to own and display 
to the world that it had such power, mastery and high technology.’ 
 
I explained to Mr Nyerere that there was no way that we could have proceeded with the 
constitutional negotiations if we had retained the nuclear bomb. The nuclear bomb was 
anathema to the creation of trust that we were seeking from the constitutional 
negotiations. I said to Nyerere: ‘The nuclear bomb is perceived and seen as the product 
of apartheid. It is the apartheid bomb. The perceptions are indissolubly linked.’ 
 
I found it interesting that Nyerere harboured these thoughts and deep-seated views. For 
me it was a raaisel (English translation: a riddle, a poser, an enigma) which could not 
stand up to logical scrutiny. 
 
Nyerere never explained to me in what way Africa could have gained prestige from 
retaining our nuclear bombs. His logic also flew in the face of the emerging nuclear 
reality, which had as its central purpose the objective of getting Africa to be declared a 
nuclear free zone. Nyerere’s deep-seated view seemed to be a negation of the massively 
positive steps of nuclear relinquishment, accession to the NPT, accession to the 
Pelindaba Treaty, and the abrogation of South Africa’s apartheid Constitution with the 
negotiation of one of the most advanced constitutions in the world. Nyerere persisted with 
this bondage thought pattern.”544 
 
                                                
543 See Allison, Graham, Cote, Owen, Falkenrath, Richard & Miller, Steven. 1996. Avoiding 
Nuclear Anarchy – Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Weapons and Fissile Material. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
544 Op cit Botha. In these paragraphs Botha justifies Hank Cohen’s fears. They were real, and the 
fact is that the successor regime might have been tempted to proliferate these nuclear weapons. 
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Nyerere’s essential logic seems to have been that the nuclear bombs were 
a res communis and should have been rightfully bequeathed to Africa. His 
private utterances would appear to be in contravention of the African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the 
Bamako Convention. Tanzania was bound by both of these Conventions. 
Article 2 of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources articulates the principle of sustainable development 
and respect for the environment as the common heritage of humankind or 
public good. Subsequently, the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the 
Import into Africa and Control of Trans-boundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Waste within Africa has reaffirmed 
international environmental law principles; for example: state responsibility 
for trans-boundary pollution, the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and obligations 
relating to sustainable management and resource utilisation. The OAU 
also introduced the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of 
Pelindaba).545 Suffice it to say that Nyerere’s private comments were at 
fundamental odds with the public principles espoused by this treaty. 
 
Dr Neil Barnard confirmed that Mr Joe Modise, the ANC’s Minister of 
Defence, expressed fury about South Africa relinquishing these weapons 
and acceding to the NPT and not bequeathing them to them. Dr Barnard 
recollected that: 
 
“I was worried about these weapons ending up in the hands of the ANC, particularly as 
Mandela and Kaddafi were quite close at that time. I said: ‘You will be in trouble if we 
have an ANC government with a nuclear weapons capability.’ 
 
I recall a significant occasion when Joe Modise, who was to become the ANC’s Minister 
of Defence, came up to me and expressed fury that we had divested ourselves of this 
capability and acceded to the NPT. 
 
                                                
545 du Plessis, Max. 2007. ‘The African Union’. In John Dugard (ed). International Law: A South 
African Perspective. Third Edition. Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd. 547–548. 
Subsequently, the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import into Africa and Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Waste within Africa reaffirmed 
international environmental law principles. The OAU also introduced the African Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). 
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If our nuclear weapons capacity had been handed over to the ANC, it would have had 
very serious and negative implications for South Africa’s international relations, its 
constitutional status, and indeed its legitimacy as a state. This was an important reason 
for dismantling the nuclear arsenal. We started dismantling the nuclear capability after we 
returned from Vienna.”546 
 
The respondents were all in consensus that the relinquishment of the 
nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT was a key pre-condition to 
achieving legitimacy as a successor state. 
 
The testimony offered by Professor Mouton is in its essence a replication 
of that presented by Barnard. Professor Mouton recalled in his testimony, 
that he too, had been lobbied by a senior member of the ANC not to 
relinquish the nuclear bomb and accede to the NPT. It is the researcher’s 
view that both President Nyerere and Mr Joe Modise revealed an 
inclination that might have led inexorably to détournement de pouvoir.  
 
Professor Mouton recalled that:  
 
“When I had completed my job of overseeing the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal 
and this was publicly announced, a senior person from the ANC came to me. I can’t 
remember his name. He was quite a figure, though. 
 
He said: ‘Why did you dismantle the nuclear bomb? … We wanted it …’ 
 
You will recall that at that time that Nelson Mandela and Muammar Kaddafi were great 
friends.”547 
 
It can be deduced from Professor Mouton’s comments that one of the 
reasons the nuclear weapons were relinquished and South Africa acceded 
to the NPT was because of the danger of criminal nuclear proliferation.548  
 
                                                
546 Interview with Dr Neil Barnard at the Chameleon Restaurant in Plattekloof, Cape Town on 
29 October 2007. 
547 Op cit Mouton. 
548 The death of Karen Silkwood is perhaps the most publicised case of criminal nuclear 
proliferation. See Rashke, Richard. 1981. The Killing of Karen Silkwood. Gray’s Inn Road, 
London: Sphere Books Limited. 191– 381.  
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Mr Mike Louw also offered an insightful corroboratory opinion on the 
proliferation concerns associated with the friendship between Mandela 
and Kaddafi. He recollected that:  
 
“Mandela impressed me from the beginning. He was straightforward. He did not mince 
his words. He did not seek favour. He was himself. He did not try to be anyone. There 
were no outward signs of bitterness, although I know that that was only my impression. 
He knew that what was done was done. He knew that he had broken the law willingly and 
knowingly. He was charismatic because he was non-charismatic. 
 
I could not help but notice how out of touch he was. Although he had newspapers, what 
you read in them, and walking outside in the streets dealing with the reality of existence, 
are two very different things. We explored the theme of how divorced he was from reality 
and whether he could and would catch up ... the point of elasticity of his mindset ... his 
capacity to learn as an adult – and I came to the conclusion that he would catch up. 
 
For example, he was to be awarded a Mohamir Kaddafi Peace Prize, and we told him 
that Kaddafi was now persona non grata. Mandela kept on harking back to a visit that he 
had made to North Africa decades before, and I was worried about an unnecessary bond 
with the obsolete. Some of his arguments were really out of touch. He was very up-beat 
about this accolade – the Kaddafi Peace Prize. 
 
But what do you expect? I got a long lecture from him on reality. And a long speech about 
his experiences in North Africa ... 
 
This was as a result of his being in gaol for so long. I chose never to argue with him, only 
to listen. It was in our view nothing to do with his ideological orientation. This would have 
changed our entire perspective. We factored in the matter of his own obsolescence into 
our discourse, in order to correct a major error of misperception.  
 
Barnard gave the feedback on these meetings, firstly to PW Botha and then to FW de 
Klerk I found it important and interesting that Mandela kept his mind going by thinking 
very carefully about various issues. He worked out his point of view on violence and co-
operation with the Soviet Union, on negotiation, etc. When he gave us his explanation, it 
was always well thought out.  
 
Again our concern was whether he would vary his responses and show a lack of 
consistency. My realisation was that Mandela was absolutely consistent, to the extent 
that you might gain the impression that he was talking from a tape recorder and his 
viewpoint came through with word-for-word exactitude.  
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I also felt respect for him. He is very brave. He knew that the National Intelligence Service 
obviously had strong propagandistic capabilities and could have gone out and abused his 
trust and twisted his words. And we did not abuse this trust. He was very brave and he 
was doing what he was doing out of conviction. I respected this deeply. I never felt that 
he was insincere. You could trust him. If he said something, he would stick with it.”549 
 
Mike Louw presented the basic reasons that Mr Mandela was treated with 
respect and no games were played with him. The ratione personae is 
offered here. The spirit was one of good faith. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
It has been shown that the reasons that the nuclear arsenal was 
relinquished and South Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were many, complex, and systemically 
interrelated. Although there was a general convergence on the reason for 
the accession, each respondent placed a slightly different emphasis on the 
reasoning. There are seven reasons that were proffered to justify this 
decision, and they are summarised below. But, before presenting those 
reasons, I wish to offer a brief synopsis of my interpretation of the relative 
emphasis placed by each respondent on the most important causal factors 
underlying the decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the 
NPT. 
 
For Mr de Klerk, the most important issue was that this decision was a 
necessary condition for successfully concluding the constitutional 
negotiations and gaining international recognition for this settlement. He 
was also deeply concerned about ensuring juridical continuity in the 
context of the transition, and he was determined that the successor regime 
should be bound by the NPT prior to the conclusion of the constitution 
negotiations. His juridical concerns went further than the NPT and covered 
the entire ambit of South Africa’s constitutional framework and 
international relations. Mr de Klerk indicated that the retention of the 
nuclear weapons while negotiating a democratic non-racial Constitution 
                                                
549 Interview with Mr Mike Louw at La Patt Café, Hatfield Plaza, Pretoria on 18 March 2005. 
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would have signified negotiations in bad faith, and for this reason they 
were relinquished. He did not wish to bequeath the successor regime a 
poisoned chalice, so he kept the negotiations in camera and out of Mr 
Mandela’s knowledge in order to protect him from being stigmatised on 
account of being in possession of these weapons. The reason for Mr de 
Klerk’s holding these sentiments was that he personally wanted the 
constitutional negotiations to be successful regardless of who ended up 
being the short-term political beneficiaries.  Mr de Klerk did not refer to any 
concerns about the ANC’s potential to proliferate nuclear weapons during 
the course of his animus, but it is suspected that these were legitimate but 
privately-harboured concerns. 
 
Mr Pik Botha offered a similar explanation to Mr de Klerk as to the reasons 
for South Africa’s accession to the NPT, but his testimony differed from Mr 
de Klerk’s in certain important respects. Mr Botha emphasised the 
coercive pressure that the United States placed on South Africa to accede 
to the NPT as a precondition for international juridical recognition. This 
pressure was so incessant and intense that the researcher questioned 
whether South Africa had indeed voluntarily relinquished the nuclear 
arsenal and acceded to the NPT, or done so under duress. The conclusion 
that he reached was that it was a voluntary and independent decision 
although conducted under duress. One of the reasons that the United 
States placed such pressure on the predecessor regime to relinquish the 
nuclear arsenal was their fear that the ANC might have nuclear 
proliferation inclinations. It was discovered that there was indeed 
substance in this assertion. It was also found that there was an African 
continental view that these nuclear weapons should have been retained in 
order to place Africa in the prestigious nuclear club. The United States 
was therefore concerned about both South Africa’s proliferation 
inclinations under an ANC regime and an African nuclear proliferation 
scenario as well. 
 
Professor Stumpf’s animus converged with that offered by Mr de Klerk. He 
too did not express a specific fear of the proliferation propensity of the 
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ANC or the OAU in an African continent-wide scenario. He did not identify 
a concern about juridical continuity, but he did strongly assert that the 
accession to the NPT was linked to the successful outcome of the 
constitutional negotiations and therefore, by implication, the successor 
regime’s achieving positive international recognition status. 
 
Professor Mouton’s animus was simple and direct. For him the reason why 
the nuclear weapons were relinquished and South Africa acceded to the 
NPT is that the nuclear weapons were useless. He did share that he had 
personal experience of a senior ANC official’s proliferation inclinations. Dr 
Barnard’s view was that the decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal was 
a furiously-contested internal decision, which hinged on different 
perspectives as to what could be achieved in terms of a deterrent quid pro 
quo. For him, the nuclear arsenal seemed to be a useful ‘chess piece’ that 
needed to be played for maximum political benefit for South Africa. His 
view was that it was not played to the greatest possible benefit. 
 
Mr Mike Louw’s perspective was unique, quite different from those 
expressed by all of the above respondents. He argued that the retention of 
nuclear weapons was contrary to jus cogens and that South Africa had an 
obligation erga omnes to rid itself of them. He stressed the pariah 
recognition status that these caused and regarded them as being 
symptomatic of a moral and legal degeneracy that could be changed only 
by making a totally fresh constitutional start. He therefore advocated the 
need for both a political and a legal revolution if South Africa were not to 
degenerate into a failed state. 
 
The first reason proffered as to why South Africa relinquished the nuclear 
weapons and acceded to the NPT was that it was done to ensure that the 
new Constitution was written, negotiated and implemented without 
impediment. 
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Second, the weapons were relinquished and South Africa acceded to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons because any practical 
military usage would have constituted a crime against humanity.  
 
Third, after many failed attempts over a number of years, the deterrent 
usage of nuclear weapons had not achieved any tangible quid pro quo in 
the form of a reduction of sanctions. This point is arguable, though. The 
international goodwill accorded to the legitimacy of the constitutional 
transition could be contended to have been a major tangible and intangible 
quid pro quo. Indeed, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet 
Union’s withdrawal of support to the Cubans in the military battle fields in 
Angola made the South African presumptions regarding nuclear 
deterrence obsolete and irrelevant. 
 
Fourth, the retention of the nuclear arsenal would have signified a 
mendacious intent by the predecessor regime towards the successor 
regime totally incompatible and contrary to the good faith commitment of 
negotiating a democratic and non-racial Constitution designed to dissolve 
the legacy of apartheid. 
 
Fifth, the reason Mr Mandela was excluded from the relinquishment and 
accession processes was that his inclusion would have vastly complicated 
both the relinquishment and accession to the NPT and endangered the 
constitutional settlement. If Mr Mandela had inherited the nuclear arsenal, 
he would have been bequeathed a poisoned chalice. The retention of the 
nuclear arsenal would have compromised his international credibility, and 
would have been deemed a gesture in bad faith. The technical and legal 
challenge of relinquishing the nuclear arsenal and acceding to the NPT 
therefore needed to be handled meticulously and with great care. The 
ANC did not have the technical expertise to perform this task properly. The 
challenge of securing a new Constitution for South Africa rested on Mr de 
Klerk’s ability to manage the constantly changing and fragmenting 
coalitions and groups which had vested interests in both the accession to 
the NPT and the constitutional settlement. 
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Sixth, Mr de Klerk was concerned about ensuring that the codification of 
rules relating to the succession of the state was managed in a way that 
ensured juridical security in the context of South Africa’s international 
relations. He was therefore confronted by two intrinsically interrelated 
challenges that needed to be managed simultaneously. The first challenge 
that needed to be managed was the technical–legal one of relinquishing 
the nuclear weapons and acceding to the NPT. The second challenge was 
the danger of conflict arising from mistrust, and the different remits of the 
multiple stakeholders that might have been impacted by the nuclear 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT.  
 
In retrospect, Andrew Feinstein’s investigation into ANC corruption with 
respect to the multi-billion dollar arms deal justifies the perspicacity of the 
United States’ concerns about criminal nuclear proliferation.550 This arms 
corruption began in about 1998, four years after the ANC had assumed 
power.551 The endemic corruption that has been evident in South Africa 
since the inception of democracy has been of such an intense and all-
pervasive level that the researcher’s personal view is that a criminal 
nuclear proliferation scenario would almost certainly have arisen had 
South Africa retained these weapons. The temptation to sell these nuclear 
weapons to the highest bidder, whomsoever it might have been, at the 
greatest profit would simply have been too great. 
 
The researcher’s viewpoint is that plausible South African nuclear 
proliferation scenarios under an ANC regime would have had: 
 
• A political driving force pertaining to extensive reciprocity 
obligations to allies in the struggle – Libya, Cuba and Palestine 
would be obvious examples in point;  
• A criminal driving force; 
                                                
550 Feinstein, Andrew; After the Party; Jonathan Ball Publishers Johannesburg, 2007. 
551 Op cit Feinstein at 155. 
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• A criminal driving force legitimised and camouflaged by ostensible 
political loyalties. 
 
Extreme pressure was placed on South Africa by the Accessory Powers to 
roll back its nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. This pressure raises 
the questions of whether South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear 
arsenal and accession to the NPT was actually voluntary or not. 
 
Given the presumption that South Africa’s constitutional settlement was 
causally linked to the nuclear relinquishment, and accepting the fact that 
South Africa was also pressurised to relinquish these weapons and 
accede to the NPT, to what extent does it follow that South Africa’s 
constitutional settlement was a sovereign act, and to what extent was its 
constitutional settlement an act of geo-legal imposition? 
 
The researcher’s view is that Mr de Klerk could have decided not to 
accede to the NPT.  He would have gained support from elements within 
the SADF, ARMSCOR, the right wing, and more tacitly, from certain 
elements within the ANC and OAU as well. In gaining this support for non-
accession, he would, however, have lost international support and 
credibility for the legitimacy of the constitutional transition. It would have 
been a parochial municipal gesture that would have been alienated by 
international law.  
 
Mr de Klerk made a conscious decision not to follow the parochial path. 
This decision was, like many important decisions, made under great 
pressure. It was therefore a sovereign decision. The same logic applies to 
Mr de Klerk’s decision to negotiate a new and democratic constitution. He 
could have elected to retain the status quo by increasing repression, but 
that would have been an unwise and destructive choice. The conclusion is 
therefore that the decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and negotiate 
a new constitution was a sovereign choice.   
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The expert sample were unanimous that there would probably not have 
been a successfully negotiated constitutional transition in South Africa had 
the nuclear weapons not been relinquished simultaneously with the 
constitutional negotiations. It was clear to Mr de Klerk and the other 
respondents that South Africa’s constitutional transition would not have 
been granted international approval by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the Accessory Powers, the Nuclear-Weapons-States, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, and the United Nations Security Council 
had it retained possession of these devices, and had it not acceded to the 
NPT.  
 
While the constitutional negotiations were generally speaking, but not 
always, conducted as a relatively public matter, the nuclear negotiations 
were always, of necessity, conducted as a private and indeed secret 
matter. They were conducted in camera. The ANC played no decision-
making or participating role whatsoever in the nuclear relinquishment 
process and South Africa’s accession to the NPT. The reason proffered for 
this was that it was felt that the nuclear weapons issue would have 
complicated the constitutional negotiations, perhaps beyond redemption, 
and caused major rifts and unnecessary conflicts both within South Africa 
and internationally. The relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal was 
therefore an essential prelude to the new Constitution’s being granted 
international legitimacy.  
 
According to a research report presented to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the United States Senate: 
 
“South Africa relinquished its nuclear weapons only after the coincidence of four 
developments, each of which appears to be critical to the South African decision. 
 
These include: 
 
1. Reassessment of Threat – The end of the Cold War reduced feelings of 
insecurity as 50 000 Cubans withdrew from the region. 
2. Desire for International Standing – After the end of apartheid, the South African 
regime sought to normalise relations with the rest of the world in order to achieve 
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the political and economic assistance that would accompany such a move. The 
normalisation of relations required South Africa to relinquish its nuclear weapons. 
3. Personal Leadership – President FW de Klerk’s personal leadership represented 
a critical factor in the South African decision. 
4. Regime Change – As the National Party prepared to relinquish power to the 
African National Congress, the National Party feared the ANC might share 
nuclear weapons or technologies with its allies in Libya, Cuba, the PLO or Iran.  
 
A single reason cannot explain a country’s decision to roll forward or roll back its nuclear 
weapons programme. Second, a state’s decision regarding the development of nuclear 
weapons should not be viewed as a single distinct (and) irreversible decision. On the 
contrary, history consistently demonstrates that the proliferation decision making process 
of states can be better understood as a series of decision points in which states ‘dial up’ 
or ‘dial down’ their programmes in an effort to keep their options open. Decisions relating 
to proliferation evolve slowly and incrementally.”552 
 
The researcher’s view is that the value of the four factors mentioned in the 
Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations cited above resides in their 
dynamic and systemic interrelatedness. They were all relevant to the 
decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal, and to accede to the NPT, but 
the nuances of understanding and emphasis that underpinned the 
decision were obviously variable and subtle. 
 
The reassessment of the military threat was unquestionably an important 
justificatory factor that provided a rationale for the relinquishment and 
accession decision. But this cannot be understood as a comprehensive 
rationale. South Africa could have retained those weapons had it wished 
to. Military threats wax and wane. The respondents understood that any 
usage of these weapons would have constituted a crime against humanity. 
Nuclear weapons could not have been used legally in the type of military 
conflict that manifested in Angola, because their effect is indiscriminate 
and disproportionate. The variability and subtlety of the matter is illustrated 
by the fact that the ANC Minister of Defence, Mr Joe Modise, bewailed the 
relinquishment decision, and wished for the retention of the nuclear 
                                                
552 Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate. 2008. ‘Chain Reaction: 
Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East’. One Hundred and Tenth Congress, Second 
Session, Washington DC. 21 –22. February. 
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weapons. The military threat was not the issue for him. His concern was 
the national prestige that would arise from their retention. Mr Julius 
Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, held a similar but Africa-wide view, 
which he communicated to Mr Pik Botha, and which is annotated in this 
chapter. 
 
The search for international standing and positive as opposed to pariah 
state recognition was a complicated pursuit. It required changing the 
perceptions of South Africa as a pariah state to its being a respected 
member of international bodies. It also demanded, inter alia, that South 
Africa should not be tarred perceptually with the same brush as in the 
case of Iraq. It required the creation of juridical security in its international 
relations by demonstrating inter alia that the succession of state would 
leave Pretoria bound to its preceding treaties and agreements. This was a 
subtle project. The need for internal stability and standing within South 
Africa itself was an equally important component of the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. 
 
‘The personal leadership of Mr FW de Klerk was fundamental to the 
rollback and accession decision and its interrelationship with the 
constitutional transition. It is very difficult to envision this process as 
having happened efficiently and painlessly without his leadership.  
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Chapter Six 
How the Nuclear Arsenal was Relinquished and Accession 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and Compliance with International Law was Achieved 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the question of how South Africa’s nuclear arsenal was 
relinquished will be interrogated, together with an analysis of how it 
acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 
compliance with international law. This ‘how’ question is relevant to the 
research as it will assist in understanding the practical question of how 
South Africa fulfilled the terms and conditions of acceding to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This clarification of the ‘how’ 
question is intended to serve a broader purpose, as it may be of 
assistance to other states who may have developed a nuclear weapons 
capability and have also decided to relinquish these weapons of mass 
destruction. This chapter is structured to introduce the reader to both the 
general themes and specific questions which are of basic importance as to 
how this matter would be pursued in the context of international law. The 
reader will firstly be introduced through the ‘eyes’ of Mr de Klerk and his 
co-respondents to the general themes that are relevant to understanding 
the ‘how’ question. It begins with a composite analysis of Mr de Klerk’s 
contribution towards addressing the ‘how’ question in the context of the 
transitional negotiations leading to a non-racial and democratic 
Constitution. Mr de Klerk’s role was crucial to this process. His colleagues 
(and the respondents) enacted the principles of his decisions and made 
them work in reality. The nuclear relinquishment and accession process 
was portrayed in the interviews as a focused conversation. The primary 
data that was shared by Mr de Klerk during his interview is cross-
referenced with that of the other respondents. Some of the citations are 
fairly lengthy. Their value resides in the important primary data and factual 
information that they contain and their historically significant contribution in 
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clarifying an important and little-appreciated aspect of this country’s 
nuclear status in conjunction with the constitutional transition. The 
information arising from the interviews is triangulated with relevant 
literature and then subjected to phenomenological reduction when and 
where appropriate. The phenomenological reductions assist in refining, 
contextualising and qualifying the insight arising from the data contained in 
the interviews. 
 
Mr de Klerk’s reflections on this matter are presented according to 
different themes relevant to how the weapons were relinquished and 
accession to the NPT was achieved. One of his important instructions was 
that an Announcement Plan should be put in place. The Announcement 
Plan is instructive because it provides a clear basis for understanding how 
he envisioned the implementation of the entire process of relinquishment 
and accession. His legal–strategic approach was multifaceted and 
designed to solve complex interrelated political and social problems. The 
first section of this chapter is therefore devoted to understanding Mr de 
Klerk’s role in how relinquishment and accession were pursued. After this, 
the question of how these matters were synchronised will be revealed by 
means of a reflection on the Announcement Plan. Mr de Klerk instructed 
that an Announcement Plan should be established and a discussion of this 
plan, although it was continually adapted, is intended to provide the reader 
with a useful holistic view of the overall reasons guiding how it was 
envisioned that the nuclear arsenal would be relinquished, and how 
accession to the NPT would be achieved. 
 
The nuclear relinquishment and accession process, although underpinned 
by complex reasoning, was a practical event that required effective project 
management skills. It is for this reason that Mr de Klerk placed 
considerable emphasis on selecting the right, high-quality people to 
perform this task. His decision to appoint Professor Wynand Mouton as 
the Oversight Auditor is therefore explored. This discussion about 
appointments has been included to reveal the role of human judgement 
and discretion in reaching high-quality decisions about who should be 
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entrusted with the responsibility of representing South Africa before the 
IAEA on the matter of Safeguards. 
 
Mr de Klerk was compelled to apply a similar considered judgment at an 
institutional level when he decided that the Atomic Energy Corporation 
(AEC) would be the designated state authority to determine how South 
Africa would relinquish its nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. He did 
this knowing that there were other state agencies and corporations, for 
example, ARMSCOR and the South African Defence Force (SADF), which 
might have performed this role. He perceived ‘institutional neutrality’ in the 
Atomic Energy Corporation that commended it, rather than ARMSCOR, to 
be mandated with the authority to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and 
accede to the NPT. ARMSCOR or the SADF would almost inevitably have 
included persons who were strongly opposed to the decision to relinquish 
the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT and would therefore probably 
have attempted to subvert the process. This was perhaps because Mr de 
Klerk anticipated that other potential agencies and state corporations 
might have been tempted to filibuster because they perceived that they 
might lose power and influence because of the decision to relinquish the 
nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. 
 
Mr de Klerk needed to ensure that the relinquishment process was 
conducted in an orderly and structured manner and for this reason he 
established internal nuclear regulatory protocols that afforded credence to 
the nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. He granted the 
IAEA inspectors unfettered access to investigate any suspected military 
sites in South Africa. The matter of access to military sites and the 
question of state sovereignty proved to be an important question of 
general international applicability and relevance in relation to which Mr de 
Klerk needed to reach a decision. This temporary waiver of sovereign 
territorial rights was condoned by Mr de Klerk because it was anticipated 
that this gesture of granting unconditional access to the nuclear inspectors 
would create comity and trust and open the way for the constitutional 
negotiations to proceed smoothly. In addition, it contributed to South 
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Africa’s gaining a new and positive recognition status. Indeed, this 
openness was commended by Dr Hans Blix to the United Nations Security 
Council, where open access was deemed to be an exemplary principle 
that should guide international practice with respect to how nuclear 
inspections are conducted in terms of the NPT. Because the nuclear 
relinquishment and accession process needed to be conducted in a 
structured fashion, the matter of internal regulatory controls was given 
careful attention. These controls afforded credence to the accession. It will 
be shown later that authorising documents were provided to those 
individuals charged with implementing the ‘how’ decision to ensure that no 
official countermanded Mr de Klerk‘s decisions. 
 
Having presented the general framework of how South Africa set about 
relinquishing its nuclear arsenal and acceding to the NPT, the research 
will focus on specific aspects of the ‘how’ question which are guided 
mostly by the Statute of the IAEA and the NPT in the context of 
international law. These specific matters include inter alia: 
 
• The form of accession is not prescribed under international law; 
• The credibility of the Initial Report; 
• Safeguards and Comprehensive Safeguards; and 
• Acceptance by the General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
 
More specifically, the first matter that is presented is an interrogation about 
the flexibility on the ‘form’ of accession to the NPT. The ‘form’ of accession 
was not prescribed. The architecture of the form of accession was 
designated by the intention and consent of Pretoria to be bound by the 
NPT. The ‘form’ of accession therefore arose from the unique set of 
interrelated circumstances that gave rise to South Africa’s decision to 
relinquish its nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT. South Africa 
developed its own indigenous nuclear relinquishment and accession 
process that had a ‘form’ that solved its specific requirements on how to 
relinquish and accede to the NPT. It is contended that each country that 
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wishes to relinquish nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT will need to 
develop its own indigenous form of treaty accession suitable to its reality 
and specific factual circumstance. This is because each state will have its 
own country-specific case that will need to be addressed on its own 
merits. 
 
The discussion on the ‘form’ of accession is also a logical and necessary 
prelude to an assessment of the matter of the Initial Report and the 
authority of the Safeguards Audit Agreement. The documentation that 
contained the vital nuclear evidence that was reported to the IAEA and 
formed the database on which Safeguards was based was called the 
‘Initial Report’ by the IAEA. The Initial Report and Safeguards need to be 
discussed in sequence, starting with the Initial Report and followed by the 
questions that revolved around Safeguards. In South Africa the Initial 
Report was termed the ‘Opening Inventory’, and they are therefore one 
and the same. The discussion about the Initial Report is a necessary 
precondition for understanding how Safeguards are implemented. The 
accession process was predicated on a carefully compiled factual, and 
empirically verifiable, body of scientific information – evidence – that 
validated South Africa’s entire nuclear programme. It needed to be 
verifiable, according to the laws of nuclear physics, which were regulated 
by the NPT and the IAEA’s Safeguards protocols.553 A precise and 
credible Initial Report/Opening Inventory was compiled by the South 
African Safeguards Manager, Dr Nick van Wiellig, in record time for 
presentation for review by the IAEA’s inspectorate. This Initial Report 
provided crucial, empirically validated information that reconciled the 
nuclear inspections in preparation for accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
The onus was on South Africa to present a substantively impeccable Initial 
Report to the International Atomic Energy Agency, in pursuit of compliance 
with Safeguards. Any noteworthy variances could have meant that South 
                                                
553 Cochran, Thomas. 1994. ‘Highly Enriched Uranium Production for South Africa’s Nuclear 
Weapons’. Science and Global Security, 4(6):166–176. 
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Africa’s highly enriched uranium and nuclear weapons would not be 
properly accounted for on relinquishment, and that the Safeguards would 
therefore not have been met. Had this occurred, the Initial Report would 
not have been endorsed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Safeguards would not have been approved for ratification by the United 
Nations General Assembly, and the country’s credibility and sovereign risk 
profile would probably have been severely shaken. Needless to say, its 
pariah recognition status would have been perpetuated under these 
compromising circumstances and state continuity jeopardised. The 
constitutional transition would perhaps have been thwarted and 
international juridical insecurity enhanced. 
 
The Safeguards constituted the audit standards of the relinquishment and 
accession exercise, as determined by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and its multinational inspectorate of nuclear experts. South Africa 
was subjected to two phases of Safeguard Audit. 
 
The first process of verification was the IAEA’s Safeguards, which related 
to peaceful nuclear usage for domestic energy creation. The remit of the 
first Safeguards pertained to the present only and did not audit South 
Africa’s previous military nuclear weapons programme at all. The second 
Safeguards Audit investigated the previous programme. Two different 
types of nuclear expertise were therefore required for the different audits. 
The first type of expertise required was civilian nuclear expertise, and the 
second was military nuclear expertise. The second phase of verification, 
which included the military nuclear weapons audit, was conducted by an 
enlarged team of nuclear weapons experts who operated under the aegis 
of the IAEA and were referred to as the ‘Extra Team’. These two audits 
impacted on the form of accession. Furthermore, the United States played 
a dominant role in the activities of the Extra Team. In the phase of the 
second Safeguards Audit by the Extra Team, it was particularly important 
to build trust with the Americans. They were mistrustful about South 
Africa’s intentions with respect to the nuclear arsenal. This was borne out 
by their historical experience. For this reason, the question of how trust 
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was developed is explored, as it lies at the heart of settling a transaction in 
good faith. It was recognised that this mistrust, if not counteracted, could 
perpetuate South Africa’s pariah recognition status. Trust was gradually 
developed through the South Africans and Americans planning 
interactively together, sharing information and solving problems jointly. In 
this way, positive and respectful relationships were cultivated. The matter 
of trust is equated with the measure of good faith relating to the accession. 
It is anticipated that this will be a matter of specific concern in all 
processes of accession to the NPT. 
 
The penultimate matter addressed in this chapter is an investigation as to 
how South Africa’s Comprehensive Safeguards credentials were accepted 
at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
September 1991. This acceptance of the Comprehensive Safeguards 
once again circles back to the substantive integrity of the Initial Report that 
was discussed earlier in the chapter, and which constituted a vital building 
block justifying the IAEA’s recommendation, flowing from the Safeguards, 
that South Africa’s accession to the NPT should be supported. South 
Africa had proved beyond reasonable doubt and to the satisfaction of the 
highest scientific standards possible that it had indeed relinquished its 
nuclear arsenal in every conceivable manner. Furthermore, it could not 
and would not proliferate nuclear weapons in the future. South Africa’s 
achievement of compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement was a vitally important step in its accession to the NPT. The 
IAEA’s endorsement of South Africa’s compliance with the terms and 
conditions of that Agreement was also an important ceremonial process, 
underpinned by comity, where South Africa’s ‘good faith’ in acceding to the 
NPT was ratified before a world audience. It was therefore important to re-
establish good international relations. It is significant that the timing was 
carefully synchronised with South Africa’s constitutional transition. 
 
Article V of the Statute of the IAEA is devoted to matters pertaining to the 
General Conference of the IAEA. It provides the authority to, inter alia: 
 
 325 
“E. 3. Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of membership in accordance 
with Article XIX ... 
6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations … 
7. Approve any agreements or agreements between the Agency and the United 
Nations.”554 
 
On 16 September 1991, South Africa signed a Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA. Its expulsion from the General Conference of the IAEA was 
revoked, and the country regained its seat.555 This reinstatement came 
about because South Africa’s Initial Report was ratified and deemed 
compliant with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The 
relinquishment and accession to the NPT was conducted as a legal-
strategic project that was articulated and stringently controlled by Mr FW 
de Klerk, and executed by a trusted relinquishment and accession team. 
Mr de Klerk instructed the team to comply to the letter with South African 
municipal law and international law as it pertained to accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
 
Stumpf recalled that:  
 
“Our brief and instructions from Mr de Klerk were ‘absolutely not to put a foot wrong, and 
to follow the letter of the NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement’. I had to 
dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s. That is why he gave me the instructions to comply with 
the IAEA.”556  
 
All the terms and conditions of the NPT needed to be perfectly complied 
with before the weapons could be ‘deemed to be relinquished’, and 
accession to the NPT could be ratified.  
 
                                                
554 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at 3–4. 
555 Nuclear News, October 1991 at 26.  
556 Interview with Professor Waldo Stumpf at the University of Pretoria, Minerals Science 
Building, Pretoria on 18 October 2007. The inference that Mr de Klerk placed great importance on 
reconciling between a conflict of laws resides in inter alia the fact that he gave Professor Waldo 
Stumpf and other key persons written instructions to relinquish the weapons in order to ensure 
execution, and his appointment of the Oversight Auditor and instruction that he should adhere to 
all terms and conditions of the NPT. He was also deeply concerned about ensuring constitutional 
continuity and juridical security    
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6.2 Mr de Klerk’s Role in How the Nuclear Arsenal was 
Relinquished and How South Africa Acceded to the NPT 
Mr de Klerk’s testimony makes it evident that he took the matter of the 
relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT personally 
and devoted constant and dedicated thought and energy to managing the 
matter. It is fair to infer that that he regarded it as a high priority, and it is 
probably because he took it so seriously that the process was conducted 
successfully. The leader in charge of the nuclear relinquishment and 
accession processes maintained stringent control procedures in order to 
ensure that there were no variances and breakdowns. His technical team 
consented to the intention to accede to the NPT, and as a team they were 
able to maintain their consensus on consent and intention throughout the 
entire process. 
 
Mr de Klerk explained:  
 
“I appointed a technical team to advise me on the way forward in a process of 
decommissioning the nuclear arms which had been assembled. When I took the decision 
to relinquish our nuclear arms, all the key players in my Cabinet who were involved in the 
nuclear oversight accepted this decision. 
 
This included Magnus Malan who might not have been that enthusiastic, but who was 
part of that decision. Of course some individuals and scientists who were involved in the 
nuclear programme were upset. However, I gave the political decision-makers the fullest 
opportunity to influence this decision to relinquish our nuclear arsenal. It was not an 
imposed decision.”557 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Mr de Klerk is pointing out that he went to great pains to ensure that the 
internal process of reaching a decision on the relinquishment of nuclear 
weapons was agreed upon by the key decision-makers. This would 
appear to be in contrast to the decision-making process in Iraq, where 
there was little or no internal agreement and consensus on their 
                                                
557 Interview with FW de Klerk at the Offices of the FW de Klerk Foundation in Plattekloof, Cape 
Town on 4 October 2007. 
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relinquishment process. The researcher’s view is that the absence of an 
internal Iraqi consensus was one of the causal factors that contributed to 
the subsequent war. Conversely, the presence of an internal consensus in 
South Africa had a direct and positive bearing on the outcome. 
 
“I was acutely aware that South Africa needed to adopt an internationally-credible 
process to do so. I appointed Professor Wynand Mouton, former rector of the University 
of the Free State, to preside over this decommissioning process. He was a brilliant 
academic and had formerly been head of the SABC. Mouton was an international 
scientist of repute. He led the entire nuclear decommissioning process. Mouton 
conducted careful inspections and created a credible process of verifying the 
decommissioning. 
 
When this process was completed in South Africa, it needed to be signed off with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and they needed to check all our facilities. We 
invited them to check all the former nuclear facilities and materials and accounted for 
everything.  
 
Had the decision to relinquish our nuclear arsenal not been taken early on, the 
constitutional transition would have been a much more dangerous and prolonged process 
than it was. It would have been more analogous to the changes that are presently taking 
place in Israel, where they are negotiating on an excruciatingly painful tit-for-tat-basis to 
(for example) release so many Hamas guerillas, for some or other concession. That type 
of process is inefficient, time-consuming and painful. 
 
The decision to un-ban the ANC and release all political prisoners was unilateral, but my 
political constituency needed to be brought along with this decision.   
 
There are some that have said that we should have gained more leverage out of our 
atomic capability. I personally do not think that South Africa could have (gained more 
leverage), and that had we attempted to do this, it would have created intense mistrust, 
muddied the waters and confused the constitutional transition. 
 
Indeed, if we had chosen the Israeli negotiation process, every move that we made 
towards relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal or any other initiative would have been 
seen as a concession.”558 
 
Heald: “Was the ANC in the know about the nuclear relinquishment?”559 
 
                                                
558 Op cit De Klerk. This comment by De Klerk again resonates and is perfectly congruent with the 
considered viewpoint offered by Barnard mentioned above.  
559 Loc cit.  
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De Klerk: “I think that as a matter of courtesy, Mandela would have been advised, 
probably via a letter. I cannot at this stage recall exactly how he was advised but I am 
sure that he was. You might need to ask Dave Steward about this fact. Dave Steward has 
the most astonishingly excellent memory.”560 
 
Mr de Klerk’s first priority was that the relinquishment and accession 
should be conducted as an internationally credible process. An 
internationally credible process would be logically congruent with South 
Africa’s achieving positive international recognition for its new non-racial 
democratic Constitution. A process that lacked international credibility 
would lead to the opposite outcome. An important feature of the credibility 
of the process was that it needed to be expertly project managed by a 
person of repute. This was why Mr de Klerk took the decision to appoint 
Professor Mouton. Mr de Klerk briefly alluded to his offer of access to the 
IAEA’s inspectors, but at this stage in his interview did not spell out the 
magnitude of that offer and its ramifications. (That is addressed later in the 
chapter.) The commentary about the importance of taking this decision to 
relinquish the arsenal and accede to the NPT early on in the constitutional 
negotiations was signified as an important cornerstone of its success. It 
reveals that the nuclear accession and constitutional negotiations needed 
to be carefully synchronised. They could in fact have become interlinked in 
a very negative fashion, had the nuclear programme been placed in the 
public domain. They were simultaneous processes, and, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first time that this assertion has been made in the 
literature. It was for this reason that the relinquishment and accession 
were set about confidentially and conducted unilaterally. Confidentiality 
was a contributing factor to the success of the intervention. Mr de Klerk‘s 
allusion to Hamas and the Israeli negotiations is noteworthy, because they 
represent a case study in fragmenting groups and an example of poor 
comity. 
 
                                                
560 Loc cit. It has been ascertained from the interview with Stumpf that Mr Mandela was informed 
about South Africa’s decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal only the day before this 
announcement was made to the world.  
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Mr de Klerk had a choice. He could either conduct the process 
incrementally, as was done in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian scenario, 
or conduct it unilaterally it by adopting a ‘big bang’ approach. He chose the 
latter path, and he has proved to be correct in his judgement. He decided 
to exclude the ANC entirely from this process, and again this was wise 
from a practical perspective, as it prevented the process from breaking 
down around the inability to maintain sufficient consensus and obviate the 
ever-present risk of fragmentation. My final comment is that I am certain 
that Mr de Klerk was being tactful in his response to my question about 
whether the ANC were informed about the nuclear relinquishment or not. 
The answer to this question is that they were certainly excluded from the 
process entirely. 
 
6.2.1 The Announcement Plan and Question of Timing 
This analysis of the Announcement Plan is intended to assist the reader in 
gaining a clearer understanding of the entire process of nuclear 
relinquishment and accession from a holistic perspective. Professor 
Stumpf’s testimony is particularly important in offering clarity on this 
matter. He, of course, was one of the persons tasked with designing the 
Announcement Plan. The announcement of South Africa’s relinquishment 
of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT was delayed on a number 
of occasions because of very important additional reasons. 
 
Mr de Klerk delayed the announcement because he felt that South Africa 
would be unfairly (and illegally) tarred with the same brush as Iraq. At that 
time, the Gulf War was raging. Iraq had indeed proliferated nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It had acted in breach of 
the NPT. South Africa had never breached the NPT, but because of its 
international pariah status, Mr de Klerk felt that it would have been 
perceived as a threat to world peace. This might have occurred had South 
Africa’s possession of a nuclear arsenal been prematurely disclosed to the 
international media. It would most certainly have tarnished its aspirations 
for a positive international recognition status being accorded to the new 
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Constitution. Had the security situation in Angola, instead of stabilising, 
radically degenerated, there might have been a call by the military 
leadership to hold onto these weapons as deterrent bargaining tools. A 
scenario of Pretoria retaining its nuclear arsenal and then reversing an 
undertaking to accede to the NPT after international disclosure of its 
nuclear weapons status could have led to a greatly-enhanced perception 
of pariah recognition status, sovereign risk and juridical insecurity. 
Constitutional continuity would have been precarious at best. It would 
have been difficult to negotiate an internationally-recognised constitutional 
settlement successfully under this type of situation. Mr de Klerk received 
an overwhelming vote of confidence from the electorate in the last white 
referendum, which sought electoral endorsement for the constitutional 
changes, to proceed with the constitutional negotiations. Mr de Klerk 
interpreted this electoral endorsement as constituting a mandate from his 
constituency to relinquish the nuclear weapons, and he set about planning 
to accede to the NPT.561 
 
The relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and the constitutional settlement 
were shown in the previous discussion to be intrinsically interlinked.562 The 
timing of the nuclear relinquishment, accession and constitutional 
negotiations had to be carefully synchronised, because the concept of the 
nuclear relinquishment process was so huge that it could easily have 
eclipsed the perceived import of the constitutional negotiations in the eyes 
of the world. Mr de Klerk therefore delayed the timing of the 
announcement until he was confident that there would be no negative 
reactions to the decision that might impel a reversal of the constitutional 
settlement.563  The manner in which the announcement was made was 
also important to the success of the accession process. Mr de Klerk 
applied the ‘doctrine of no surprise’ to the key stakeholders. He ensured 
that no one was ‘wrong footed’ or compromised by the timing of the 
announcement. He did not want anyone to be embarrassed by the 
                                                
561 Loc cit. 
562 Op cit Stumpf. 
563 Loc cit. 
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decision to relinquish the nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. He 
placed a priority on the preservation of excellent relationships.  He 
therefore took particular care to ensure that the IAEA inspectors, and 
specifically Dr Hans Blix, were in the country at the time of 
announcement.564 
 
Dr Blix was informed of the decision on 22 March 1993, the day before the 
formal announcement was made. Mr Mandela was informed about the 
decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the next day, on the morning of 
23 March 1993. The confirmation of the sequence of the announcement 
and accession to the NPT proves that the process was conducted 
unilaterally.565 
 
Professor Stumpf explained the reasoning that underpinned the 
Announcement Plan:  
 
“People have often asked me whether we could have acceded earlier. The answer to the 
question is simple ... No, we could not have acceded earlier. The question is, however, a 
valid one. Should we not have announced the relinquishment of the nuclear weapons 
programme at the point of accession? That was on 10 July 1991. 
 
Should Mr de Klerk have stated to the world: ‘We acceded to the NPT today. We had this 
nuclear weapons programme, and it is now dismantled, and the IAEA will now be invited 
to South Africa to verify that the nuclear weapons have been dismantled.’?566 That would 
perhaps have been the correct way to have done it, from a purely logical perspective.567 
 
                                                
564 Ibid. 
565 Ibid. 
566 The following assessment explores how the accession to the NPT was synchronised with the 
constitutional negotiations. The announcement of South Africa’s accession to the NPT and 
relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal had to be withheld until such time as both processes were 
aligned. If the announcement had been made prematurely, it would have opened up a Pandora’s 
Box for the constitutional negotiations. 
567 The correct way from a logical perspective does not mean the correct way from a political 
perspective. 
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I know that there was one meeting at the Union Buildings where this matter was in fact 
discussed extensively.568 Mr de Klerk was very hesitant about following that course. We 
said to Mr de Klerk: ‘This really is the correct way to do it.’ But he said no. 
 
There were two reasons for Mr de Klerk’s hesitancy. Firstly, it was in the middle of the 
First Iraq War (the Gulf War). I explained to you in my notes on your research proposal 
that you should keep in mind that Iraq was a signatory to the NPT, and that Iraq had 
really broken the NPT. South Africa was in an entirely different situation. South Africa had 
never signed the NPT.”569 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Professor Stumpf reveals in this transcript that the question of choosing 
the appropriate timing was central to understanding how the nuclear 
accession was conducted. The reality is that the negative perceptions and 
mistrust that arose from the Gulf War could have been imputed to South 
Africa, regardless of the fact that the point of accession was on 10 July 
1991, and regardless of the substantive merits of the South African case. 
Mr de Klerk judged that the world was not yet ready to hear another 
instance of nuclear proliferation, albeit one with a happy ending of 
accession to the NPT. The substantive case of South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment and accession was not ready for presentation, regardless 
of its technical merits. Mistrust about South Africa’s hitherto pariah 
international recognition status still needed to be permitted time to 
dissipate. It did not matter that Iraq had acted unlawfully and breached the 
NPT and that South Africa had never breached the NPT. Both countries 
were regarded with great suspicion, and South Africa’s bona fides still had 
to be put to the test. 
 
“People don’t understand how the IAEA operates. The news media and the general 
public often don’t understand their modus operandi.  They think that the IAEA comes here 
as a swarm of people and that they look behind every little cupboard. It does not work like 
that. It is highly scientific. In our case, they went to the Y plant and they got hold of all the 
production records that we had kept over all the ten years of production. Then they 
                                                
568 Op cit Stumpf. Discussions at the Union Buildings had the purpose of seeking ground rules of 
appropriate nuclear conduct. 
569 Op cit Stumpf. Legal status of South Africa vis-à-vis the NPT. Mr de Klerk understood that the 
world would not have understood this vitally important but subtle legal difference.  
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analysed those records meticulously, and predicted how much material the plant should 
have used and could have produced, and compared that with the material that we had 
declared. On this basis they were able to calculate exactly what we had done within a 
minuscule margin of error, which was not relevant. This was a lengthy exercise. This is 
what nuclear verification is all about. 
 
At that point in time, the purpose was to verify that South Africa had declared all the 
material and it was under Safeguards. In other words, it was intended that the nuclear 
material should be used for peaceful purposes, and this was subject to verification from 
the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Americans wanted to get in on 
the act because they still thought that we would hide some HEU and so on.”570 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Professor Stumpf discussed in the passages above the substantive 
integrity of the Safeguarding process. It was obviously a process of 
scientific robustness and substantial integrity, but this rigorousness was 
understood only by very few people: the IAEA inspectors and their nuclear 
expert counterparts. It was felt that their message of the integrity of the 
process would not impress the world media, and a much more carefully 
conceived public relations programme would need to be implemented. 
This public relations programme can be understood as Mr de Klerk’s 
Announcement Plan.  
 
“It was not simply a matter of Mr de Klerk standing up in Parliament and announcing that 
there had been a very extensive nuclear weapons programme that had just been 
dismantled. The Announcement Plan involved informing various parties beforehand. Mr 
de Klerk also realised that he did not want the fact that: 
 
(a) we had such a programme, and 
(b) we had dismantled it; 
(c) to take key decision-makers off-guard. 
 
He did not want key decision-makers to read about the nuclear relinquishment in the 
headlines of the newspapers or hear it over the news. We had to draw up an extensive 
Announcement Plan in which crucial people were informed of this programme before it 
was to be announced in Parliament. The day before the announcement was made was 
22 March 1993. It was then that the Director General of the IAEA, Dr Hans Blix, was 
                                                
570 Loc cit. 
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informed. He was the last guy that Mr de Klerk would have wanted to have suddenly 
surprised. The international newspapers would have been onto him. There was another 
technical requirement that needed to be considered. We had to delay the announcement 
until there were IAEA inspectors on site here in South Africa. 
 
I have mentioned to you before that at that point we had signed a Safeguards Agreement. 
The IAEA inspectors were here in South Africa quite frequently, and they were also here 
for the Prior Safeguards Agreement. We knew that if there were no inspectors on site, 
this announcement would be embarrassing to the IAEA, and we did not want to inflict 
embarrassment on them. We did not want them to have to scramble to get here. The 
world would expect it of them to be in South Africa immediately. We thus were compelled 
to wait until March, when they were in the country and at hand. Right, so we had two 
senior inspectors here on site doing their normal inspection. On the morning of 23 March, 
Mr Mandela was informed before the announcement was made in Parliament. So, too, 
was Mr PW Botha. I know that my former head, Wynand de Villiers, had to travel down to 
Wilderness and inform him. I am not sure who else was informed. There were one or two 
others that were informed. 
 
At two o’clock in the afternoon of 23 March there was a big meeting in Cape Town of all 
the diplomats. They were called together. The Director General of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and I had to announce that the programme had been set in motion and 
that it was now dismantled. The diplomats were told that it was to be publicly announced 
later on in the afternoon so that nobody would get caught off-guard. They wanted to 
ensure that no one would possibly be compromised by the information. At 5 o’clock that 
afternoon, Mr FW de Klerk then announced it in Parliament.  
 
That is the reason there was quite a long time between the time that we acceded to the 
NPT and were compliant with the NPT. This was actually because of the interim political 
situation. It is clear that those persons who were responsible for South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment process did not want there to be any confusion about the matter. They did 
not play games, as was the case in Iraq. The rules underpinning the nuclear 
relinquishment process were co-operation and collaboration, not competition and conflict. 
This is because the creation of an international attitude of trust in South Africa was 
essential to its constitutional success.”571  
 
                                                
571 Loc cit. The ‘doctrine of no-surprise’ was contained in the Strategic Arms Limitation  Treaty 
(SALT) and called for the US and the USSR to inform one another about their own nuclear 
weaponisation developments, so that in the event of a new weapons technology being created, it 
would not spur an arms race and create escalatory panic. The care with which Mr de Klerk 
approached this matter is remarkable. The Iraqi weapons inspections were conducted in a manner 
that was oblivious to the centrality of process.  
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Phenomenological Reduction 
Mr de Klerk used the Announcement Plan as a framework for ensuring 
that harmonious relationships were maintained during the relinquishment 
and accession process with all the key decision makers. He also placed 
considerable emphasis on ensuring that high levels of comity were always 
observed. Careful thought was devoted to ensuring that ceremonial 
process and protocol were always of the highest order so that no 
individual or state would be offended and thereby place this fragile 
process at risk. 
 
The Announcement Plan was designed to ensure that the message that 
South Africa had developed and possessed a nuclear arsenal, then 
relinquished it and acceded to the NPT, was received in an appreciative 
and credible manner, both within South Africa itself and internationally. Mr 
de Klerk understood that South Africa and the world were not ready to 
accept the fact that South Africa’s point of accession to the NPT was 
actually 10 July 1991. It is contended that the United States and the 
United Kingdom were politically reluctant to accept the truth that Iraq had 
actually already relinquished its nuclear arsenal and was completed 
depleted at the conclusion of the Gulf War. They had committed much 
political capital to demonising Iraq on its questionable credentials relating 
to its alleged possession of nuclear weapons. It might have been very 
embarrassing for them to admit that they had been wrong in their 
speculation and accusations about Iraq. Mr de Klerk understood fully that 
there would have been serious credibility problems associated with an 
announcement that South Africa had relinquished its nuclear weapons in 
1991. South Africa’s positive recognition approach had to be carefully 
managed and timed. The correct timing of this announcement would help 
to make acceptance of the legitimacy of the constitutional agreement an 
international formality, ensuring constitutional continuity and maintaining 
international juridical security. It was imperative that none of the 
stakeholders should be permitted to be embarrassed by the process, as 
that embarrassment could have led to the subversion of accession to the 
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NPT, and therefore to the foundering of the constitutional settlement. The 
synchronisation of the process of which timing was an inherent component 
therefore required particular care. 
 
In this way, Mr de Klerk was able to dissolve one of the most serious 
threats to the constitutional transition. A high quality of foresight and 
wisdom characterised the design of the Announcement Plan. 
 
Ian Brownlie confirmed that: 
 
“International comity, comitas gentium, is a species of accommodation not unrelated to 
morality but to be distinguished from it nevertheless. Neighbourliness, mutual respect, 
and the friendly waiver of technicalities are involved, and the practice is exemplified by 
the practice of exemption of diplomatic envoys from customs duties. Oppenheim writes of 
the rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by states in their mutual 
intercourse without being legally bound by them.”572   
 
The interaction between the South Africans, who were vested with the 
responsibility of relinquishing the nuclear arsenal, the IAEA inspectorate, 
and the US inspectorate had to be very carefully addressed. Von 
Baeckmann et al clarified that the IAEA and the South African nuclear 
relinquishment and accession team needed to develop joint seminars, and 
were obliged by the nature of the project to work co-operatively and 
collaboratively together. 
 
The relevant Article in the IAEA’s Statute is: 
 
“Article VIII Exchange of Information 
 
A. Each member shall make available to the Agency all scientific information developed 
as a result of assistance extended by the Agency.”573   
 
The project was intensely intricate and complicated, and the full extent of 
the programme could be completely understood only by sharing a deep 
                                                
572 Brownlie, Ian. 2003. Principles of International Law. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 28. 
573 Statute of the IAEA at 7. 
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scientific discourse. This understanding was the first step that needed to 
be taken on which a foundation of trust could be built. Trust had to be 
cultivated between the South African nuclear relinquishment and 
accession team and the IAEA. The trust arose from sharing data and 
information, in pursuit of compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement. An informal moral code of conduct and a covenant of trust 
gradually developed, on which the legal accession to the NPT in all its 
complexity could be predicated. The preservation of respectful, trusting 
relationships – comity – was a central feature of South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment process and accession to the NPT. Professor Stumpf 
offered an example of the great pains to which the South Africans went in 
order not to embarrass Dr Hans Blix in any way. He confirmed:  
 
“The day before the international announcement was made on 23 March 1993, the 
Director General of the IAEA, Dr Hans Blix, was informed. He was the last guy that Mr de 
Klerk would have wished to have suddenly surprised. We knew that if there were no 
inspectors on sit, this announcement would be embarrassing to the IAEA, and we did not 
want to inflict embarrassment on them.”574 
 
It is clear that those persons who were responsible for South Africa’s 
nuclear relinquishment process did not want there to be any confusion 
about the matter. They did not play games, because they valued comity. 
Professor Stumpf contended that a failure to have informed the IAEA 
about the then pending announcement that South Africa had relinquished 
its nuclear weapons and then acceded to the NPT would have been 
construed as a gross breach of trust and of good faith. It would have 
undermined comity. 
 
The final section of this analysis will be devoted to exploring how the 
actual timing of the relinquishment and accession process was 
synchronised with the Announcement Plan. 10 July 1991 was the seminal 
date – ‘the point of accession’ – when South Africa acceded to the NPT. 
Mr de Klerk then delayed the announcement of South Africa’s accession 
                                                
574 Op cit Stumpf. This citation provides an indication of the importance of the relationship aspect 
in South Africa’s relinquishment and accession process.  
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to the NPT, its development, and subsequent relinquishment of its nuclear 
weapons capability until 23 March 1993. It was a full eight months later, in 
November 1993, that the General Assembly of the United Nations 
accepted that South Africa was compliant with the NPT, and Pretoria’s 
accession was ratified. This purposeful delay of the announcement of 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
NPT therefore covered a 20-month period. 
 
It has been argued that the constitutional settlement would almost 
certainly have been placed at deep risk had the announcement of the 
accession to the NPT been made on 10 July 1991. The country and the 
world were simply not ready for the announcement. The constitutional 
transition towards a non-racial democracy was not yet assured. The 
political climate in South Africa at that time was volatile, and there were 
waves of violence around the country. The acts of violence were 
particularly outrageous in KwaZulu Natal, and might have degenerated 
into civil war if unchecked. An announcement at that time would have 
been incendiary. Mr de Klerk would have risked being attacked from all 
sides of the political spectrum had he not carefully planned the timing of 
the announcement.  
 
Professor Stumpf offered his assessment of the sequence of accession in 
his following submission: 
 
“Now I also noticed that in some areas you were a bit uncertain about the dates of the 
nuclear rollback. They need to be corrected. I want now to discuss the dates. The first 
meeting about dismantling the nuclear arsenal was in September 1989. I do not have the 
exact day, though. It was approximately two weeks after de Klerk took over from PW 
Botha. That was the first meeting, where the fundamental relinquishment decision was 
taken. It was not a discussion. It was a decision. FW de Klerk made the decision. FW de 
Klerk told me that we should go away, and draw up a Rollback Plan for the entire matter. 
He requested a broad plan (the nuclear relinquishment) and instructed me to come back 
to him with this Rollback Plan as soon as possible. It was in November 1989 that we took 
the first Rollback Plan for the nuclear relinquishment process to Mr de Klerk. We 
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estimated that: ‘it would take so long, and this is when it would start,’ and so forth.575 So it 
was in November, when we took the plan to him.576 I don’t know the exact day now, but 
we took the plan to him. 
 
We explained to FW de Klerk that it would take about six months to set up all the 
documentation and procedures for this to be enacted. It would then take an estimated 
twelve months to dismantle the six devices. So in November 1989 FW de Klerk got our 
plan and he approved it. We realised that we needed a signature from Mr de Klerk to 
authorise the nuclear dismantlement. It was not good enough for us to say that we were 
at a meeting where this matter was decided. We needed a formal document authorising 
this decision in order to enact it.  Early in January 1990, we requested Mr de Klerk to 
authorise the relinquishment formally with an Authorising Document and his personal 
signature. We requested a written instruction from Mr de Klerk. Mr de Klerk said fine. Yes 
– he would give it to us, and he issued two written instructions, which we got in February 
1990. Official authorisation was granted in February 1990, but the decision to relinquish 
the nuclear arsenal had been taken some months prior to that. The written instruction 
said that ‘FW de Klerk hereby gives instructions to us to dismantle this nuclear weapons 
programme in a safe and secure manner ... to remove the HEU from the devices, to re-
melt them into unrecognisable ingots (because they have a special shape), into little 
ingots, transport the material to the AEC, who were really the owners of the material at 
that stage ... and then finally to advise government on accession to the NPT as a non-
nuclear-weapons-state’. 
 
Mr de Klerk in fact issued us with two authorising letters, because the first one went to 
General Magnus Malan, who then took it to both ARMSCOR and the South African 
Defence Force. The other letter went to Minister Dawie de Villiers, who was then my 
Minister (Minerals and Energy). I received that letter (the Authorising Document).That 
was the essential chronological sequence of the decisions that were taken. The actual 
decision was already taken in September ’89. Beyond that it was just planning.”577  
 
Mr de Klerk’s commitment to an Authorising Document is again indicative 
of internal regulatory and legal integrity under South African municipal law.  
 
                                                
575 Op cit Stumpf. For Stumpf, the starting point of the decision to relinquish the nuclear weapons 
programme and accede to the NPT was his instruction from De Klerk to draw up a rollback plan. 
The ‘how’ question required the development of a comprehensive internal relinquishment 
programme. This was complementary to the IAEA’s regimen under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
576 It was also in November 1989 that the meeting took place in Vienna with the IAEA, where Mr 
de Klerk realised that South Africa would not be able to achieve a quid pro quo for its accession to 
the NPT. 
577 Op cit Stumpf. 
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6.2.2 Mr de Klerk’s Appointment of Professor Wynand Mouton as 
Head of Oversight of the Nuclear Relinquishment Process 
and Accession to the NPT 
Professor Wynand Mouton was required to conform to a strict and regular 
reporting obligation to Mr de Klerk on all matters related to the 
relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal and accession to the NPT. Mr de 
Klerk required full and exact information of the status of the process at all 
times. Professor Mouton was deployed in the role of Oversight Auditor of 
the entire process. His instructions were that he should abide by the NPT 
correctly and to the letter. This also meant that he needed to comply with 
the Statute of the IAEA as well. Professor Mouton acted as an Inter-
Ministerial Chairman on the nuclear rollback and accession process. This 
meant that he had to chair meetings between various organisations, 
ministries, companies and departments, some of whom might have 
opposed the accession decision, and indeed actively tried to sabotage the 
process. 
 
As Oversight Auditor, Professor Mouton was required to understand fully 
the entirety of the complex nuclear physics that underpinned the creation 
of the bomb, and all other technical matters relevant thereto, and to 
convey this knowledge to the inspectorate of the IAEA and the Extra Team 
in a coherent and logical manner that proved to the various inspectorates 
the integrity of both relinquishment and accession. Professor Mouton’s 
remit required mastery of stringent control and safety procedures to 
manage the HEU in a safe and orderly fashion, in terms of both the 
Statute of the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. Professor Mouton was tasked to face tough processes of 
interrogation from the IAEA inspectors, including Dr Hans Blix. He also 
authorised the physical destruction of all documents related to the nuclear 
weapons programme in synchronisation with the accession to the NPT. 
Finally, he was a physical witness to the dismantlement process and the 
de-enrichment and transfer of the HEU. 
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The duty of the IAEA was to interrogate every aspect and detail of South 
Africa’s nuclear programme, in order to determine compliance with 
Safeguards. This interrogation was so detailed, exacting and scientifically 
precise that it required world-class expert knowledge, not only of nuclear 
physics, but also of nuclear weapons as such. The requirement for the 
task of ‘Head of Oversight’ was ideally a brilliant and internationally 
respected nuclear physicist who had the authority to chair politically-
charged and difficult meetings effectively. His credibility needed to be dual 
– both internal and international.  Accession to the NPT is a task that can 
hardly be undertaken without the participation of internationally credible 
scientists. It would be preferable if these scientists were indigenous, 
because the development of nuclear weapons is frequently linked with 
international insecurity about constitutional sovereignty, which is 
complicated by association with matters of national prestige and pride. 
Professor Mouton possessed the ability and knowledge to lead the 
oversight process with credibility at both a local and an international level. 
He alluded in his response to the crucial importance of appointing people 
who could be trusted, and reflected upon the moral covenant of trust.  It 
has been noted that Mr de Klerk appointed Professor Mouton on the basis 
of trust in his technical competence and credibility. Professor Mouton also 
appointed his own staff according to the same criteria. He emphasised the 
imperative of building trust between the inspectorate and the South African 
relinquishment team as being fundamental to the success of the task of 
accession to the NPT. 
 
“In 1989, Mr de Klerk approached me and asked me whether I would be prepared to act 
as his auditor on the relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal in South Africa. He asked me 
whether I would be prepared to oversee the dismantling of the nuclear weapons 
programme, and he said that this would require that I had to report to him, on a strict and 
regular basis, that all the requirements of the NPT were fulfilled to the letter.  
 
He instructed that everything had to be done correctly, and every term and condition that 
was required for South Africa’s accession to the NPT had to be perfectly fulfilled. I was 
requested to audit the entire nuclear arsenal as it pertained to the rollback process. This 
meant that I had to work with other people representing the various organisations and 
departments that were party to the process. These organisations and departments 
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included ARMSCOR, the SADF, the AEC, the Ministry of Minerals and Energy, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. These people were all engaged in 
this process.  
 
De Klerk asked me to be his ‘Oversight Auditor’ in rolling back the nuclear arsenal. The 
reason for my appointment, I think, was that I had a doctorate in nuclear physics which I 
had gained from Utrecht University in Holland.”578 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Mouton’s immediate interpretation of international law as it pertained to 
this research was focused on accession to the NPT. The NPT requires 
that inspectors conduct regular, extremely rigorous and intensive 
inspections of a country’s nuclear regimen. Mouton’s duty was to be the 
official auditing counterpart to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
nuclear inspection regimen. This required an extensive knowledge of 
nuclear physics, and the ability to communicate with scientific exactitude. 
Mouton also had to have access to all the facts, and be in possession of a 
comprehensive knowledge of the entire nuclear programme. Apart from 
the imperative for having expert technical knowledge and ability in nuclear 
matters, Mouton also had to be able to interact harmoniously and 
effectively at an inter-ministerial and departmental level. This was because 
multiple departments were involved and impacted by the nuclear rollback. 
 
Mouton revealed that his background experience and knowledge of 
nuclear physics, together with his resumé, which included academic and 
government leadership positions, were the factors that inclined Mr de 
Klerk to appoint him for this role. It was a carefully-considered 
appointment. It would appear that Professor Mouton was honoured by the 
approach that was made to him by Mr de Klerk, because of the importance 
and worthwhile nature of the assignment. Mr de Klerk’s quiet appointment 
of the Oversight Auditor was a crucial implicit aspect that contributed to 
the success of the relinquishment and accession process. 
 
                                                
578 Interview with Professor Wynand Mouton at his apartment at Gordon’s Bay in the Strand in 
Western Cape on 30 October 2007. 
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Professor Mouton continued:  
 
“I had also held various leadership positions, including that of Vice Chancellor of the 
University of the Orange Free State and Chairman of the Board of the South African 
Broadcasting Service (SABC). Uranium is a difficult ‘chap’ to handle. It is highly toxic and 
radioactive. You can’t put it in a safe and lock it away. There are some nice things going 
on inside of it. (Laughs) It took about three years to dismantle the bombs. Each bomb 
was designed to exist in two complementary halves. The two halves were never put 
together, as this would have formed a composite nuclear bomb. There were two pieces of 
uranium. The one piece was uranium 235 and the other was uranium 238. The two 
uranium types have mass differences. The one piece of uranium had a hole in the middle 
of it. The bomb works on the device by smashing these two uranium types of different 
mass together. When that is done, the mass becomes critical and you have an atomic 
explosion. 
 
Hans Blix of the International Atomic Energy Agency came to visit us in South Africa and 
to interrogate the credentials of our nuclear programme. He played an extremely 
important role in South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process and accession to the 
NPT. He and the inspectors came to look at what we were doing in terms of accession to 
the NPT. They questioned us for many hours. Hans Blix can ask probing questions!  The 
questions were of the type: ‘How can I be assured that there are only six bombs? Have 
you got HEU to make another bomb?’ My response was: ‘I have looked in meticulous 
detail at every piece of information that is available. I have investigated the facilities and 
questioned all the people and studied all the data.’ I said: ‘I stand here before you to tell 
the truth.’ FW de Klerk looked for and appointed people that he knew that he could trust. 
Because you are dependent on people, it is essential that you should be able to trust their 
integrity and ability. Others need to trust them as well.”579 
 
It is recalled that Mr de Klerk in his interview also offered extensive 
introspection on the crucial matter of trust. The nuclear relinquishment 
process had to be trustworthy at the personal relationship level between 
the inspector and the inspected. It is important to note the respect and 
high esteem in which Dr Hans Blix was held by Professor Mouton. When 
there is respect of this nature, mutual trust is the natural corollary. 
Professor Mouton also offered an insight into the comity and ‘process 
aspects’ of how he communicated with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, which was the legitimating authority for accession to the NPT. He 
                                                
579 Op cit Mouton. 
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submitted that he offered his assessment and Oversight Auditor review to 
the IAEA on South Africa’s nuclear status under oath. The point is that the 
accession to the NPT is, in the final analysis, a solemn ceremony 
underpinned by integrity. 
 
Professor Mouton recalled that: 
 
“I also made sure that the people that were handling this process were people that I could 
trust and that I was fully confident in them. Trust is extraordinarily important. Enriched 
uranium develops a nickel ‘skin’ covering and this had to be taken off. This reduces the 
mass of the HEU and we had to reconcile this reduction in the mass of HEU to fractions 
of grams to the IAEA.”580 
 
The physics and chemistry of highly enriched uranium is in a constant 
phase of flux. That is the nature of the element. This change in physics 
had to be conveyed in a credible way to the inspectorate, as it manifested 
differently depending upon time. Any incorrect calculation of the nuclear 
physics and chemistry of the relinquishment process would have damaged 
trust. 
 
Professor Mouton maintained that:  
 
“It was in the interest of everyone that these bombs were relinquished. There were about 
12 000 documents that were destroyed. All the documentation relating to the nuclear 
weapons was brought to a central point and we made one hell of a fire with a blow-pipe to 
destroy them. It took two days to burn all the documents. We burnt the whole blooming 
lot. There were about 1 000 people working on the project. The remarkable thing is that 
no one said anything about the nuclear weapons programme. There was never a leak. 
Those years were intensely interesting years ...You will have noticed from my response 
that my task was to audit that the nuclear weapons were destroyed in an absolutely 
meticulous way. There was a senior journalist from the Washington Post who came to 
interview me on this dismantlement and accession process. He stayed over a weekend to 
conduct interviews and understand what we had done. He said that it was a very 
important assignment that was conducted here in South Africa, from an international 
perspective.”581 
                                                
580 Loc cit. The nuclear verification and inspection process under the IAEA is a precise science of 
applied physics and exact measurement.  
581 Loc cit. 
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The commentary offered by Professor Mouton is important because it 
provides unequivocal testimony that all South Africa’s nuclear weapons, 
facilities for nuclear weapons, HEU, plus associated research, drawings, 
diagrams, designs, plans and documentation were destroyed in their 
entirety. The potential for further nuclear proliferation had been nullified. 
 
6.2.3 The Appointment of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) as 
the Designated State Authority 
One of the aspects that Mr de Klerk needed to manage carefully was 
those South African persons and agencies with ‘nuclear proliferation 
inclinations’ who might have attempted to use their institutional power to 
subvert the relinquishment process and accession to the NPT, and 
thereby have quashed the putative constitutional settlement. Obviously, 
there were mixed views on the matter of the nuclear relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT among persons from within ARMSCOR and the 
SADF. Some persons supported the decision, while some opposed it. 
Those who opposed the nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT 
did so because of the painful knowledge that there would be a loss of 
funding, professional prestige, influence, knowledge resources, and career 
opportunities that would inevitably accompany this decision. Professor 
Stumpf indicated that one way in which Mr de Klerk solved the dilemma of 
defusing this opposition was by entrusting the institutional authority of the 
relinquishment and accession process to the Atomic Energy Corporation. 
Mr de Klerk perceived the AEC as being relatively neutral and as having 
‘non-proliferation inclinations’. For Mr de Klerk, the challenge was not so 
much in discovering a legal–technical solution to the problem of rolling 
back the nuclear arsenal and acceding to the NPT. The greater challenge 
was to master the social and political problem of managing the different 
interest groups and stakeholders, who could fragment, and might then 
undermine, the constitutional settlement and state continuity. 
 
Professor Stumpf confirmed that Mr de Klerk faced the daunting task of 
uncovering ways of keeping all the divergent stakeholders with their 
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different, and often conflicting, interests aligned to a common vision on the 
nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. He interrogated the 
practical question of managing a relinquishment process in a low trust 
situation:  
 
“Now, let’s come back to the question that you asked me earlier on: ‘Why did De Klerk 
trust me?’ I had a feeling (I must be very careful about what I say. I do not want you to 
misquote me here) ... I don’t want to use the word mistrust. But I do think that De Klerk 
was uncertain about ARMSCOR and the security forces being involved in the 
dismantlement programme. The AEC at that point was a more neutral research and 
development organisation. I think that it was because of this that FW was more 
comfortable in asking me to head this dismantlement programme, although I worked very 
closely with the head of ARMSCOR and the Chief of the South African Defence Force. 
That is all I can say about the question that you asked about him trusting me with this 
matter. FW de Klerk realised at that point that the six devices had been completed. They 
were a fait accompli.”582 
 
The divergent and conflicting interests arose from powerful persons and 
institutions. Mr de Klerk’s decision to entrust the nuclear relinquishment 
and accession to the AEC was wise.  His task was complicated by the fact 
that the situation could be designated as one of very low trust within South 
Africa as well. Stumpf also discussed the matters of perceived conflict of 
jurisdiction and the territoriality of the accession process that existed 
between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States 
inspectorate. This tension can be understood as having its source in the 
conflict of laws between international law and United States municipal law. 
It therefore fell within the ambit of international private law. 
 
6.2.4 The Matter of Access to Military Sites and the Question of 
Sovereignty 
Mr de Klerk granted a temporary waiver on sovereign rights of access and 
egress to military facilities to allow the inspectors to inspect all suspected 
nuclear sites in order to ensure that there were no residual doubts about 
                                                
582 Op cit Stumpf. These exact words were used by FW de Klerk himself … they pertain to 
Moxley’s “so what?” question. These weapons had been built and the design process could not be 
un-created. 
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nuclear material having been retained after the relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT had been completed. Mr de Klerk’s decision to grant 
unfettered access to military sites was brave. One can understand how, in 
a situation which is characterised by low trust, the granting of such a 
waiver on this sovereign right, although legally appropriate in terms of 
obligations that exist erga omnes and jus cogens, might be politically 
unfeasible. The offer of unlimited access to the inspectorate might have 
been misconceived by adversaries as a sign of political weakness. It was 
therefore a morally brave decision on Mr de Klerk’s part. 
 
“…I still remember that at one meeting with Mr de Klerk I said, ‘Mr de Klerk, I think that it 
is correct to invite such a team, but we would then have to give them free access to 
wherever they want to go.’ He agreed, and asked: ‘What should we do?’ I said: ‘Give 
them an invitation that they can go anywhere they want and visit anywhere anytime; 
obviously within reason ...’ And he gave them that invitation.”583 
 
“... We said to this Extra Team (it was an ad hoc team under the IAEA leadership): ‘Mr de 
Klerk has given you the authority to visit anywhere, anytime, and you can talk to anybody, 
obviously within reason ... you cannot go and visit someone at twelve o’clock at night, 
because he may complain.’ They made use of that offer.”584 
 
In this regard Ian Brownlie asserted: 
 
“While the concept of territorial sovereignty normally applies in relation to states, there is 
the likelihood that international life will comprehend situations in which international 
organizations not only assume legal responsibility for territory in respect of which no state 
has territorial sovereignty. Such a situation arose in 1966 when the General Assembly 
terminated the Mandate on South West Africa. The nature of the legal relations of an 
organisation to the territory would be cause for difficulties of substance.”585  
 
Mr de Klerk voluntarily authorised that Pretoria’s territorial sovereignty 
should accommodate inspections by this Extra Team, which was 
comprised of agents of the nuclear-weapons-states. He reached this 
decision as it was wise to do so, and would create trust. Any reluctance or 
hesitation by South Africa to permit the IAEA’s inspectors or the Extra 
                                                
583 Loc cit. 
584 Ibid. From a process perspective, this was in total contrast to how it was done in Iraq. Access to 
inspecting facilities was often contested. 
585 Op cit Brownlie at 107–108. 
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Team access to conduct nuclear inspections would have been viewed with 
suspicion. Mr de Klerk’s granting of access therefore resonates with the 
circumstance that led to the termination of South West Africa’s mandate in 
1966, referred to by Brownlie above.  
 
For Dr Hans Blix, South Africa’s decision to grant the inspectors 
unrestricted access to all questionable facilities was an exemplar that he 
contended should be emulated by the world at large. He also reflected 
upon the difficult duties that the inspectors had to perform and how they 
require collaboration and active co-operation from the state that is being 
inspected if they are to perform their duties properly and ensure that 
nuclear weapons are not used in armed conflict. 
 
“Inspectors cannot shoot their way into locations and installations they are entitled to visit 
and inspect. As we saw in Iraq, they can be shut out or shut in. The inspected State must 
know that the Security Council will intervene and enforce the right of inspectors as it did 
in Iraq.”586 
 
Dr Hans Blix offered four key reasons that explained why South Africa’s 
relinquishment of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT was 
successful: 
 
• “First, transparency regarding all nuclear related activities is important to build 
confidence in the completeness and correctness of a State’s declaration of 
nuclear material and installations. (Substance) 
• Second, a voluntary offer to go beyond standard obligations and accept Agency 
inspection anywhere, any time on a case by case basis, helps to inspire 
confidence. (Comity) It goes without saying that in taking up such offers the 
Agency, while sometimes asking to see sites that may be military, is ready to 
make arrangements to protect legitimate military secrets from being revealed 
during inspection. (Relationship) 
• Third, it is important to have inspectors who have some knowledge and 
understanding of nuclear weapons design and production. (Substance) 
• Fourth, even in the case where the agency has been shown the most extensive 
co-operation and openness and has conducted the most extensive inspections, it 
is not in a position to affirm that a declaration is correct and complete. (Comity) It 
                                                
586 Blix, Hans. 1991. ‘Inspections in Iraq’. Statement to the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Washington DC. 23 October. 
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can only report after a very thorough verification that nothing is found suggesting 
the opposite.”587 
 
Mr de Klerk displayed comity in his relationship with the inspectorate and 
eschewed a parochial South African municipal law application of territorial 
sovereignty in order to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency 
unfettered access to inspect South African military facilities for nuclear 
weapons, because of its responsibilities under international law.  
 
Professor Stumpf’s suggestion and Mr de Klerk’s granting of the right to 
the inspectors to visit any place, any time, anywhere had a sequel. Dr 
Hans Blix, in an update to the Security Council asserted that: 
 
“The Agency must have the right of free access to locations pinpointed by the intelligence 
reports. Although the Agency is given the right to perform special inspections in 
Safeguards Agreements, it has never been used for the purpose of inspecting undeclared 
locations. This is primarily because up until recent events in Iraq, there was never any 
information indicating a need for such inspections. Such inspections would obviously 
have to be conducted very carefully and be subject to control from the Board of 
Governors. Other improvements to the right of access should be made by extending the 
right of unannounced inspections and providing the right of entry for inspectors without 
visa requirements”.588 
 
In this paragraph we see that Mr de Klerk’s decision to grant unlimited 
access and egress to potential nuclear weapons sites was commended to 
the United States Security Council to be codified into international law. It is 
submitted that the IAEA’s imperative for open access arose from the 
realisation of the credibility value of Mr de Klerk’s open invitation to the 
IAEA (at the suggestion of Stumpf), that they were free to visit any place at 
any time to conduct nuclear inspections. This was an important invitation 
as it created trust and respect.   
 
                                                
587 Blix, Hans. 1995b. ‘Statement by Dr Hans Blix to the Review and Extension Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. New York. 17 April. 4–5.    
588 Op cit Blix (1991).  
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6.2.5 Internal Nuclear Regulatory Protocols that Afforded 
Credence to the Nuclear Relinquishment and Accession to 
the NPT  
South Africans devised their own internal procedures and methodologies 
for dismantling the nuclear weapons and for acceding to the NPT. These 
procedures and methodologies were comprehensive and were helpful to 
the IAEA inspectors, as they provided proof of systematic diligence in 
managing the programme. The internal contractual arrangements between 
the ministries, the SADF, ARMSCOR and the AEC regarding nuclear 
matters within the State’s own appurtenances needed to be based on 
probity and integrity. The probity and integrity of these arrangements 
needed to be comprehensively recorded and audited and kept in a 
meticulously accurate condition. These records had to be compliant with 
internationally expected standards of integrity. Any omissions of factual 
material, technical mistakes, or incorrect stockholding could potentially 
have serious international law, political and humanitarian ramifications for 
any state that possesses a nuclear weapons capability, and is placed 
under inspection. Professor Waldo Stumpf referred to the fact that South 
Africa, as a threshold nuclear-weapons-state, ensured that it had a reliable 
internal administrative structure, legal regimen, and regulatory structure 
within ARMSCOR, the SADF and the AEC. These served as policy and 
procedural guidelines for its nuclear weapons programme. This is what 
Professor Stumpf referred to as a comprehensive nuclear ‘paperwork 
system’. 
 
There was therefore only one standard of auditing excellence that was 
acceptable to the nuclear inspectorate and that was perfect record-
keeping, and a perfectly-reconciled nuclear audit in compliance with the 
IAEA’s statute. South Africa needed to justify every milligram of HEU 
usage. There were no significant irreconcilable gaps in the facts that were 
presented to the inspectorate. This meant that ARMSCOR, the SADF, and 
the AEC had to dispense with any ‘turf-related rivalries’ that might have 
existed between them, and work co-operatively with each other, in order to 
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present proof of their regulatory integrity to the IAEA. No inter- or intra-
departmental, ministerial and organisational territorial turf battles could be 
countenanced that might have compromised the integrity of the data on 
the country’s nuclear status. 
 
Stumpf mentioned the internal regulatory arrangements: 
 
“They (the nuclear bombs) were handed over technically to the South African Defence 
Force. ARMSCOR and the South African Defence Force had developed a weapons 
handover arrangement between them. It was a paperwork system ... 
 
The devices were technically in the ‘physical possession’ of ARMSCOR, but they were 
really the legal property of the South African Defence Force. This explains why the South 
African Defence Force had to be part of this dismantling programme. It could not be 
otherwise. ARMSCOR was obviously central to the relinquishment process because the 
nuclear bombs were still in their possession.”589 
 
Professor Stumpf confirmed that extensive control systems were enacted. 
There were clear inter- and intra-organisational duties, rights and 
obligations created under South African municipal law. He also indicated 
that there were indeed plans to conduct an underground nuclear test at 
some point in time. It was important for the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to be aware of all the control systems as they afforded the system 
technical and regulatory credibility. 
 
Professor Stumpf offered an assessment of the integrity of the control 
systems: 
 
“One needs to understand the extensive control systems that existed in those days. 
There were plans that were to be enacted if these devices were to be tested 
underground. (There were plans to do that at some point in time.) 
 
These control systems required four pass signatures to the system that had to be 
obtained, before enactment. There was not simply just one pass signature. 
 
1. The Head of the AEC had the pass signature code to one half of the device. 
 
2. The Head of ARMSCOR had the pass signature code for the other half. 
                                                
589 Op cit Stumpf.  
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3. Then the Chief of the Defence force had the pass signature code to put them 
together. 
 
4. Finally, the Head of State (Mr de Klerk at that point) had the pass signature code to 
activate it. 
 
So it was never intended to be a one-man decision.590 These four people had to act in 
concert: 
 
• The Head of State; 
•  The Head of AEC; 
• The Chief of the South African Defence Force; and 
• The Head of ARMSCOR. 
 
All of them had secret pass signature codes to these devices and each was useless on 
its own.591 FW de Klerk obviously brought me in to ensure that the nuclear material was 
relinquished. It was part of the control system. That is the background of how it 
worked.”592 
 
It was important to prove to the IAEA and the Extra Team that a decision 
to push a nuclear button in South Africa could not be arbitrarily decided 
upon the whims of a dictator, as was the case in Iraq. There were 
responsible municipal law-based control systems in place in the case of 
South Africa.593  
 
6.3 Flexibility on the Form of Accession to the NPT 
Ian Brownlie contended that treaties are brought into force on the basis of 
the two pivotal questions of intention and the consent to be bound. He 
observed that there are considerable variations as to the form in which a 
treaty is presented, because intention and consent are multifaceted. It will 
be shown that in South Africa, ‘form’ was characterised by two 
Safeguarding processes that underpinned South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment process and its accession to the NPT. The first nuclear 
                                                
590 Pelindaba was the subject of an armed robbery in 2007.  
591 These control procedures might not be effective in a criminally-corrupt regime.  
592 Op cit Stumpf. 
593 The stringent integrity of the control systems was confirmed in Steyn, Hannes, van der Walt, 
Richardt & van Loggerenberg. 2003. Armament and Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear 
Weapons Experience. Pretoria: Network Publishers. 
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audit consisted of the IAEA’s safeguarding the civilian nuclear programme. 
This exercise was an obligatory precondition for accession to the NPT in 
terms of international law. The second audit involved a double-checking 
and voluntary additional commitment to a secondary Safeguarding 
process that was conducted by the Extra Team on every aspect of South 
Africa’s nuclear weapon status. The Extra Team consisted of nuclear 
weapons experts from the United States and other nuclear-weapons-
states. This secondary audit was conducted by consent with the specific 
intention of acceding to the NPT. The first IAEA Safeguarding process was 
deemed to be an insufficiently stringent audit from the nuclear-weapons-
states’ perspective. A second audit that double-checked and extended the 
terms of reference was regarded as being essential for clarifying the 
precise status of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. The form of 
South Africa’s accession to the NPT was founded on the reconciliation of 
these two powerful audits. The Extra Team’s Safeguarding was thus a 
voluntary additional ‘double-audit’ designed to put to rest any residual 
fears that might have existed in the international community that South 
Africa had retained its nuclear weapons capability. The audit that was 
conducted by the Extra Team was not authorised in the NPT. It was a 
voluntary additional multilateral agreement conducted with the consent of 
Pretoria and the nuclear-weapons-states with the specific intent of 
acceding to the NPT. This multi-lateral agreement was therefore 
congruent with the intention of the NPT. 
 
The form of the consent to be bound by the NPT was determined by the 
unique circumstances relating to South Africa’s accession. Safeguards 
can therefore be divided into two distinct integrated phases. The first 
phase involved the obligatory process, where the IAEA took the 
determinate role under the authority of its Statute and the NPT. During the 
first phase of accession, South Africa had not yet conceded that it had 
developed a nuclear arsenal. John Dugard concurred with Brownlie’s view 
on the flexibility as to the form of accession to treaties, and makes a 
similar point that there are no prescriptions in international law that specify 
how states are to conclude treaties. Multilateral treaties usually require 
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both signature and subsequent ratification in order to provide the state 
with a final opportunity to re-appraise the wisdom of its intentions and to 
review its consent before being bound. Dugard informed that a state is 
obliged not to subvert a treaty after ratification, until such time as it has 
specifically confirmed that it no longer intends to be party to the treaty.594  
 
There are two further procedural processes that need to be noted and 
which guide the accession to the NPT. Ian Brownlie clarifies further: 
 
“Accession, adherence or adhesion occurs when a state which did not sign a treaty 
already signed by other states, formally accepts its provisions. Accession may occur 
before or after a treaty has entered into force. The conditions under which accession may 
occur and the procedure involved depend on the provisions of the treaty. Recent practice 
has introduced the terms acceptance and approval to describe the substance of 
accession.”595 
 
I interpret Brownlie’s assertion as implying that there was almost certainly 
adhesion on Pretoria’s part to the NPT, and perhaps adherence as well, at 
the time when South Africa entered (through the agency of the AEC) into 
the bilateral agreement with the United States of America to abide by the 
‘spirit and the letter of the NPT’ on 31 January 1987.596 Adhesion arose 
from the fact that South Africa formally accepted the provisions of the 
NPT. Accession therefore came after adhesion, because South Africa’s 
accession to the NPT followed an indigenous developed form. Once 
again, this is congruent with the principle espoused by both Brownlie and 
Dugard that there are few specific prescriptions on form as far as 
accession to treaties is concerned. The intention and the consent of the 
parties are the paramount concerns in the matter of accession to treaties. 
This does not mean that the matter of form was treated nonchalantly. 
Great care was taken to ensure that the form of accession to the NPT met 
four standards of excellence. These standards related to achieving: 
                                                
594 Dugard, John. 2007. International Law: A South African Perspective (with contributions by 
Bethlehem, Daniel, du Plessis, Max & Katz, Anton). Third Edition. Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd. 
404. 
595 Op cit Brownlie at 583. 
596 Masiza, Zondi. 1993. ‘A Chronology of South Africa’s Nuclear Program’. The 
Nonproliferation Review, 35–55, Fall. 43. 
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substantive compliance with Safeguards and the relevant international 
law; harmonious and respectful relationships (both personal and in the 
realms of international relations) with the inspectorate and other relevant 
persons, congruent comity (together with appropriate and necessary 
ceremony), and finally, carefully considered timing and synchronisation. 
Substance, relationship, comity and time were therefore the basic 
elements that together played crucial and integrated roles in designating 
the form of how South Africa acceded to the NPT. 
 
In addition, national and international political considerations played an 
important part in shaping how the form of relinquishment and accession to 
the NPT would develop. South Africa’s accession to the NPT was guided 
by its own municipal law, which is closely aligned with legal practice in 
Great Britain.597 In the citation below, Professor Stumpf confirmed that 
treaty accession does not prescribe rigid criteria on form, and that 
Brownlie’s and Dugard’s insight holds true. Stumpf corroborated that the 
IAEA did not specify a methodology on the form of accession to the NPT  
 
Heald: “Did the IAEA specify a methodology for accession to the NPT?”598 
 
Stumpf: “Not really, because keep in mind, at that point South Africa was still maintaining 
this policy of uncertainty like the Israelis are doing at the moment. ‘Do you have nuclear 
weapons?’ It was almost an open secret that we had nuclear weapons. It had never been 
acknowledged that we had them, though. Pik did not have the authority at that point to 
say, ‘Yes, we do have a nuclear weapons programme.’ All that he could say was: ‘We 
have a Y Plant that makes highly enriched uranium.’ So he could not really talk to them 
(the IAEA) and say: ‘How should we get into the NPT?’ For the same reason, he could 
not really talk to them and say: ‘How should we get rid of it?’ It was sort of skirted around 
and not properly acknowledged at that point. It was not formally acknowledged that we 
had such a programme and had such devices.599 At one point a senior inspector of the 
IAEA came to see me in my office privately. He said to me: ‘Look, I know that we cannot 
talk about the past, but we are picking up a lot of evidence that you were involved in a 
nuclear weapons programme. We are happy with what you have declared. We have no 
suspicions, but at some point you will have to make a declaration.’ I said to him: ‘Look, I 
hear what you are saying. That is in the hands of Mr de Klerk. I cannot say more at this 
                                                
597 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 404. 
598 Op cit Stumpf. 
599 Loc cit. 
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point.’ He did not push me and did not ask me outright whether there had been a nuclear 
weapons programme. De Klerk made the announcement at the appropriate time. What 
happened then was unique.”600 
 
Heald: “It was a legal difference, but De Klerk understood that perception could be seen 
as truth.”601 
 
Stumpf: “Absolutely, the world would have said that ‘South Africa is another Iraq’, in the 
first instance. Secondly, the internal political situation in South Africa at that time was very 
uncertain ... It was uncertain whether De Klerk would receive the necessary mandate 
from his own constituency to turn the country’s constitutional situation around. (This was 
at the time just before he had called that last whites-only referendum.) He was concerned 
that the news that we were dismantling the nuclear weapons would have been seen as a 
sign of weakness and would not have been palatable to the white electorate at that time. 
The realistic fear was that the white electorate might latch onto the nuclear 
relinquishment process to derail the political transformation, which was his key goal. So 
De Klerk said: ‘No, gentlemen, the time is not right for this announcement. We will 
maintain complete secrecy around it, until the time is ripe.’ We went back to Mr de Klerk 
after the political situation seemed settled and we said to him: ‘Mr de Klerk, we have to 
consider announcing this programme. ’We could not keep it quiet forever. There was too 
much evidence lying around, so that a nuclear weapons expert would have immediately 
known that there was such a programme. Mr de Klerk kept on saying that the time was 
not right, until late in 1992. After he got a vote of overwhelming positive acceptance from 
the white electorate in the last white referendum, Mr de Klerk said: ‘Fine’. (You will have 
to verify the date, but I think that it was late into 1992.)  ‘I am now convinced that the 
country can absorb this information and you must draw up an Announcement Plan.’ This 
Announcement Plan had ramifications that needed to be carefully managed.”602 
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Professor Stumpf’s discussion about the ‘open secret’ that South Africa 
possessed nuclear weapons at that stage was particularly relevant to the 
decision to conduct a second Safeguards audit by the Extra Team. His 
commentary reveals how the real politik at that time appeared to require 
some equivocation about the reality of Pretoria’s possession of this 
nuclear arsenal. This international collusion in support of the ‘open secret’ 
that South Africa had a nuclear arsenal reveals the tortuous risks posed by 
                                                
600 Ibid. 
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602 Op cit Stumpf. 
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the way in which the NPT is drafted, interpreted and executed. 
Acquiescence and complicity by the IAEA in this collusion to turn a blind 
eye to South Africa’s possession of a nuclear arsenal was conceivably 
rationalised by the quality of Mr de Klerk’s leadership and belief in his 
good faith, as well as his intent and consent to accede to the NPT. With 
the knowledge of hindsight, this decision was correct. 
 
There could be other conceivable scenarios where such trust might be 
misplaced. A state might not negotiate in good faith. It might possess a 
nuclear arsenal that it has signalled that it intends relinquishing. A 
supervening event (perhaps a leadership struggle) occurs, and the 
outcome is that an extremist clique takes political power. The commitment 
of the prior leadership to relinquishing nuclear weapons and acceding to 
the NPT is then quickly forgotten, and the possession and proliferation of 
nuclear weapons gathers new momentum. In such a scenario, collusion by 
the IAEA could quite feasibly degenerate into a threat to world peace and 
indeed perhaps tacitly lead to condoning circumstances that could even 
lead to an act of aggression, which is in breach of the United Charter and 
also contrary to international law.   
 
6.4 The First Process of Verification – the Initial Report (Opening 
Inventory) 
The Initial Report can be understood as analogous to a company’s annual 
report and books of account. In the case of a company, it is important for 
the annual report to be signed off and approved by the auditors. If the 
audit is qualified and the auditors refuse to sign off the books of account, 
then it can be deduced that the books of account are deceptive in one 
form or another and do not represent a true and fair reflection of the health 
and activity of the business under review. In the nuclear sphere, an Initial 
Report has a similar function to a company’s books of account, except that 
the Initial Report contains all the relevant scientific data that is required for 
conducting a nuclear audit. South Africa’s goal was therefore to present an 
Initial Report consisting of all the relevant facts, information, data, proof, 
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and scientific evidence to standards of such impeccable integrity that it 
would be approved with the authority and credibility of the scientific rigour 
contained within the competence of the inspectorate of the IAEA. 
 
Nuclear physicists and other experts in the IAEA peer reviewed the 
scientific integrity of Initial Report. Their approval provided an important 
although not infallible indication that a state was not proliferating nuclear 
material. The scientific proof was sufficiently robust to be equated with the 
legal principle of ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’ The man charged with this 
responsibility for writing up the Initial Report was Dr Nick van Wiellig, who 
was Professor Waldo Stumpf’s Safeguards Manager. He was tasked with 
presenting the Initial Report which was termed the ‘Opening Inventory’ in 
South Africa. 
 
Professor Stumpf explained the process thus: 
 
“We signed the NPT on 10 July 1991. We were then formally a non-nuclear-weapons-
state. The NPT afforded you a period of up to 18 months to put together your Opening 
Inventory. You put forward your statement of the Opening Inventory of your Declarable 
Material. The NPT looks only at materials, and does not look at other things. Today it has 
gone a bit further, but at that time their concern was about enriched uranium and 
plutonium. We did not have any plutonium. In the first instance, the IAEA gave us a 
period of 18 months to comply. Politically, it was moving so fast that I said to Nick van 
Wiellig, my Safeguards Manager: ‘I am sorry, Nick, but this statement of Opening 
Inventory must be completed and finished in four weeks.’ He said to me: ‘Waldo, that is 
impossible. I simply won’t be able to do it.’ You have a document this thick [gestures with 
hand], and you have to specify: 
 
• Where everything is located; 
• How it is located; and 
• All the ‘whys and the wherefores’.  
 
I said to him: ‘I am sorry, Nick, you have got no choice. You are going to have to finish 
this in four weeks’ time.’ 
 
He said: ‘It can’t be done.’ I said: ‘Go away and do it.’ Then he went out, and I must say, 
in six weeks he produced the Opening Inventory. In the annals of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, it probably still stands today as one of the best Opening Inventories that 
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there ever was. Keep in mind it was not just the HEU – these little soap bars that we had 
re-melted. There was lots of other uranium in the enrichment plant. It was a major 
exercise to draw up this Opening Inventory. Nevertheless, we did that. We realised that 
we needed to beat the looming deadlines.”603 
 
It is evident from Professor Stumpf’s testimony that he took professional 
pride in the quality of the submission made by Dr van Wiellig under 
intense pressure. The nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT 
was a deadline-driven process. The time dimension was absolutely critical. 
Failure to meet these deadlines could have brought chaos. 
 
Von Baeckmann et al used the ‘Initial Report’ which was duly authorised 
by the Safeguards Agreement to judge whether South Africa’s accession 
to the NPT should be supported by the IAEA, and whether the IAEA 
should make such a recommendation of authorisation and justification to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. They submitted: 
 
“As required under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, South Africa submitted to 
the IAEA an ‘Initial Report’ of its nuclear programme.604  
 
The ‘Initial Report’ is a comprehensive document and includes quantitative data on all 
types of nuclear material, on a facility-by-facility basis. It is expanded by its attachments, 
which provide detail on the location and the number of items of nuclear material 
contained in each respective facility.”605  
 
The confirmation by Von Baeckmann et al of South Africa’s submission of 
its Initial Report (Opening Inventory) converges elegantly with Professor 
Stumpf’s testimony. The functional interrelationship between the Initial 
Report and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is neatly clarified. 
 
6.5 The Matter of the Authority of the First Safeguards Audit 
The first phase of the IAEA’s remit with respect to Safeguards was to audit 
the declared inventory, to be satisfied that the material that they contained 
                                                
603 Loc cit. 
604 See Duffy, Gloria. 1988. ‘Compliance and the Future of Arms Control’. Report of Project 
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605 von Baeckmann, Adolph, Dillon, Garry & Perricos, Demetrius. 1995. ‘Nuclear Verification in 
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was correctly accounted for. In practice, the objective was to audit the 
‘present’ nuclear status. It was not to audit the past nuclear material that 
would have included the nuclear arsenal. (That task fell under the second 
phase of the Safeguards, which was conducted by the Extra Team.) 
These two phases of Safeguarding required different technical areas of 
nuclear knowledge to be conducted effectively. The first phase required 
knowledge of civilian nuclear matters that included nuclear power stations 
and nuclear medicine, for example. The second phase required 
knowledge of nuclear bombs and all matters relating to nuclear weapons. 
 
The first Safeguard Audit was authorised by the IAEA’s Statute and by the 
NPT. It was an audit of civilian energy facilities, and the inspection team 
did not include nuclear weapons experts. The civilian nuclear facilities 
were inspected by the IAEA in accordance with the Safeguard criteria with 
the objective of preventing nuclear proliferation. Accession to the NPT is 
achieved by concluding a Safeguards Agreement between the non-
nuclear-weapon state and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Article 
III of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states: 
 
“1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept 
Safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the 
exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed 
under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from 
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Procedures for the 
safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or 
special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any 
principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by 
this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all 
peaceful nuclear activities with the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or 
carried out under its control elsewhere.”606 
 
It was precisely in the area of diversion from civilian usage to military 
proliferation anticipated in Article III(1) of the NPT that South Africa set 
                                                
606 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
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about establishing its nuclear arsenal. Nuclear materials and research 
were diverted from their ostensible peaceful civilian intentions into the 
military nuclear weapons programme. The civilian nuclear energy 
programme was used as a ploy and a deceit to conceal the military intent. 
 
The authority for the Initial Report arises from Article XII on Agency 
Safeguards. Relevant clauses include: 
 
“1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear 
reactors, and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring that it will not further 
military purposes, that it complies with the applicable health and safety standards, 
and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this 
article ... 
 
3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in 
ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used to 
produce in the project or arrangement. 
 
4. To call for and receive progress reports: 
 
(Compliance with the ‘Initial Report’ would be enforced through inspections and 
inspectors.) 
 
5. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated by 
the Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have 
access at all times to all places and data and to any persons who by reasons of 
occupation deal with materials, equipment or facilities which are required by this 
Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and special 
fissionable material supplies and fissionable products and to determine whether 
there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military 
purposes.”607  
 
The IAEA’s inspectors picked up clear signs that South Africa was 
proliferating nuclear weapons during the first civilian phase of the 
Safeguards process. It has been noted that the inspectors who conducted 
the first phase of the inspection were experts in the civilian usage of 
nuclear energy. They were not expert in matters pertaining to nuclear 
weapons, which is a specific area of specialisation. For this reason, the 
                                                
607 Op cit NPT at 10. 
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first phase of Safeguards could not go beyond the civilian nuclear 
inspections. A second Safeguarding process was required to audit the 
nuclear weapons programme. That process required experts in inspecting 
nuclear weapons facilities. 
 
6.6 The Matter of the Authority of the Second Safeguards Audit: 
The Extra Team’s Nuclear Weapons Audit 
Unlike the first phase of Safeguards, which explored only the ‘present’ 
status of South Africa’s civilian nuclear programme, the second phase 
safeguarded the past nuclear weapons programme in its entirety. This 
required that they needed to establish the exact nature of every minute 
detail of the past programme with scientific exactitude and safeguard it.  
The first and second phases of the auditing process were therefore 
complementary. 
 
In the testimony that follows, Professor Stumpf explains how the Extra 
Team conducted the second verification of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons status under the aegis of the IAEA. The first Safeguard audit was 
prescribed by the IAEA’s Statute and authorised by the NPT. The second 
Safeguard audit was (in a  very narrow sense) voluntary, inasmuch as it 
was arranged  by means of a multilateral agreement with the consent of 
Pretoria and the nuclear-weapons-states, of which the United States was 
the most vocal advocate. This was pursued in order finally to put to rest 
any residual fears that South Africa still retained nuclear weapons. It was a 
characteristic of the form of accession which was suitable to the 
circumstances that prevailed at the time. Stumpf informed that: 
 
“After the announcement had been made on 23 March 1993, they came back for a 
second verification.608 The difference was that they were now verifying the past. That was 
not in the terms and conditions of the NPT. There was an open invitation from Mr de 
Klerk saying: ‘We invite you to come back and verify the past, although it is not a part of 
the NPT.’ This is an open invitation.”609 
                                                
608 “They” were the Extra Team, consisting of nuclear weapons experts from the United States and 
also from other nuclear-weapons-states as well, who had the most conspicuous role.  
609 Op cit Stumpf. 
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Heald: “Very clever. Trust was built up by openness.”610 
 
Stumpf: “Oh, we had nothing to hide at that point. 
 
Keep in mind that the IAEA does not have nuclear weapons experts, because they are 
not supposed to supervise countries with nuclear weapons. At that point the IAEA said: 
‘We have a few guys who know something, but they are not nuclear weapons experts.’ 
The IAEA asked whether we would be comfortable if they put together an Extra Team of 
nuclear weapons experts. 
 
We said: ‘Fine; we really have no problem with that,’ and then they put together a team, 
an ad hoc team, that had quite a few Americans on it, some guys from the UK, some from 
Russia, and some from France. There was no one from China on that team. These were 
now real nuclear weapons experts. They knew about nuclear weapon designs. 
 
Heald: “Did you have any advisors in terms of compliance with the NPT?”611 
 
Stumpf: “Now that is a good question. Right in the early stages, at the very first meeting 
in September this matter was discussed. How would this work? 
 
At that point South Africa was not an NPT signatory. Although we had a Safeguards 
Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, we did not have a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Safari Reactor, for example, fell under the 
scope of a Safeguards Agreement.”612 
 
Professor Stumpf did not really answer the question about whether or not 
they had advisors.613 Those persons who assumed responsibility for this 
project understood all the ramifications of accession to the NPT, and were 
experts in the field constituted the Advisory Team. They were effectively 
the highest authorities in the land. It would appear that world-class expert 
advisors might be wisely included in this process at as early stage as is 
possible. 
 
Stumpf continued with his explanation:  
 
                                                
610 Loc cit. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Ibid.  South Africa’s legal status vis-à-vis the NPT in 1989 was that it had a Safeguards 
Agreement but had not acceded to the NPT. (This was not yet the Comprehensive Safeguards 
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613 To this day I do not know whether they had advisors or not. 
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“The IAEA was not a strange animal to us. We knew how it worked.614 We knew what the 
NPT said. The question was raised at the September meeting: ‘When do we accede to 
the NPT? 
 
I said to Mr de Klerk and the Ministers: ’There is no way that we can accede to the NPT 
before we have dismantled these devices. The NPT does not allow nuclear weapons to 
be possessed by a party unless you are one of the ‘Big Five’. They were the only ones 
that were allowed to have them. You can’t go and say ‘Mr NPT, I have some nuclear 
weapons, but I want to become a signatory. You have to get rid of them first.’ This is a 
quandary, because the NPT was not designed for nuclear relinquishment. The IAEA 
should really have made it easier for a country to accede to the NPT. The moment that 
you acceded to the NPT, you would actually be breaking the NPT, if you had not 
dismantled the devices, and re-melted the HEU, and so forth. We could accede to the 
NPT only at the point when we had dismantled the devices and re-melted the HEU. 
Anything less would have been in breach of the NPT at the point of accession. It was thus 
only at that point of full relinquishment that we could accede to the NPT. 
 
Mr de Klerk said to us: ‘This is fine.’ That is why he specified later in his Authorising 
Document that we were to advise government on its accession to the NPT. The NPT 
actually was a strange document at that time. It only looked forward from the point of 
accession. From a logical point of view, what you had done in constructing nuclear 
weapons prior to the choice of acceding to the NPT was ‘nobody’s business’.615 Today 
the procedure is a bit different. The NPT have what they call an Additional Protocol to the 
NPT (which South Africa has also signed) and where they look into your past history. But 
at the time of our nuclear relinquishment the position was that once you had acceded to 
the NPT, the NPT looked at you from that point onwards and forwards. They were not 
allowed really to look backwards. I will talk a bit later about the implications that this had 
on the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement that had been signed. That was the 
situation with the NPT.”616 
 
The researcher’s deduction is therefore that from a perspective of positive 
law, South Africa might have claimed that it had the right to possess 
nuclear weapons for a limited deterrent purpose, partially because it was 
not a signatory to the NPT at the time when these were developed. Had it 
been a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
                                                
614 They understood the IAEA’s legal remit. It was part of their day-to-day work and the ultimate 
guiding authority. 
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616 Loc cit. 
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Weapons at the time of development, it would obviously have been in 
breach of this treaty. 
 
Similarly, South Africa could not have legally acknowledged this 
possession and capability at the time of accession, because that would 
have placed the country in breach of the NPT. The researcher’s deduction 
is that the NPT (at that time), by virtue of this default, might have 
encouraged a clandestine approach to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons by threshold states. Any acknowledgement of possession would 
have rendered a country in breach of the NPT at the point of accession. 
This discouraged the volunteering of nuclear weapons status. 
 
In the next instance, a fairly extensive citation of the research of Von 
Baeckmann et al will be depicted. The reason for its inclusion is that it 
provides the reader with confirmation of the extent and detail of the 
relinquishment and accession process. It also counters casual 
conversation that might be inclined to foster proliferation-centred rumours 
and fears that have no basis in reality. Most importantly, it offers a general 
corroboration of Professor Stumpf’s testimony. 
 
Von Baeckmann et al asserted that: 
 
“By the time of the IAEA team’s visit in April 1993, the dismantling and destruction of 
weapons components and the destruction of the technical documentation had been 
nearly completed. Dismantling records concerning the HEU components were available. 
They provided sufficient detail to enable ARMSCOR data to be correlated with the 
corresponding data in the nuclear material accountancy records maintained by the AEC. 
 
The dismantling of the non-nuclear components of the weapons had been carried out in 
accordance with procedures approved by the South African authorities. A number of 
destroyed or partially destroyed components had been retained and were shown to some 
members of the team in April 1993. Remaining records, in the form of ‘build history’ 
logbooks for the completed weapons and the experimental devices, were examined and 
compared with the dismantling listings. Identification numbers of remaining components 
were compared and found to be consistent with those shown on the records. The team 
carried out an audit of the records of the transfer of enriched uranium between the AEC 
and ARMSCOR/Circle. 
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As a result of this audit, the team (the Extra Team) concluded that the enriched uranium 
originally supplied to ARMSCOR/Circle had been returned to the AEC and was subject to 
IAEA safeguards at the time that the Safeguards Agreement entered into force. The team 
visited all facilities identified as having connections with the former nuclear weapons 
programme. It is appropriate to record the active co-operation of the South African 
Authorities in arranging for access to all facilities that the team requested to visit, both 
those facilities which had been provisionally listed by the South African authorities as 
having direct connection with the former nuclear weapons programme, or with peripheral 
activities, and additional facilities identified by the team. The IAEA is not in possession of 
any information suggesting the existence of any undeclared facilities connected with the 
programme.”617  
 
Von Baeckmann et al again refer to the fact that the relinquishment 
process and accession to the NPT were conducted with the IAEA in a 
spirit of active co-operation. Stumpf indicated that South Africa had no 
obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
to declare what had been the past purpose of its nuclear material. Von 
Baeckmann et al therefore concurred that Stumpf’s assertion was the 
correct understanding of the law as it applied to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at that time. Equally, the primary task of 
the IAEA was to ascertain that all material had been declared and placed 
under Safeguards. Priority was afforded to this task during 1992. 
 
Stumpf explained:   
 
“The IAEA also resisted any interference in the process. We obviously also resisted 
interference in the process ... We said: ‘Look, we will give the IAEA everything we have. 
But we are not obliged to tell the Americans or anybody anything else at that point.’ Yes, 
you are quite right. There was pressure from outside on us. The pressure arose not so 
much from the sides of the UK and the Russians, but it came from the US. They pushed 
very hard. They wanted to get in on the act, by any means. This was resisted.”618 
 
The US had legitimate proliferation fears about South Africa. The IAEA did 
not get its remit from the US. It gained it from its Statute, the NPT, and 
                                                
617 Op cit Von Baeckmann et al. 
618 Op cit Stumpf. 
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resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United 
Nations. 
 
Heald: “Was it effectively resisted?”619  
 
Stumpf: “Yes. This is because the IAEA said: ‘We want to do this according to our remit. 
The Americans have nothing to do with this. We are the UN-appointed body to handle 
this matter we are tasked to do this and we will verify this.’ I must say that the IAEA has 
got some very professional people. I have always worked well with them, I really have. 
They arrived on the site in November 1991 after we had signed the NPT. The NPT says 
to the IAEA: ‘We now have to look forward from this point onwards.’ The IAEA was not 
allowed to ask us questions about the past. I had anticipated this. I said to Mr de Kler:k 
‘What must I do if they ask me outright, did you have some nuclear weapons?’ He said to 
me: ‘Then you say to them, yes.’ He said, ‘Don’t lie to them. But keep it confidential, for 
internal political reasons, until such time as it is safe to announce it.’  Fortunately they 
never asked me. (But it was an open secret.) Later on we (the IAEA and I) laughed about 
it. I said, ‘Maybe you should have asked me.’ They were afraid that I would rebuff them 
and say: ‘This is no business of yours.’  That is the factual situation. The IAEA were 
legally correct not to ask us about the past nuclear programme. But they started to pick 
up a lot of indirect evidence that there must have been a programme of nuclear weapons. 
They were quite happy that we had kept all the material evidence. The IAEA also had 
something to prove to the Americans. They wanted to show that they had slipped up in 
Iraq but that they had corrected that in the case of South Africa.”620 
 
Von Baeckmann et al therefore concurred that Stumpf’s understanding of 
the law as it applied to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons at that time was correct. Equally, the primary task of the IAEA 
was to ascertain that all nuclear material had been declared and placed 
under Safeguards. Priority was given to this task during 1992. 
 
It is for this reason that Von Baeckmann et al maintained that: 
 
“The task was further complicated when, on 23 March 1993, State President de Klerk 
announced that South Africa had developed and subsequently dismantled a limited 
deterrent capability involving the design and manufacture of seven gun-assembled 
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devices. The news prompted the IAEA to augment its Safeguards Team in South Africa 
with, among other specialists, nuclear weapons experts.”621  
 
The augmented IAEA Safeguards team can be understood as the Extra 
Team. 
 
Von Baeckmann et al furthermore reported that: 
 
“Over the following five-month period, the IAEA was augmented by nuclear weapons 
experts who carried out inspections at a number of facilities and locations that had been 
declared to have been involved in the former nuclear weapons programme”.622  
 
The objectives of these inspections were to: 
 
• “Gain assurance that all nuclear material used in the nuclear 
weapons programme had been returned to peaceful usage and had 
been placed under IAEA Safeguards”;623 (Confirmed by Professors 
Stumpf and Mouton.) 
• “Assess that all non-nuclear weapons-specific components of the 
devices had been destroyed and that all the laboratory and 
engineering facilities involved in the programme had been fully 
decommissioned, and abandoned or converted into commercial 
non-nuclear usage or peaceful nuclear usage; that all weapons-
specific equipment had been destroyed; and that all other 
equipment had been converted to commercial non-nuclear usage or 
peaceful nuclear usage”;624 (Confirmed by Professors Stumpf and 
Mouton.) 
• “Obtain information regarding the dismantling programme, the 
destruction of design and manufacturing information, including 
drawings, and the philosophy followed in the destruction of the 
nuclear weapons”;625 (Confirmed by Professors Stumpf and 
Mouton.)  
                                                
621 Op cit Von Baeckmann et al at 42.  
622 Loc cit. 
623 Op cit Von Baeckmann et al at 46.  
624 Loc cit.  
625 Ibid. 
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• “Assess the completeness and correctness of the information 
provided by South Africa with respect to the timing and scope of the 
nuclear weapons programme, and the development, manufacture, 
and subsequent dismantling of the nuclear weapons”;626 (Confirmed 
by Professors Stumpf and Mouton.) 
• “Consult on the arrangements for, and ultimately witness, actions at 
the Kalahari test shafts to render them useless”;627 (Confirmed by 
Mr Pik Botha, and Professors Stumpf and Mouton.) 
• “Visit facilities previously involved in or associated with the nuclear 
weapons programme and to confirm that they were no longer used 
for such purposes”;628 (Confirmed by Mr de Klerk, Mr Pik Botha, 
and Professors Stumpf and Mouton.) 
• “Consult on future strategies for maintaining assurance that the 
nuclear weapons capability would not be regenerated”.629 
(Confirmed by Mr de Klerk, Mr Pik Botha, and Professors Stumpf 
and Mouton.)   
 
These objectives were conducted according to stringent schedules which 
were set out across the entire time-line of the relinquishment and 
accession process. Von Baeckmann et al contended: 
 
“These objectives were based on the IAEA’s rights and obligations under the Safeguards 
Agreement and on the stated policy of the South African Government for full transparency 
with respect to the country’s former nuclear weapons programme”.630 
 
The IAEA therefore relied on two sets of rights in order to perform its 
obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. The first right emerged 
under the Safeguards Agreement, and the second right emerged from the 
principle of comity that ensured that Pretoria was transparent and co-
operative in its dealings with the IAEA. 
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In the following citation offered by Professor Stumpf, we are shown the 
extent of the coverage of the second Safeguarding process. Professor 
Stumpf informed: 
 
“They (the Extra Team) visited companies that had nothing to do with this programme – 
they went all over. They explored military contracts that might be related to the nuclear 
weapons programme. They went all over the country, visiting quite a few armaments 
factories, even those that were involved with conventional armaments and were not 
involved in the nuclear weapons project. They spoke to many people who had left 
ARMSCOR, and who had left the AEC at that point. They spoke to all the experts who 
had designed these devices. They spoke to lots of people in the Defence Force who had 
been involved with the nuclear project. Slowly they started putting the whole picture 
together of what the past picture looked like. It tallied with what we had informed them. 
What they saw on the ground gave us some credibility.”631 
 
6.7 Building Trust with the Americans and the IAEA – 
Maintaining Sound Interpersonal Relationships 
Professor Stumpf reflected upon the fragile relationships that initially 
existed between the South Africans and the Americans at the beginning of 
the relinquishment and accession process, and how this relationship of 
mistrust was gradually improved upon, by developing of mutual 
understanding that arose from joint problem-solving over time. This 
mistrust came to the fore during the inspections conducted by the Extra 
Team and was certainly a legacy of the mistrustful relationships that 
existed between South Africa and the United States about the nuclear 
weapons programme, and which had extended over at least two decades. 
 
Professor Stumpf recalled: 
 
“The Americans questioned the IAEA’s competence then. The relationships between the 
IAEA and the South Africans were professional and good. The Americans were initially 
extremely distrustful of the South Africans. They interrogated whether the South Africans 
were relinquishing the nuclear weapons and acceding to the NPT in a spirit of good faith. 
Trust between the South Africans and Americans was slowly nurtured over a period of 
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time when they were able to work and plan together in a co-operative and collaborative 
manner. Trust needed to be earned.”632 
 
Professor Stumpf’s starting point is to acknowledge the low levels of trust 
that originally existed between the South Africans and the Americans at 
the time of inspection. Mr Pik Botha provides testimony which explains the 
origin of this mistrust. It will be recalled that he had a continuous 
involvement in the political aspect of the nuclear relinquishment process, 
over many years. Mr Botha described how the State Department in the 
United States set up a special section called the Department of Energy 
(DOE) to deal with all matters relating to nuclear weapons. The DOE 
performed a similar role to the IAEA, but its remit related to the United 
States’ national interest. (The DOE can be understood as being a United 
States municipal law equivalent to the IAEA, which falls under international 
law.) South Africa was engaged in meetings with the DOE on its nuclear 
status for a period of years. The DOE placed South Africa under pressure 
to dismantle its nuclear programme. 
 
The interaction between the South Africans and the Americans at the DOE 
constituted a ‘shadowing’ of the inspectorate of the Extra Team after the 
IAEA had completed its remit. The DOE had a relationship with the IAEA, 
and this symbiosis served the useful purpose of creating for the IAEA a 
‘double’ international oversight arrangement on nuclear weapons and their 
possible proliferation. The Extra Team investigated South Africa’s past 
nuclear weapons programme after the IAEA had performed its task. The 
membership of the Extra Team included American, British, Russian and 
French inspectors. The American inspectors were the most prominent in 
their critique of South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and accession to the 
treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Mr Pik Botha’s 
citation is included to afford an insight into the modus operandi of the 
Americans as far as South Africa’s nuclear programme was concerned. At 
that particular stage, the relationships were strongly conflictive, 
competitive and coercive. 
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Mr Pik Botha explained that: 
 
“A special section, or division, was created in the State Department at the USA. This 
section was called the Department of Energy (DOE). It dealt with all matters relating to 
nuclear weapons and worked quite closely with the IAEA. Its function was to assess 
nuclear matters locally and globally. The DOE functioned as a component of the US State 
Department and they called for meetings with South Africa regularly. These meetings 
took place over the years.  There was a guy called Kennedy who was in charge of the 
DOE at that time. He was not related to the Kennedys. Pressure to dismantle the nuclear 
programme was directed from the USA, Britain, the Soviet Union and the State 
Department which created the DOE. The DOE worked closely with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. It therefore had direct access to the United Nations Security 
Council. This access could be used to pressurise South Africa to put a halt to its 
ambitions relating to nuclear weapons. 
 
In 1978 President Jimmy Carter passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act through 
Congress. This Act prohibited the transfer of any nuclear technology to any non-NPT 
countries. At the time of the promulgation of this Act, South Africa had delivered a 
consignment of low grade uranium to the DOE. It was intended that this uranium would 
be enriched for peaceful power generation to be used at Koeberg nuclear power station. 
The DOE declined to hand over the upgraded uranium to Eskom, who were the principals 
for Koeberg. They were thus in breach of contract with Eskom. The DOE demanded 
payment for the enrichment which it refused to deliver.”633 
                                                
633 The US created legislation to prohibit nuclear proliferation in, inter alia, South Africa by 
promulgating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978, 92 Stat. 120. Approved 10 March 1978. 
Statement of Policy: Sec 2 ‘The Congress finds and declares that the proliferation of nuclear 
explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices 
poses a grave threat to the security interests of the United States and to continued international 
progress toward world peace and development. Recent events emphasize the urgency of this threat 
and the imperative need to increase the effectiveness of international safeguards and controls of 
peaceful nuclear activities to prevent proliferation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the United 
States to– 
(a) actively pursue through international initiatives mechanisms for fuel supply assurances and 
the establishment of more effective international controls and over the transfer and use of 
nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to 
prevent proliferation, including the establishment of common international sanctions;  
(b) take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the United States in meeting its 
commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-
proliferation policies by establishing procedures to facility timely processing of requests for 
subsequent arrangement and export licenses;  
(c ) strongly encourage nations which have not ratified the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons to do so at the earliest possible date;”.  
The US also used economic and financial pressure to disrupt South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
programme. South Africa’s civil nuclear energy requirements were regarded by the USA as 
subordinate to the overarching requirement that its nuclear weapons programme should be 
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The United States was in breach of contract on the Koeberg uranium 
contract. This breach of contract arose from their legitimate fear that South 
Africa was enriching this uranium with nuclear proliferation objectives in 
mind. This incident caused mistrust between the United States and South 
Africa. South Africa, like Iraq, used the legitimate matter of the generation 
of electricity by nuclear power as a camouflage to conceal its military 
nuclear intentions. This ploy is clearly anticipated in both the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The transfer of this enriched uranium 
would have been in contravention of Articles I and II of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons inasmuch as the transfer or receipt 
of HEU that might be used for military purposes is prohibited. The transfer 
would have been in breach of Article III B2 of the Statute of the IAEA, 
which requires the IAEA to ’establish control over the use of special 
fissionable materials ...’. 
 
The discovery of the nuclear test site at Vastrap and the confirmation that 
South Africa had built the Y Plant to make HEU required a high level of 
caution about the transference of all fissionable material, because it could 
be subverted to military usage. Mr Botha acknowledged that the concerns 
of the Americans about South Africa’s good faith in acceding to the NPT 
were valid and needed to be respected. He conceded that the Americans 
were quite correct to interrogate to their satisfaction whether or not South 
Africa was playing games, and respecting the principle of comity. This was 
an entirely legitimate line of interrogation.634 
 
Professor Stumpf in the following citation found that certain displays of 
rudeness and presumptive arrogance by a particular member of the United 
States inspectorate was unacceptable. It undermined comity and was 
destructive to relationships. These displays of disrespect could have 
                                                                                                                                 
discontinued. The US in this gesture of a breach of contract to deliver upgraded uranium to Eskom 
sent out a clear message that the nuclear weapons programme should be discontinued.  
634 See Clausen, Peter. 1993. Nonproliferation and the National Interest – America’s Response to 
Nuclear Weapons. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers. 
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damaged the relationship aspect of the relinquishment and accession 
process and indeed placed it at risk. The conduct that he alluded to 
included the casting of destructive aspersions, negative parochial framing, 
and sowing of suspicion at a personal level about the nuclear matters 
which were in fact being addressed with sincerity and executed according 
to the highest Safeguards standards pecified by the IAEA and the NPT. 
 
It can be expected, as a general principle, that all state representatives will 
abhor undignified treatment and would often be inclined to refuse to co-
operate if treated in a disrespectful manner. Rudeness could place an 
entire nuclear relinquishment and accession process at risk. 
 
Professor Stumpf illustrates this point thus: 
 
“The first inspectors arrived in November, and that particular American started applying a 
lot of pressure onto the system because they still did not trust us. They still thought that 
we were playing games. They thought that we would be hiding things and so forth. That is 
why I made a bit of a negative comment about ‘Mr X’.  ‘Mr X.’ played a lot of games at 
that stage. I experienced him as somehow sowing suspicion in the hope that South Africa 
would never declare all of its materials. ‘How can we trust that you will play open cards 
with us?’ and so on. So I had many run-ins with ‘Mr X. 
 
But let’s put that aside.635 We resisted the attempt by the Americans to become involved, 
and so too did the IAEA. The Americans wanted to become involved. They did not trust 
the IAEA and the reason for that is the following: it was post-1991 and the Iraq situation 
was dominating their attention. The Americans said to the IAEA: ‘You failed in Iraq; you 
did not pick up its nuclear weapons programme. You are not good enough ... you can’t do 
it.’ So the Americans did not trust the IAEA at that point and even today they don’t always 
trust them. There were very good reasons for the Americans’ distrust.”636  
 
Heald: “You were trusted by the Americans eventually ... Mr de Klerk made the point that 
he had the meeting with George W Bush Senior in the Rose Garden at the White House, 
and that it was there that the President of the USA made the announcement that the 
change process in South Africa is irreversible. This whole thing is about trust.”637 
 
                                                
635 The accession to the NPT could have been endangered by other persons, who were part of the 
inspection regime, ‘playing games’. 
636 Op cit Stumpf. 
637 Loc cit. 
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Stumpf: “It is. Keep in mind that the Americans did not trust us, or the IAEA, because they 
were not part of the verification process until after March 1993. Then they became part of 
the verification process of the past. You must always see this in two phases. After we had 
signed the Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA just looked at the inventory with all the HEU 
that was there and they were satisfied that all had been declared and that nothing 
remained. The IAEA did not look back. They just looked at the material. The second 
process began after March 1993. The Americans were involved and were really trying to 
understand the extent of the past programme. What had been done? What were the 
driving forces behind the programme?  After that they also had some trust in it because 
they had been part of the process ... but not before that. They were very distrustful before 
that. Maybe this was because Saddam Hussein had shown the world that he could play 
games with them. It was only after the Americans became actively involved in the 
relinquishment and accession process that they started to trust the South African bona 
fides. This involvement resulted in a commitment to the integrity of the accession 
process.”638  
 
Heald: “I would guess that our sales of G5 and G6 artillery to Iraq could not have helped 
trust much?”639 
 
[If South Africa could transact with Iraq on G5 and G6 artillery, then why should they not 
proliferate nuclear weapons to Libya, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq and North Korea?]  
 
Stumpf: “Absolutely.”640 
 
It was through interactive planning between the South Africans and the 
Americans that trust in the true status of the South African nuclear 
weapons programme was gradually nurtured. Professor Stumpf offered a 
detailed and practically-reasoned submission on how South Africa 
relinquished its nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT. He alluded to 
the careful nurturing of trust with the IAEA. This gradual building of trust 
was an important moral theme that underpinned South Africa’s accession 
to the NPT. Trust needed to be created and spread more widely on an 
ever-increasing canvas. Firstly it needed to be developed individually 
among the members of the relinquishment team; simultaneously it needed 
to be developed with the IAEA; thereafter it needed to be nurtured with the 
Extra Team, and particularly with the American members of that team 
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because of their suspicions about the effectiveness of the IAEA and South 
Africa’s integrity. 
 
South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the 
NPT was not only a matter of harmonising municipal law with international 
law. It also required the harmonising of the conflict of laws with an 
intensely and indeed dangerously fragile set of constitutional negotiations 
that would change the very face of South Africa’s legal system. The 
underlying political turmoil escalated this complexity and intensified the 
need to manage it wisely. 
 
Von Baeckmann, Dillon and Perricos641 corroborated Professor Stumpf’s 
commentary on the establishment of the Extra Team thus: 
 
“The (inspection) team’s assignment was extended to include assessing the status of the 
former nuclear weapons programme and ascertaining that all nuclear material involved in 
the programme had been removed and placed under Safeguards.”642 
 
There were clearly differences in opinion between the IAEA and the 
American members of the Extra Team as to the perception of 
mendaciousness relating to South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme. 
The relationship with the IAEA had been built up over many years of 
involvement in Safeguards, and was conducted specifically in terms of its 
Statute and the NPT. Good all-around interpersonal relationships were 
built up between the IAEA and Pretoria during the first phase of the 
accession process, which was concerned with South Africa’s civilian 
nuclear programme. The United States entered the inspectorate of the 
Extra Team during the second and much more controversial phase of 
inspection, which was focused on Safeguarding the nuclear weapons 
programme. A second round of trust and relationship building had to be 
nurtured. Any interference with the IAEA’s inspection regime, by the 
United States or any other State, would have constituted a breach of the 
                                                
641 Perricos was a member of the IAEA’s South African inspection team who was tasked with this 
remit. He can therefore be regarded as an expert on the matter of South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment process and accession to the NPT, from the perspective of the IAEA’s inspectorate. 
642 Op cit Von Baeckmann et al at 42–43. 
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Statute of the IAEA and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. The Americans therefore did not possess legal authority to 
intrude upon the IAEA’s inspection remit in South Africa, as this could 
result in the abrogation of the United Nation’s Authority. 
 
By the same token, South Africa’s request for a material (sanctions-
reducing) quid pro quo for relinquishing its nuclear weapons created a 
conflict of laws between United States municipal law and international law. 
The Americans therefore had a clear authority to decline to support South 
Africa’s request for a sanctions-reducing quid pro quo. The authority for 
this decision lay within the Charter of the United Nations. The legal 
authority for their stance resided in the Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, which is vested by the United Nations with the duty to 
conduct inspections and set safeguards on nuclear energy matters. (See 
Article IIIA, 5, 6, B, 1, 2 of the IAEA Statute.) 
 
6.8 Approval of South Africa’s Comprehensive Safeguards at the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in September 1991 
South Africa remained a member of the IAEA after its suspension from 
participation in the General Conference, but obviously could not attend the 
General Conference meetings. This sanction remained in place for a while 
after the Safeguards Agreement was reached. South Africa could resume 
participation at the General Conference of the IAEA only once the 
procedures relating to the implementation of these sanctions were formally 
withdrawn by virtue of a recommendation to this effect by the IAEA to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
 
Professor Stumpf recalled: 
 
 “The Extra Team finished their work in about July of 1993. About then, the Extra Team 
wrote a report to the IAEA. They said that they had investigated the past programme, and 
they recommended that the General Conference of the IAEA accept that South Africa had 
achieved full compliance with all the requirements of the NPT. South Africa had declared 
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everything of its past programme, which has been demolished. There was no information 
left any more of the design of these weapons that could proliferate. What sort of 
information was destroyed? It was only technical information that was destroyed, that 
could be seen as ‘proliferation-centred’. The IAEA actually complimented us and informed 
us that we were absolutely right to have destroyed those drawings before they arrived at 
the scene. If they had arrived and seen those drawings, they would have had to say: ‘You 
are technically in violation of the agreement.’ 
 
In September 1993 the General Conference of the IAEA accepted that South Africa was 
fully compliant with the NPT. The General Conference of the IAEA sent a 
recommendation to the General Assembly of the UN that South Africa was compliant with 
the NPT. In November 1993, the General Assembly of the UN accepted that South Africa 
was fully compliant with the NPT. That was really the end of the verification process. The 
IAEA comes here and visits South Africa every so often. They still have their open 
invitation, and they still have the right to come anywhere, any time, if they so require. But 
they are not making use of this invitation now. After November 1993, they still asked from 
time to time to visit and inspect some places. We never refused them. Why not? The 
whole reason for this, Geoffry, is that we all realised that it was in our interest for South 
Africa to have a credible clean slate record. If we had tried to play ‘footsy-footsy‘ with the 
IAEA, we would have damaged ourselves. The decision had been taken for South Africa 
to embark on a new political process. We decided: ‘Let’s clean this thing out; let’s draw 
the bottom line and say that it is part of our history, but it is not part of the political 
process of the future.’ That in broad terms is my response to the points that you 
raised.”643  
 
Von Baeckmann et al corroborated Professor Stumpf’s recollection when 
they recalled: 
 
“Over the months that followed, the team thoroughly examined detailed records and 
verified the inventories of nuclear materials in South Africa. As a result, the IAEA was 
able to conclude that there were no indications suggesting that the Initial Inventory was 
incomplete or that the South Africa nuclear weapons programme had not been 
completely dismantled.”644 
 
Professor Stumpf explained:  
 
“That is why the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement was pushed so hard. The 
Agreement really specifies how the IAEA will verify the nuclear status of a country.”645  
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Von Baeckmann et al agreed with Stumpf’s rationale for the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement being pushed so hard, and 
mentioned: 
 
“For the IAEA, it was therefore possible – on the basis of the data contained in the Initial 
Report and subsequent inventory changes – to establish an itemised list of each facility’s 
nuclear material inventory. Verification of such itemized lists was carried out during the 
first few months of the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. 
This was done in accordance with the requirements for Physical Inventory Verification 
(PIV) specified in the IAEA 1991-1995 Safeguards Criteria, using established 
accountancy verification measures. Unlike other States that had entered into 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, South Africa had been operating a number of 
nuclear facilities, of unique indigenous origin, that previously had not been the subject of 
Safeguards. Details of their design and operation were thus relatively unknown to the 
IAEA at the time the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement was concluded.”646  
 
Heald asked: 
 
“When you were project-managing the process of relinquishment, were you having 
constant conversations with the Americans, the Russians, the French and the British 
about what you were doing?”647 
 
Stumpf responded:  
 
“Let me go back one step in history. In 1974 South Africa was barred from participating in 
the IAEA General Conference. At that point the General Conference was set to be held in 
India. It is actually a bit funny that 1974 was the same year that India exploded its first 
nuclear test device outside of the NPT. They were not chastised for this. But anyway, that 
is politics. So we were barred here.648 Although we remained a member of the IAEA, we 
could not attend the General Conference at that time. Now moving forward to 1991, the 
General Conference of the IAEA was set to be held in September 1991. FW de Klerk 
wanted us to become a full member of the IAEA again for its political leverage. It was 
important for South Africa to participate in the General Conference.649 We realised that if 
we had not signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement at that point, we would 
never get full acceptance at the IAEA. People would have said: ‘Look, those guys have 
                                                
646 Op cit Von Baeckmann et al. 
647 Op cit Stumpf. 
648 South Africa was suspended from membership privileges in terms of Article V E.3 of the 
General Conference of the IAEA. 
649 Its exclusion from the General Conference was a mark of its pariah nuclear and political status. 
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signed the NPT. It is a ‘foefie’ (English translation: a deceptive and frivolous ploy). They 
are never going to sign the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.’ North Korea took six 
years to sign a Safeguards Agreement, which is obviously a lot longer than 18 months. 
 
Nevertheless, at the General Conference (I was there, and there were quite a number of 
other people there, also Neil van Heerden and those people were there), the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement was signed. I know that it was on the opening 
morning of the conference (that Sunday we had lots of faxes and telefaxes coming in 
from Pretoria ...). Then on that Monday morning at 08h30, the Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement was signed. 
 
Hans Blix was then the Director General of the IAEA. At 09h00 Hans Blix got up and 
opened the General Conference of the IAEA and his opening words were: ‘South Africa 
has signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.’ It was quite a momentous 
occasion, because nobody expected us to do it. They still suspected that South Africa 
was playing games with the world.650 The perception was that we were not serious about 
the NPT and nuclear relinquishment.”651 
 
Prior to its accession to the NPT, South Africa had retained its 
membership of the IAEA but was prohibited from participating in its 
General Conference. This sanction prevented it from contributing to the 
creation of international law on matters pertaining to nuclear weapons, 
because it could not participate in law-making conferences.  
 
Von Baeckmann et al corroborated Professor Stumpf’s assessment that 
the accession to the NPT: 
 
“... was promptly followed by the signing of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA on 16 September 1991”.652 “Four days later, the IAEA General Conference 
adopted a resolution aimed at ensuring early implementation of the Safeguard’s 
Agreement and verification of the completeness of the inventory of South Africa’s nuclear 
installation and material. 
 
In November 1991, a senior team of IAEA safeguards officials specially appointed by the 
Agency’s Director General carried out the first inspections under the Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement. The activities to verify the correctness of South Africa’s Declared 
Inventory of nuclear material extended over several months and involved long-
                                                
650 The suspicion of South Africa’s playing games with the world was a serious manifestation of 
mistrust. This playing of games was also a perception that applied in the case of Iraq. 
651 Op cit Stumpf. 
652 Op cit Von Baeckmann et al at 42.  
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established measures. These included the examination of contemporary operating and 
accounting records, and analysis of the nature and quantity of nuclear material.”653  
 
The signing of the Safeguards Agreement led directly to the withdrawal of 
this sanction, and its resumption of participation at the General 
Conference. The signing of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
was an important event in itself. It signified that the threat of South Africa’s 
engaging in nuclear proliferation was being substantively and procedurally 
eliminated. As a corollary to this, it heralded the gradual return to 
credibility and respectability of South Africa as a state. It signified an 
inversion of its recognition as a pariah state into being perceived as a 
respected member of the international community of states, in pursuit of 
juridical security. 
 
6.9 Conclusion  
The purpose of this analysis has been to search for answers to the 
question of how the nuclear arsenal was relinquished and how South 
Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
in compliance with international law.  Rich findings have emerged from this 
research.  
 
It was discovered at an overall conceptual level that the relinquishment 
and accession to the NPT took place at four levels simultaneously: 
substance; process; relationship and time. These will be qualified below. 
 
Firstly, the exercise took place at a substantive level of international law – 
ratione materiae – where the data contained in the Initial Report had to be 
submitted according to exceptionally high levels of scientific exactitude. 
The IAEA’s inspectorate effectively acted as an international nuclear 
physics ‘peer review committee’ that functioned at the highest levels of 
expertise available in the world.  There needed to be precise adherence to 
the Prior Safeguards Agreement, the Safeguards Agreements, and the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to the satisfaction of the 
                                                
653 Loc cit.  
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International Atomic Energy Association, and also (almost as a second 
nuclear audit) to the satisfaction of the Extra Team. 
 
Secondly, it took place according to stringent deadlines. Indeed, it was a 
deadline-driven process – ratione temporis. An excellent example of how 
Mr de Klerk addressed the notion of ratione temporis lay in his instructions 
that a very carefully-considered Announcement Plan should be developed 
over time. 
 
Thirdly, the relinquishment and accession of nuclear weapons was 
conducted in a positive spirit of legal process and procedure, which can be 
interpreted as a spirit of comity. The legal process and procedural issues 
included the formally-ratified re-admission to and participation in the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and later 
on, before the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
 
Fourthly, trusting relationships with the persons who had been appointed 
were an imperative. Mr de Klerk wanted those involved in the 
relinquishment and accession to be sincere and not to play any games, as 
subsequently happened in the case of Iraq. The matter of upholding 
excellent personal relationships was alluded to by all the respondents – 
this is designated as ratione personae. 
 
All four of these dimensions were carefully and appropriately harmonised. 
Mr de Klerk was careful to ensure that meticulous performance standards 
were upheld as far as South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear weapons 
and accession to the NPT were concerned.  
 
The first step that Mr de Klerk took in setting about the nuclear 
relinquishment and accession strategy was to communicate his intentions 
to a select group of trusted and highly-competent colleagues who had the 
ability to enact his intentions to the letter of the law. 
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Second, he needed to establish internal consensus even among those 
who opposed the choice. This internal consensus was required in order to 
gain support for the wisdom of the decision, so as to prevent filibustering 
from those who perceived that they might have stood to lose as a result of 
the decision to relinquish the nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. 
 
Third, Mr de Klerk appointed an internationally credible domestic 
relinquishment and accession team in whom he had confidence to enact 
the process of nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. This 
team needed to be credible in the eyes of the IAEA as well as those of a 
group of nuclear weapons experts referred to as the Extra Team. 
Professor Mouton was appointed as the Oversight Manager in charge of 
the project. 
 
Fourth, Mr de Klerk ensured that the timing of the decision to relinquish 
the nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT was appropriate. His 
viewpoint was that it needed to be done as swiftly as possible, because 
any delay in the relinquishment and accession might have placed the 
credibility of the constitutional settlement under profound national and 
international jeopardy. It would have sown global juridical insecurity about 
South Africa. In this regard, he also instructed that an Announcement Plan 
should be developed, against which accession to the NPT would be 
synchronised and calibrated. 
 
Fifth, Mr de Klerk instructed that an appropriate project-management 
methodology should be applied to conduct this undertaking successfully. 
He decided not to use a tortuous approach such as that which has been 
unsuccessfully applied in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas. He 
rejected an ‘incremental’ approach and elected for a ‘big bang’ approach. 
He purposefully sought to pursue an efficient, quick and painless 
relinquishment and accession process. 
 
Sixth, Mr de Klerk decided to conduct the relinquishment and accession 
process unilaterally, without the involvement of the ANC. The rationale for 
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this was that he needed to devise an approach that would not alienate his 
electorate and the international community of states, who might have 
perceived the process as a threat to world peace. He was acutely aware 
that this relinquishment process, while necessary for world peace, might 
have been perceived by elements of his constituency as being 
unnecessarily concessionary, because of the nature of parochialism.  
Equally, the international community might have reacted with panic to a 
formal but untimely confirmation that South Africa indeed possessed an 
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Mr de Klerk decided that the electorate would be included only at the last 
moment, at the time of the announcement of the accession ... when it was 
already a fait accompli. In other words, his unilateral decision also 
excluded the ANC, his own constituency, the far right, and all other 
political parties, from the accession decision. The support of these 
stakeholders could not have been assured. He recognised that if the 
matter was not handled appropriately, he might be attacked by: 
 
1. The ANC on the left; 
2. Disaffected members of his own constituency; (and) 
3. The right wing, which inter alia had a very strong support base in 
the military and police.  
 
He conducted the relinquishment process and accession to the NPT as a 
fait accompli from the perspective of his successors. It was, for him, wiser 
to make a binding unilateral decision than to enter into a naïve and 
inappropriate public negotiation process that would have fanned 
proliferation fears at an international level, and would have been 
condemned as appeasement to international pressure at the domestic 
level, perhaps from elements within the political left and right alike. (My 
viewpoint is that this was a very important reason underpinning the 
success of the process in South Africa.) 
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Seventh, Mr de Klerk realised, after Mr Pik Botha had failed to achieve a 
quid pro quo from the US in the form of a reduction of sanctions at the 
November 1989 meeting, that the pursuit of a deterrent trade-off should be 
abandoned. He learned from this failure. 
 
Eighth, the matter was conducted in camera so as to ensure that it was 
not portrayed in the media as some type of concessionary game, where 
every move might be interpreted in the media as a ‘win–lose’ interchange. 
He was acutely cognisant that gallery-playing had retarded the pursuit of 
peace in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, and many other places as 
well. 
 
All of the above considerations interacted and contributed to a successful 
outcome. 
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Chapter Seven 
A Comparison of How South Africa and Iraq Relinquished 
their Nuclear Weapons in Terms of International Law 
 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to comparing how South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment process was conducted with the way in which Iraq’s was 
conducted. The purpose of presenting this comparison of the way in which 
South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment processes were carried out 
was to discover the prognosis for successful interstate knowledge 
transference relating to nuclear relinquishment and accession. The two 
cases are most certainly comparable; but comparability does not 
necessarily imply that the knowledge is transferable. The substantiating 
evidence that informed this comparison of how the nuclear relinquishment 
processes were conducted was derived from UN General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions on the inspection regimen in Iraq, the 
literature on the subject, and the cumulative testimony of the respondents. 
It was Iraq’s obdurate and cumulative breaches of international law, 
manifested in its ignoring of United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
which precipitated the decision to invade that country in 2003. Iraq’s 
contraventions of the IAEA, UNMOVIC654 and UNSCOM655 inspection and 
Safeguards regimens resulted in increasing levels of international 
frustration that eventually erupted into an invasion of that country. 
 
I contend that the invasion itself was illegal in the absence of this 
authorisation. The logic behind my contention is that on 8 November 2002 
the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 
(2002), which held that Iraq was in material breach of its disarmament 
obligations, which had been established by Resolution 687 (1991). 
Resolution 1441 instructed that the weapons inspections should resume 
within 45 days and reiterated that serious consequences would arise from 
                                                
654 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq. 
655 The United Nations Special Commission. 
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continued violations. Security Council Resolution 1441 can be understood 
as providing a distillation of the actions that needed to be conducted by 
Iraq in order to avoid ‘serious consequences’ – an allied invasion led by 
the United States. It provided a summary of the remit and knowledge that 
needed to be transferred for Iraq to avoid war. According to Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Resolution 1441 did not provide the United States with 
automatic authorisation to “take unilateral military action to effect regime 
change in Iraq, certainly not before another meeting of the Security 
Council”.656 Suffice it to say that this additional meeting of the Security 
Council did not take place, and the allied invasion brought about regime 
change in Iraq. 
 
Resolution 1441 provided Iraq with a final period within which to comply 
substantively with the Safeguards, but the allied invasion of Iraq took place 
before this final offer had expired. It was therefore illegal in terms of 
international law.657 The legal authority to embark on war is sourced in 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits states from 
using force against one another, barring only two exceptions to this rule. 
The first exception is when force is required in self-defence (authorised by 
Article 51); and the second exception is when the United Nations Security 
Council grants this authority to protect international peace and security 
(contained in Chapter VII), as occurred in the case when the allies 
responded militarily to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Neither of these two 
circumstances pertained to the allied invasion of Iraq on 8 March 2003, 
and it is my contention that the ‘Bush Doctrine’ attempted to create new 
international law to justify this invasion.658  
                                                
656 O’Connell, Mary Ellen. 2002. ‘UN Resolution 1441: Compelling Saddam, Restraining Bush’.: 
Jurist Legal Intelligence, 21 November. University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
657 Press Release SC/7564, Security Council 4644th/Meeting (AM). 2002. ‘Security Council Holds 
Iraq in Material Breach of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance to Comply: 
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1441’. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.un.org/NEWS/docs/2002/SC 75664. 
658 President George W Bush outlined the argument for pre-emptive self-defence in an Address to 
the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September 2002 (the National Security Strategy/Bush 
Doctrine), asserting that the US government: “... will defend the United States, the American 
people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it 
reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of 
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This comparative analysis of South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear 
relinquishment processes will show that the invasion was perhaps 
justifiable when seen against Iraq’s consistent breaches of international 
law with regard to how it conducted the nuclear relinquishment process. It 
is hoped that this comparison may be of assistance in cases where a state 
has proliferated nuclear weapons and wishes to relinquish them and to 
accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
and where it may be confronted by similar challenges to those 
experienced by the divergent experiences of either South Africa or Iraq. 
Comparative knowledge about the merits and de-merits of how the 
alternative relinquishment and accession approaches were undertaken in 
both South Africa and Iraq in terms of international law may have practical 
and beneficial outcomes, by reducing nuclear proliferation and 
ameliorating the associated international conflict. 
 
The phases of the research that comprise this chapter are sequenced as 
follows. The research is introduced by presenting an analysis of South 
Africa’s failed attempt in 2003 at knowledge transfer to Iraq relating to 
nuclear relinquishment. This failed attempt at knowledge transfer 
represents the intellectual challenge that will need to be overcome if the 
lessons learned are to be transferable. Thereafter the reader is introduced 
to an important delimitation of this study. South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment programme pertained only to nuclear weapons as such. 
                                                                                                                                 
self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm 
against our people and our country … given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United 
States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a 
potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that 
could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let 
our enemies strike first … for centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer 
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an 
imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often condoned the legitimacy 
of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often visible in the mobilization of 
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to 
the capabilities of today’s adversaries … The United `States has long maintained the option of pre-
emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the 
greater is the risk of inaction- and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
pre-emptively.”         
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Iraq’s relinquishment programme had a broader and more complex remit 
than South Africa’s, and included the relinquishment under Safeguards of 
its chemical and biological weapons programmes as well. The nuclear 
relinquishment in Iraq therefore needed to be disaggregated from its 
chemical and biological weapons programmes in order to render clarity to 
the comparative nuclear weapons study of South Africa and Iraq. 
 
The literature analysis was purposefully edited to remove an analysis of 
the relinquishment of chemical and biological weapons from this 
comparison. This means that the logic that underpinned the 
relinquishment of nuclear weapons in Iraq was simplified, but that the case 
was even more complicated than that presented here. The comparison 
itself between South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment programmes 
was structured according to a simple sociology of law framework that 
allowed for comparison of four important variables that underpinned the 
nuclear relinquishment in both countries. These variables included 
substance, comity, relationships and time, and they are discussed in 
separate sub-sections of this chapter. 
 
The comparative analysis of South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear 
relinquishment processes that follows reveals that South Africa’s nuclear 
relinquishment process was inspired by a greater vision of implementing a 
social contract in the form of a non-racial democratic Constitution. A 
voluntary and shared vision of a desired constitutional future gripped the 
country at the time of the accession process. The deeper underlying 
constitutional reasons as to why South Africa relinquished its nuclear 
arsenal set the standards for how this process of relinquishment and 
accession would be conducted. Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process was 
complicated by the fact that it was conducted under international 
compulsion and was not inspired by a greater constitutional vision. It was 
not conducted voluntarily, as was the case in South Africa. The 
relinquishment process itself in Iraq was regarded by Saddam Hussein’s 
military regime as a national humiliation, a forfeiture of sovereignty, and a 
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display of weakness.659 The underlying antagonistic presumptions as to 
why Iraq relinquished its nuclear arsenal provide insight into why it was 
fraught with such difficulty. 
 
Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process is introduced through the writings of 
two expert participants in Iraq’s weapons inspectorate, namely; Dr Hans 
Blix, who led it, and Scott Ritter, who was personally involved as an 
inspector and therefore had close involvement in the matter. Iraq, in 
contrast to South Africa, submitted a substantively flawed Initial Report/ 
Opening Inventory to the Inspectorate. It was indeed so flawed that it 
could not be recommended for approval for Comprehensive Safeguards. 
Iraq’s nuclear audit therefore failed to be ratified by the United Nations. 
The failure to submit the Initial Report was interpreted by the international 
inspectorate as indicating uncertainty about whether or not Iraq was 
proliferating nuclear weapons. With this flawed information at its disposal, 
the inspectorate could neither claim with certainty that Iraq was 
proliferating nuclear weapons nor disaffirm this. 
 
The Karama Barracks incident revealed a serious disregard for creating 
comity and trusting relationships with the international inspectorate on 
Iraq’s part. The international UNSCOM inspectorate was duped on the 
authority of the state, which led them astray, into inspecting the Karama 
Barracks, which was actually a sewage reticulation plant located in 
Baghdad. This signified an absence of ceremonial appropriateness and a 
flagrant abuse of comity. The head of state should have co-operated and 
provided active assistance and direction to the international inspectorate. 
This misdirection was additionally intended to humiliate the inspectorate 
and was also indicative of personal relationships conducted with contempt. 
My personal interpretation of the Karama Barrack incident is that this type 
of incident can irreparably destroy trust and the prognosis for future 
healthy relationships. The humiliation of the inspectors might have created 
residual antagonisms and could even have led to unsympathetic 
                                                
659 Ritter, Scott. 1991. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and For All. Rockefeller 
Center, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
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judgement on the Safeguards. In short, it created a hostile ethos between 
the Iraqi state and the inspectorate. It was a childish gesture that could 
have galvanised the political power of those militarists who wished for war 
and were hostile to the idea that the inspectors might produce a report 
which showed that Iraq was compliant with the Safeguards. Another 
example of Iraq’s poor relationships with the inspectorate is that of an 
orchestrated event, when members of the Iraqi public heaped verbal 
abuse on the United Nations inspectors while they were visiting a mosque 
in their private capacity as tourists. 
 
A comparative analysis of the impact of United Nations General Assembly 
and Security Council Resolutions on the inspection regimen in Iraq and 
South Africa is then conducted. This covers a period of about a decade. 
The reader is provided with a chronology of United Nations resolutions 
involving condemnation of Iraq’s various and cumulative breaches of 
international law during the course of the inspection of weapons of mass 
destruction. This chronology of resolutions is annotated in terms of 
breaches and violations of substance, comity, relationship and time, and 
subjected to light phenomenological reduction where and when 
appropriate. It is triangulated with the previous research contained in this 
thesis.  
 
The data that emerged from the assessment of the chronology of 
breached United Nation’s resolutions are presented in summarised and 
comparative columnar format for easy understanding and straightforward 
comparative analysis of South Africa and Iraq’s relinquishment process. 
The method of phenomenological reduction was applied to compress the 
data into these themes. The reader is then presented with the general 
findings arising from the comparison of how South Africa and Iraq set 
about relinquishing their nuclear arsenals. The research found that the 
‘how’ question could not be disaggregated from ‘why’ the nuclear arsenals 
were relinquished in both countries, and for this reason, the general 
findings are introduced with a brief comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s 
respective responses to the ‘why’ question. It is shown that the reason that 
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these weapons were relinquished was based on fundamentally different 
suppositions in both countries. Iraq did not want to relinquish its nuclear 
arsenal, because it foresaw that this would undermine its national security 
and sovereignty. Iraq’s relinquishment process was not voluntary and was 
conducted begrudgingly under international compulsion. South Africa 
pursued its relinquishment process voluntarily because it was perceived 
by Mr de Klerk that this process would enhance national and international 
security. After briefly introducing the underlying logic pertaining to these 
divergent views on why the nuclear arsenals were relinquished, the 
general comparative findings of how the nuclear arsenals were 
relinquished in South Africa and Iraq are presented. 
 
Thereafter I offer a brief reflection on the legality of the use of force 
against Iraq in terms of anticipatory self-defence. The comparative 
analysis lends itself to an explanation as to why this invasion was 
conducted in spite of its illegality. I contend that this invasion was 
conducted because Iraq’s cumulative breaches of international law 
occurred over a long period of time, and were combined with its failure to 
comply with the Safeguards. They were all-too-frequently accompanied by 
an illegal disregard for substance, process, relationships and time with 
respect to its interaction with the international inspectorate. This tardiness 
eventually led to such frustration from the United States and United 
Kingdom concerning Iraq’s questionable motives with respect to its 
suspected possession of weapons of mass destruction that the country 
was invaded. Finally, I once again revert to a reflection on the 
transferability of the knowledge that was created from the nuclear 
relinquishments conducted in both these countries, seen through the lens 
of the deeper analysis and understanding that was created in this 
exposition.  
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7.2 South Africa’s Failed Attempt in Iraq at Transfer of 
Knowledge relating to Nuclear Relinquishment 
The legal challenge that confronted the South African delegation which 
visited Iraq just two weeks prior to the allied invasion in March 2003 was to 
assist Saddam Hussein’s regime to comply with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1441.660 The challenge of creating a meaningful 
knowledge transfer from this comparative analysis of South Africa and 
Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment processes is formidable. South Africa 
attempted to assist Iraq in relinquishing its nuclear arsenal in 2003 about 
two weeks prior to the allied invasion of that country. A small contingent of 
South African experts on weapons of mass destruction visited Iraq at the 
behest of President Thabo Mbeki, and with the consent of the Iraqi 
government, just prior to the outbreak of the Second Iraq War in 2003. 
This group possessed expert knowledge on atomic, biological and 
chemical warfare. They attempted to offer the Iraqis advice on how they 
should best proceed with relinquishing their weapons of mass destruction 
to the satisfaction of the weapons inspectorate of the IAEA, UNSCOM and 
UNMOVIC, on the basis of South Africa’s successful experience in this 
regard. The South Africans were unsuccessful in their mission.661 This 
failure to transfer the knowledge of the relinquishment of nuclear weapons 
and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
is conceded up-front, because it represents an important limitation on the 
research. It cautions the reader that the transference of this regulatory 
knowledge is a serious and difficult challenge.  
 
                                                
660 According to Mary Ellen O’Connell op cit: “... [t]he resolution places a set of difficult although 
not impossible demands on Iraq with regard to weapons of mass destruction: Saddam Hussein 
must allow unimpeded access by UN and International Atomic Energy Agency Inspectors. (Para 
5) He must declared within thirty days of the resolution all details of any Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), delivery systems, and/or WMD programs. (Para 3) The inspectors will have 
UN Security guards, facilities and broad authorities to support their work. (Para 7) The inspectors 
will report obstruction of their efforts to the Security Council. (Paras 4 and 11.) The Council will 
convene immediately upon such a report. (Para12.) The resolution calls for serious consequences 
in the event of continuing Iraqi non-compliance. (Para 13) Weapons inspectors will make an 
interim report within 60 days of the resolution. 7 January 2003. (Para 5)”       
661 Interview with Professor Waldo Stumpf at the University of Pretoria, Minerals Science 
Building, Pretoria on 18 October 2007. 
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The attempted knowledge transfer which was conducted in the hurly-burly 
of the events that galvanised into war was unsuccessful. This practical 
failure is a sobering criticism of the intention of this chapter. Professor 
Waldo Stumpf participated in the South African delegation that visited Iraq 
and tried to assist them to abide by the Safeguards in 2003, two weeks 
before the war began. He is sceptical about the prognosis for knowledge 
from these events being successfully transferred from South Africa to 
other threshold states that might wish to relinquish their nuclear arsenals 
and to accede to the NPT. He submitted that a delimitation on his 
assessment of the prognosis for a successful transfer of this knowledge 
might be that he is a specialist in neither politics nor international relations. 
He contended that South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment circumstances 
were singularly unique, and therefore arguably of questionable general 
applicability to other countries. His overriding criticism of the notion of 
knowledge transfer was that South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process 
involved two processes that were conducted simultaneously. The first was 
the nuclear relinquishment and accession process, and the second was 
the constitutional settlement. Both of these were deeply interrelated and 
interdependent. 
 
Professor Stumpf contended that South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment 
process might possibly prove to be of relevance to North Korea and South 
Korea should they enter into constitutional negotiations to reunify. A 
constitutional reunification of these two countries would probably require 
North Korea to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT as a 
fundamental condition for negotiations to proceed. This would require 
these countries to embark, like South Africa, upon a simultaneous process 
of constitutional negotiations and nuclear relinquishment if they were to be 
conducted in good faith and succeed. Stumpf did not raise the subject of 
the potential transferability of this nuclear knowledge to Iran. This was 
because Iran’s controversial nuclear stance had not manifested at the time 
of the interview. It is my view that Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process 
might prove to be relevant to Iran, because both countries share a similar 
outlook to nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. They both 
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seem to regard nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT in an 
involuntary and begrudging light and show antagonism to submitting to the 
Safeguards. 
 
Professor Stumpf argued that South Africa’s case of nuclear 
relinquishment and accession does not provide a relevant case for Israel. I 
respectfully differ with this view, because I think that a constitutional 
settlement between Israel and Palestine would not be able to proceed 
without Israel relinquishing its nuclear weapons capability and acceding to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that sense, it 
bears some resemblance to the case of South Korea and North Korea 
under a reunification scenario. It also bears a degree of resemblance to 
South Africa’s case, which was conducted in the context of deep mistrust 
of the ANC. Finally, Professor Stumpf contended that the cases of India 
and Pakistan’s nuclear status bear little resemblance to the case of South 
Africa. 
 
Stumpf commented that while Iraq’s nuclear weapons were in an 
advanced weaponisation phase both prior to and during the Gulf War of 
1991, Iraq was simply too exhausted and financially ruined by the Gulf 
War to proceed with their nuclear weapons programme. They had already 
been defeated in 1991, and the British and American invasion of 2003 
consolidated the extent of their 1991 defeat with the imposition of 
comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. Professor Stumpf contended 
that Iraq’s battle fatigue would have been so pervasive and intense that 
the military establishment would simply not have had the wherewithal to 
pursue a nuclear weapons programme that required such intense focus, 
energy and co-ordination. He submitted this suggestion to President 
Thabo Mbeki at the Union Buildings in Pretoria before the group visited 
Baghdad in 2003. He recalled that: 
 
“Hans Blix is retired now. But the UN did use him before the Second Iraq War. He made 
himself very unpopular with the Americans by saying that the Iraqis had nothing. We had 
all expected this. In the First Iraq War (the Gulf War), yes, you could have expected 
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nuclear weapons, but not in the Second. They were too depleted from the First Iraq War. 
I want to relate quite an interesting story to you. About two weeks before the Second Iraq 
War invasion, I was asked to go to the Union Buildings and have a meeting with Mr 
Mbeki. Aziz Pahad was there. They said that they wanted to send a team to Iraq to tell 
the Iraqis that the Americans are serious, and that they are going to invade Iraq. They 
wanted to convince the Iraqis to play open cards with the Americans. Mr Mbeki asked us 
and the guys from ARMSCOR if the Iraqis had any nuclear weapons. I said to Mr Mbeki 
that it was highly unlikely that the Iraqis were able to make anything after the First War. 
‘They have expended themselves’, I said. ‘I think that we must accept what the IAEA and 
UNMOVIC have said. There is nothing now as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.’ 
Mr Mbeki accepted that. Then he put together a small team including nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons guys and we went across to Iraq to try to convince the Iraqis that 
they should disclose everything. What I am saying is that it would just have been 
impossible for Iraq to have done anything after their First War (the Gulf War). You need 
big facilities. It is not like chemical weapons, where you can do something in a small 
laboratory. You need big facilities to make nuclear weapons. You mentioned in your 
introductory commentary that you were interested in understanding the transferability of 
this nuclear relinquishment process to other countries. The South African nuclear 
weapons situation was in my view unique. Each situation is unique. Our scenario, as you 
know, involved a contiguous political handover together with a nuclear rollback. I am not 
so certain whether one could apply this knowledge and experience directly to any other 
countries. It might be applied in a very limited manner, partially and indirectly, to nuclear 
rollback in other countries.  
 
I need to make it clear that I am not a specialist in politics and international relations. The 
nuclear situations that exist around the world are varied and very different. South Africa 
represents a very different situation from that of Israel. There are differences between 
India, Pakistan and South Africa. The situation in North Korea might possibly offer some 
similarities to the South Africa case. 
 
Perhaps if a new government were to assume power in North Korea at some time in the 
future, then the South African nuclear weapons relinquishment process might be 
applicable in some respects. The North Korean scenario might possibly involve some 
type of contiguous handover of political power and relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal. 
If this situation sketched about North Korea were to materialise, it is possible. I think that 
part of the rollback process might be partially informed by aspects of the South African 
experience. The South African experience of nuclear rollback and constitutional 
settlement was unique.”662 
 
                                                
662 Loc cit. 
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Phenomenological Reduction 
Professor Waldo Stumpf’s deep involvement in project managing the 
world’s first voluntary nuclear relinquishment and accession process lends 
credibility to his deduction that Iraq had no nuclear weapons prior to the 
allied invasion of Iraq in 2003. It should be acknowledged that this 
diagnosis converged with and validated the IAEA’s, UNSCOM’s and 
UNMOVIC’s Safeguards audit, which concluded that it had not been 
positively confirmed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons at the time of 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The subsequent war and defeat of Iraq 
proved that this assessment was correct. Why, then, did the nuclear 
weapons experts (who are scientists) in the United States and the United 
Kingdom not collaborate upon the conclusions of the international 
inspectorate who deduced that Iraq was free of nuclear weapons? This 
cross-country comparison of South Africa and Iraq is intended to assist in 
providing some clarity on the matter. There was clearly a failure of 
knowledge transfer between the international inspectorate and the United 
States and United Kingdom nuclear inspectors. This failure might have 
been of some purpose if the United States and United Kingdom had been 
hell-bent on invading Iraq, regardless of whether it had possession of 
weapons of mass destruction or not. Equally, if the United States and 
United Kingdom had already made up their minds to invade Iraq, they 
would have wished that South Africa’s good faith effort in sharing its 
nuclear relinquishment experience would fail.  
 
Stumpf offered a caution about assuming naïve presumptions on the 
transferability of knowledge from these cases. This caution is based on his 
own personal life experience, which showed just how difficult this 
knowledge transfer might prove to be. The South African mission entered 
Iraq with good intentions, but they were far too late to be effective. By this 
time, the negative pattern of obstructive behaviour exhibited by the Iraqis 
towards the inspectorate had already long been entrenched. The situation 
in Iraq had already entered a point of irreversibility. The invasion had 
gathered momentum and could not be stopped.  
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One could submit that the South African experience of relinquishment and 
accession might possibly have been assimilated by the Iraqis, had it been 
presented to them years earlier. But would they have been ready for the 
message? Dr Hans Blix corroborated Professor Stumpf’s recollection of 
the South African information-exchange visit, and reflected: 
 
“While we were in Baghdad, we met one delegation from the Government of South Africa. 
It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its 
dismantling of the nuclear weapons programme, by a wholehearted co-operation over 
two years with the IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by 
South Africa to send in a group of experts for further talks.”663 
 
In another commentary about the South African mission, Dr Blix 
recollected: 
 
“We also met with a group of officials sent by the South African government to talk to the 
Iraqis about the successful experience they had had of carrying out internationally verified 
nuclear disarmament. This was friendly advice, but it did not seem to change anything in 
the Iraqi attitudes.” 664 
 
Dr Blix, like Professor Stumpf, confirmed that the South African mission to 
Iraq was a failure. The challenge created by Professor Stumpf’s critique is 
to contribute to mitigating the failure of knowledge transfer in the future. It 
is intended that a deep comparative analysis using a clear sociology of law 
framework will help in this regard. 
 
7.3 The Disaggregation of Iraq’s Nuclear Relinquishment 
Process from the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Programme 
The research attempted to use meticulous analysis to disaggregate Iraq’s 
nuclear weapons programme syntactically from its chemical and biological 
                                                
663 Blix, Hans. 2003b. As delivered: ‘Briefing of the Security Council’. Executive Chairman, 
UNMOVIC. New York. 14 February. 
 
664 Blix, Hans. 2004. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. London: 
Bloomsbury. 164–165.  
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weapons programme, although it was, of course, intrinsically integrated.665 
666 In South Africa, the nuclear weapons programme was clearly discrete 
from the chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction 
programmes. It fell under the mandate of the Atomic Energy Agency 
(AEC), and there was little or no interference in its jurisdiction by other 
government ministries. I saw no evidence of the existence of a similar 
agency in Iraq to which the task of nuclear relinquishment was delegated. 
Indeed there was a plethora of ministries and agencies, none of which 
appeared to have coherent authority.667 Iraq also had neither a dedicated 
oversight auditor to perform the relinquishment task as was performed by 
Professor Wynand Mouton, nor a dedicated project manager to run the 
project, as was done by Professor Waldo Stumpf. Needless to say, 
Saddam Hussein showed no signs of emulating Mr FW de Klerk’s 
‘authorising document’ to guarantee ministerial support for the 
relinquishment process under Iraqi municipal law. The scope of the 
research in this chapter was thus de-limited to a specific focus on nuclear 
weapons. The research did not consider biological and chemical weapons, 
the inclusion of which would have obviated the relevance of the 
comparison between South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment 
processes. 
 
The terms of reference for disarming Iraq were hence much broader than 
was the remit for South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and accession 
process. In Iraq, they extended to all weapons of mass destruction – 
atomic, biological and chemical. The remit was therefore more complex in 
Iraq than it was in South Africa. It will be agreed that Iraq regularly, 
systematically and flagrantly flouted both international law and 
international humanitarian law, while South Africa did not. Iraq did not 
seem to pay too much heed to United Nations resolutions that condemned 
its conduct with respect to nuclear weapons. In so doing, Iraq ensured that 
                                                
665 Keegan, John. 2004. The Iraq War. London: Hutchinson. 
666 Burgess, Stephen & Purkitt, Helen. 2001. ‘The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Program’. USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Air War College, Air 
University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. April. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.au.af/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 
667 Op cit Ritter (1991). 
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its nuclear relinquishment process was further complicated than it in fact 
needed to be.  
 
In South Africa there was a single inspection regimen that was applied to 
nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons were not the 
responsibility of the inspectorate. They were a separate entity and did not 
fall under the mandate of the IAEA.  In Iraq, on the other hand, there was 
a combination of three simultaneous inspection regimens for nuclear 
weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. The production 
processes associated with manufacturing nuclear weapons are very 
different from those processes required to make chemical and biological 
weapons. The entire inspection process in Iraq was therefore, by its 
nature, considerably more complicated than it was in South Africa. All 
three weapons of mass destruction (WMD) manufacturing processes 
(nuclear, biological and chemical) are scientifically discrete. This means 
that the inspections were also conducted on varying, and markedly 
different, weapons processes in the case of Iraq, from those pertaining to 
South Africa. 
 
The manufacture and storage of nuclear weapons requires substantial 
capital investment and large and stable industrial facilities. Chemical and 
biological weapons, on the other hand, have very different manufacturing 
processes, which require considerably less capital investment, and can be 
conducted in small facilities, such as a private home. Lethal chemical and 
biological weapons can quite easily be stored in a domestic refrigerator. 
Storage of this type would be inconceivable in the case of nuclear 
weapons. Concealment of clandestine chemical and biological weapons is 
therefore much easier than it is for nuclear weapons. The search for 
nuclear weapons leads the inspectorate to different prospective sites from 
the search for chemical and biological weapons. Concealed chemical and 
biological weapons can almost literally be hidden like ‘a needle in a 
haystack’.  
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Iraq had to deal with multiple inspection stakeholders, including 
UNMOVIC668, IAEA, UNSCOM669, and also the active intervention of inter 
alia the United States and the United Kingdom’s intelligence agencies. 
This meant that Iraq’s relinquishment process had multiple inspection 
authorities, while South Africa’s relinquishment and accession process 
had to address the single regulatory authority of only the IAEA and its 
Extra Team, and logically, by extension, the Department of Energy (DOE). 
 
7.4 Towards Developing a Sociology of Law Framework for 
Comparing the Nuclear Relinquishment Processes in South 
Africa and Iraq 
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötze offered an excellent treatise on 
comparative international law, and I drew inspiration from their study670 in 
the task of conducting the comparison of how South Africa and Iraq 
relinquished their nuclear armaments in terms of international law. 
Zweigert and Kötze contended that one of the big challenges in 
comparative law is to construct a relevant sociology of law framework, and 
they concede that this is a difficult undertaking. The two countries’ 
respective relinquishment processes are compared by creating a simple 
sociology of law framework to synthesise the facts at hand. Zweigert and 
Kötze pointed out that comparative law and the sociology of law have 
much in common: 
 
“Sociology of law aims to discover the causal relationships between law and society. It 
seeks to discover patterns from which one can infer whether and under what 
circumstances law affects human behaviour and conversely how law is affected by social 
change, whether of a political, economic, psychological, or demographic nature. This is 
an area where it is very difficult to construct theories, but if one can support one’s theory 
                                                
668 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is an 
integrative body for UNSCOM and the IAEA and presided over the relinquishment of the WMD 
in Iraq.  
669 The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) is responsible only for chemical and 
biological weapons and long-range missiles.  
670 Zweigert, K & Kötze, H. 1997. An Introduction to Comparative Law (translated from the 
German by Tony Weir, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge). Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University/Clarendon Press.  
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with comparative data from other nations and cultures, it will become much more 
persuasive.”671  
 
Zweigert and Kötze’s reflections upon the pursuit of a framework for 
comparative legal analysis is a useful starting point for comparing South 
Africa and Iraq’s relinquishment processes.  The relationship between law 
and society is not only highly complex it is also often tendentious. Both 
societies were far too complex to impute neat causal relationships 
between law and society. It is therefore my view that the relationship 
between law and society is often better understood as an art rather than 
as a science, although scientific frameworks are very helpful. The law as it 
was encoded in the NPT most certainly effected social change in both 
countries in profound and different ways. In South Africa the outcome of 
the interrelationship between the NPT and social change was peace, while 
in Iraq, the outcome was war. I propose that the comparative sociology of 
law framework for analysing the nuclear relinquishment process in terms 
of international law should be simple and easily understandable.  
 
Firstly, the relinquishment processes in both South Africa and Iraq took 
place at a substantive level of international law, where there had to be 
exact submissions to Safeguards. The nuclear programmes in South 
Africa and Iraq were indigenous and for this reason Safeguards in these 
countries would have different nuances. The substantive elements of the 
respective relinquishment processes are comparable. Dr Blix asserted that 
“[t]he war in Iraq was triggered and indeed legitimated by Iraq’s failure to 
comply with the Safeguards Agreement of 1991”.672 
 
It is important to note that one of the factors that triggered the war in Iraq 
was its substantive failure in 1991 to safeguard as required by the IAEA. 
For Dr Blix: 
 
                                                
671 Op cit Zweigert & Kotze at 11. 
672 Blix, Hans. 2003a. ‘An Update on Inspection Presented to the United Nations Security 
Council’. New York. 27 January.  
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“The substantive co-operation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to 
declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and 
activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that 
nothing proscribed remains. Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441 (2002) states that this co-
operation shall be ‘active’. It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of 
‘catch as catch can’. Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of 
creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead 
to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items 
to destroy or credible evidence of the absence of such items.”673 
 
Dr Blix offered a good, practical definition of substance.   
 
Secondly, comity relates to matters such as state considerateness and 
helpfulness; the effectiveness of the ceremony of meetings; respect for 
United Nations Resolutions; facilitating access to inspection sites; 
provision of guides; and the civility that is displayed towards the 
inspectorate and the inspected. Meetings need to be conducted in a spirit 
of comity with appropriate protocol, due process and civility. The 
ceremony of meetings should be congruent with their substantive purpose. 
Comity also denotes helpfulness in expediting legal processes and 
procedures. It implies a seriousness of intention and not playing games 
with nuclear inspectors. An overly pedantic, bureaucratically obstructive 
and nitpicking approach would be indicative of poor comity. Comity can 
therefore be broadly understood as comprising the ‘process element’ of 
the relinquishment interaction. Dr Hans Blix designated co-operation on 
process or comity as having: 
 
“... regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical arrangements to 
pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built into the 
premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must 
nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the very beginning in running the 
operation of an inspection”.674 
 
This is a good, practical definition of the process of comity, in the context 
of nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. 
                                                
673 Loc cit.  
674 Ibid.  
 404 
 
Thirdly, the relinquishment of the nuclear weapons took place at a 
relationship level. How did the quality of the human relationships that 
accompanied the relinquishment of the nuclear weapons in South Africa 
compare with those manifested in the same process in Iraq? Were the 
relationships respectful and considerate, or were they destructive? In the 
following discussion, Dr Blix offered what he regarded as the relationship 
criteria that are appropriate, and should be assumed by inspectors. Dr Blix 
commented thus: 
 
“On another matter, I felt and continue to feel that I had the wiser view. Inspectors, I 
believe, should avoid humiliating the inspected. I think a Rambo-style attitude on the part 
of inspectors antagonises more than it intimidates. Inspection is not the pursuit of war by 
other means. Inspectors are not occupiers and should neither shoot nor shout their way 
in. Many inspectors have told me that Iraqi scientists and technicians provided more 
information in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war when they were talked to calmly than when 
they were bullied. This is not to suggest that in a brutal police state either method will 
stand much chance of eliciting information, when the revelation might mean torture and 
death to the witness.675 … 
 
I tried to describe with some adjectives the way I thought inspectors should conduct 
themselves: Driving and dynamic – but not angry and aggressive; Firm – but correct; 
Ingenious – but not deceptive; Somewhat flexible – but not pushed around; Calm – but 
somewhat impatient; Keeping some distance – but not arrogant and pompous; Friendly – 
but not cosy; Respectful of those you deal with – and also demanding of respect 
yourself.”676 
 
The above criteria offered by Dr Blix are excellent ingredients for both 
comity and ensuring healthy relationships. Fourthly, the relinquishment in 
both countries took place according to stringent deadlines; it was a 
temporal and deadline-driven process. The comparison between South 
Africa and Iraq concerns the extent to which these deadlines were 
adhered. Was there punctuality, or was there dilatoriness? How did the 
temporal aspects of South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment compare with 
that of Iraq, and what lessons, if any, can be extracted from this 
                                                
675 Ibid. 
676 Ibid. Also discussed by Blix (2004) in Disarming Iraq at 52.  
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comparison? It has already been shown that Mr de Klerk created an 
Announcement Plan and insisted that the relinquishment process should 
be carefully synchronised. Synchronisation includes both project 
managing a process and timing in harmony. These four dimensions of 
comparative change have been inserted into a Venn diagram in order to 
clarify the comparative variables of analysis.  
 
Figure 7.1: Relinquishment of Atomic Weapons at the Levels of Legal 
Substance, Comity, Relationships and Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright ©  2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College: Adapted by Heald 2008. [I  
added the fourth circle, designated as ‘Time’  and changed the term ‘Process’  to ‘Comity’ ,  
because I held the view that the latter was more apposite.] 
 
7.4.1 Iraq’s Initial Report for Safeguards Consists of 12 000 Pages 
of Unrefined Information – A Substantial Problem  
Although Iraq acted in breach of international law most frequently and 
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factual basis in this chronology to justify the allied invasion from the 
perspective of international law. Iraq’s obstructive and unco-operative 
conduct must have been deeply frustrating for the international 
inspectorate, but in my view did not provide a legal basis for authorising 
the war. Dr Hans Blix mentioned that Iraq’s Initial Report and data 
submission to the inspectorate were fundamentally and substantively 
flawed, rendering them un-creditworthy: 
 
“On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12 000 pages in response to 
paragraph 3 of Resolution 1441 (2002) and within the time stipulated by the Security 
Council. One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq might have tried 
to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open 
disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM 
document S/1999/94 of January 1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 
(S/1999/356). These are questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent 
commentators have often cited.”677 
 
Iraq submitted 12 000 pages of unfiltered and unrefined information to the 
inspectorate. This was a problem of substance. It meant that the 
inspectorate could not endorse the Safeguards in Iraq with authority and 
contend – beyond reasonable doubt – that they were correct. The result of 
this lack of clarity on the Safeguards was that the country was framed 
internationally with a degenerate pariah recognition status. This 
presentation of 12 000 pages of unrefined information can be contrasted 
with the conciseness, accuracy, and deadline-driven submission of the 
Initial Report/Opening Inventory submitted by the South African 
relinquishment team. 
 
The reader will recall the pride that Professor Stumpf revealed in his 
Safeguards Manager, Dr Nick van Wiellig’s, submission of a perfectly 
reconciled and audited Initial Report in record time. The Iraqis did not 
refine the information; they dumped documentation on the inspectorate. 
The substance of the Iraqi case was therefore poorly presented. Iraq’s 
unco-operative approach towards the inspection regimen created a haze 
                                                
677 Op cit Blix (2003a). 
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of inaccurate speculation about their proliferation inclinations. Amidst this 
confusion was an ominous ambiguity on their WMD status, which could, 
and ultimately did, trigger anticipatory self-defence. 
 
7.4.2 Iraq Dupes UNSCOM into Inspecting the Karama Barracks, a 
Sewage Reticulation Plant, Masquerading as a Nuclear 
Weapons Site – Abuse of Relationships and Absence of 
Comity 
On one occasion, while in Baghdad, UNSCOM received incorrect 
intelligence reports from Iraq that the Karama Barracks might have been a 
site generating weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi minders (who were 
representatives of the state) failed to take UNSCOM into their confidence 
and inform them that they were hopelessly and embarrassingly on the 
wrong track in their assessment, and that the Karama Barracks was 
actually a sewage reticulation site. The Iraqi minders allowed the 
UNSCOM inspectors to be publicly humiliated by inspecting the raw 
sewage facility. The Iraqi minders appeared to enjoy the ridicule of the 
UNSCOM inspectors. 
 
Scott Ritter recalled: 
 
“We made our way back to our parked Nissan Patrol, enduring the smiles and laughter of 
our Iraqi minders, who were clearly having a good time at our expense.”678  
 
It is noted that the conduct of a person or group of persons will be 
regarded as an act of state under international law if the individual or 
group acts under the instructions of that State. I interpreted Saddam 
Hussein’s acquiescence, whether passive or active, to the humiliation of 
the inspectorate at the Karama Barracks as an act of state. Saddam 
Hussein was the president and head of the Iraqi state and therefore had a 
special representative relationship with the United Nations and its various 
weapons inspectorates. 
                                                
678 Ritter, Scott. 2005. Iraq Confidential – The Untold Story of America’s Intelligence Conspiracy. 
London: I.B. Taurus. 29. 
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John Dugard contends that: 
 
“As a general principle the conduct of private persons is not attributable to a state under 
international law, but where there is a special relationship between the persons and the 
state their conduct is attributed to the state.”679 
 
Saddam Hussein was not acting as a private person when he authorised 
the inspectors to audit the Karama Barracks. He did this cognisant of his 
special authority that arose from statehood. It can therefore be argued that 
the solicitation of the visit to the Karama Barracks by the Iraqi minders was 
intended to cause embarrassment and indignity, and damage 
relationships. This incident was inappropriate and undignified. It was 
indicative of a singular lack of comity and disregard for the dignity of 
relationships. This created mistrust and damaged relationships, because 
of the escalatory urge to retaliate.680 John Dugard offered a further 
authority for contending that this visit constituted an act of state: 
 
“According to art 9, the conduct of a group of persons may be attributable to a state if the 
group was in fact exercising elements of governmental authority in default of the official 
authorities. This principle is illustrated by Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran, in which the 
acts of the Revolutionary Guards as immigration officials in Teheran airport were held to 
be attributable to Iran on the basis that the Guards, although not actually authorised by 
the new government, at least exercised elements of governmental authority in the 
absence of official authorities, in operation of which the new Government must have had 
knowledge and to which it did not specifically object.”681 
 
I therefore deduce that the Iraqi minders could be held attributable to Iraq 
on the basis that they, too, also exercised official elements of 
governmental authority to which they did not specifically object. Again 
John Dugard’s reflection provides further authority to the assertion that this 
humiliation on the UNSCOM inspectorate by the Iraqis was indeed an act 
of state. 
                                                
679 Dugard, John. 2007. International Law: A South African Perspective (with contributions by 
Bethlehem, Daniel, du Plessis, Max & Katz, Anton). Third Edition. Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd. 
274–275. 
680 Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran (1987) 17 Iran-USCTR 92; 82 ILR 178. 
681 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 275. 
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7.4.3  Verbal Abuse by Iraqi Public to UN Inspectors – The Mosque 
Incident  
The example presented in this specific discussion is in my view equivocal. 
Dr Blix offered an interesting criticism of the case of an abusive public 
outburst to a tourist visit to a mosque by five weapons inspectors. He 
asserted that the demonstration was orchestrated by the Iraqi authorities, 
and attested: 
 
“I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and harassment. For instance, for 
some time far-fetched allegations have been made publicly that questions posed by the 
inspectors were of an intelligence character. While I might not defend every question that 
inspectors might have asked, Iraq knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and 
Iraq should say so. On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in front 
of our offices and inspection sites. The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five 
inspectors to a mosque was followed by an unwarranted public outburst. The inspectors 
went in without any UN insignia and were welcomed in the kind manner that is 
characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were 
taken around. They asked perfectly innocent questions and parted with the invitation to 
come again. Shortly thereafter we received protests from the Iraqi authorities about an 
unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of mass 
destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely 
to occur without the initiative or encouragement from the authorities. We must ask 
ourselves what the motives may be for these events. They do not facilitate an already 
difficult job, in which we may try to be effective, professional and, at the same time, 
correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can take it up in a calmer 
and less unpleasant manner.”682 
 
John Dugard’s preceding analysis pertaining to the Karama Barracks 
incident can also be imputed to the Mosque incident. Dr Blix does not 
make it clear whether or not Iraq had appointed minders to guide the 
inspectors on this tourist excursion, so responsibility for this incident 
cannot be attributed to them, in the absence of the availability of these 
facts. But responsibility can be attributed to the rabble-rousers on the 
basis that they were exercising official elements of government authority to 
which the Iraqi government did not object.   
 
                                                
682 Blix, Hans. 2003c. ‘Briefing to the Security Council’. Guardian Unlimited, Friday 14 February. 
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A further interpretation of the Mosque incident comes to mind. While Dr 
Blix’s criticism is understandable, these Iraqi protests could equally be 
interpreted as a spontaneous venting of frustration against the perceived 
cultural insensitivity of the inspectors, whose presence was perhaps 
experienced by the Iraqi people as violating national pride, values and 
norms. Hence my assertion that this incident was equivocal. There are 
deep religious sensibilities in Iraq. The combination of religion combined 
with the humiliation of being ‘occupied’ by inspectors might have created a 
spontaneous xenophobic outburst against the inspectors. The inspectors 
were persons who were perhaps perceived as having an easy tourist life 
visiting the Iraqi people at their leisure in the context of appalling poverty, 
degenerate violence, exceptionally high levels of personal insecurity, 
sanctions, international ostracism, and pariah statehood. The aftermath of 
the nuclear inspection was not an innocent tourist benefit for the people of 
Iraq. This crowd might have become outraged because of the looming 
reality of sanctions, poverty, violence and a looming war, and the 
inspectors might have been the conductor for this anger. 
 
7.5  Adherence and Non-Adherence to UN General Assembly and 
Security Council Resolutions on the Inspection Regimen in 
Iraq 
The UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions that pertained 
to Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process will be analysed and assessed 
against South Africa’s case, which has already been presented. There is 
an important distinction that needs to be reiterated at the outset of this 
comparative analysis of the degree of adherence to United Nations 
resolutions, and that is that South Africa did not ever act in breach of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while Iraq frequently 
did. In addition, South Africa had always acted in compliance with the 
IAEA’s inspection and safeguards regimens. Iraq, in contrast to South 
Africa, acted in constant breach of the NPT, flouting many United Nations 
resolutions and international law. The starting point of this analysis is 
therefore to seek clarity on the legal status and authority of the United 
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Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, which 
should be kept in mind when conducting the comparative analysis. 
 
“Recommendations contained in United Nations Resolutions are not binding per se, but 
an accumulation of UN Resolutions and recommendations might contribute to the 
formation of a customary rule and collective practice …683  
 
A state may incur responsibility directly or indirectly. It incurs responsibility directly when, 
acting through its organs or agents, it violates its obligations towards another state under 
treaty or general international law. Indirect responsibility occurs when a state injures the 
person or property of a foreign national and in so doing is deemed to have injured the 
state of the nationality of the injured person itself.”684   
 
It is for this reason that I contend that Iraq incurred direct responsibility for 
the Mosque Incident under international law. The reader will notice that 
this pattern of incurring either direct or indirect responsibility is recurrent 
and occurs over many incidents that display a similar pattern, in this 
chronology of breached United Nations Security Council resolutions. Iraq 
might not initially have been bound in international law by the 
recommendations made through United Nations resolutions. But the 
accumulation of recommendations contained in these resolutions that 
were ignored did incline towards customary practice and the establishment 
of a binding collective set of norms. I assert therefore that with the 
passage of time, this cumulative flouting of the United Nations resolutions 
constituted a substantive breach of international law. 
 
UNSCOM provided a useful Chronology of Main Events in the inspection 
regimen in Iraq from 3 April 1991 until 17 December 1999. The events that 
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are cited provide a disturbing accumulation of UN resolutions that were 
habitually ignored by Iraq, and led directly to the decision by the United 
States and the United Kingdom to invade Iraq. This chronology provides a 
compendium for understanding the factual extent to which Iraq breached 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions 
pertaining to the relinquishment of weapons of mass destruction. South 
Africa’s comparative status with respect to its adherence and compliance 
with United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions is 
weighed against the Iraqi experience in each instance, with a retrospective 
commentary being offered. 
 
(1) “On 3 April 1991 Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) was breached. In section 
C, it was decided ‘that Iraq shall unconditionally accept under international 
supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass 
destruction, ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometres, and related 
production facilities and equipment’. It also provided for the establishment of a 
system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on 
these weapons and missiles. It required that Iraq make a declaration within 15 days 
of the location, amounts and types of all such items. On the 6 April 1991 Iraq 
accepted Resolution 687 (1991) (5/22456). 
 
 From 23 to 28 June 1991 UNSCOM/IAEA inspectors try to intercept Iraqi weapons 
carrying nuclear related equipment (calutrons). Iraqi personnel fire warning shots in 
the air to prevent the inspectors from approaching the vehicles. The equipment is 
later seized and destroyed under international supervision. On the 28 June 1991 a 
statement was issued by the President of the Security Council deploring Iraq’s 
denial of access to an inspection site and asking the Secretary General to send a 
high level mission to Iraq immediately. 15 August 1991 Security Council resolution 
707 (1991) demands that Iraq provide without further delay full, final and complete 
disclosure of its proscribed weapons and programmes, as required by Resolution 
687 (1991).”685 
 
Ad (1) Iraq’s conduct was illegal in terms of international law. It had 
breached a substantive Security Council obligation erga omnes to destroy 
weapons of mass destruction under international supervision and then 
reneged against its own agreement with violence. It is contended that the 
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soldiers who fired the shots did so with the direct authority of the state and 
the state therefore assumed direct authority for this incident. 
 
South Africa was not condemned with a single United Nations Security 
Council resolution to disclose further information without delay. The reader 
will recall that its Safeguards Manager, Dr Nick van Wiellig, provided the 
IAEA with an excellent Initial Report/Opening Inventory – in just six weeks. 
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) evidenced a substantive breach of 
the terms and conditions of Safeguards. The decision by Iraq to block the 
inspection and to shoot warning shots constituted a gross lapse in comity 
and violation of relationships. Iraq repudiated Security Council Resolution 
687 (1991) (5/22456), which it had previously accepted. There could 
consequently be little certainty about whether the state would contract in 
good faith or not. 
 
(2) “6 September 1991 The first UNSCOM inspection team is blocked by Iraq 
militia.”686 
 
Ad (2) In South Africa no inspection team was ever blocked or obstructed. 
They were aided and abetted in the pursuit of their duties. 
 
Iraq’s action was illegal in international law because it was obliged to 
assist the Safeguards inspection team in their duties in pursuit of 
international peace. Iraq’s conduct constituted a breach of comity, 
substance and relationships. 
 
(3) “21–30 September 1991 IAEA inspectors find large amounts of documentation 
relating to Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The Iraqi officials confiscate 
some documents from the inspectors. The inspectors refuse to yield a second set 
of documents. In response, Iraq refuses to allow the team to leave the site with the 
documents. A four-day stand-off during which the team remained in the parking lot 
of the site ensues. Iraq permits the team to leave with the documents following a 
statement by the President of the Security Council, threatening enforcement action 
by members of the Council.”687 
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Ad (3) Professor Wynand Mouton destroyed all residual documentation 
under the auspices of the IAEA and the Extra Team. In South Africa the 
inspectors were always treated with respect and given free and complete 
access to any site that they deemed proscribed. There was never any 
interference with any inspector. There was never a need for recourse to a 
threat on military escalation. Iraq’s actions again constitute an affront to 
substance, relationships and comity. 
 
(4) “11 October 1991 Security Council 715 (1991) approves the plans for on-going 
monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary General (S/22871/Rev.1) 
and the Director General of the IAEA (S/22872/Rev.1) The Commission’s plan also 
established that Iraq shall accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other 
personnel designated by the Special Commission. 
 
 October 1991 Iraq states that it considers the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification 
Plans, adopted by Resolution 715 (1991), to be unlawful and states that it is not 
ready to comply with resolution 715.”688 
 
Ad (4) South Africa was never instructed by a United Nations Security 
Council Resolution to disclose information on its nuclear weapons 
capabilities and designs, or other related issues. It did this voluntarily and 
not by coercion. South Africa also never contested the legality and 
authority of the IAEA or the United Nations Security Council on this matter. 
 
Iraq’s refusal to comply with Resolution 715 constituted an affront to 
comity and substance. The contention that the Ongoing Monitoring and 
Verification Plans that were adopted by Resolution 715 (1991) were 
unlawful is an unsubstantiated allegation, and Resolution 687 read 
together with Security Council Resolution S/23663, cited in paragraph (5) 
below, renders their conduct illegal. 
 
(5) “28 February 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council, upon receipt 
of the Special Commission’s Report, reaffirming that it is UNSCOM alone to 
determine which items are to be destroyed under Resolution 687, and condemning 
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Iraq’s failure to provide full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolution 
(S/23663)”.689 
 
Ad (5) The South Africans followed a contrasting approach to the Iraqis, 
who contested and disputed the legality of many United Nations Security 
Council resolutions. South Africa did not ever contest the legality or 
jurisdiction of the IAEA, the NPT or the Statute of the IAEA. 
 
Iraq’s failure to comply constituted a disregard of both substance and 
comity. 
 
(6) “12 March 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council noting a 
statement made in the Council by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq expressing the 
view that Iraq had not yet complied fully and unconditionally with its obligations 
under the relevant Security Council resolutions (S/23709).”690 
 
Ad (6) The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq indeed conceded in this incident 
that Iraq had acted illegally by not meetings its obligations to uphold the 
Security Council resolutions in terms of international law. This is the 
second instance of Iraq accepting its obligations to the United Nations 
Security Council in terms of international law, only to breach them later. 
This is the second breach of the UN Security Council resolution that is 
noted in the UNSCOM Chronology and constitutes a breach of 
international law. There was a formal and growing concern about the 
integrity of Iraq’s WMD inventory and the data that they presented for 
Safeguards audit. This was in contrast to the case of South Africa, where 
no such concern was expressed.This was manifested in a failure on the 
part of Iraq to comply with substance and time. 
 
(7) “9 April 1992 Iraq calls a halt on UNSCOM’s aerial surveillance flights, making 
reference to the possibility that the aircraft and its pilot would be endangered. 
 
 10 April 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s 
threats to the safety and security of UNSCOM’s surveillance flights over Iraq and 
reaffirming UNSCOM’s right to conduct such flights (S/23803). Subsequently, Iraq 
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affirms that it does not intend to carry out any military action aimed at UNSCOM’s 
aerial flights.”691 
 
Ad (7) This is the third recorded breach by Iraq of a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution, and of international law. These threats were 
at the behest of Iraqi soldiers under the responsibility of the Iraqi state. 
They could have been interpreted as an intentional, premeditated act of 
international aggression against the inspectorate. This matter of contesting 
aerial surveillance was echoed in South Africa, in the case of the US Spy 
Plane incident, discussed previously. Iraq transgressed on substance, 
comity and relationships. The threat to shoot down surveillance flights 
conducted by UNSCOM was provocative, as UNSCOM had United 
Nations Security Council authorisation to conduct the inspectorate. There 
was no equivalent transgression of international law exhibited by the 
South Africans that even vaguely compared with this incident. This is the 
reason that Iraq was increasingly recognised as a pariah state. 
 
(8) “6–29 July 1992 Iraq refuses an inspection team access to the Ministry of 
Agriculture. UNSCOM had reliable information that the site contained archives 
relating to proscribed activities.”692 
 
Ad (8) This is a repeated contravention of international law. Iraq was 
obliged to facilitate access to the inspectorate. In South Africa there was 
no such substantive restriction on access and ingress. This incident 
confirms a neglect of comity and substance. 
 
 (9) “24 November 1992 Statements made by the President of the Security Council 
concerning statements by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and regretting threats, 
allegations and attacks made by him regarding various United Nations operations 
in Iraq (S/24839).”693 
 
Ad (9) This is the second recorded instance of the Deputy Prime Minister 
of Iraq showing an acceptance of the applicability of international law to 
their case and regret at Iraq’s non-adherence. This is the fourth breach of 
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a United Nations Security Council Resolution. In addition, the Deputy 
President of Iraq was compelled to retract a statement which was 
damaging to relationships, and could have even been interpreted as an 
intended act of international aggression. Given the fact that these 
breaches are repetitive and cumulative the time aspect is now becoming 
significant, as ultimatums and deadlines start becoming increasingly 
conspicuous. It was evident that the inspectorate would eventually lose 
patience.  
 
This refers again to Iraq’s disregard of comity, substance, relationships 
and time. 
 
(10) “January 1993 Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into 
Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq starts incursions into the demilitarised zone between Iraq 
and Kuwait and increases military activities in the no-fly zones.”694 
 
Ad (10) Iraq’s refusal to allow UNSCOM flight rights in Iraq was a 
substantial rescinding of comity. This might be regarded as akin to the 
South African Defence Force resuming its military activities in a de-
militarised Angola and Namibia after the implementation of Resolution 
435. These actions were yet again in breach of international law, as they 
obstructed UNSCOM from performing its United Nations-authorised 
inspections. Underpinning this illegality was a severe disregard for comity. 
 
(11)  “8 January 1993 Statement by the President of the Security Council, noting that 
Iraq’s action in prohibiting the use of UNSCOM aircraft is an ‘unacceptable and 
material breach’ of Resolution 687 (1991) and warns Iraq of ‘serious 
consequences’ were it to continue (S/22081).695”  
 
Ad (11) This is the fifth breach of a UN Security Council Resolution by Iraq 
cited in the UNSCOM Chronology of Main Events. The President of the 
Security Council resorted to threatening ‘serious consequences’ for the 
cumulative breaches of international law by Iraq. This is indicative of 
growing impatience. The time element was significant here. At this stage 
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of the analysis, it should be evident that Iraq habitually breached 
international law. Iraq’s conduct was provocative and indicative of a 
serious escalatory conflict.696 This snowballing disregard for international 
law manifested in all the four selected dimensions of this comparison, and 
included a disregard for substance, comity, relationship and time. There 
was clear evidence of the application of inappropriate rules of engagement 
under international law.697  
 
(12) “July 1995 Iraq threatens to end all co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA if 
there is no progress towards the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo by 31 
August 1995.”698 
 
Ad (12) Iraq’s counter-ultimatum was once again escalatory and 
provocative. It might be interpreted as a ‘tit-for-tat’ ultimatum in response 
to the Security Council’s injunction communicated in paragraph (11). The 
agenda in this instance de-emphasised nuclear relinquishment and 
focused on the material quid pro quo of a deterrent trade-off, in exchange 
for nuclear relinquishment. Iraq’s failed deterrent strategy is therefore 
exposed. It is similar to South Africa’s inasmuch as it was also 
unsuccessful. Underlying Iraq’s acquisitiveness was incongruent comity, 
substance and timing, which were predicated on damaged interpersonal 
relationships. The interaction of these four elements made Iraq’s pursuit of 
a deterrent quid pro quo, a flight of fancy. 
 
(13) “8 August 1995 General Hussein Kamel, Minister of Industry and Minerals and 
former Director of Iraq’s Military Industrial Corporation, with responsibility for all of 
Iraq’s weapons programmes, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Hussein 
Kamal had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the 
prohibited weapons programmes. Iraq withdraws its ‘Third Biological Full, Final and 
Complete Disclosure’ and admits a far more extensive biological warfare 
programme than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits 
having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range 
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missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA 
with large amounts of documentation hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by 
Hussein Kamel, relating to prohibited weapons programmes, which subsequently 
leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent 
VX and Iraq’s development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq also informs UNSCOM that 
the deadline to halt co-operation is withdrawn.”699 
 
Ad (13) It is difficult to sort through the ‘fog’ of the matter. Were the Iraqi 
authorities attempting to scapegoat General Kamal for their self-inflicted 
breaches of Safeguards, or was he a criminal who had proliferated 
weapons of mass destruction, or was it something more opaque? The only 
equivalent event that the researcher could relate to the Hussein Kamal 
incident in 1976 was the discovery that Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, who 
was in charge of the Simonstown Naval Dockyard, was a Soviet spy. It 
has been alleged that it was Commodore Gerhardt who led the Soviet 
Union to the discovery of the nuclear test site that was situated at Vastrap 
in the Kalahari Desert. I am not sure whether similar allegations were 
directed at General Hussein Kamel and whether or not they had 
substance, because my impression is that there was misinformation 
associated with this incident.  
 
(14) “November 1995 The Government of Jordan intercepts a large shipment of high 
grade missile components destined for Iraq. Iraq denies that it had sought to 
purchase these components, although it acknowledged that some of them were in 
Iraq. UNSCOM conducts an investigation that confirms that Iraqi authorities and 
missile facilities have been involved in the acquisition of sophisticated guidance 
and control components for proscribed missiles. UNSCOM retrieves similar missile 
components from the Tigris River, which have been allegedly disposed of there by 
Iraq’s involvement in the covert acquisition.”700 
 
Ad (14) The first incident in this chronology of Iraq’s substantive failed and 
improper relinquishment process was recorded in April 1991. Four and a 
half years of intensive United Nation’s authorised inspections had since 
taken place under international scrutiny. At this late juncture it now 
emerged that Iraq has been involved in seeking components for 
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proscribed missiles. This was a substantive breach of international law 
and a provocative violation of the ethos of comity. It would have damaged 
trust and undermined relationships as well. It is inferred that the Nuclear-
Weapons-States would have been monitoring Iraq’s cumulative pattern of 
obstruction of the Safeguards with growing concern and impatience. There 
was no recorded instance of any equivalent proliferation of proscribed 
material in the case of South Africa. Once again, the disjuncture can be 
interpreted as manifesting itself at the substantive, comity, relationship and 
time elements of this cross-country comparison.  
 
(15) “March 1996 UNSCOM are denied immediate access to five sites designated for 
inspection. The teams enter the sites after delays of up to 17 hours. 
 
 12 June 1996 Security Council resolution 1060 (1996) terms Iraq’s actions ‘a clear 
violation of the provisions of the Council’s resolutions’. It also demands that Iraq 
grant immediate and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection by 
UNSCOM. 
 
 13 June 1996 Despite the adoption of resolution 1060 (1996), Iraq again denies 
access to another inspection team.”701 
 
Ad (15) Five years on Iraq had still not reached a coherent arrangement 
regarding access rights for Safeguards Inspections. This restriction of 
access and breach of international law can once again be regarded as 
part of an escalatory reprisal game indicative of a disregard for substance, 
comity, relationship and time. It signified a dangerous disregard for comity. 
It is my view that these cumulative and consistent violations of UN 
Security Council resolutions contributed towards politically legitimating the 
allied military invasion of that country, in spite of the dubious legality of 
anticipatory defence under international law, as grounds for going to war- 
jus ad bellum.  
 
(16) “30 June 1996 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the 
Council deplores the refusal of Iraq to allow the Special Commission to remove 
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certain missile engines from Iraq for analysis, and demands that Iraq allow such 
removal (S/PRT/1996/49).”702 
 
Ad (16) Iraq had once again substantively breeched international law. It is 
not dissimilar from the incident cited in Ad (14) in November 1995, when 
Jordan intercepted the shipment of proscribed missile components that 
were intended for Iraq. It reveals that the leadership involved in Iraq’s 
nuclear relinquishment was unconscionable. The Security Council was 
invoked yet again, to deplore Iraq’s breach of another resolution. It would 
appear as though the Iraqi regime became quite immune to the United 
Nations Security Council’s condemnation of their conduct.  
 
(17) “21 June 1997 Security Council Resolution 1115 (1997) condemns Iraq’s actions 
and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM’s team immediate, unconditional and 
unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and official interviews by UNSCOM. 
The Council also calls for an additional report on Iraq’s co-operation with the 
Commission and suspends the periodic sanctions review.”703 
 
Ad (17) The Security Council issued a further ultimatum to Iraq that was 
duly ignored. This constitutes the eighth habitual violation of a Security 
Council resolution tendered against the inspectorate for inhibiting their 
right of access to conduct audits in respect of Safeguards noted in this 
chronology. The matter of achieving a quid pro quo in the form of a 
relaxation of sanctions was expressed in paragraphs (12) and (18).  
 
(18) “5 August 1998 The Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba’ath Party 
Command decide to halt co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA pending 
Security Council agreement to lift the oil embargo, reorganize the Commission and 
move it either to Geneva or Vienna. In the interim, Iraq would on its own terms, 
permit monitoring under resolution 715 (1991).”704 
 
Ad (18) The speculation about Iraq’s pursuit of a deterrent quid pro quo 
articulated in Ad (17) is confirmed in paragraph (18). It is recalled that 
Mr de Klerk pursued a diametrically opposite relinquishment methodology 
to that chosen by Iraq. He cast aside the notion of achieving any residual 
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deterrent quid pro quo. He also conducted the relinquishment and 
accession programme in camera, outside the glare of public politics. Had 
he chosen to conduct this matter as an open negotiation, in a public forum, 
he would have similarly risked being accused of weakness by friend and 
foe alike.  The instance that is recalled in Iraq and discussed above is 
again indicative of an absence of comity.  
 
(19) “13 September 1997 One of UNSCOM’s personnel is manhandled by an Iraqi 
officer on board one of the Commission’s helicopters while the inspector was 
attempting to take photographs of the unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles 
inside a site declared by Iraq to be ‘sensitive’, that was designated for inspection. 
Two days later, Iraq again failed to freeze movement inside another ‘sensitive site’ 
designated for inspection.”705 
 
Ad (19) This is part of a pattern of threats and coercion that was directed 
at the international inspectorate by Iraq: paragraph (1) warning shots; 
paragraph (2) confiscation of documents from the inspectorate, and stand-
off and locking of inspectors into parking lot for four days; paragraph (10) 
refusal to allow inspectors flights using their own aircraft to perform their 
United Nations Security Council-authorised duties; paragraph (15) denial 
of access to suspected sites; and paragraph (19) manhandling of 
UNSCOM official. International law was yet again disregarded by virtue of 
their refusal to allow the Commission the necessary access for it to 
conduct its United Nations-sanctioned inspection, for the purpose of 
Safeguards. It is again reiterated that in South Africa, no IAEA official was 
ever manhandled, and access was never impeded. 
 
Iraq’s actions again constituted an indifference towards substance, comity, 
relationship, and time. 
 
(20) “17 September 1997 While seeking access to a site for inspection declared by Iraq 
to be ‘sensitive’ UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape the movement of files, 
the burning of documents and dumping of ash-filled waste cans into a nearby 
river.”706 
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Ad (20) The attempt to destroy the evidence upon which the Initial Report 
would be audited constituted a breach of international law. There was not 
a single equivalent example in South Africa of the substantive factual 
evidence of the nuclear programme being tampered with. Iraq’s 
destruction of evidence constituted a violation of substance, which 
obviated the creation of trust, and was unlawful. 
 
(21) “23 October 1997 Security Council Resolution 1134 (1997) demands that Iraq co-
operate fully with the Special Commission, continues the suspension of the periodic 
sanctions reviews and foreshadows additional sanctions pending a further report on 
Iraq’s co-operation with UNSCOM.”707 
 
Ad (21) This is another Security Council ultimatum directed at Iraq to 
abide by international law. It is contended that the repetitious and 
cumulative ignoring of these ultimatums foreshadowed the eventual loss of 
international patience and invasion of that country. The Security Council 
had repeatedly demanded that Iraq should abide by international law. The 
suspension of the sanctions review and enactment of additional sanctions 
on Iraq by the Security Council can be regarded as punitive and as a ‘tit-
for-tat’ against Iraq’s escalatory breach of UN Security Council resolutions. 
This conduct revealed a breach of comity, although the substance, 
relationship and time elements were also neglected.  
 
(22) “29 October 1997 The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr Tariq Aziz, sends a letter 
to the President of the Security Council, informing the Council of policy decisions 
taken by the Government of Iraq. The letter includes a decision not to deal with 
personnel of United States nationality working for UNSCOM, a demand that all 
personnel of United States nationality working for UNSCOM leave Iraq by a given 
deadline, and a request that UNSCOM withdraw its ‘cover’ for the ‘spy plane’ U-2 
provided by the United States.”708  
 
Ad (22) This is an interesting revelation about the conflict of laws in Iraq. 
In contrast to the South African case, Iraqi municipal law appeared not to 
have been reconciled with international law. The reader will recall that in 
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the previous chapter, a conscious effort was made by the South Africans 
to cultivate a trusting relationship with the Extra Team, of which the 
Americans constituted the most influential and vocal component. Iraq’s 
display of an absence of comity towards the American contingent of 
UNSCOM’s inspectorate was rash. It might have even contributed towards 
the political legitimating of the military invasion of Iraq.  
 
(23) “12 November 1997 Security Council resolution 1137 (1997) condemns the 
continued violation by Iraq of its obligations, including its unacceptable decision to 
seek to impose conditions on co-operation with UNSCOM. It also imposes a travel 
restriction on Iraqi officials who are responsible for or participated in the instances 
of non-compliance.”709 
 
Ad (23) This is again indicative of the conflict of laws. The expulsion of the 
Americans who performed UNSCOM’s inspectorate might have been 
lawful under Iraq’s municipal law, but this was most certainly not 
authorised by international law. In this paragraph, UNSCOM confirmed 
Iraq’s tenth violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution and 
breach of international law. This resolution represented but one of many 
imprecations from the Security Council to Iraq to abide by international 
law. The imposition of travel restrictions upon the Iraqi leadership 
represents a personalisation and escalation of the conflict. There is again 
evidence of transgressions by Iraq of the substantive, comity, relationship 
and time elements of this comparison.  
 
(24) “13 November 1997 Iraq requires the personnel of United States nationality working 
for UNSCOM to leave Iraq immediately. The Executive Chairman decides the 
majority of UNSCOM personnel should withdraw temporarily from Iraq. A skeleton 
staff remains in Baghdad to maintain UNSCOM’s premises and equipment.”710 
 
Ad (24) The expulsion of the Americans who were in Iraq performing a 
remit, which was authorised by the United Nations Security Council, was a 
further indication of a breakdown in relationships with the inspection 
authority. It is inferred that this gesture was probably a tit-for-tat in 
response to the travel restrictions imposed upon the Iraqi leadership. The 
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recurrent theme is again that Iraq displayed a persistent absence of comity 
and disregard for relationships. It is noted that Iraq’s focus on the United 
State’s inspectors had become escalatory, and the matter of national 
prestige would undoubtedly have complicated the prognosis for a 
successful relinquishment exercise. 
 
(25) “9 September 1998 Security Council Resolution 1194 (1998) unanimously 
condemns Iraq’s decision to suspend co-operation with UNSCOM, terming Iraq’s 
actions a totally unacceptable contravention of Iraq’s obligations; demands Iraq 
rescind its decision and decides not to conduct 60 day sanctions reviews until Iraq 
does so and the Commission reports to the Council that it is satisfied that it has 
been able to exercise its full range of activities, including inspections.”711 
 
Ad (25) The United Nations Security Council Resolution (1194) (1998) 
cited Iraq’s eleventh violation of a Security Council resolution and breach 
of international law. The breach appears to have been manifested in an 
absence of concern about substance, comity, relationship and time. 
 
(26) “31 October 1998 Iraq announces that it will cease all forms of interaction with 
UNSCOM and its Chairman and halt all UNSCOM’s activities inside Iraq, including 
monitoring. The Security Council, in a statement to the press, unanimously 
condemns Iraq’s decision to cease all co-operation with UNSCOM. 
 
 5 November 1998 Security Council Resolution 1205 (1998) unanimously condemns 
Iraq’s actions and demands that Iraq rescind immediately its decisions of 
31 October and 5 August.”712 
 
Ad (26) Iraq disengaged from substantive consultations with the 
international weapons’ inspectorate. This created the pre-conditions for 
the US and British invasion of Iraq. The invasion was legitimated by Iraq’s 
inappropriate conduct with respect to the UN authorised inspections. The 
invasion was partially caused by Iraq’s absence of substantial compliance 
with international law, disregard for international comity, contempt for 
nurturing respectful interpersonal relationships and dilatoriness with regard 
to time. 
 
                                                
711 Op cit UNSCOM at 11. 
712 Op cit UNSCOM at 11–12. 
 427 
7.6 A Taxonomic Comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s Nuclear 
Relinquishment Processes 
In addition to Iraq’s material breach of the above-mentioned resolutions, it 
breached a total of 16 prior United Nations Security Council resolutions 
over a period of 12 years.713 714 In the next section of this research, the 
reader is presented with four tables that provide a taxonomic comparison 
of South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process viewed from the 
perspective of international law. They include sociology of law 
comparisons inspired by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötze that were 
conducted along the lines of substance, comity (process), relationships 
and time. Phenomenological reduction was used to synthesise the data 
into deeper linkages. The outcome of this is that it provides a concentrated 
comparative synthesis and analysis of the two nuclear relinquishment 
cases. It is clear that South Africa and Iraq undertook the respective 
nuclear relinquishments in profoundly different ways, with divergent 
objectives. The differences in conduct and objectives were deep seated 
and had been entrenched over years, to the extent that they had become 
habitual in the respective states. Iraq regularly and purposefully breached 
international law with respect to the Safeguarding process on the grounds 
of substance, comity, relationships and time, while South Africa did not. 
Iraq was often reprimanded by the United Nations Security Council by 
virtue of resolutions that attempted to impel it into compliance with 
Safeguards. These resolutions were regularly ignored over a long period 
of time. This was certainly not the case in South Africa, which took every 
effort to achieve compliance with the Safeguards. 
 
                                                
713 World Press Review. (Undated.) ‘The United Nations, International Law and the War in Iraq’. 
[Online]. Available: http:www.worldpress.org/specials/Iraq [Accessed 25 March 2010]. 
714 Kimball, Daryl & Crail, Peter. 2003. ‘Disarming Saddam – A Chronology of Iraq and UN 
Weapons Inspections from 2002–2003’. Arms Control Association.  July. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iraqchron 
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Table 7.1: A Substantive Comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s Nuclear 
Relinquishment Processes 
 
Key Issue of 
Substance 
South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Compliance with the 
NPT. 
Never in breach of 
NPT. 
Iraq acted in breach of 
NPT. 
Iraq’s substantive 
breach of the NPT in 
1991 created a 
legacy of mistrust 
that complicated its 
relinquishment and 
accession. 
South Africa took a 
great deal of effort to 
comply to the letter 
with all terms and 
conditions of the 
NPT.  
Military/operational 
usage of nuclear 
weapons. 
Never contemplated. Saddam Hussein 
contemplated dropping 
an atomic bomb 
unannounced on 
Israel.  
Saddam Hussein did 
not have qualms 
about contravening 
international law and 
committing crimes 
against humanity. 
Indeed, he deployed 
chemical and 
biological weapons 
against the Kurds in 
northern Iraq and 
killed thousands in 
what has been 
alluded to as 
genocide. Hussein is 
cited as saying: 
“Don’t tell me about 
the law. The law is 
anything I write on a 
piece of paper.”715 
 
                                                
715 Hamza, Khidhir & Stein, Jeff. 2001. Saddam’s Bombmaker. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Frontispiece.  
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Key Issue of 
Substance 
South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Policy of nuclear 
deterrence. 
South Africa never 
contemplated using 
nuclear weapons 
operationally. They 
were used for a limited 
deterrence purpose 
only. The rationale for 
deterrence was a 
positive law 
interpretation along the 
lines of the Lotus case. 
This assumed that 
what is not expressly 
prohibited is allowable. 
South Africa had an 
explicit written nuclear 
deterrent policy written 
by the Witvlei 
Committee. 
Iraq used its nuclear 
weapons for deterrent 
purposes. The 
researcher was not 
able to discover a 
clear written deterrent 
policy in Iraq, although 
there might have been 
such a document.  
South Africa had an 
explicit written 
deterrent policy. This 
afforded integrity to 
its municipal law and 
regulatory policies.  
South Africa created 
regulatory credibility 
for its municipal law, 
while Iraq did not. 
International lifting of 
sanctions as trade-off 
and quid pro quo for 
the relinquishment of 
nuclear weapons and 
accession to the 
NPT. 
South Africa failed to 
achieve a nuclear 
deterrent quid pro quo 
for relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT.  
Iraq also failed to 
achieve a nuclear 
deterrent quid pro quo 
for relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT. 
The researcher’s 
view is that there 
was wisdom in not 
granting any tangible 
quid pro quo for the 
relinquishment and 
accession processes 
in both countries, 
because this might 
have been 
interpreted as 
condoning 
escalatory 
relationships that 
could place 
humanity at risk. 
The granting of 
trade-offs may be a 
dangerous 
precedent. 
The presentation of 
factual material on 
nuclear weapons to 
the inspectorate.  
South Africa was 
meticulous about 
presenting 
comprehensive, 
precise, factually 
verifiable material.   
Iraq lied about its 
nuclear resources and 
capabilities. They 
dumped 12 000 pages 
of unrefined data on 
the inspectorate. 
Trust developed in 
South Africa, but 
was eroded and 
corroded in Iraq. 
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Key Issue of 
Substance 
South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
The deployment of a 
competent project 
team to relinquish 
nuclear weapons and 
accede to the NPT 
South Africa’s 
approach was carefully 
structured, and 
conducted as a high 
priority legal–technical 
project-management 
exercise, aimed at 
ensuring smooth 
accession to the NPT. 
Iraq’s approach was 
diffuse and very badly 
structured. 
The approach that 
South Africa 
selected created 
trust in the 
inspectorate, while 
the approach that 
Iraq followed created 
mistrust and failed to 
imbue confidence. It 
created anxiety, fear 
and confusion. 
Compliance with 
Comprehensive 
Safeguards. 
South Africa’s 
compliance with the 
Comprehensive 
Safeguards 
Agreement was 
regarded with 
professional pride. 
There is little evidence 
in the literature of Iraq 
seeking to comply 
urgently with the 
Comprehensive 
Safeguards 
Agreement. Indeed, 
Iraqi conduct was 
characterised by 
obfuscation. 
South Africa’s 
diligence and proven 
sincerity in 
complying with 
Safeguards resulted 
in its gaining the 
support of the IAEA, 
the General 
Assembly of the 
United Nations and 
the ‘Big Five’.  
It took her out of her 
international 
isolation. 
It assisted in the 
constitutional 
objective of 
achieving a positive 
recognition status. 
Iraq did not gain this 
support, because of 
its failure to comply 
to the letter with the 
NPT. 
The ‘driving force’ 
behind the 
relinquishment and 
accession process.  
The decision was 
voluntary in order to 
pursue the greater 
vision of securing a 
nationally and 
internationally 
acceptable 
constitutional 
settlement. The hostile 
military threats 
dissipated with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and 
the withdrawal of the 
USSR, Cuba and the 
East Germans from 
Angola. 
The decision was 
involuntary and 
imposed by the United 
Nations. In Iraq, the 
hostile military threats 
still remained. 
Both South Africa 
and Iraq were under 
deep constitutional 
stress. South Africa 
developed an 
expansive and 
inclusive 
constitutional vision, 
while Iraq did the 
opposite. 
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Key Issue of 
Substance 
South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
The role of the 
peaceful use of 
nuclear energy for 
the generation of 
electricity for civilian 
purposes. 
The peaceful use of 
nuclear energy was 
used as a camouflage 
to screen a potentially 
mendacious usage.  
The peaceful use of 
nuclear energy was 
also used as a 
camouflage to screen 
a potentially 
mendacious usage. 
There is a 
convergence 
between both 
countries’ ‘peaceful’ 
nuclear 
programmes. They 
were in both cases 
used as ploys to 
conceal a 
comprehensive 
nuclear weapons 
programme. 
The number of 
inspection 
authorities. 
South Africa’s major 
inspection counterpart 
was the IAEA. It was, 
of course, enlarged by 
the addition of the 
Extra Team, which 
investigated past 
nuclear activities. 
Iraq’s situation was 
altogether more 
complicated. It had to 
address multiple 
inspection authorities. 
These inspection 
authorities included: 
IAEA, UNMOVIC, 
UNSCOM, and the 
national intelligence 
agencies of the US 
and UK. 
The terms of reference 
of the inspection 
regimen in Iraq 
pertained to the 
extended mandate of 
weapons of mass 
destruction, which 
included nuclear, 
chemical and 
biological weapons.    
The technical 
problem of 
disarmament was 
much more 
complicated in Iraq 
than it was in South 
Africa, because of 
the multiplicity of 
powerful 
stakeholders 
involved in that 
country. 
The social problem 
of managing the 
fragmentation of 
views between the 
multiple inspection 
teams is referred to 
by Horst Rittel as a 
‘wicked problem’.716 
Rittel posits that 
wicked problems are 
problems whose 
definition constantly 
changes; which do 
not have right or 
wrong answers, but 
have better or worse 
answers; where the 
leader has no right 
to be wrong and 
where there is 
limited opportunity to 
learn by trial and 
error.717 
 
                                                
716 Ritttel, Horst & Webber, Melvin. 1973. ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company. Policy Sciences, 4:155–169.  
717 Rittel, Horst. 1969. ‘Reflections on the Scientific and Political Significance of Decision 
Theory’. Professor of Science Design, University of California, Berkeley. Working Paper No 155, 
February. 
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7.6.1  The Matter of Substance 
Iraq’s intention was to create a similar type of nuclear bomb to those which 
South Africa had produced. The difference was that Iraq intended using 
the bomb operationally, while South Africa did not. The absence of internal 
regulatory protocols and organised documentation within Iraq destroyed 
the substantive credibility of its case. This was one of the reasons the 
Iraqis struggled so hard to prove unequivocally that they had relinquished 
their nuclear arsenal. They did eventually co-operate on substance, but by 
the time they did so, it was substantially too late. They had cried ‘wolf’ too 
often, which itself can be regarded as a game of destructive comity. 
 
In the next table, a comparison of comity in the context of South Africa and 
Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment programmes is presented. 
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Table 7.2: A Comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s Nuclear Relinquishment 
and Accession to the NPT in Terms of Comity 
 
Key Issue of Comity South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Necessary 
information for 
inspections provided 
in a transparent, co-
operative and 
trustworthy manner.  
South Africa under the 
instructions of Mr de 
Klerk offered the IAEA 
a standing invitation to 
inspect any site, 
anywhere (in South 
Africa), and at any 
time. 
Iraq often failed to 
provide co-operative 
access to the 
inspectorate. They 
were frequently seen 
as being reluctant to 
furnish the essential 
information.  
South Africa placed 
a strong emphasis 
on co-operation with 
the IAEA, affording 
them open access to 
nuclear facilities. 
This South African 
concession on 
transparency was 
codified into United 
Nations Resolutions, 
and was cited as 
being an exemplar of 
appropriate process 
and procedure for 
nuclear inspections. 
‘Rules of 
engagement’ 
between the 
inspectorate and the 
inspected.    
South Africa decided 
to assume a co-
operative and 
collaborative analytical 
problem-solving 
approach with the 
IAEA inspectorate – in 
limine. 
The IAEA inspectorate 
and its South African 
counterparts 
conducted joint-
problem-solving 
seminars; and planned 
together in a respectful 
and interactive 
manner. The parties 
assumed a problem-
solving and principled 
negotiation process. 
No ‘games’ were 
played. 
In South Africa, Mr de 
Klerk assumed a 
strong role of 
presidential authority. 
Iraq quite frequently 
assumed a conflictive 
and competitive 
approach towards the 
inspectorate. The 
inspectors were of the 
view that their Iraqi 
counterparts played 
dangerous escalatory 
games. From an 
analytical perspective 
Iraq assumed a hard 
bargaining and zero-
sum game to the 
relinquishment and 
accession process. 
The Iraqis did not have 
a clear presidential 
mandate from Mr 
Saddam Hussein.  
The researcher’s 
view is that Iraq’s 
decision to follow a 
conflictive and 
competitive 
approach towards 
their nuclear 
relinquishment and 
accession to the 
NPT was the single 
most unwise and 
counterproductive 
feature of their 
chosen strategy. It 
prevented in limine 
clarification of the 
facts. 
Their choice of these 
conflictive and 
competitive ways of 
interacting was 
totally inappropriate 
and trivialised the 
nuclear 
disarmament. It 
destroyed comity. 
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Key Issue of Comity South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Relative degree of 
co-operation with 
inspectors. 
Very high. Sometimes good, but 
on too many 
conspicuous 
occasions, it was very 
bad. 
Poor co-operation 
with the inspectorate 
is irresponsible 
because the 
inspectors’ 
suggestions and 
recommendations 
are ultimately 
converted into 
United Nations 
Security Council 
Resolutions and may 
even result in the 
legitimisation of war. 
Respect for 
ceremonial 
processes. 
South Africa’s respect 
for ceremonial 
processes was high. 
The Announcement 
Plan is an example of 
this respect for 
process and 
procedure. It 
attempted in a 
systematic way to 
ensure that the 
process was not 
jeopardised in any 
way.  
The ceremonial 
respect and degree of 
elation towards South 
Africa’s compliance 
with the 
Comprehensive 
Safeguards 
Agreement was 
another example. 
At the celebration in 
Vienna of South 
Africa’s accession to 
the NPT, the South 
African gift of the 
ploughshare made out 
of the nuclear casings 
was an excellent 
example of comity.  
Iraq’s respect for 
ceremonial processes 
was very low. They 
had breached the NPT 
and relinquished their 
arsenal reluctantly. 
The inspectorate’s visit 
to the Karama sewage 
reticulation plant is an 
example of a 
destructive ceremonial 
process and poor 
comity. 
The researcher’s 
viewpoint is that 
Iraq’s display of 
disrespect for comity 
and ceremonial 
process was an 
important causal 
factor leading to the 
war in 2003. 
Selection criteria for 
relinquishment team. 
Very stringent and 
performance 
calibrated.  
Little evidence of 
stringency and 
performance 
calibration. 
The care that Mr de 
Klerk took in 
selecting the right 
people was central 
to his success. 
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7.6.2  The Matter of Comity 
The essential difference in the comparison between South Africa and 
Iraq’s respective nuclear relinquishment programmes under the 
international inspections regimens is that South Africa, under the 
instructions of Mr FW de Klerk, set about relinquishing the nuclear arsenal 
voluntarily, while Saddam Hussein begrudgingly engaged in this process 
under compulsion. The rules of engagement with respect to the 
inspectorate, from the South African perspective, were those of comity in 
international law, and included co-operative and collaborative analytical 
problem-solving. In contrast, the rules of engagement with respect to the 
inspectorate in Iraq were often competitive and conflictive, and destroyed 
comity. In Iraq, the escalatory game of cat-and-mouse was played.This 
was extremely dangerous to international peace. The researcher’s view is 
that Iraq had also failed to present a sufficiently compelling case in the 
domain of comity. Iraq did ultimately co-operate on comity, but by the time 
it did so, it was too late. Iraq should have done so from the beginning. 
 
In the next table, a relationship comparison between South Africa and 
Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment and accession processes will be offered. 
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Table 7.3: A Relationship Comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s Nuclear 
Relinquishment and Accession to the NPT 
 
Key Issue of 
Relationship 
South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Respect for personal 
relationships. 
Trust and credibility, 
with respect for the 
integrity of personal 
relationships, was 
regarded as the 
essential bond for 
achieving 
substantive and 
procedural 
compliance with the 
Safeguards 
Agreement. There 
are many examples 
in this research of 
the pre-eminence of 
the integrity of 
personal respectful 
relationships. It will 
be recalled that the 
Announcement Plan 
was designed to 
ensure that Dr Hans 
Blix was in the 
country because ‘he 
was the last person 
in the world that Mr 
de Klerk would have 
wished to have 
embarrassed’. 
Iraqis elected to follow 
competitive and 
conflictive rules of 
engagement with 
respect to its 
disarmament and in 
relation to the 
inspections, and set a 
precedent of 
mistrustful personal 
relationships. This 
trust was never fully 
restored and 
contaminated the 
presentation of Iraqi 
data with suspicion. 
Iraq’s approach of 
playing games 
escalated tensions and 
detracted from the task 
at hand. Ratione 
personae was poor. 
Respect for personal 
relationships – 
ratione personae – 
was the starting 
point on which South 
Africa’s successful 
nuclear 
relinquishment and 
accession to the 
NPT was predicated. 
This respect was not 
evident in the case 
of Iraq. 
Respect for 
institutional  
relationships. 
South Africa’s 
deportment with the 
IAEA and the Extra 
Team was always 
carefully measured 
and appropriate.  
Mutually respectful 
institutional 
relationships – ratione 
personae – were 
based on excellent 
personal relationships. 
Iraq’s deportment with 
regard to institutional 
relationships with the 
IAEA, UNMOVIC and 
UNSCOM was often 
cavalier. 
Respectful 
institutional 
relationships were 
predicated on 
respectful personal 
relationships – 
ratione personae. 
 
 437 
 
Key Issue of 
Relationship 
South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Respect for 
international 
relations. 
The South Africans 
were fully cognisant of 
the fact that they were 
regarded as 
international pariahs at 
the time of the 
decision to relinquish 
the nuclear arsenal 
and accede to the 
NPT. Mr de Klerk’s 
stated goal was to 
have South Africa 
reaccepted as a 
respected member of 
the international 
community of nations.  
He pursued a new and 
positive recognition 
status for South 
Africa’s new 
constitution. The 
raison d’être for the 
relinquishment and 
accession process and 
for the interlinked 
constitutional 
negotiations was for 
South Africa to restore 
its international 
standing. 
The Iraqis were 
engaged in highly 
conflictive international 
relations with the US 
and UK and gained 
only dubious support 
from others. 
At the time of their 
disarmament process, 
they were highly 
cynical in their 
international relations. 
The outcome in 
South Africa was 
peaceful, because 
this was the 
intended result. 
The outcome in Iraq 
was war, because 
they flouted 
international 
relations. 
 
 
7.6.3  The Matter of Relationship 
South Africa developed co-operative and respectful relationships with the 
inspectorate, while Iraq did not. The importance of this qualitative 
difference in relationships cannot be underestimated. The researcher’s 
view is that Iraq failed at the relationship level because they consistently 
breached United Nations Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions, and this degenerated into a regular pattern of breach of trust. 
Once this trust was destroyed, it was very difficult to reconstitute.  
 
For South Africa, relationships led to peace; in the case of Iraq, their 
negative relationships led to war. 
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Table 7.4: A Time Comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s Nuclear 
Relinquishment and Accession to the NPT 
 
Key Issue of Time South Africa’s 
Approach 
Iraq’s Approach Commentary 
Timelines and 
relative urgency 
devoted to the 
process and 
procedure of the 
relinquishment of the 
nuclear arsenal and 
accession to the 
NPT. 
In South Africa, the 
timelines were strictly 
adhered to. The 
relinquishment and 
accession process 
was conducted 
exceptionally quickly. 
This urgency to abide 
by timelines was 
because of the serious 
light in which the 
matter was regarded 
by Mr de Klerk.  
The decision to 
relinquish the nuclear 
arsenal was taken in 
September 1989. The 
point of accession was 
10 July 1991, and the 
announcement was 
made on 23 March 
1993.  
Iraq’s disarmament 
process began in 
1991. It dragged on for 
twelve years until 
2003. 
There was little 
evidence of a 
proactive game plan 
for nuclear 
relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT. 
There is evidence of a 
dilatory approach, and 
little evidence of 
proactive compliance, 
although there are 
reports of substantial 
compliance in certain 
areas and domains. 
The Iraqi process was 
reactive while South 
Africa’s approach was 
proactive.  
When we note the 
cumulative non-
compliance with 
United Nations 
General Assembly 
and Security Council 
Resolutions by Iraq, 
it becomes self-
evident that these 
breaches occurred 
over time – ratione 
temporis. 
Deadlines were 
repeatedly broken 
over a decade, and 
eventually the 
disrespect displayed 
towards ratione 
temporis resulted in 
Iraq being presented 
with an ultimatum by 
the US and UK. This 
was not heeded and 
the war ensued. 
South Africa’s 
compliance with the 
timelines was seen 
in a positive light. 
Iraq’s dilatory 
approach was seen 
in a very negative 
light. 
 
7.6.4  The Matter of Time 
Time is a vitally important but invisible dimension of international law. 
South Africa’s approach towards Time was deadline driven, and the entire 
nuclear relinquishment and accession process took barely two years. The 
respondents have conveyed their deep sense of urgency about this 
process in the research. 
 
Iraq’s approach towards time was nonchalant. They were not strongly 
deadline driven. They had thirteen years to complete the task of nuclear 
relinquishment and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, and they still failed. 
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7.7 The General Findings of the Comparison of How South Africa 
and Iraq Relinquished their Nuclear Weapons in Terms of 
International Law  
This comparison of how South Africa and Iraq’ relinquished their nuclear 
arsenals in terms of international law raises the stark questions of why 
was Iraq so consciously obstructive and why did it commit so many 
material breaches of international law, particularly in light of the fact that it 
did not possess any nuclear weapons at during the years preceding the 
allied invasion in 2003. After deep reflection, I can only deduce that Iraq’s 
regular and cumulative disregard for international law was purposeful. It is 
presumed that the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein came to the view 
that they had no choice but to break international law consistently as a 
matter of nuclear policy. It was done for a similar reason to that which 
justified the first phase of South Africa’s official Witvlei Nuclear Weapons 
Policy, which advocated a phase of planned ambiguity that neither 
confirmed nor denied that South Africa possessed a nuclear arsenal. 
 
It is my view that Iraq’s repeated breaches of international law were 
intended to create an international aura of ambiguity about its nuclear 
intentions. The truth that it had actually relinquished its nuclear arsenal 
could not be publicly admitted. This was because the Iraqi regime derived 
its power from uncertainty, fear and terror. The regime’s intrinsic power 
was sourced in uncertainty, fear and terror, and the myth of its military 
might was fundamental to its maintenance of political power. It breached 
international law and showed contempt for the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions to perpetuate the myth of its nuclear strength, and as 
disinformation against the reality of its military powerlessness. Iraq 
therefore became a victim of its own propaganda and lies. The regime 
could not admit that it had relinquished its nuclear arsenal even when it 
had done so, because this admission would perhaps have been 
interpreted by the many opponents to the junta as weakening, and it might 
have led to an uprising and revolution. The nuclear weapons were 
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therefore an ambiguous bluff and camouflage, as they were non-existent. 
This bluff was perpetuated in the vain hope of perpetuating the continuity 
of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. 
 
The knowledge transfer attempt by South Africa failed because there was 
no suitable knowledge to transfer. The Iraqis were locked into a trap. Any 
disavowal of their nuclear weapons programme would appear to have 
been regarded by the regime of Saddam Hussein as an admission of 
sovereign weakness. Such a public admission would have placed the 
dictatorship at risk, because there was much internal and external 
opposition to it. Its foundation was based on terror and fear, and the 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction programmes 
represented an important cornerstone of that propaganda of terror. The 
regime therefore perpetuated its policy of nuclear weapons ambiguity for 
as long as possible. The United States and the United Kingdom, in my 
view, played along with this lie and then called the dictatorship’s bluff by 
using Iraq’s obfuscation on its nuclear weapons status as an excuse to 
justify their invasion of Iraq, sans Security Council authorisation. South 
Africa’s visit to Iraq and attempted knowledge transfer was therefore a 
failure. The Iraqis, in spite of their numerous breaches of international law 
and disregard for United Nations Security Council Resolutions, had 
actually relinquished their nuclear weapons and had indeed complied with 
Safeguards, but not in the coherent and prescribed format required by the 
IAEA. There was a great deal of confusion in Iraq’s relinquishment 
process at the substantive, comity, time and relationship levels, and it 
could aptly be described as a fog of confusion that was conveyed to 
conceal the fact that ‘Emperor’ Saddam Hussein at that stage wore no 
clothes. 
 
Two important questions remain to be answered: firstly, why did the United 
States and United Kingdom illegally invade Iraq when it clearly had no 
nuclear weapons; secondly, why was the knowledge transfer between the 
international inspectorate and the United States and United Kingdom a 
failure? It is contended that the answer to the first question is that the 
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United States and United Kingdom illegally invaded Iraq under the 
pretence of accepting its propagandistic disregard for international law 
manifested in its numerous breaches on United Nations Security Council 
resolutions at face value, because they perceived that it was in their 
national interest to do so. Secondly, the knowledge was not successfully 
transferred between the international inspectorate and the United States 
and United Kingdom’s inspectorates because the successful knowledge 
transfer would have been perceived to be against these national interests.  
 
South Africa sought to relinquish its nuclear arsenal in order to ensure that 
the new non-racial and democratic Constitution achieved positive 
international recognition stature and obviated its then pariah recognition 
stature. Iraq, by way of contrast, did not appear to have a clear 
constitutional vision that was unified into its relinquishment purpose. South 
Africa relinquished its nuclear arsenal and acceded to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to seal a social contract of 
good faith for a unified future in a non-racial democracy. Iraq had no such 
comparative vision for a desired constitutional future, to be shared by its 
diverse population. South Africa’s nuclear relinquishment process was 
conducted voluntarily; while Iraq’s was not voluntary and was conducted 
under international duress. 
 
South Africa’s reason for relinquishing its nuclear arsenal included the 
active pursuit of constitutional continuity in the light of its national 
transition, and was at the same time an attempt to enhance international 
juridical security in the context of this change of regime. South Africa 
envisioned that the relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal would enhance its 
international security and prestige. Iraq held the opposite view. Iraq 
perceived that the relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal would diminish its 
international and domestic security. Constitutional continuity and 
international juridical security did not appear to be a concern in Iraq at the 
time of relinquishment. South Africa discovered that it could not derive a 
deterrent quid pro quo in exchange for its nuclear weapons. Iraq persisted 
with the vain pursuit of seeking a deterrent quid pro quo in exchange for 
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the relinquishment of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq conjured an 
all-too-literal interpretation of the conversion of nuclear deterrence into 
political and economic advantage. The reality was that nuclear deterrence 
in Iraq created the opposite set of circumstances. Mary Ellen O’Connell 
makes the point that the controversial debate about Iraq since 1991 was 
whether sanctions should be lifted or implemented and “not whether states 
should be able to use military force to rid Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to produce them. No acquiescence has 
occurred to allow force for enforcing weapons inspections, and certainly 
none has developed to authorise the ousting of Saddam Hussein”.718 It 
was because South Africa had a clear vision expressed by strong 
leadership at that particular time in its history that it was successful in 
relinquishing its nuclear weapons and acceding to the NPT. Iraq did not 
have clear leadership and a unifying vision. Its accession to the NPT was 
not linked with a larger and positive constitutional vision for the future. 
 
Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process differed from South Africa’s because 
they had neither the consent to accede to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation on Nuclear Weapon, nor the intention of doing so. Consent 
and intention are, of course, the two fundamental criteria required for 
treaty accession. Indeed, Iraq actively opposed the relinquishment and 
accession process over a long period. The nuclear relinquishment 
decision in Iraq was not a voluntary decision; it was an imposed decision, 
and reluctantly enacted. This is again indicative of how diametrically 
opposed it was to South Africa’s process, which was both consensual and 
intentional. Iraq appeared to become increasingly committed to obstructing 
the international inspectorate over a long period, and attitudes hardened. 
These hardened attitudes would make the transfer of knowledge of South 
Africa’s nuclear relinquishment and accession process very difficult 
indeed. In my view, the only way that this knowledge could have been 
peacefully transferred was if the Iraqi leaders who were involved in this 
process had abdicated. Given Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial and tyrannical 
                                                
718 Op cit O’Connell. 
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leadership style, this was hardly going to be feasible. The Iraqi state 
representatives who were vested with the responsibility for nuclear 
relinquishment, have, in my opinion, provided a case study of shockingly 
negligent and incompetent negotiation.  
 
The researcher contends that the failure by Iraq to respect Resolution 687 
(1991) wholeheartedly and to enter into the relinquishment process in a 
positive spirit of co-operation, together with their wrong choice of 
conflictive and competitive conduct, was a prime cause of the escalation of 
the conflict and the subsequent invasion of that country by the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Had Iraq followed the spirit and the letter 
of the South African nuclear relinquishment methodology from the 
beginning, they might possibly not have brought about the devastation that 
so tragically was visited upon them as a result of the ensuing war. 
 
The research found that Iraq had repeatedly violated the inspection and 
safeguarding regimens and United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council Resolutions over a period of more than a decade. There 
were at least twelve occasions between 1991 and 1998 alone where Iraq 
breached UN Security Council resolutions and where these violations 
were condemned by the United Nations General Assembly.719 In contrast, 
not one condemnatory resolution was tabled by the United Nations 
Security Council with respect to South Africa’s relinquishment of its 
nuclear arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons. South Africa did not default with a single breach of the 
Safeguards Agreements; nor was there any instance of untoward 
interference with the IAEA’s or Extra Team’s inspectorate during the entire 
relinquishment and accession process. 
 
During the period between 1991 and 1998, the researcher was able to 
identify at least fourteen major breaches of the right of access to the 
United Nations inspectorate by the Iraqi authorities. In addition to Iraq’s 
                                                
719 UNSCOM. Chronology of Main Events: December 1999. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronology.htm 
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recurrent breaches of diverse United Nations resolutions, it also breached 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, international law, and international 
humanitarian law. 
 
7.8  A Brief Reflection on the Legality of the Use of Force against 
Iraq in Terms of Anticipatory Self-Defence 
On 7 June 1981 Israeli jets bombed the nuclear reactor located at Osirak 
in Iraq. Israel legitimated this bombing by alleging that Iraq intended using 
this reactor for nefarious purposes which might have included dropping a 
nuclear bomb on their territory, upon the orders of Saddam Hussein.720 In 
other words, they justified this bombing under the rationale of anticipatory 
self-defence. Khidhir Hamza was a leading figure in Saddam Hussein’s 
nuclear bomb construction programme. He confirmed that: 
 
“In 1971, on the orders of Saddam Hussein, we set out to build a nuclear bomb. Our goal 
was to construct a device roughly equivalent to the bomb the United States dropped on 
Hiroshima in 1945, that is to say, with the explosive power of twenty thousand tons of 
TNT. The first one would be a crude device, a sphere about four feet in diameter, too big 
and heavy for a missile warhead but suitable for a demonstration test or, as we 
discovered to our horror, Saddam’s plan was to drop one unannounced on Israel.”721 
 
The threat articulated by Khidhir Hamza is undoubtedly very serious. In 
this instance, a serious threat to Israel’s existence is alleged by an 
ostensibly credible witness. According to his testimony, Saddam Hussein 
wished to drop a nuclear bomb on Israel in 1971. The question that arises 
is: was there a right of anticipatory self-defence in international law?722 
Singh and Macdonald argued: 
 
“A threat to use very serious weapons – nuclear weapons being an obvious example – 
could justify an earlier use of defensive force than might be justified in the case of a less 
                                                
720 Op cit Blix (2004) at 19. 
721 Op cit Hamza & Stein at 333. 
722 Singh, Rabinder & Macdonald, Alison. 2002. ‘Legality of the Use of Force Against Iraq’. 
Opinion Public Interest Lawyers, Matrix Chambers, Gray’s Inn, London. 10 September. 8. 
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serious threat. However, the existence of the threat, regardless of how serious that threat 
might be, must still be supported by credible evidence.”723 
 
The answer to this question in the case of the Osirak incident is therefore 
affirmative. The substantive justification for destroying the Osirak nuclear 
reactor was that the Safeguards inspections that had been conducted in 
Iraq by the IAEA were not trusted.724 Nevertheless, Israel was condemned 
for this action of anticipatory self-defence by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency on 19 June 1981 in a unanimous resolution that was 
adopted by the United Nations Security Council. Israel’s action was 
deemed a serious threat to the Safeguards system.725 The United States 
supported this resolution against Israel, but added the rider that they 
supported it because Israel had failed to explore all peaceful means before 
bombing the nuclear reactor. This implied that the US would probably not 
have supported the resolution against Israel had it exhausted all peaceful 
means prior to this military excursion. 
 
John Dugard asserted that: 
 
“Legal scholars are divided as to whether art 51 allows force to be used in anticipatory 
self-defence. One school argues that art 51 permits force to be used in self-defence if, 
and only if, an armed attack occurs. Another argues that customary-law right of 
anticipatory self-defence is preserved by the phrase ‘inherent right’ in art 51, and that in 
the context of modern weaponry it is ridiculous to argue that the drafters of the Charter 
could have intended to exclude such a right.”726  
 
South Africa has also used the rationale of anticipatory self-defence to 
justify attacks on houses in Lesotho, Moçambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Namibia and Botswana, claiming that these pre-emptive actions would 
forestall subsequent acts of terror. John Dugard cited President P W 
Botha as legitimating the state’s right of anticipatory self-defence: 
 
                                                
723 Op cit Singh and Macdonald at 13.  
724 Op cit Blix (2004). 
725 Mallison, WT & Mallison, SV. 1982. ‘The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7 Upon the Iraqi’s 
Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defence?’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 15:417. 
726 Op cit Dugard (2007) at 507. 
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“It is a particularly serious transgression of international law for states to provide 
sanctuary to elements which plan, instigate and execute acts of terror against other 
states, as is happening in Southern Africa. It is an established principle of international 
law that when this occurs, the state against which such acts are perpetrated, has the right 
to resort to acts of self-defence and to carry out pre-emptive strikes.”727 
 
South Africa did not seek United Nations Security Council authorisation to 
embark upon these pre-emptive raids into foreign states. Quite apart from 
the reality of the threat of terror, these raids were therefore illegal in terms 
of international law. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States and 
United Kingdom was also justified in terms of anticipatory self-defence. A 
State can lawfully use force against another only if it is authorised by a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution and in “[i]ndividual or collective 
self-defence (a right under customary international law which is expressly 
preserved by Article 51 of the Charter)”.728 
 
Iraq’s breaches of various United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council Resolutions, Safeguards Agreements, and inspection processes 
legitimated the military invasion of Iraq. The fact that they legitimated the 
invasion does not, however, mean that the invasion was lawful in terms of 
international law. 
 
Singh and Macdonald cite Professor Antonio Cassese, former President of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as asserting 
that: 
 
“If one undertakes a perusal of State practice in the light of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention to the Law of Treaties, it becomes apparent that such practice does not 
evince agreement among States regarding the interpretation of Article 31 with regard to 
anticipatory self-defence.”729 
 
Singh and Macdonald then proceed to cite Oppenheim as providing an 
authoritative view on the legality of anticipatory self-defence: 
 
                                                
727 Loc cit, referring to House of Assembly Debates 20 May 1986 (cols 6032–6034). 
728 Op cit Singh and Macdonald at 7. 
729 Cassese, Antonio. 1998. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 309. 
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“States may have the right to defend themselves by using force to pre-empt an imminent 
and serious attack. However, such use of force would have to be in accordance with the 
general rules and principles governing self-defence. The development of the law, 
particularly in the light of more recent state practice, in the 150 years since the Caroline 
iIncident, suggests that action, even if it involves the use of force and the violation of 
another state’s territory, can be justified under international law where: 
 
(a) an armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, against a state’s 
territory or forces (and probably its nationals); 
(b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive action against that attack; 
(c) there is no practicable alternative to action in self-defence, and in particular another 
state or other authority which has the legal powers to stop or prevent the 
infringement does not, or cannot, use them to that effect; 
(d) the action taken by way of self-defence is limited to what is necessary to stop or 
prevent the infringement, i.e. the needs of self-defence.” 730  
 
It is quite clear that legal justification for the invasion of Iraq revolved 
around the implementation of the terms and conditions of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1441 of 2002. It is my contention that the 
anticipatory self-defence justification in Iraq was illegal because the 
invasion of Iraq was conducted in a manner which was not procedurally 
correct and with a high disregard for legal comity, because the allies did 
not receive explicit United Nations Security Council authorisation under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter for the martial adventure. 
 
Israel was condemned for bombing the nuclear reactor at Osirak because 
it had failed to explore all peaceful means before bombing the installation. 
The selfsame logic applies to the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was 
no indication of an imminent attack from Iraq that could justify the use of 
force against it. Iraq was not afforded a reasonable period of time to 
implement Resolution 1441. The invasion took place too soon after the 
adoption of Resolution 1441 (2002), and Iraq’s circumstances were too 
internally chaotic for it reasonably to provide the required information in 
such a short period of time. In other words, the allies did not afford 
                                                
730 Op cit Singh and Macdonald at 9–10, where they cite Jennings & Watts (eds.), 1992 at 41–43. 
See: Jennings, Robert (QC) & Watts, Arthur (eds.). 1992. Oppenheim’s International Law. Ninth 
Edition. Harlow, Essex: Longman. 
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adequate time for the Iraqis to achieve compliance with Resolution 1441. 
The comparative analysis of the relinquishment process did not provide 
any clear substantive evidence that Iraq would create an overwhelming 
humanitarian catastrophe. It is conceded that the Saddam Hussein regime 
was an international menace, but it is clear that they were too depleted at 
that stage to be a threat to world peace. The inspections, although very 
messy, did not yield any evidence of retained nuclear weapons. In 
addition, the Bush Doctrine itself does not, in my view, withstand the 
scrutiny of strict compliance with international law. It seemed to be an 
attempt to fit the war fever that prevailed at that time into United Nations 
structures which governed the use of force and which are provided in the 
United Nations Charter. 
 
In March 2003, the Attorney-General advised Prime Minister Tony Blair 
that there must be a degree of imminence to justify anticipatory self-
defence, and he made the point that:  
 
“I am aware that the USA has been arguing for recognition of a broad doctrine of a right 
to use force to pre-empt danger in the future. If this means more than a right to respond 
proportionately to an imminent attack (and In understand that the doctrine is intended to 
carry that connotation) that is not a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists or is recognised 
in international law.” 731  
 
It is contended that the invasion of Iraq under the doctrine of anticipatory 
self-defence was illegal because it was disproportionate. President 
George W Bush indicated that if Iraq failed to implement any of the terms 
and conditions demanded in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1441, he would use force to effect regime change in Iraq. He ordered this 
invasion in spite of the fact that Iraq had not had sufficient time to comply 
with the implementation of these terms and conditions. 
 
Mary Ellen O’Connell submitted that the argument justifying this threat of 
anticipatory self-defence resided in the argument that: 
                                                
731 British Attorney-General’s Advice to Blair. 7 March 2003. Global Policy Forum. [Online]. 
Available: http://65.181.175.195/component/content/article168/36072.html  
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“... the ceasefire resolution, 687 (1990), which did explicitly authorise the use of force to 
oust Iraq from Kuwait and establish peace in the region. Further, members of the Security 
Council for about a year after the adoption of the ceasefire resolution apparently 
acquiesced in the interpretation that it implied authority to do more than liberate Kuwait. 
Few protested the creation of the Kurdish protection zone in northern Iraq or in using 
force to establish no fly zones in northern and southern sectors of the country. So while 
Resolution 687 paragraph 34 explicitly reserves to the UN Security Council the decision 
to take measures against Iraq beyond sanctions, using force in the no-fly zones is 
arguably permissible”.732  
 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides that “the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if armed attack occurs”. Legal scholars 
have long contended that anticipatory self-defence is permissible in the 
case where an armed attack is imminent. The definition of imminence 
developed from the Caroline incident, which occurred in 1837.733 The 
Caroline was deployed by Canadian rebels and used as a logistical supply 
ship in opposition to British rule. The British army duly attacked the 
Caroline in anticipatory self-defence. The Caroline incident itself provided 
tangible indications of an imminent attack by the rebels in 1837. In my 
view, there was no equivalent compelling evidence of Iraq machinating an 
imminent attack on the United States or United Kingdom circa 2003. It is 
very difficult to understand the United States and United Kingdom’s 
authority under international law for invading Iraq. Questions which have 
yet to be answered include: Why did the allies’ own nuclear inspectors 
reject the opinion of the international inspectorate (who were all experts) 
that Iraq did not possess any nuclear weapons? Why did the allies persist 
with pretending that they believed Iraq’s propaganda of nuclear ambiguity 
when the facts confirmed the contrary? I can only deduce that the allies 
proceeded to invade Iraq because they believed that it was in their 
                                                
732 Op cit O’Connell. See also: Quigley, John. 2000. ‘The United Nations Security Council: 
Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage?’ Texas International Law Journal, 35:124; Lobel, 
Jules & Ratner, Michael. 1999. ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use 
Force, Cease-Fires, and the Iraqi Inspection Regime’. American Journal of International Law, 
93:124: Wedgewood, Ruth. 1998. ‘The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 678: The 
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International Law, 92:724–726. 
733 Jennings, RY. 1938. ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’. American Journal of International 
Law, 32:82, 85. 
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national interest to do so, and international law was bent and disregarded 
to fit in with this notion ex post facto. 
 
7.9 Completing the Circle: Is the Comparative Knowledge that 
Emerged from South Africa’s Nuclear Relinquishment 
Processes Transferable to Other States? 
There is a constant battle between heart and mind. If rationality is 
permitted to prevail, the knowledge that was created in the nuclear 
relinquishment cases of both South Africa and Iraq should be transferable 
to other states at least in part. The sociology of law framework consisting 
of substance, comity, relationship and time was particularly useful in 
organising the findings, and these criteria could well be used as broad 
outlines for conducting a nuclear relinquishment and accession process. 
The circumstances of each country though can be expected to differ 
greatly, and so my starting point would be a presumption of uniqueness. 
 
This analysis has illustrated that the nuclear relinquishment and accession 
processes in South Africa and Iraq were conducted in qualitatively 
different ways from the perspective of substance, comity, relationships and 
time. These categories provide useful headings for identifying to the 
lawyer the clusters of the most generic themes that underpin the 
relinquishment of nuclear weapons and accession to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is contended that these themes 
will offer relevant but imperfect guidelines to any country that wishes to 
relinquish its nuclear arsenal and to accede to the NPT. The knowledge 
should therefore be imperfectly transferable from one state to the next. 
 
Iraq’s negative conduct in the domains of substance, comity, relationship 
and time was such that it eclipsed its own substantive case of proving that 
it was free of weapons of mass destruction. It was invaded in spite of the 
fact that there was no concrete proof of its having retained nuclear 
weapons. No weapons of mass destruction were discovered during or 
after the invasion. 
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The research discovered that the methodologies followed in the cases of 
South Africa and Iraq were diametrically opposed in terms of international 
law. There were some commonalities in their approaches, inasmuch as 
both countries failed in their endeavour to achieve a deterrent quid pro quo 
in the form of the lifting of sanctions. Both countries camouflaged civilian 
usage of nuclear power for the creation of electrical energy as a decoy to 
pursue their nuclear weapons objectives. South Africa presented a 
successful case, and Iraq presented a failed case, for nuclear 
relinquishment and accession. The comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s 
nuclear relinquishment approaches reveals stark contrasts. These 
contrasts originate from the fact that they are very different societies with 
very different cultures, histories, constitutional frameworks and political 
circumstances. Although the specific variables in each country will always 
remain unique, there are a number of generic themes that would probably 
prevail and be of relevance to all nuclear relinquishment processes and 
instances of accession to the NPT. 
 
• In Iraq, there were incessant time delays in relinquishment and 
providing a comprehensive opening inventory. This was not the 
case in South Africa. 
• In Iraq, there was evidence of a contaminated inspection process 
including playing silly games and disrespect for comity in 
international law. In South Africa, great care was taken to cherish 
comity. 
• In Iraq, there was evidence of poor substantive compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the NPT. The Iraqi Initial Report was 
imprecise and chaotic. In South Africa, it was precise and perfectly 
reconciled. 
• In Iraq, there is evidence of acutely disrespectful relationships 
between the inspectors and inspected. In South Africa, great care 
was taken to ensure that respectful relationships were maintained. 
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7.10 Conclusion 
The conclusion is that the knowledge that arose from this comparative 
analysis of South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment processes and 
accession to the NPT would probably hold lessons and guidelines that 
might well be relevant in part, or in full, to other countries contemplating a 
similar exercise. It would seem that the Iraqis had already transferred the 
necessary facts and knowledge to the inspectorate prior to the visit from 
the South African delegation, and that the inspectors understood that Iraq 
had relinquished its nuclear weapons. The South African case and visit 
were therefore irrelevant to the Iraqis at that time. This conclusion 
presumes that it was not the United Nations inspectors who took the 
decision on whether or not Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. 
It asserts rather that it was the United States’ and British intelligence 
services that made the judgment call, thus mollifying the United Nations 
inspectors’ remit. It is contended that the conflictive and competitive rules 
of engagement which Iraq elected to follow with respect to the 
inspectorate over the years were sufficiently inappropriate and destructive 
upon relationships to have created a negative legacy that compromised 
the substance, comity and time components of the interaction, and 
therefore negated trust. Their disregard for international law during the 
wasted time of the inspection regime resulted in the allies eventually losing 
patience and trust. They, too, sadly disregarded international law. The 
vitally important case of nuclear relinquishment in Iraq was therefore not 
adjudged on the facts, but was rather assessed on the basis of the legacy 
of the contaminated comity, poor substantive compliance, and 
disrespectful relationships that had been cultivated over a period of more 
than a decade.  
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion 
 
8.1 A Synopsis of the Structure, Evidence and Argumentation 
Contained in this Research 
This conclusion is introduced with a brief synopsis of the structure, 
evidence and argumentation contained in the chapters that comprise the 
research and is intended to afford the reader with retrospective clarity on 
the structure and organisation of this thesis as an entirety. The answers 
that emerged to the research questions posed in chapter one are 
presented. South Africa’s accession to the NPT led directly to the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which resulted in the entire African 
continent becoming a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The second 
consequence was that the remit of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) 
in South Africa changed. The AEC’s focus moved completely away from 
military application of nuclear science. The new focus was entirely on 
commercial, energy, industrial and medical nuclear applications which are 
authorised and indeed encouraged by the NPT. It was shown that South 
Africa’s nuclear programme changed practically and metaphorically from a 
focus on swords to a focus on ploughshares.  
 
8.1.1  Chapter One: Research Questions, Aims and Methodology 
Chapter one clarified the research questions, aims, objectives and 
methodology. It identified the various themes that comprise this research. 
These included the challenge of securing and interviewing a small expert 
sample of respondents who were personally involved in South Africa’s 
nuclear weapons programme from its relinquishment to its accession. The 
goal of the research was to seek to understand the reasons that South 
Africa voluntarily relinquished its nuclear arsenal and acceded to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in terms of 
international law. 
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The research design and methodology formed the conceptual cornerstone 
of this thesis. The research was distinguished by the fact that it set about 
using phenomenology as a research methodology. The research 
demonstrated that the methodology of phenomenology could be usefully 
and practically deployed in applied legal research involving lived 
experience. The decision to conduct this legal research as a 
phenomenological case study of the lived experience of key decision-
makers who were responsible for the nuclear relinquishment and 
accession process undoubtedly created an ambitious research challenge. 
It was considerably more conceptually complicated than it would have 
been had the research been conducted as a literature review of the 
research questions. The results of this research, though, provide the 
reader with a document that may well be of practical assistance in 
addressing the legal aspects of nuclear relinquishment and accession to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I initially 
questioned the appropriateness of the phenomenological method to this 
research, but gradually came to realise its robustness as I became ever 
more deeply involved in the dissertation. I suspect that phenomenological 
methodology may have a possible application in International Criminal 
Court investigations, for example. There are, in my view, many areas of 
legal research where the methodology of phenomenology may be usefully 
employed for both data collection and legal analysis. 
 
The research was unique because it sought to triangulate the lived 
experience of the respondents with the extensive and relevant 
international legal knowledge that underpins the legality of nuclear 
weapons. The testimony provided by the respondents indicated that the 
original terms of reference for this research as set out in Chapter One 
were too narrow. The original intention was to conduct the research as a 
single case study of the South African experience, but its scope was 
enlarged upon to create a second comparative case study of the Iraqi 
relinquishment process. This was done in order to ascertain the extent to 
which the knowledge that emerged from these two cases might be 
transferable to other states that might wish to relinquish their nuclear 
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arsenals and accede to the NPT. A simple sociology of law framework was 
designed in order to render the two countries’ nuclear relinquishment 
processes comparable. The design included a structured comparison of 
the relinquishment processes in South Africa and Iraq along the variables 
of: substance, comity, relationships and time.  I had no knowledge prior to 
undertaking this research that South African nuclear weapons experts 
visited Iraq just prior to the 2003 invasion in order to offer advice on how to 
relinquish their nuclear arsenal, and that this attempt at knowledge 
transfer had failed. This represented an important de-limitation on the 
question of the transferability of the knowledge. 
 
The introduction offered the reader: 
 
• An historical background on the evolution of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons capability; 
• The core phases of the relinquishment process and its legitimising 
function with respect to the constitutional negotiations; 
• The failed mission to Iraq to transfer knowledge of the South 
African nuclear relinquishment process; 
• Mr de Klerk’s instruction to relinquish the nuclear arsenal; South 
Africa’s recognition crisis; 
• South Africa’s purposeful delay in acceding to the NPT; 
• A broader historical overview of nuclear relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT – the cases of Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Libya, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, including 
an exposition of the similarities and differences; 
• The legal status of nuclear weapons and the evolving legal clarity of 
nuclear weapons; 
• A discussion on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons; 
• The legal status of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); 
• The research questions; 
• The impact, if any, which international law had on the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal; 
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• An explanation of how South Africa set about acceding to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
relinquishing its nuclear arsenal; and finally 
• The question of whether the knowledge experience of South 
Africa’s relinquishment and accession is transferable. 
 
8.1. 2 Chapter Two: An Emerging International Consensus on the 
Possession, Legality and Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons 
in Armed Conflict: The Period from 1945 to 1995 
This chapter was presented as a literature study and did not involve 
interviewing the expert sample. Together with Chapter Three, it constituted 
the basic framework of international law in which the primary research 
would be embedded. The study of the gradually emerging clarity on the 
legality of nuclear weapons was contextualised towards the legality of 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme during this period. Chapter 
Two involved an international study of the growth of international law as it 
pertained to all aspects of nuclear weapons. 
 
There were three themes that informed how this chapter would be 
structured. Firstly, it was structured to present the reader with an 
understanding of the law as it evolved with respect to the usage of nuclear 
weapons in armed conflict.  Secondly, the analysis explored how the 
testing of nuclear weapons had impacted on the development of 
international law as it pertained to an ever deeper and more subtle 
appreciation of their legality. Thirdly, it considered how international law 
had developed with respect to nuclear proliferation and accession to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This research was 
presented chronologically in accordance with the development of the law 
over the post-World War II period up until 1995. It was shown that 
international law developed erratically and very often in response to deep 
crises that occurred in various states around the world involving diverse 
controversial aspects of nuclear weapons. The argumentation that was 
presented included: 
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• An analysis of Alexander Sack’s seminal exploration of atomic, 
biological and chemical warfare in international law; 
• Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; 
• The development of peremptory norms of international law – jus 
cogens and obligations erga omnes; 
• An exploration of the startling impact of the Lucky Dragon incident 
on world opinion about the legality of nuclear testing; 
• The gradual evolution of a consensus on the imperative for the 
establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones; 
• A detailed exploration of the Shimoda case and its implications in 
respect of the legality of nuclear weapons; and 
• The very contentious and growing international consensus on the 
illegality of nuclear tests in the South Pacific, because of the 
conflicts that developed between Australia, New Zealand, the South 
Pacific Islands and France about her propensity to conduct nuclear 
tests in that region. 
 
8.1.3 Chapter Three: The International Court of Justice’s Advisory 
Opinion as to the Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict 
Chapters Two and Three can be regarded as constituting an integrated 
continuum. They are interdependent. Chapter Three revealed that there 
was a growing international consensus that gradually occurred in the post-
World War II period as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons. On 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice offered its 
seminal Advisory Opinion as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons in armed conflict. This opinion almost distils the findings of 
Chapter Two into a coherent framework. Chapter Three explored various 
important underlying questions that still pertain to the legality of the threat 
and use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. 
 
The Advisory Opinion was assessed from two perspectives that 
underpinned the critique of the Opinion. The Lotus case related to the 
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positivist testimony which held that ‘that which is not prohibited is 
permitted’. The nuclear-weapons-states were shown to subscribe 
generally to this doctrine insofar as their testimony presented before the 
ICJ was concerned. The positivist testimony was juxtaposed against the 
Martens Clause and the testimony of natural law. The non-nuclear-
weapons-states generally subscribed to a natural law interpretation of the 
legality of nuclear weapons under international law. In addition, the legality 
of the policy of nuclear deterrence was explored, because this matter 
emerged as being very important to both South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear 
relinquishment. 
 
Chapters Two and Three were used to offer a conceptual understanding 
for the subsequent legal triangulation of this research with the 
respondents’ testimony which is presented to the reader from Chapter 
Four until the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
8.1.4 Chapter Four: Interpreting the Respondents’ Understanding 
of the Legality of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Policy  
This chapter focused predominantly on triangulating the respondents’ 
testimony about the lived experience of the nuclear relinquishment and 
accession to the NPT with international law. It explored South Africa’s 
changing legal relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
which was very troubled during the 1970s up until the early to mid-1980s 
but showed gradual signs of improvement from about 1985. The 
respondents expressed interesting and different views on the legality of 
South Africa’s nuclear arsenal. Mike Louw subscribed to the opinion that 
South Africa’s nuclear arsenal was illegal per se inasmuch as it was a 
threat to world peace; Mr de Klerk held that South Africa had an obligation 
erga omnes to relinquish these weapons. Professor Stumpf corroborated 
Mr de Klerk’s testimony. Dr Barnard argued that international law as it 
pertained to both the legality of nuclear weapons and the administration of 
the NPT is fundamentally discriminatory; it is his contention that its 
structure creates a master–servant relationship between the nuclear-
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haves and the nuclear-have-nots. The nuclear-weapons-states have 
assumed an elite master role, and international law has condoned this, 
allowing them to proliferate nuclear weapons legally over the post-World 
War II period. The non-nuclear-weapons-states have assumed a servant 
role and been afforded no such latitude to proliferate nuclear weapons 
under international law. Dr Barnard asserted that this inconsistency in 
international law could undermine its very credibility. He regarded this 
dualism as being potentially dangerous. Professor Stumpf also regarded 
the application of international law as it pertained to the legality of nuclear 
weapons as being logically inconsistent. 
 
The respondents explored the question of the legality of the policy of 
nuclear deterrence. Their views were legally contradictory. They 
subscribed to the opinion that nuclear deterrence as a state policy was 
legal. Their reason for this subscription appeared to follow a legal-positivist 
line that gained its authority from the Lotus case and mimicked the 
application of international law as it pertains to the nuclear-weapons-
states. The respondents were unanimous in their view that any testing or 
usage of nuclear weapons was illegal under international law. It is 
submitted that this contradictory interpretation of the legality of nuclear 
deterrence may not be unique, and could indeed be shared by the leaders 
in other threshold nuclear states. The lived experience of the respondents 
is presented in terms of seminal and often traumatic events. These 
important events included: 
 
• The discovery by the Soviet Union of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal 
that was located at Vastrap in the Kalahari Desert; 
• The United State’s invoke a warning of anticipatory self-defence in 
opposition to South Africa conducting any nuclear tests; 
• The South Atlantic Double-Flash incident; 
• The US Spy Plane incident; 
• Mr Pik Botha’s meeting with Ronald Reagan and General Haig that 
opened up the supply of enriched uranium to supply Koeberg 
nuclear power station; 
 460 
• The Uranium Red Book incident which involved an abuse of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s international communication 
channels for the purpose of disseminating apartheid propaganda; 
• The Nkomati Peace Accord as a possible signification of the 
possibility of a peaceful negotiated settlement in South Africa; and 
finally 
• Mr PW Botha’s 1985 meeting with the top leadership of ARMSCOR. 
This meeting was discussed as it can be argued that it was on this 
occasion that the official nuclear rollback began.  
 
8.1.5 Chapter Five: The Logic Underlying the Decision to 
Relinquish the Nuclear Arsenal and Accede to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
This chapter investigated the reasons why the nuclear arsenal was 
relinquished and why South Africa acceded to the NPT. It was revealed 
that South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to 
the NPT was linked to the perceived outcome of the constitutional 
negotiations. It was shown furthermore that the nuclear relinquishment 
process and accession to the NPT was synchronised with the actual 
constitutional negotiation process because it was recognised that: 
 
1. To retain the nuclear arsenal up one’s sleeve and negotiate a 
constitutional with this hidden surprise would have been tantamount to 
negotiating in bad faith. 
2. The retention of the nuclear arsenal would have probably been 
perceived in the international community as a threat to world peace 
and would have resulted in South Africa’s new Constitution being 
accorded pariah recognition status. 
3. Any military or operational usage was deemed to be illegal. 
4. The nuclear weapons were militarily redundant. 
5. Any nuclear testing would have been deemed illegal under 
international law. 
6. Nuclear deterrence as a policy had failed and South Africa was unable 
to achieve a deterrent quid pro quo. 
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7. South Africa relinquished its nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT 
in order to set a stage that would enable constitutional continuity and 
juridical security. 
 
Nuclear weapons were not used as an instrument in South Africa’s 
approach when negotiating, either domestically with the ANC, or in 
international forums. The ANC were completely excluded from any 
involvement in the nuclear relinquishment and accession process because 
it was adjudged that such involvement would have been a poisoned 
chalice to the government in waiting. An important question that informed 
the composition of this chapter was an exploration of the legal implications 
of the possible scenario of South Africa degenerating into a failed state, as 
had happened in the case of Iraq. One of the factors that could have been 
a driving force behind a failed state in South Africa would have been a 
situation where South Africa retained its nuclear arsenal whilst attempting 
to gain international recognition for its constitutional negotiations. The 
research also explored important matters including: 
 
• State recognition; 
• Mr de Klerk’s animus and testimony; 
• The notion that to have retained the nuclear arsenal whilst 
negotiating the new constitution would have signified a cynical and 
opposite intention; 
• The imperative for retaining a framework of constitutionality in 
relinquishing the nuclear weapons and acceding to the NPT; 
• The question of ensuring state continuity and the imperative to 
prevent internal social fragmentation; 
• Professor Mouton’s animus and testimony; 
• Mr Pik Botha’s animus and testimony: 
• Professor Waldo Stumpf’s animus and testimony; and finally 
• The conundrum of the ANC’s hypothetical nuclear proliferation 
inclinations. 
 
 462 
8.1.6 Chapter Six: How the Nuclear Arsenal was Relinquished and 
Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and Compliance with International Law was 
Achieved 
This chapter attempted to understand the important and practical question 
of ‘how’ South Africa relinquished its nuclear arsenal and acceded to the 
NPT in terms of international law. The process of relinquishment and 
accession was successful because Mr de Klerk regarded it as an 
extremely important matter and assumed a clear leadership role. Topics 
and themes that were covered included: 
 
• An exploration of Mr de Klerk’s role in determining how the nuclear 
arsenal was to be relinquished; 
• The Announcement Plan and the question of timing; 
• Mr de Klerk’s appointment of Professor Wynand Mouton as head of 
oversight of the nuclear relinquishment and accession process; 
• The appointment of the Atomic Energy Corporation as the 
designated state authority; 
• The matter of access to military sites and the question of 
sovereignty; 
• Internal nuclear regulatory protocols that afforded credence to the 
nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT; 
• The flexibility of the form of accession to the NPT; 
• The Initial Report for Safeguards; 
• The authority of the first and second Safeguards Reports; 
• Building trust with the Americans and the IAEA; and 
• Approval of South Africa’s Comprehensive Safeguards at the 
General Conference of the IAEA in September 1991. 
 
8.1.7 Chapter Seven: A Comparison of How South Africa and Iraq 
Relinquished their Nuclear Weapons in Terms of 
International Law 
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This chapter offered a comparative analysis of South Africa and Iraq’s 
nuclear relinquishment processes in order to explore the important 
question of the possible transferability of the knowledge South Africa had 
gained in negotiating its nuclear relinquishment and accession to the NPT. 
A phenomenological reduction revealed that the allies probably invaded 
Iraq with the knowledge that Iraq had already relinquished its nuclear 
arsenal prior to the invasion. The argument supporting this deduction is 
essentially very simple. Iraq were too exhausted and financially depleted 
after their defeat in the Gulf War to have retained a nuclear arsenal. The 
international inspectorate subscribed to this view on the basis of careful 
scientific analysis. It is therefore scientifically improbable that the United 
States and United Kingdom’s nuclear inspectors would have held a 
significantly differing view on the matter of Iraq’s nuclear weapon status. 
For this reason, it is deduced that the invasion of Iraq was conducted as a 
political decision. Iraq’s nuclear weapons status must surely have been 
known, but it was arguably not acted upon. 
 
Iraq conducted itself in an inappropriate manner over a period of more 
than a decade by breaching numerous United Nations Security Council 
resolutions relating to its nuclear status. These breaches of international 
law were clustered in terms of substance, comity, relationship and time for 
the purposes of comparative international analysis. It is argued that the 
disregard for international law on Iraq’s part was sufficiently cumulative, 
frequent and serious to result in the allies developing a fairly coherent 
political justification for the invasion of Iraq in spite of the fact that the 
legality of the invasion was highly tendentious in terms of international law.   
 
More specifically, the chapter explored: 
 
• South Africa’s failed attempt at a knowledge transfer to Iraq in 2003 
just prior to the allied invasion of Iraq; 
• The disaggregation of Iraq’s nuclear relinquishment process from 
its chemical and biological weapons programme; 
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• The development of a sociology of law framework to structure this 
comparative analysis of the transferability of knowledge question; 
• Iraq’s non-compliance with Safeguards and failed Initial Report; 
• The Karama Barracks incident; the Mosque incident; 
• Adherence and non-adherence by Iraq to UN Security Council 
resolutions; 
• A taxonomic comparison of South Africa and Iraq’s nuclear 
relinquishment processes in terms of substance, comity, 
relationship and time; 
• A reflection of the legality of anticipatory self-defence in the use of 
force against Iraq; and finally 
• An interrogation of whether the comparative knowledge that 
emerged from South Africa (and Iraq’s) relinquishment process is 
transferable to other states. 
 
8.2 The Answers to the Research Questions  
It will be recalled that four questions were posed at the outset of this 
research. These questions were:  
 
1. Why was the decision reached to roll back the nuclear arsenal in South 
Africa?   
 
2. What impact, if any, did international law have on the decision to 
relinquish the nuclear arsenal? 
 
3. How did South Africa set about acceding to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and relinquishing its nuclear 
weapons in terms of international law? 
 
4. To what extent, if any, is the knowledge created by South Africa’s 
experience under international law of relinquishing its nuclear arsenal 
and acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons transferable? This led logically to the researcher conducting 
a comparative analysis of the South African and Iraqi nuclear 
relinquishment processes and identifying criteria that might assist in 
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rendering the knowledge creation that took place in South Africa 
transferable to other states. 
 
These matters have already been extensively addressed and interrogated 
in the main body of this research. The answers to these questions will 
therefore be offered in synoptic form, in accordance with the Dispositif. All 
of the questions have complex and systemically interrelated answers, and 
the reader is cautioned that there is a danger of being simplistic in the 
presentation of the distilled essence of the research findings.  
 
Answer 1 
• The reason it was decided to relinquish the nuclear arsenal in 
South Africa and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons at the specific time when the decision was 
reached was because it was realised that the entire constitutional 
transition would have been placed in profound jeopardy had this 
action not been taken. 
 
The nuclear relinquishment and accession to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was intrinsically linked to the 
constitutional transition, which was being negotiated in public. It 
was conducted in order that the new Constitution would be 
accorded a positive international recognition status and to reverse 
the pariah recognition status that had accompanied the previous 
policy of apartheid. 
 
A compelling case was presented that the very security of the State 
might have been threatened had these weapons been retained, and 
had South Africa not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons. Concerns existed about the potential nuclear 
proliferation inclinations that might exist within certain elements of 
the African National Congress as an unproved national liberation 
movement, and these fears were regarded as having substance. It 
could conceivably have precipitated a civil war if the far right had 
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engaged in conflict over the matter of nuclear weapons. South 
Africa could have been regarded as a threat to world peace had it 
retained these weapons, and this could even have justified a 
military invasion of the country to negate such a threat to 
international peace. South Africa would, at best, have been most 
reluctantly re-accepted into the community of nations, with a tainted 
recognition status had it retained possession of these weapons and 
had it not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. It would conceivably have been placed at grave risk of 
becoming a failed state. 
 
Answer 2 
• Aspects of international law permeated the entire process of 
nuclear relinquishment and the decision to accede to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The theme of the conflict 
of laws was important inasmuch as South African municipal law 
needed constantly to be reconciled with international law. The 
impact of international law on the decision to relinquish the nuclear 
weapons and to accede to the NPT was not explicitly 
acknowledged by the respondents as such, but it was implicitly 
acknowledged in all of the responses as a continual and converging 
theme. The respondents agreed that these nuclear weapons could 
never have been used militarily; that any such usage would 
probably have constituted a crime against humanity; and that 
genocidal trials would therefore have been instituted after any such 
usage. 
 
The respondents clearly took a natural law position on the 
operational deployment of nuclear weapons. They held that such 
weapons would not have been able to distinguish friend from foe; 
their use would have been disproportionate and cruel, causing 
unnecessary suffering; they would permanently have contaminated 
the natural environment; their use would have been escalatory and 
provoked retaliatory strikes; and they would have been 
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indiscriminate and a threat to humankind. The respondents 
articulated that there was a jus cogens norm that these weapons 
could never be lawfully deployed under international law. 
 
South Africa’s policy of nuclear deterrence was justified as having 
been in legal compliance with the position that had been assumed 
by the nuclear-weapons-states. It was encapsulated in the adage 
that derives from the Lotus case, which contends that that which is 
not prohibited is permitted. There were logical contradictions 
between the assumptions of natural law and positive law, which 
were poorly reconciled, and for which the researcher created a 
logical fault-line. In essence, the respondents equated international 
law with acting in complete compliance with all the terms and 
conditions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. 
 
This was a practical and sensible starting point. But the full scope of 
international law, including international humanitarian law as it 
pertains to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, needs to be 
deeply and intrinsically considered, and incorporated into, all the 
strategic thinking of each and every nuclear programme, whether 
this is for civilian or military usage. It was for this logic that the 
respondents articulated an erga omnes norm to relinquish these 
weapons.  
 
Answer 3 
• The answer to the question of how South Africa relinquished its 
nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT under international law is 
complex. It was conducted voluntarily, although extensive 
international pressure was placed upon South Africa, particularly by 
the United States of America, to perform this duty. South Africa 
followed the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons to the letter. 
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Mr de Klerk developed a dedicated project-management team of 
the highest integrity and competence to perform the duty of 
relinquishment and accession. This duty was performed in camera. 
The researcher was of the opinion that this was a wise decision, 
given the circumstances that prevailed in South Africa at the time. 
 
The relinquishment and accession process was conducted 
according to high internal regulatory standards, specified by South 
African municipal law, which were designed to harmonise with the 
terms and conditions of the safeguards specified by the IAEA, and 
embodied in international law. The potential for a conflict in laws 
between South African municipal law and international law was 
therefore eliminated, and the process was harmonised. 
 
The relinquishment process was synchronised via the design of an 
Announcement Plan, which Mr de Klerk instructed should be fine-
tuned continuously, and adapted according to the radically-
changing and often tempestuous political vicissitudes that were the 
reality of the time. The relinquishment and accession process was 
conducted so as to be balanced and appropriate from the 
perspectives of substance, comity, relationship and time. These 
matters were four balancing themes that needed to be kept in 
harmony.  
 
Answer 4 
• Finally, the response to the question of whether the knowledge that 
arose from South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and 
its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons is transferable to other countries is intricate. If the country 
that is relinquishing its nuclear weapons is reluctant to do so, and is 
defiant of international law, then it will be very difficult to transfer the 
knowledge. But if that country is acting in harmony with the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons and international law, 
and wishes to relinquish its nuclear arsenal voluntarily, then the 
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application of the knowledge that was acquired in the case of South 
Africa might be partially transferable, if implemented selectively and 
with care and discretion.  
 
8.3 The Pelindaba Treaty: An African Nuclear-Weapons-Free 
Zone 
The Pelindaba Treaty was concluded in terms of Article VII of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It confirms that: 
 
“[n]othing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional 
Treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons to their respective 
territories”.734 
 
The South African Parliament passed the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993. The effect of this legislation was to 
regulate through an Act of Parliament South Africa’s relinquishment of 
nuclear weapons, accession to the NPT, and all possible future 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This Act made it illegal to 
conduct any activities that aid or abet proliferation in any way. It created a 
prospective and future prohibition on the possession, usage, and threat of 
all nuclear weapons and research-based activities connected thereto. In 
addition to its orientation towards the future, the Act also created a 
retrospective obligation which declared any past proliferation activities 
illegal. This retrospective obligation was included to ensure that there 
could be no basis for concluding that South Africa had salted away and 
retained any of its nuclear weapons. 
 
                                                
734 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
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Jozef Goldblat735 maintained that: 
 
“In 1995, as a result of several years work, OAU and UN experts succeeded in 
elaborating a draft treaty which, after some amendments, was approved by the OAU 
Assembly. The treaty is also called the Treaty of Pelindaba, after the former seat of South 
Africa’s nuclear-weapons-related activities. Other aspects of the Treaty of Pelindaba also 
followed the pattern of the NWFZ arrangements in force in Latin America and the South 
Pacific. On December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly welcomed the Treaty of 
Pelindaba, and in April 1996, the treaty opened for signature. The Treaty of Pelindaba 
prohibits the manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or acquisition by other means, as well as 
possession and control of, any nuclear explosive device (in assembled, unassembled, or 
partly assembled forms) by the parties. In addition – and this is an important novelty – 
research on, and development of, such a device are banned. Moreover, the treaty bans 
seeking, receiving or encouraging assistance in the above-enumerated activities (Articles 
3 and 5). Under Protocol II, open for signature by the five Nuclear-Weapons-States, the 
signatories should undertake not to test or assist in or encourage the testing of any 
nuclear device within the African zone.”736 
 
The Treaty of Pelindaba was swiftly concluded, in the researcher’s opinion 
wisely, immediately after South Africa’s accession to the NPT. Had there 
been a delay in the conclusion of this treaty, it is possible that the memory 
of the seriousness of South Africa’s case would have diminished and this 
would have opened up the opportunity for future nuclear proliferation by 
other African states. 
 
8.4 The Atomic Energy Corporation in South Africa: From 
Swords to Ploughshares 
Mr Pik Botha kindly provided the researcher with the minutes from the 
Atomic Energy Corporation Overview of Activities 1997/1998.737 These 
minutes need to be read in terms of the Preamble to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons together with Articles IV and V of 
                                                
735 Goldblat, Jozef. 1997. ‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment’. The 
Nonproliferation Review, 8–19. 
736 Op cit Goldblat at 25. 
737 Atomic Energy Corporation: Overview of Activities 1996/97 Budget for 1997/98 Reference 
HUB 150/5.1. 6 March 1997. 
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this Treaty. They pertain to the peaceful and economic applications of 
nuclear energy.738 
 
The minutes confirm the peaceful turnabout of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons programme. However, the most important element of the 
minutes is that they confirm that a plan was initiated by the AEC in 1990 to 
convert the Corporation from being state-funded to becoming financially 
self-sufficient, by focusing on developing a profitable portfolio of 
commercial opportunities focused on selected niche markets. It was 
intended that the AEC would develop nuclear-related technologies for 
peaceful purposes, including nuclear medicine and nuclear energy in the 
form of a pebble-bed nuclear reactor system. 
 
“It will act as South Africa’s national nuclear authority, serving the State’s objectives in 
terms of national institutional responsibilities, international nuclear relations, the 
maintenance of supportive technologies and appropriate socio-economic 
development.”739 
 
These minutes also provide the final confirmation that South Africa 
relinquished its nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT in accordance 
with all its international obligations, and in compliance with international 
law.  
 
                                                
738 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 
“Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including 
any technological by-products which may derive by nuclear-weapon States from the development 
of explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether 
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States. 
Article IV: Nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties 
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination.   
Article V: Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measure to ensure that, in 
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation, and through appropriate 
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosives 
will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory 
basis and that the charge to such Parties for these explosive devices used will be as low as possible 
and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapons-states Party to the 
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or 
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-
nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the 
Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.”  
739 Op cit Atomic Energy Corporation Overview of Activities. 
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8.5 Postscript 
The nuclear relinquishment process and accession to the NPT could 
easily have gone completely wrong. Professor Mouton referred to an 
incident where he was in a vehicle that was transporting highly enriched 
uranium that was intended for de-enrichment. He recalled that: 
 
“We bolted the Highly Enriched Uranium, when it was to be melted down and de-
enriched, into the back of a vehicle – a Toyota – when we transported it. A General 
Opperman (I think that was his name) was placed in charge of overseeing that this de-
enriched HEU was transported safely. The military were involved, but no one besides 
General Opperman was informed about what was going on.  
 
I remember one incident vividly. I was in the vehicle transporting the HEU which was to 
be melted down. Suddenly, out of nowhere, the most enormous black snake that you 
could ever imagine crossed the road directly in our path. The driver got the fright of his 
life and swerved the vehicle carrying the HEU to avoid running over the snake. 
 
I blasted the driver and said: ‘Why did you not just run over the snake? You know what 
we are carrying and how totally, extremely dangerous it is!’ 
 
The driver’s response was: ‘Sorry, I avoided the snake because I did not want the vehicle 
to stink, after I had flattened it.’”740 
 
Human fallibility and error are among the greatest dangers that could 
result in a nuclear disaster. Even the most meticulously-stored nuclear 
device might inadvertently be triggered, totally by accident. 
 
                                                
740 Interview with Professor Wynand Mouton at his apartment at Gordon’s Bay in the Strand in 
Western Cape on 30 October 2007. See also Schelling, Thomas. 1980. The Strategy of Conflict. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
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